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ABSTRACT 
INDO-SRI LANKA RE*LATIONS: NEHRU TO 
INDIRA GANDHI 
With the failure of Norway-brokered another peace effort, to 
bring the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE to the negotiating table 
in the month of July 2004, once again the need has arisen to analyse 
prospects for peace in South Asia. Following post-cold war trends in 
international politics and with the emergence of new power equations and 
calculations, the great powers of the world shifted their focus from 
ideological confrontation and objective of containment to the making of a 
new world order, where patterns of 'calculated cooperation' would be 
followed, and also where no single country should be allowed to impose 
hegemonism or to be exorbitantly communal in any region of the world. 
Given to these considerations, this is the most suitable time to 
analyse India's relations with its neighbouring countries. I have therefore 
chosen the topic "Indo-Sri Lanka Relations : Nehru to Indira Gandhi" my 
research. 
The basic aim of this research is to study why India has been 
blamed to be hegemonistic in the region and what are the linkages 
between India's 'Big Brother' attitude and Sri Lanka's ethnic havoc, 
which has the potential to inspire other secessionist movements in the 
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South Asian region. The objective is to focus upon the reasons 
responsible for spoiling relations of two neighbouring countries which 
have been tied by a number of cultural, linguistic, and religious ties for 
centuries. 
This research work has been divided into nine chapters. I have 
tried to analyse though the experience of colonialism, common 
membership of UN, NAM etc. and compulsions of developing economies 
led the two countries to respond in a similar way to many international 
crisis. There was consensus among them on basic tenets of Non-
alignment, NIEO,. Indian Ocean as a 'Zone of Peace'. On the broader 
issues of general disarmament and arms control, there was a near 
unanimity between these two countries. Because of the massive 
acquisition of arms and ammunitions both conventional and nuclear by 
the great powers the world was on the verge of a catastrophe. Sri Lanka 
and India which belonged to the third world, could not afford to spend 
heavily on armaments because of the inbuilt restrictions on their 
economies. Obviously any international movement for disarmament found 
an active response from these states as, in the long run, their own people 
would be saved from annihilation in a global warfare. 
However, differences in their perceptions to some multilateral 
arms control agreements like NPT were noticeable. While Sri Lanka 
supported it by signing and ratifying at an early date, India's reluctance 
to sign it appeared to be mainly because it wanted to keep its options 
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Open particularly in view of the fact that China had already acquired 
nuclear capability. The issue of South Asia as a nuclear free zone 
constituted another area of divergence. A possible explanation for Sri 
Lanka's support to the proposal emerged from the notion of a security 
threat from India. Along with such a fear-psychosis it had also to be kept 
in mind that Sri Lanka had signed the NPT. But it is noteworthy that even 
if the respective stands of both the countries manifested divergence on 
some issues, such differences did not affect the basic strands of bilateral 
interaction. 
However, certain bilateral issues like the issue of Kachchativu 
and the citizenship status issue, have definitely enhanced the tensions 
between two neighbours. Both the countries expressed their claim over a 
small and unpopulated island of Kachchativu which is situated at the Palk 
strait region. The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accepted Sri Lankan 
claim over the island as she did not want to spoil her friendship with 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike. For that purpose India entered into the Indira 
Gandhi-Sirimavo Bandaranaike Agreement of January 1974, which not 
only settled the issue of Kachchativu but also indicated India's 
willingness for evolving a policy of friendship and mutual co-operation 
with its neighbours. Though no problem was left so far the location of 
maritime boundary between the two countries was concerned but because 
of the confusing language of Article 4 and 5 of the 1974 Agreement, 
Indian fishermen particularly from Tamil Nadu suffered a great setback 
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The misery of leading a tough life filled with exploitation and 
the pain of losing their fundamental rights in particular the citizenship 
right, ultimately gave birth to a major irritant i.e. the citizenship status 
issue, that spoiled the cordial bilateral relations of two countries for a 
long time. 
Hence, another irritant between Indo- Sri Lanka relations was 
the question of stateless persons of Indian origin. Just after its 
independence in 1948, the discriminatory policies of Sri Lankan 
Government, resulted in the loosening of citizenship by the people of 
Indian origin. To sort out the problem Jawahar Lai Nehru pursued a 
number of bilateral talks with his Sri Lankan counterpart but he could 
never accept the principle of compulsory repatriation as it might have 
set an example for other African and Asian countries. Besides he always 
believed that those who had contributed in strengthening the economy of 
Sri Lanka and stayed their for generations, could not be taken off the 
right of citizenship all of a sudden and that Sri Lanka just wanted to 
lessen the number of the people of Indian origin, thus regarded these 
proposals as discriminatory. Even Nehru-Kotelawala Pact of January 
1954 could not be implemented as Sri Lankan Government accepted 
only two categories i.e. Indian Nationals and Ceylon Nationals but 
completely neglected the third category of 'stateless persons'. As 
compared to Nehru's firm approach, Lai Bahadur Shastri preferred an 
accommodative approach by entering into 1964 Shastri -
Bandaranaike Pact. In fact to settle citizenship issue, India made 
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conflict. And these policies were also responsible for the rise of Tamil 
militancy. Tamil organizations like TULF, LTTE etc. sprang up very 
quickly to fight discrimination done by the Sinhala Sri Lankan 
Government. As the communal problem originated due to injustice done 
with Tamils of Indian origin or estate workers, Indian Government 
directly or indirectly has always been involved in this problem. Indira 
Gandhi offered India's good offices and appointed G. Parthasarathy as the 
chief negotiator. However, this is also a reality that during her times, 
India provided training to Tamil militants on Indian soil in order to 
militarily pressurize the Jayewardene Government. Indira Gandhi wanted 
the legitimate and genuine demands of the Tamils to be met but within 
the framework of a united Sri Lanka. Her successor Rajiv Gandhi, 
however, treated the subject in a different manner and involved India 
militarily in the ethnic havoc of the island, and faced a great diplomatic 
failure. IPKF operation proved to be a big failure, both Tamil militants 
and Sri Lankan Government turned hostile to India and ultimately India 
faced great embarrassment and it had to call IPKF back from Sri Lanka. It 
did not stop here but Rajiv Gandhi paid a heavy price as he was killed by 
one suicide bomber of LTTE. Till then all the successive Indian 
Governments have maintained sort of neutral stand and have avoided 
(generally) reacting on developments occurring in the island. Let it be 
western powers or Sri Lankan Government or LTTE or Indian 
Government itself, every body knows that without Indian involvement it 
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will be very difficult to settle the ethnic problem. Realizing this fact only 
LTTE asked India to be involved in the peace process, Sri Lankan 
Government too under the western pressure, requested India to play an 
active role in the peace process, but India has preferred to watch all the 
developments quietly. Therefore, US backed Norway has taken over the 
responsibility of peace-brokers. Even Norweigians keep India informed of 
all the developments which occur in peace process. In February 2002 Sri 
Lankan Government and LTTE signed Norwegian-brokered peace truce. 
Things were about to be finalized but first due to some ingenuine and 
unnecessary demands of LTTE and then due to bitter power politics of Sri 
Lanka, thus created a stalemate in peace talks. 
We should never forget that our region is heir to a centuries-old 
tradition of tolerance, pluralism and creative interaction. We need to 
recapture this ethos in the modern context. In the post-cold war world of 
globalization, countries around the world are increasingly focusing on 
regional economics. Political disputes have been resolved diplomatically 
or quietly deferred for tackling at a more opportune time. Conflict has 
given way to cooperation; dialogue moderates differences. There is a 
clear recognition that hostility only stunts economies, inhibits trade and 
retards progress. In words of Former Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee: "If we in South Asia look back objectively at the experiences 
of our freedom struggles and of our nation building, the one stark lesson 
that stands out is the imperative of forging a unity based on our 
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commonalities. Whenever we have dissipated our energies in internal 
squabbling, external forces have come in to sort our differences and 
stayed on to exploit our resources." 
Hence, both India and Sri Lanka should understand that their 
search for pragmatism, maturity and wisdom will have to involve both 
Governments and civil society. It will also require a widespread 
understanding that in today's contest, collective regional interest is an 
expression of enlightened self-interest. Both the Governments may avoid 
the mistakes committed by predecessors as time has provided them with 
full opportunity to work together to make Indian Ocean a 'Zone of Peace' 
as well as South Asia a safe and prosperous region. 
The research is based on primary as well as secondary sources. 
Original documents have been collected from Sri Lankan High 
Commission in India, Ministry of External Affairs, India and National 
Archives of India. Personal meetings with Mr. J.N. Dixit, National 
Security Advisor and Mrs. Dhammika Samasinghe, Second Secretary to 
Press and Culture Sri Lankan High Commission, India, have been a great 
source of authentic informations. Besides, unpublished dissertations have 
also been scanned and analysed. However, empirical and inductive 
approaches have also been adopted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INDO-SRI LANKA RELATIONS: NEHRU TO INDIRA GANDHI 
With the failure of Norway-brokered another peace effort, to 
bring the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE to the negotiating table in 
the month of July 2004, once again the need has arisen to analyse 
prospects for peace in South Asia. Following post-cold war trends in 
international politics and with the emergence of new power equations and 
calculations, the great powers of the world shifted their focus from 
ideological confrontation and objective of containment to the making of a 
new world order, where patterns of 'calculated cooperation' would be 
followed, and also where no single country should be allowed to impose 
hegemonism or to be exorbitantly communal in any region of the world. 
Given to these considerations, this is the most suitable time to 
analyse Indo-Sri Lanka relations right from the day of their independence 
as since its independence, India has been blamed to be hegemonistic in the 
region and Sri Lanka is one country whose more than two decades old 
communal problem, has the potential to inspire other secessionist 
movements in the South Asian region. To understand the connections 
between India's 'Big Brother' attitude and Sri Lanka's ethnic havoc, we 
have analysed the policies and attitudes of the successive Governments of 
both the countries simultaneously since their independence. 
2 
Introduction 
In the post World War 11 period the entire world entered into a 
period of cold war, consequently two hostile blocks emerged on the basis 
of ideology. The Capitalist one was headed by the USA and the 
Communist was led by the former USSR. This precarious situation created 
hazard for the newly independent and small countries of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America etc. All those were struggling for their political stability, 
economic prosperity and social strength. But in that condition it was very 
difficult for them to choose any independent idea. Many options emerged -
whether to align with either of the block or to have an independent 
philosophy. In these conditions Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of 
Indian foreign policy, introduced a new concept that would be followed in 
the realm of foreign affairs and that was the concept of non-alignment. He 
favoured the policy of not aligning with any of the big powers but to 
follow the policy of peaceful co-existence. 
Pt. Nehru formulated this policy of peaceful co-existence in order 
to maintain congenial relations with our neighbours. Our neighbour Sri 
Lanka is a country with whom we have shared numerous ethnic, linguistic, 
cultural and strategic bonds. Nehru was well aware of the strategic 
importance of Sri Lanka as had been stated by Ravi kaul, a former 
Commander of the Indian Navy, he said, "Sri Lanka is as important 
strategically to India as Eire is to the United Kingdom or Taiwan to China. 
As long as Sri Lanka is friendly or even neutral, India has nothing to 
worry, but if there be any danger of the island falling under the domination 
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of a power hostile to India, India cannot tolerate such a situation 
endangering her territorial integrity".' 
The cultural and historical heritage of Sri Lanka goes back to 
2,000 years. The reference of Sri Lanka as the "resplendent land", is found 
in the ancient Indian epic Ramayana. 
So first tie was the religious tie which binds the iwo neighbours. 
The Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka in the 3 century B.C. from 
India, where it had been established by Gautam Buddha three centuries 
earlier. During the reign of Indian Monarch Asoka, Buddhism was elevated 
from a minor sect to an official religion enjoying all the advantages of 
royal patronage. According to Mahavamasa, the most valuable source of 
knowledge for scholars probing the legends and historical heritage of Sri 
Lanka, Asoka's son and emissary to Sri Lanka, Mahinda introduced the 
king Devanampiya Tissa (250 B.C. - 207 B.C.) to Buddhism. 
Devanampiya Tissa became a powerful patron of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. 
Devanampiya Tissa employed Asoka's strategy of merging the political 
state with Buddhism, supporting Buddhist institutions from the state's 
coffers, and locating temples close to the royal palace for greater control. 
With such patronage, Buddhism was positioned to evolve as the highest 
ethical and philosophical expression of Sinhalese culture and civilization. 
"Buddhism appealed directly to the masses, leading to the growth of a 
collective Sinhalese cultural consciousness".^ 
The Asokan missionary approach featured preaching and carried 
the principles of the Buddha directly to the common people, achieved 
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greater success in Sri Lanka tlian it had in India and could be said to be the 
island's first experiment in mass education. 
Buddhism exerted great impact on island's literary development 
too, as the Sinhalese studied Pali, the language of the Buddhist scriptures, 
thus influencing the development of Sinhala as a literary language. 
Early Sri Lankan society adopted the system of social 
stratification i.e. the caste system from its Indian prototype, but it 
obviously inculcated its own characteristics. In the caste structure of the 
Hindu Tamils, the vellala (cultivator) is the highest caste, in the same way, 
all Sri Lankan heads of state have, since independence, belonged to the 
Goyigama caste, the highest Sinhalese caste. It is however worth noticing 
that Sri Lanka developed neither the exclusive Brahmanical social 
hierarchy nor, to any significant degree, the concept of impurity by contact 
with impure persons or materials that was at the centre stage of the Indian 
caste-system. Nevertheless, it was the impact of Buddhism which never 
allowed the intensification of the institution of caste. The cultivator's class 
occupied a very high position in the caste structure of both the Hindu 
Tamils and the Sinhalese. 
The earliest records of the history of Sri Lanka reveal the fact 
that Sri Lanka was a multi-ethnic society. Evidence suggests that during 
the early centuries of Sri Lankan history there was considerable harmony 
between the Sinhalese and Tamils. 
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With the usurpation of the Sinhalese throne at Anuradhapura, by 
two adventurers Sena and Guttika from southern India, in 237 B.C. 
challenged, for the first time, the peace and stability of the island. For the 
first time Sri Lanka was ruled by Tamils, continuously for twenty two 
years. The two were subsequently murdered, and the Sinhalese royal 
It 
dynasty was resorted. In 145 B.C., a Tamil general named Elara, of the 
Chola dynasty (which ruled much of India from the ninth to twelfth 
centuries A.D.), took over the throne at Anuradhapura and ruled for forty-
four years. A Sinhalese king, Dutthagamani (or Duttugemunu), waged a 
fifteen year campaign against the Tamil monarch and finally deposed 
him". Duttagamani's victory is generally interpreted as the beginning of 
the 'Sinhalese nationalism' which still has the potential to stir the religio-
communal passion of the Sinhalese. 
In the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., owing to the assertion of 
three Hindu empires in southern India-the Pandya, Pallava, and Chola, the 
Tamil threat to the Sinhalese Buddhist kingdoms had turned to be very 
prominent. In India, the absorption of Buddhism by Hinduism and 
subsequent rise of Tamil identity assertion (as now they had identified 
themselves as Dravidian, Tamil, and Hindu, respectively) further 
intensified Sinhalese insecurities. Under the rule of these kingdoms, 
Hinduism flourished and Buddhism received a serious setback. 
The Cholas were driven out of Sri Lanka by king Vijayabahu I in 
A.D. 1070 who mainly concentrated on rebuilding the Buddhist temples 
and monasteries that had been neglected during Chola rule. He left no 
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clearly designated successor to his throne, and a period of instability and 
civil war followed his rule until the rise of king Prakramabahu I, known as 
the Great (A.D. 1153-86). His reign was not only a time of Buddhist 
renaissance but also a period of religious expansionism abroad. The 
Sinhalese monarch, in order to provide aid and assistance to a Pandyan 
claimant to the throne, also involved himself extensively in Indian politics. 
By thirteenth century the Sinhalese Kingdom lost its ground and 
faced threats of invasion from India and the expanding Tamil Kingdom of 
northern Sri Lanka. Exploiting the situation, Tamils established control 
over the 'valuable pearl fisheries' around Jaffna peninsula. And this was 
the time when the Tamils and the Sinhalese were separated by the gigantic 
stretches of forests which overlay north-central Sri Lanka. 
Foreign rulers took advantage of the disturbed political state of 
the Sinhalese Kingdom and Prakramabahu VI (1412-67) was the last 
Sinhalese king to rule the entire island. This was the beginning of 
European dominance (1500-1948) over the island. First the Protuguese 
ruled over Sri Lanka followed by the Dutch rule which was replaced by the 
British rule. The point to notice here is that in India too the Mughal Empire 
(1526-1757) was facing threats from the major European powers which 
were trying hard to fill the power vacuum in the subcontinent. After 
loosing the Indian port of Madras to the French in 1758, the British 
exhibited great interest in the excellent harbor at Trincomalee and 
ultimately they captured the harbor in 1796 and expelled the Dutch from 
the island. 
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Now our period of study starts right from the day when India and 
Sri Lanka became independent. India got independence in 1947 and Sri 
Lanka in 1948. So far the regional policy priorities are concerned, for last 
five decades, India has noticeably laid attention to Sri Lanka. Though the 
relations of both the countries have witnessed the phases of divergence as 
well as convergence but the fact of the matter is that the relations have 
never touched the point of saturation or have never been completely 
broken up. Both the countries had evolved a different pattern of strategic 
thinking and different approaches towards defence and security matters. 
To know the roots of the problem between the two neighbours 
who have for centuries been tied with numerous cultural, linguistic, ethnic 
ties, we will have to understand and analyse viewpoints inculcated in the 
national psyche of Sri Lanka and articulated by its ruling elites which, 
after independence designed and shaped the foreign policy structure of Sri 
Lanka. Being a small South Asian country, Sri Lanka has always suffered 
from threat and insecurity perceptions. These threat perceptions were 
intensified by the geographical location and strategically strong position of 
India in South Asian Region. The first Prime Minister and elder statesman 
of Sri Lanka, Don Stephen Senanayake was the first to consider India to be 
a potential threat to the island's security. This faith of him was blindly 
followed by the successive UNP (United National Party) ruling elites. Sri 
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Lanka's defence Agreement with Britain was an instance of Sri Lanka's 
insecurity perceptions against India. As John Kotelawala once explicitly 
expressed about aggression from "quarters closer home" and also exhibited 
the fear of absorption of the island by India if British bases were 
withdrawn and Englishmen were completely dispensed with."* 
The UNP leaders particularly Senanayake and Kotelawala 
suspected the presence of about eight lakh Indian Tamils as India's 
potential fifth column and misinterpreted the concept of 'strategic unityf** 
supported by some of the Indian leaders and strategic thinkers. These Sri 
Lankan leaders termed the concept of 'strategic unity' as a political ploy to 
make Sri Lanka a part of India. These fears or charges were quite 
unjustified and Nehru later on attempted to lessen them by assuring the 
UNP leaders of India's goodwill and peaceful intentions. But UNP leaders 
could not be convinced and preferred a defence policy with extra-strategic 
considerations. 
* Negotiated and concluded when Sri Lanka was still a British colony, the Agreement 
came into force on the day (4 February, 1948) it became independent. Under the 
Agreement Britain ensured Sri Lanka's defence against external aggression and 
agreed to assist in the training and development of its armed forces. In return 
Britain was provided with military base and facilities in the island and assured of 
military assistance if it suited Sri Lanka's interests. 
** K.M. Panikkar in his book 'India and the Indian Ocean' has propounded the idea of 
strategic unity of India Sri Lanka and Mayanmar, as one of the pre-requisites to a 
realistic policy of Indian defence. 
***Nehru himself, in 1945, maintained that given its ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
linkages, Sri Lanka would inevitably be drawn into a closer union with India 
particularly as an autonomous unit of the Indian Federation. 
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Now the extra-strategic considerations were, breaking India's 
obstinate position on the issue of stateless Indian Tamils and the ambition 
of Sri Lankan leaders to acquire stature as Asian leaders/ 
Senanayake and his UNP wanted Indian Tamils to be repatriated 
to India as it was a political necessity emerged out of the electoral reality 
of the island in the late forties. They emphasized that it was must for the 
nation-building process in Sri Lanka. Hence, strategic partnership with 
Britain would strengthen Sri Lanka's bargaining power and would compel 
Indian Government to renounce rigid attitude on citizenship status issue. 
Nehru, however never compromised on the question of compulsory 
repatriation of Indian Tamils but his successors Lai Bahadur Shastri and 
Indira Gandhi adopted an accommodative approach and thus, failed where 
Nehru was successful to a large extent. 
Secondly, personal identity aspirations of the UNP leaders never 
allowed them to accept Nehru as a "leader of opinion in free Asia".^ They 
always admired Nehru as a statesman but wanted to nullify India's pre-
eminent position in the region by following a shrewd strategy of military 
cooperation (1947 Agreement with Britain) by utilizing Sri Lanka's 
advantageous location in the Indian Ocean. This was nothing but an 
identity assertion of a small country against a big neighbour India. Nehru 
however very intelligently avoided to criticize this move of Sri Lanka 
rather assured his small neighbour his country's good intentions. 
To India's relief, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) regime 
under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (1956-1959) and Sirimavo Bandaranaike 
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(1959-65; 1970-77) exhibited a friendly and sensitive attitude towards 
India's strategic concerns. But as a step ahead to terminate the British 
bases at Katunayake and Trincomalee in 1956, the Sri Lankan Prime 
Minister did not ask for an abrogation of the defence Agreement 
altogether. This attitude made it clear that SLFP regime though considered 
India as a friendly power but was not prepared to ignore the 'big power's 
threat factor' to the island's security. So here the difference between the 
approaches of two leaders D.S. Senanayake and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike is 
evident. The former preferred "the strategy of counterpoising India through 
military involvement in the island and the latter preferred friendship with 
India".^ So far S irimavo Bandaranaike's regime is concerned, though she 
followed her husband's foreign and security policy, she preferred 
cultivating strategic relations with China and Pakistan as compared to 
India. The examples of such approach are; the neutral stance of Sri Lankan 
Government on the Sino-Indian war and Sri Lanka's extension of air 
transit facilities to Pakistan during the 1971 war and a delayed recognition 
to Bangladesh. 
Later on Indira Gandhi's personal friendship with Mrs. 
Bandaranaike, in a way compelled India to accommodate its interests in 
some of the contentious bilateral issues like the citizenship question of 
Indian Tamils and the Kachchativu dispute. Even India's immediate 
military assistance to suppress the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
insurgency in 1971 did not exert much influence on the bilateral relations 
of two neighbours. During eighties the relations were marked with 
Introduction 
personal incompatibilities between the Congress Prime Ministers and UNP 
Presidents as Mrs. Gandhi had followed a pro-SLFP foreign policy. Not 
only the personal incompatibilities but the UNP's pro-western attitude was 
also responsible for spoiling the relations. Sri Lanka's choice was for 
military assistance and strategic presence of the west in the island. China 
and Pakistan willingly accepted military supplies to Sri Lanka while US 
arranged the services of the Israeli intelligence agencies. UK at the same 
time arranged the finances for the Sri Lankan Government to hire the 
services of former British Air Service Personnel to train its commando 
units. India made its annoyance clear on such intrusion of foreign 
mercenaries as it would have an adverse impact on the bilateral relations. 
In place of respecting India's security sensitivities, Jayewardene 
Government tried to be strategically closer to US by offering certain 
strategic gestures viz., extention of refueling and recreation facilities to 
visiting US naval ships, grant of a contract for leasing of oil storage tanks 
in the strategic harbour of Trincomalee to a Singapore based US company , 
and December 1983 Agreement of Sri Lanka with the US to establish a 
powerful Voice of America (VOA) station on the island. Furthermore Sri 
Lanka gave a fresh lease of life to the 1947 defence Agreement and sought 
Britain's direct involvement in the conflict. India however expressed its 
disliking on the set up of VOA as US navy could use it for intelligence 
purposes in the Indian Ocean. 
* The contract was subsequently revoked when India exposed the manipulation in 
selecting the tender. 
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Here the point to be noted is that despite supplying of arms, 
military help or training facilities, none of the major western countries 
viz., US and UK were willing to accept Sri Lanka's charge against India as 
a potential aggressor and followed a very realistic approach by advising 
the Jayewardene administration to seek India's help in resolving the ethnic 
conflict. China and Pakistan, however owing to their anti-India foreign 
policy continued providing military support to Sri Lanka. 
With the intensification of ethnic crisis, Sri Lanka also realized 
the ground realities and agreed to consult India on the relevance and 
employment of external military and intelligence agencies. Sri Lanka also 
decided to review its agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations 
to ensure their use solely for public broadcasting and deny Trincomalee 
port for military use by "any country in manner prejudicial to India's 
o 
interests". In return India too assured Sri Lanka of the removal of those 
Sri Lankan citizens advocating separatism or involved in terrorist activities 
and that military supplies and training facilities would be extended to Sri 
Lankan security forces. Though India too accommodated its security 
concerns yet the general impression was that India, a regional power 
coerced a strife torn small country to make extensive unilateral security 
concessions and offered its military help to the Sri Lankan army with a 
view to restrict the island's external defence contacts. But here we should 
always keep in mind that it is a general tendency among smaller countries 
to seek concessions and accommodation of their interests by big powers 
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and for them, an equal relationship with a big country should mean "taking 
more" and "giving less", if not nothing. 
In the late eighties, in order to perish the ethnic conflict UNP 
leaders changed their strategy and decided to conclude a friendship treaty 
with India. As early as in 1948, also, as western countries showed their 
disinterest in Sri Lanka's security, Jayewardene proposed a friendship 
treaty with India but Indira Gandhi did not accept the proposal as Sri 
Lanka wanted a military solution to the ethnic conflict. But when Rajiv 
Gandhi came to power, this Sri Lankan demand was accepted by India but 
unfortunately the draft of the treaty was prepared in a hurry and the 
materialization of any treaty on the basis of such draft would have 
benefited Sri Lanka more than India. 
According to the bilateral peace Agreement of July 1987, India 
took over the task of mediation, one of the most delicate practices of 
International politics. India's preference was for a military stalemate so 
that the adversaries viz. Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil militants 
would be compelled to seek a political settlement of the conflict. But some 
of the mistakes were committed on the part of Indian Government and this 
diplomatic mission proved to be a big failure. Firstly, it was a grave 
mistake that the Indian actors in the conflict had sidelined leaders like A. 
Amirthalingam and, instead, promoted the militants to become the sole 
representatives of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Secondly, the frequent 
replacement of Indian mediators broke consistency in dialogue and 
negotiations. Thirdly, it was a failure on the part of Indian leaders and 
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foreign policy experts that they could not understand the actual cunning 
motive of Jayewardene who through seeking Indian military intervention, 
wanted to use Indian power to disarm the LITE. Fourthly, the Agreement 
was not only prepared in a great hurry but it was also filled with many 
impracticable provisions. Lastly, sending of Indian Peace-Keeping Force 
(IPKF) which was the most crucial point which revealed the emptiness of 
1987 Agreement reached between India and Sri Lanka and which proved to 
be a major diplomatic failure of Indian Government. After facing great 
political and military embarrassment India had to withdraw the IPKF. 
Since then, all the successive Indian Governments have shown indifference 
towards the developments in the island. 
Here we can compare the way of functioning of different Indian 
leaders. As we know that ethnic crisis was an outcome of an enhanced and 
unsolved citizenship problem of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. During 
Nehru's regime which covers the period 1947-62, the world witnessed an 
assertive and principle based leadership which never agreed on the issue of 
mass repatriation or 'compulsory repatriation' of Indian Tamils from Sri 
Lanka to India as it would be a sort of injustice with those who had given 
their flesh and blood to the development of the island. Therefore, till the 
date Nehru was alive, Sri Lanka could not be successful in its shrewd 
policy of 'mass repatriation'. But Nehru's successors, Lai Bahadur Shastri 
and Indira Gandhi could never be as assertive as Nehru was so far the 
solution of citizenship status issue was concerned. They perceived the 
problem as a major irritant in bilateral relations and therefore complied 
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with the Sri Lankan Government's pressure by entering into bilateral 
agreements for the Indian Tamils' repatriation, "in the deliberations of 
which the various organizations of the Indian Tamils were virtually 
ignored".^ Under the leadership of Lai Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi, 
India gave up its insistence that the stateless people were Sri Lanka's 
responsibility and accepted that they were the joint responsibility of both 
the Governments. The Sirimavo Shastri Pact of 1964 and Indira Gandhi 
Sirimavo Pact of 1974 led to the beginning of a planned mass emigration 
of the Tamils from Sri Lanka to Indian subcontinent. These successive 
Indian leaders however gave preference to personal relationship with Sri 
Lankan leaders over national interest. This move of Indian leaders however 
had an adverse effect on the family system of about five lakh Indian 
Tamils who had to repatriate and their family members were divided for 
both Indian and Sri Lankan citizenship. For this, India should be blamed 
more than Sri Lanka, because it, by entering into an unfair deal, approved 
Sri Lanka's policy of mass repatriation. 
Similarly, India could not handle skillfully the Kachchativu 
issue. Nehru on several occasions exhibited his ignorance about the 
location of the Kachchative island. Though both the countries expressed 
their claim over this "tiny" and "barren" island but Nehru never made it an 
issue where "national prestige" was involved and he never entered into an 
agreement with Sri Lanka and ceded it to the same. But Indira Gandhi 
considered this as a major irritant in bilateral relations and finally entered 
into an Agreement with Sri Lanka in 1974 and accepted Sri Lankan claim 
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over Kachchativu island despite the availability of enough evidences that 
Kachchativu had been a part of India,* and it is also a fact that this move of 
Mrs. Gandhi was completely against the wishes and interests of Tamil 
Nadu. The Kachchativu island, although, had no strategic value for India at 
the time of this Agreement but, today, its importance has increased 
considerably in view of the expanding maritime activities of the people of 
coastal Ramnad and the steady rise in the commercial value of marine, 
products, especially prawns. Unfortunately, Indian leadership ignored the 
future commercial value of the Palk Strait Region. Had Indian leadership 
been a bit considerate that time, Indian fishermen would not have faced 
problems what they are facing today. 
The political and strategic irritants have however always affected 
the relations of two neighbours but so far relations in economic sphere are 
concerned, both the countries have progressed towards a modest level of 
economic interaction over the years. Although many political initiatives, 
within an institutionalized framework, have not been taken to strengthen 
bilateral economic relations. Bilateral Trade is still governed by the 
Agreement signed in 1961, and the Joint Commission for Economic, Trade 
and Technical Cooperation which remained temporarily inactive during the 
late seventies and for most part of the eighties. 
The island was supposed to be a part of the Zamindari of Raja of Ramnad who had 
regularly leased it and was also receiving rent from that land. During the British 
rule in India it was the Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad in the erstwhile state of 
Madras and present day Tamil Nadu. 
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From the beginning, India has been a highly desired market for 
the Sri Lankans and an important source of supply of primary products at a 
lower cost. Though the volume of bilateral trade is not quite high, there has 
been a steep increase in imports and exports of both the countries. The 
difference is that India has increased its export by nearly five times, 
whereas its imports have merely doubled in value. This has created a huge 
trade deficit for Sri Lanka. India's exports rose from US $24.6 million in 
1965 to $88 million in 1980, registering the highest growth rate of about 
42 percent per year. At the same time, India's imports increased from $9.7 
million in 1965 to $38 million in 1980. During 1985-95, India became the 
second largest supplier of Sri Lanka's imports. Its exports accounted for 
Sri Lanka Rs.7,668 million in 1985 which rose to Sri Lanka Rs.24,045 
million in 1995. Its imports amounted to Sri Lanka Rs. 1,616 million in 
1995. The trade deficit for Sri Lanka has been soaring from $37.89 million 
in 1977 to $62.4 million in 1980, $268.1 million in 1993-94 and $523.4 
million in 1996-97.'" In view of its chronic nature the Sri Lankan 
Government has been constantly urging the Indian Government to take 
measures to reduce the adverse trade balance. Finally, in January 1997, 
India issued an unilateral decision, when the then External Affairs Minister 
I.K. Gujral visited Colombo, to remove quantitative restriction and reduce 
tariffs on some 80 items of export interest to Sri Lanka was a small step to 
reduce the island's trade deficit." 
On other areas of economic cooperation joint ventures bilateral 
credit and technological assistance the progress has been very moderate. 
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India had as many as 14 joint ventures in Sri Lanka by 1991 and 
transferred intermediate technology under the Indian Technical and 
Economic Cooperation Programme. In this context, Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreement that was concluded on 22 January 1997'^ 
between the two Governments further strengthened the bilateral economic 
ties. Regarding bilateral credit, India extended about Rs.944 million up to 
March 1990 and another $30 million was agreed upon in March 1995 for 
the purchase of capital goods and spares from India. Besides, during his 
visit to Colombo in January 1997, Gujral announced India's contribution 
of Rs.50 million to Sri Lanka's rehabilitation programme in the north-east. 
Even though Sri Lanka is not economically dependent on India, there are 
many areas in which both the countries can come ahead for economic 
cooperation.'^ The Free Trade Agreement which India and Sri Lanka 
entered on 28 December, 1998*'' was a progressive step towards trade 
promotion between two countries. This Free Trade Agreement has resulted 
in narrowing the trade deficit of Sri Lanka with India. In fact in the words 
of India's Prime Minister Atal Bdiari Vajpayee, "In Fact, the success of the 
India - Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement has inspired us to expend its 
scope to cover services and investment in a comprehensive economic 
partnership agreement".'^ 
Now India has to determine its Sri Lankan policy in the context 
of ethnic strife. Owing to the Norwegian sponsored peace bid, for the last 
more than 12 months, not even a single person has died of ethnic violence. 
Now the question is how this ethnic violence can be ended? Is federalism 
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the solutions of this ethnic mess and what should be India's response to the 
peace-process which is going on in Sri Lanka? 
The terms devolution, federalism, power sharing and 
decentralization are critical words in ethnic conflict resolution. As the 
available tools there can be two models of ethnic crisis, the integrative 
model which presupposes an overriding centre, while the consociational 
model prescribes for fully autonomous federating units. Devolution is the 
most often used word in Sri Lankan ethnic parlance, "but as far as the 
model is concerned there is a fierce debate between the protagonists of the 
consociational model, mostly the Tamils and "Colombo liberals', and those 
of the integrative model, mostly the Sinhalese and so-called Sinhala 
Buddhist hardliners".'^ Devolution received immense importance with the 
emergence of Chandrika Bandaranaike kumaratunga on the political scene 
in 1994 with the victory of her coalition People's Alliance (PA) in the 
general election, which was soon followed by her own victory at the 
presidential poll. She made it the central point at her election campaigns 
that "historic injustice had been done to the Tamil community in the island 
and that she would solve the problem permanently through a massive dose 
of devolved powers to them after working out a federal structure for the 
country".'^ This is however different point that she failed in her mission. 
Here we have to analyse how effective federalism is as a remedy to the 
inter-ethnic problem and in particular how viable it is in the Sri Lanka 
situation. In Sri Lanka there are two popular concepts; one arguing for 
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federalism as a solution to the ethnic problem thereby securing the state 
from disintegration, and the other arguing against federalism. 
The first argument draws heavily from the current literature on 
constitutional law, human rights, minority rights and international 
conventions dealing with questions of self-determination, group rights, etc. 
The argument is that the territorial basis to Tamil ethnicity, their 
'homeland' in the northern and eastern provinces, should be recognized as 
a province in the Sri Lankan federation with some modifications and the 
basis of granting them power to govern themselves should be conceptually 
based on the theory of self-determination. 
While the second argument draws heavily from Sri Lanka's 
history and comparative federal experience around the world. Those who 
support this argument believe that throughout history both the Sinhalese 
and the Tamils have shared one heritage and the entire island belongs to 
both and other communities. To make northern and eastern province the 
homeland of only Tamils, would only be a harbinger of disintegration of 
the country. Although, Sri Lankan Sinhalese elite have failed miserably in 
their job during the past five decades as a result of which the ethnic 
problem has reached at its culmination. The biggest mistake that President 
Kumaratunga Committed, according to this school, was by drawing a new 
package of devolution, completely ignoring the evolutionary process. 
If one compares these two arguments one finds differences 
between them. The first concept is theoretical in orientation and advocates 
drastic and innovative changes. In a way it is willing to take the risk. The 
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second one is empirical in its orientation and believes in a slow and 
evolutionary process to handle the crisis. It does not want to take a risk, 
particularly in the context of the LTTE's Eelam demand. 
If we analyse the current situation, the Sri Lankan Government 
would never allow LTTE to create a new Eelam state as it is completely 
against the territorial unity and integrity of Sri Lankan state. LTTE had 
completely ignored Chandrika Kumartunga's devolution package. On 23 
December 2001, the Government of Sri Lanka declared a unilateral 
ceasefire, the LTTE immediately reciprocated. After the expiration of one 
month the ceasefire was extended further, for another month, in the course 
of which the ceasefire was converted into a long-term truce that Ranil 
Wickremesinghe and Vellupillai Prabhakaran signed on 22 February 2002. 
Simultaneously, the Government followed several proactive policies such 
as the release of a large number of those who had been incriminated under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and the lifting of the ban on goods 
and services reaching LTTE-controUed areas. Both parties agreed to first 
build one another's confidence, brick by brick, and then to address the 
vexed political question of devolution of powers within a federal model. 
President Kumartunga's concept of 'Union of Regions was also federal in 
all respects, but unfortunately it had certain drawbacks. She did not enjoy 
the two advantages that Wickramesinghe did. One, there was no 
international pressure on the LTTE at that time, and two, there was 
personal animosity between her and Prabhakaran. As a result, 
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Kumartunga's choice was limited to depending upon the Tamil political 
parties alone, most notably the TULF, which really did not help.'^ 
India's Sri Lanka policy can be summed up on the following lines, 
• India is fully supportive of the legitimate political, social, 
economic and cultural aspirations of the Tamils of Sri Lanka 
whether Sri Lankan Tamils or Indian Tamils (settled in Sri Lanka 
since the middle of the 19"^  century). India, however opposes 
LTTE's violent methods to achieve these aspirations. India would 
definitely prefer political dialogue to resolve the ethnic crisis. 
India believes that any settlement achieved should be within the 
framework of the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. 
In the background of the failure of the Indian mediatory efforts in 
the 1980s and 1990s, India would not actively and directly 
mediate in Sri Lanka in the near future. But India would not 
oppose mediatory or facilitating efforts undertaken by other 
countries or international organizations, provided such initiatives 
are accepted by the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE. 
India would not be interested to deal with LTTE owing to its 
direct involvement in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, till the 
guilty of the assassination be punished. Besides, India would 
attempt to strengthen and extend bilateral relations and economic 
cooperation to the extent that Colombo wishes such cooperation, 
subject to its sensitivities about any excessive Indian 
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involvement in Sri Lanka. And also to ensure that LTTE does not 
have bases or sanctuaries in India, as India is against any 
secessionist or terrorist group operating from its territory. This is 
however another point that Indian Government has been 
unsuccessful on this front as some Tamil political parties like 
MDMK still support LTTE. India's relations with Sri Lanka have 
been cordial but the question of the status of persons of Indian 
origin in Sri Lanka has caused frictions between the two 
countries. 
Hence, it can be said that there has been a sort of continuity in 
India's Sri Lanka policy especially after the withdrawal of IPKF from the 
island in March 1990. There might occur changes in the orientations of 
India's Sri Lanka policy in foreseeable future with the rise of Congress led 
United Progressive Alliance (UFA) Government in New Delhi. These new 
developments are, however yet awaited. 
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CHAPTER - 1 
INDIA AND SRI LANKA: MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 
An analysis of the interaction between Sri Lanka and India, 
underlying areas of convergence on major foreign policy issues requires to 
be undertaken in the backdrop of their similar, although not identical, 
experience of colonialism, neo-colonialism and developing economy. 
However, along with the areas of convergence, one also discerns areas of 
divergence particularly on issues impinging upon the regional security 
system. Such divergent stance has stemmed primarily from India's pre-
ponderant power structure in the region and also from the domestic as well 
as external compulsions and constraints of a small country like Sri Lanka. 
The period under analysis comprises of two regimes : (a) The 
United National Party (UNP) led coalition Government under the 
leadership of Dudley Senanayake (which was in office from 1965 to 1970) 
and (b) The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led coalition Government 
called the United Left Front - consisting of Mrs. Bandaranaike's own 
SLFP, the Troatskyite LSSP and the Communist Party (Moscow wing) 
headed by Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, which had won the 1970 elections 
and had stayed in power till the next elections in 1977. During this period 
(1965-77); the response of Sri Lanka on major international issues and its 
convergence or divergence with India, has been analysed in this chapter. 
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Non-alignment 
A major attribute of Sri Lanka's foreign policy during this period 
was Non-alignment as it used to be earlier. At the declaratory level, the 
UNP Government of Mr. Senanayake affirmed its commitment to the basic 
principles of Non-alignment. Infact Sri Lanka was one of the founder 
members of the Non-alignment group. Right from the beginning, Sri Lanka 
played an important role in consolidating the movement and fulfilling its 
objectives. It staunchly believed peace and stability to be the pre-requisites 
for socio-economic upliftment. This explains Sri Lanka's consistent 
endeavour to play a mediatory role to defuse world tensions. 
After assuming office in March 1965, the Senanayake 
Government dealt with the Vietnam war which was probably the most 
important global issue at that particular juncture. The issue had serious 
implications in the domestic political context in Sri Lanka because of the 
existence of important Buddhist pressure groups in the country. The 
Premier made a joint appeal for peace in Vietnam, issued by 17 heads of 
states and Government's of Non-aligned countries in which the signatories 
proclaimed their adherence "to the principle of inviolability of and respect 
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states".' The joint appeal 
requested the parties concerned to start negotiations without any delay. 
However, the possibility of holding negotiations was barred due to the 
resumption of bombing by USA on Vietnam. When the UN took up the 
matter for discussion, Dudley Senanayake's Government abstained from 
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the vote on various resolutions. This might be due to Sri Lanka's economic 
dependence on the involved parties, viz. China, the USA and the USSR.'^  
As regards Czechoslovakian issue, Sri Lanka condemned the 
military intervention of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia and hoped for 
speedy withdrawal of foreign troops. However, it did not become a party to 
the resolutions in the UN. The fact that the Government was at that time 
negotiating aid for several industrial projects from the Soviet Union and 
east European countries might be the explanation for the restrained nature 
of the Government pronouncements.^ 
Sri Lanka also showed anxiety regarding the Middle Eastern 
crisis of 1967 and appealed for restoration of peace. However, it abstained 
from denouncing Israel for violating UN resolutions. Though the UNP's 
low key foreign policy postures was one of the causes for such restraint, 
the more plausible reason was that of Israel being a good market for Sri 
Lanka's primary commodities.'* 
The brief analysis of Sri Lanka's response towards major events 
during 1965-70 indicates the country's concern for the establishment of 
world peace. However, its capability or scope for playing a very activist 
role was curtailed owing to compulsions of a developing economy which 
forced it to rely on external economic assistance. 
During Mrs. Bandaranaike's regime, i.e. 1970-77, the Non-
alignment movement picked up momentum and started to play a significant 
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role in international field. While addressing the Lusaka Conference in 
September 1970, Mrs. Bandaranaike reaffirmed the need to adhere to the 
tenets of Non-alignment. She stated that the Government was pledged to 
pursue an active and constructive policy of Non-alignment. The policy of 
Non-alignment was extremely important to Sri Lanka because that 
constituted a frontline defence against external threats. Since Sri Lanka 
had limited resources for defence, she had to rely on the support and 
friendship of the Non-alignment community.^ 
This attitude was fundamental to Sri Lanka's policy of friendship 
with all countries. The Non-alignment policy followed by Sri Lanka 
attained a high water mark when Colombo hosted the fifth Non-alignment 
Summit, the first of its kind to be held in Asia in 1976. Towards the end of 
her tenures, Mrs. Bandaranaike brought Sri Lanka to the forefront of the 
Non-alignment movement. 
The real conduct of Sri Lanka's Non-alignment was decisively 
influenced by the domestic considerations, both political and economic. 
The political orientations of the parties, the economic vulnerability of a 
small and primary commodity producing country and the over-all 
commitment to pursue an independent stance propelled successive 
Governments in Sri Lanka to adopt Non-alignment as a major plank of 
their foreign policy.^ 
However, there was a shift in emphasis in the Non-alignment 
policy followed by the two successive Governments one of UNP and the 
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other of SLFP. During Mr. Senanayake's period, Sri Lanlca developed 
closer ties with the west. This resulted from his Government's dependence 
on international and other credit agencies and the donor countries of the 
Aid Ceylon Consortium for assistance of different sorts.'' 
In contrast, during Mrs. Bandaranaike's regime, Sri Lanka shifted 
her foreign policy orientation more to the left. This was quite obvious 
considering the existence of a powerful leftwing component in her 
Government and, her own preference for closer association with non-
aligned and communist states which were opposed to all forms of western 
Q 
colonialism. 
There was commonality of outlook between Sri Lanka and India 
on the principles of Non-alignment. Mrs. Gandhi herself, as Prime Minister 
of India was associated with Mrs. Bandaranaike in three Non-alignment 
Summits, at Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973) and Colombo (1976). 
India was at one platform with Sri Lanka in viewing Non-
alignment as the symbol of mankind's search for peace and security among 
nations, and of the determination to establish a new and equitable 
international economic, social and political order. India was vociferous in 
its condemnation of the evil forces of colonialism, imperialism, neo-
colonialism, apartheid, Zionism and other forms of alien domination. Both 
of them extended their support to decolonization, liberation struggles in 
various parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America and general and complete 
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disarmament. Like Sri Lanka, India welcomed the triumph of the struggle 
of the people of Democratic Kampuchea the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
against United States intervention, the success of the liberation struggle of 
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Angola which had led to the 
final extinction of Portuguese colonialism and the emergence of 
independent states. Both welcomed with equal satisfaction the successful 
struggle against zionism and the striking demonstration of the Arab people 
in their liberation war of October 1973, against Israel. India further 
welcomed the growing international recognition as well as the inalienable 
national rights of the Palestinian people. 
Thus, there was a coalescene of views on the basic principles and 
policies of Non-alignment between Sri Lanka and India. However, in 
practice, there were some issues on which Sri Lanka and India differed. 
The issue of apartheid stood out as most prominent. Both Sri Lanka and 
India condemned the segregationist forums. Both of them also advocated 
economic sanctions against South Africa. However, while India 
implemented it, Sri Lanka refused to take action against it on the plea of 
taking 'collective action' by all states condemning south Africa, to make 
the sanctions effective. This type of behaviour on Sri Lanka's part was 
guided by its reluctance to spoil its attractive trade with that country. India 
viewed Sri Lanka's response uncritically because it was aware of the 
compulsions of the latter.^ 
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India and Sri Lanka on the NIEO 
The basic tenets of Non-alignment indicated that the movement 
opposed to all kinds of oppression, exploitation and injustice. In a way the 
struggle for NIEO was intimately linked with the Non- alignment's wider 
struggle for the elimination of colonialism, imperialism and 
neocolonialism in all their manifestations. In this respect, the Non-
alignment and the struggle for the NIEO were contemporary and they have 
been intimately linked from the very beginning. But especially from late 
1960s, when the decolonisation process was almost complete, the Non-
alignment movement laid a special emphasis on economic issues. 
The Algiers Non-alignment Summit in 1973 for the first time 
gave a call for a NIEO, in which instead of grudging concessions and 
discretionary aid from developed to developing countries, there would be a 
restructuring of their mutual relationship to make it more equitable and 
more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the majority of mankind. 
The sixth special session of the General Assembly in 1974 also gave full 
support to the plea by adopting a detailed resolution of the subject. 
The NIEO embodies exhaustive and ambitious purposes. The 
main objective is no less than the creation of a new structure of economic 
relationships, warranting fundamental change in a large number of related 
fields-commodity trade, market access and preference, aid flows, the 
activities of multinational corporations, the international monetary system, 
the restructuring of international institutions, the transfer of technology etc. 
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Sri Lanka and India both being non-aligned countries and victims 
of the inequities and injustices of the prevalent economic order whole 
heartedly propagated the establishment of a NIEO. 
The external payments problem of Sri Lanka was a structural and 
long-term one which emerged primarily out of world market forces which 
were not under its control. The fall in the prices of exports were the main 
problems created by the world market. To elucidate, in 1960's, the price of 
tea and rubber which accounted for over 80% of Sri Lanka's export fell by 
30% and 40% respectively.'" Despite a considerable increase in the volume 
of exports, there was no increase in the total export earnings of the 
country. Actually they declined by an average annual rate of 1.4% from 
1960 to 1969." The stagnation in export earnings and the rise in import 
bills resulted in a deficit in the balance of trade. The emerging situation 
during the 1970's was not very different in this respect. Thus, the then 
Finance Minister of Sri Lanka, Dr. N.M. Perera disclosed at a press 
conference on 19 March that the acute foreign exchange crisis, was foisted 
on Sri Lanka, over which the Government had absolutely no control. "This 
crisis was not created by US. It has been imposed on us by virtue of our 
smallness and dependence on imports for our existence and since we are 
mainly an importer of primary commodities".'^ 
In 1974, what happened was a trade deficit again which rose from 
Rs.298 million to Rs.1,227 million in 1974.'^ The overall impact of the 
increase in oil prices on Sri Lanka's balance of payment was even greater. 
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Speaking in the Manila meeting of Asian Development Bank in 1973, the 
Finance Minister of Sri Lanka, said "we are living in a period where 
external factors have brought the external payments position of developing 
countries such as Sri Lanka to almost breaking point. The present high 
level of cereal prices, superimposed on the inflationary trends affecting all 
imports from the developed world has made it extremely difficult for Sri 
Lanka to allocate adequate external resources for the productive sectors of 
the economy for new investments".''' 
Hence, Sri Lanka wanted the overhauling of the existing 
international economic order and in that place, the creation of a new one. 
In various Non-alignment conferences Mrs. Bandaranaike 
advocated the restructuring of existing international relationships. 
Participating in the Algiers Conference of non-aligned states she said "It 
now seems appropriate to provide an economic dimension to the concept of 
Non-alignment in terms more concrete than has been the case so far".'^ She 
also called for the establishment of a commercial bank for the Third World 
and the development of a currency having the support of the Third World 
to compete with the reserve currencies of the developed world.'^ While 
submitting the decision of the Colombo Summit to the 31^' session of the 
UN General Assembly in September 1976, Mrs. Bandaranaike stated; "A 
constant thread running through all the economic documents of the 
Colombo Summit is the emphasis on collective self-reliance. I should make 
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it clear that this approach is not one of hostility and confrontation towards 
any single country or group of countries".'^ 
India has also played a considerable role in the evalution of 
NIEO, Addressing the 6"^  special session of General Assembly on 9 April, 
1974, the Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh suggested the formulation 
of comprehensive policy for the revolutionization of prices of raw 
materials, provision of additional liquidity for specially affected countries, 
equitable patterns of voting rights in the IMF and other international 
financial institutions.'^ 
Most of these suggestions were incorporated in the declaration 
adopted on 1 May 1974, at the 7"' special session of the General Assembly 
in September 1975, India's delegate Mr. Y.B. Chavan envisaged a number 
of suggestions for the establishment of NIEO. He told that only through 
voluntary transfer the developing countries could acquire a sort of buffer 
between rising bills and falling export earnings. For the protection of trade 
of developing countries, a more equitable as well as exhaustive approach 
should be adopted which would deal not only with the removal of trade 
barriers but also with the question of supply of production, marketing and 
distribution. The developing countries, according to India, should have a 
greater say in the management of monetary system.'^ 
Thus, both India and Sri Lanka were at one on the basic tenets of 
the NIEO. Since both of them were basically primary commodity 
producing countries, they fell victims to the inequities of the existing 
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international order which tilted heavily in favour of industrialized 
countries of the north. Hence, both of them felt the need for a more 
equitable world economic order. 
The concepts of development and peace are interlinked while the 
NIEO envisages greater economic development of the third world 
countries, the 'Indian Ocean Peace Zone' proposal aims at the 
establishment of peace and security in the region. Both Sri Lanka and India 
strove to propagate the Indian Ocean Peace Zone proposal because this 
would minimize the tension in the region and would thereby ensure their 
national security and stability. 
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace 
The genesis of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace could be traced back to the Conference of heads of states of the 
Non-aligned countries held in Cairo in 1964 when Mrs. Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike formulated it for the first time. It was mainly due to her 
drive that the Cairo Non-alignment Conference adopted two resolutions 
which impinged directly on the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of 
Peace. While one of them envisaged the creation of 'Zones' devoid of 
nuclear weapons covering the oceans of the world especially those oceans 
which had been previously free of nuclear weapons, the other resolution 
condemned the big powers efforts to establish and maintain bases in the 
Indian Ocean.^° During UNP Government the issue of Indian Ocean as a 
Zone of Peace was rarely discussed as it's major emphasis was on the 
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0 1 
economic dimension of the foreign policy as compared to political one. 
However with the advent of Mrs. Bandaranaike into power in 1970, the 
concept was revived. 
The main thrust of Mrs. Bandaranaike's Non-alignment policy 
was aimed at getting acceptance in international community of the Indian 
Ocean Peace Zone proposal. In the Lusaka Conference of non-aligned 
nations in September 1970, Mrs. Bandaranaike told the delegates of her 
proposal at the 1964 Cairo Conference to convert the Indian Ocean area 
into a Nuclear Free Zone. She said that Latin America and Africa had 
already been accorded such a status, and expressed hope that "all countries 
bordering the Indian Ocean should join us not only in giving effect to this 
proposal but also in keeping the Indian ocean as an area of peace".^^ 
A resolution was adopted by the Lusaka Summit calling upon the 
UN General Assembly to adopt a declaration of the Indian Ocean as a ZOP 
wherefrom big power rivalry would be eliminated. In the Commonwealth 
Conference in Singapore in January 1971, Mrs. Bandaranaike forcefully 
put forward the case for a Peace Zone in the Indian Ocean by stating that 
the final objective of the Peace Zone would be "to stabilize the Indian 
Ocean as a power vacuum so that the abrasive conflicts of the cold war do 
not enter it and the region could concentrate on the solution of its major 
problems of security, underdevelopment, etc."^'' 
Being a small island in the vast expanse of Indian Ocean, it felt 
vulnerable and thought its national security to be in danger due to the 
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increasing rivalry of the great powers. Thus participating in the 
proceedings of the 26"^  session of the UN General Assembly of 1971 Mrs. 
Bandaranaike stated : "our object is to contain the activities of foreign 
powers and ensure that they do not make our part of the world a battle 
ground for their rivalries".^'' She defined her Zone of Peace proposal as 
fallows : "The essence of our proposal is that in the Indian Ocean a defined 
area shall be declared to be a Zone of Peace and reserved exclusively for 
peaceful purposes under an appropriate regulatory system. Within the Zone 
no armaments of any kind, defensive or offensive, may be installed on in 
the sea, or the adjacent seabed or on land areas. Ships of all nations may 
exercise the right of transit but warships and ships carrying warlike 
equipment, including submarines, may not stop for other than emergency 
reasons of a technical, mechanical or humanitarian nature. No manoeuvers 
by warships of any state shall be permitted. Naval intelligence operations 
shall be forbidden. No weapon tests of any kind may be conducted. The 
regulatory system to be established will be under effective international 
control".^^ 
On 16 December 1971, the UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution entitled 'Declaration of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace'. Its 
acceptance by a large number of countries and the establishment of an 
adhoc committee of the UN under Sri Lanka's chairmanship to take further 
steps for implementation of the proposal were major personal triumph for 
Mrs. Bandaranaike.^^ 
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Thus, various international forums like the UN, the 
Commonwealth of nations, Non-alignment conferences have been utilized 
by Sri Lanka w i^th a view to mobilize support on the issues pertaining 
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. 
The national security of India has often been affected by the 
peace and stability of waters "that wash the three sides of the great 
subcontinent"^^ From the Pakistani invasion on Kashmir immediately after 
the attainment of independence, to the Indo-Pak war of 1971, India's land 
oriented strategy continued to dominate the Indian defence policy which 
operated under a "dual fear of Chinese or Joint Sino-Pak invasion over 
Himalayas, Punjab and North East Frontiers".^* The financial 
implications of building up a modern navy also imposed constraints on the 
Indian Government to build up a sufficiently strong navy. But the number 
of important factors like geo-political compulsions arising out of the 
British decision to withdraw, emergence of a host of small and 
comparatively weak sovereign states and the intensification of big power 
rivalry in the Indian Ocean made it imperative on India's part to defend its 
long coast line of island territories and marine interests. India had three 
options open to her in order to check-mate the big power rivalry which 
was in proximity to her territory. First, it had to undertake a rapid 
modernization of its army which a developing country like India could not 
easily afford to do. Second, it might seek external powers protection which 
were antithetical to the basic tenets of Non-alignment of which India was a 
major advocate. So the only alternative left to India was to organize a 
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community of nations of the Indian Ocean area and convince them for 
acceptance of the proposal of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. But India 
supported the idea of Peace Zone not from the position of weakness. In this 
connection, one writer has rightly observed, "India is in a position to 
bargain with the nuclear weapon powers by expressing its readiness to give 
up its (India's) nuclear options provided the external powers also agree to 
withdraw their nuclear weapon systems permanently from the areas, 
disband their bases agree to a treaty declaring it to be a Zone of Peace, 
collectively guarantee the security of the region and renounce the use of 
force there".^° 
Thus, both Sri Lanka and India wanted the Indian Ocean to be 
maintained as Zone of Peace because of their apprehension that any large-
scale presence of extra-regional powers were bound to create problems for 
them. They also wanted the elimination of military bases because they 
thought that these would impinge upon their territorial sovereignty and 
enhance the probability of war. The concept of Peace-Zone got linked with 
that of denuclearization of the Indian Ocean. 
Sri Lanka and India on tlie Issue of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 
South Asia 
The proposal of establishing Nuclear weapon Free Zone in South 
Asia was initiated by Pakistan after India detonated a plutonium device in 
1974. India's nuclear explosion was viewed by Pakistan as affecting 
adversely peace and security of the region. 
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An analysis of the debates of the first committee and the plenary 
meetings of General Assembly and also those of the adhoc committee on 
the Indian Ocean during the 29"^  and 30"^  sessions of the UN show that the 
issue of the creation of a denuclearized zone in South Asia had 
overshadowed the question of establishment of a peace zone in the Indian 
Ocean. 
The 29"^  session of UN General Assembly accepted Indian and 
Pakistani draft resolutions on a South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 
although the emphasis of the two resolutions differ in a substantial manner 
from each other.'" The Indian delegates, B.C. Misra, while presenting the 
country's viewpoint in the first committee of UN General Assembly in 
1974, maintained that a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone could not 
contribute in a great measure to checkmating nuclear-proliferation. The 
question involved wider issues and the Nuclear Weapon states had a 
greater responsibility to tackle the problem of proliferation. The point was 
made that the initiative towards such a zone ought to come from the states 
concerned and not from the General Assembly or the Secretary General. To 
quote, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are concepts which involve the vital 
interests of states. In many respects they are what might be termed 
geographically limited non-proliferation treaties. Take the case of the so 
called region of South Asia. Five out of six states in this region are not 
parties to the non-proliferation treaty. It is necessary that a zone large 
enough and viable should be created which satisfies the security and other 
vital interests of not only some but of all the members of the region. Any 
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proposal which fails to meet these requirements in respect of all countries 
in a zone is destined to failure".''^ The same delegate subsequently 
maintained, "the South Asian countries are surrounded by nuclear weapon 
states or countries belonging to their alliances. It is clear that South Asia 
cannot be treated in isolation for purposes of the creation of a nuclear 
weapon-free zone because South Asia is an integral part of the Asian and 
the pacific region".^^ 
Thus, India's refusal to support the Pakistani draft was based 
upon various factors like India's geopolitical configuration and link with 
neighbouring powers, hesitance to commit herself to a policy without 
proper prior consultations, its stance vis-a-vis the NPT and lis very 
philosophy of international relations.^'' 
In contrast to India's position, Sri Lanka supported the move for 
a permanent renunciation of nuclear option by the South Asian states. Sri 
Lanka viewed the concept of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia and 
the Indian Ocean Peace Zone as inextricably interlinked. The Sri Lankan 
delegate Amarasinghe participating in the debate of first committee of 
U.N. maintained that "If a nuclear weapon power were to emerge in the 
Indian Ocean region, the denuclearization and also the demilitarization of 
the area would be seriously jeopardized".'^^ But his speech surprised many 
because of his prior defence of the right of a developing country to adopt 
all technologies including nuclear explosion technology for attaining a 
breakthrough in development.^^ 
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The fact that there existed a bipartisan approach on this issue in 
Sri Lanka was evident from the official statements made by UNP 
Government after it assumed power in 1977. 
Thus, there was a divergence of approach between the two 
countries on the issue of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia. 
However, Sri Lanka was at one with countries like Pakistan, Indonesia and 
China. Such convergence "manifesting itself in support to the Pakistani 
initiative on the matter is a reflection on Sri Lanka's efforts to maximize 
its manoeuverability vis-a-vis India"." 
In fact, Sri Lanka suffered from a fear complex vis-a-vis India 
owing to the geographical proximity to such a colossus. The attainment of 
nuclear capability by India in 1974 further aggravated this apprehension. 
Sri Lanka's response on the issue also could be explained by the fact that it 
was already a member of the NPT. Hence it was obliged to join any move 
to stall horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. 
Apart from the aforementioned issue, there was a divergence of 
approach between the two countries regarding NPT. 
NPT 
Sri Lanka signed the NPT at London, Moscow and Washington 
on 1 July, 1968. The treaty based on the draft submitted by the Seventeen 
Nations Disarmament Committee, prohibited the transfer by nuclear 
weapon states to any recipient whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
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nuclear explosive devices or of control over them. The signatory states 
were not to encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices. 
Account to the treaty, the non-nuclear states were also not to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
However, the treaty granted the right to the member states to develop 
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination. Sri Lanka welcomed the step (NPT) in 1968 and in 
subsequent discussions in the UN, Sri Lanka advocated non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
But India, on the contrary, was a strident critic of the provisions 
of the NPT. With regard to the view that the further spread of nuclear 
weapons would be dangerous, India was of the opinion that the basic 
danger to world peace stemmed from the motivations and actions of those 
possessing nuclear weapons, particularly the USA and the Soviet Union. A 
strategic analyst pointed out that it might be more dangerous for the 
current five nuclear weapon states to hold a monopoly on nuclear force 
than to allow some 'middle range' nations such as India to acquire nuclear 
weapons. According to him, the possession of nuclear weapons by 'middle 
range' powers could serve as a check upon the interventionist tendencies of 
the nuclear weapons states, thus contributing to peace.•'^  
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India in general had not been impressed by the attempts of the 
super power to : 
• "guarantee the protection of non-nuclear weapons signatories to 
the treaty"; 
• "guarantee no industrial espionage via the inspection system 
while promising the inspection arrangements will not hamper 
civil nuclear developments; and" 
• "offer peaceful nuclear explosions to nations not developing 
nuclear weapons". 
Thus, both differed with regard to their approach towords NPT. 
What particularly concerned India was the fact that the super powers 
continue under the SALT I and the Vladivostak guidelines the vertical 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, whereas they attempt to ban by means of 
the NPT horizontal proliferation. 
The issues that were analysed till now had global implications in 
the context of which the response of both the countries were appraised. In 
contrast to them, the liberation war of Bangladesh had decisive regional 
ramifications. Hence, it is in the fitness of things to examine both Sri 
Lanka and India's perceptions of this event of momentous significance. 
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Liberation of Bangladesh 
There were two dimensions of the crisis in Bangladesh which 
require careful scrutiny. First, it was an "internal affair" of Pakistan which 
required observance of non-interference. In contrast to this, the other 
aspect was the influx of Bangladesh refugees into India which deserved 
humanitarian concern from the world community. 
During the initial stages, Sri Lanka adopted a low-key profile on 
the issue of the East Pakistan's demand for autonomy. This was primarily 
due to the fact that the Government was busy in dealing with the situation 
emanating out of the insurgency that broke out in the island in April 1971, 
almost at the same time with the Bangladesh upheaval. Sri Lanka was 
indebted to India and Pakistan for the aid and assistance they provided in 
order to contain the insurgency. 
Nevertheless, Sri Lanka castigated India's involvement in the 
political turmoil of Pakistan in an indirect manner. This was evident when 
in the United Nations, it maintained that it was an internal issue of 
Pakistan and considered East Pakistan's demand as one of fratricidal and 
separationist in nature."^ She provided transit facilities to the West 
Pakistani troops and arms sent to the Eastern wing for suppressing the 
Bangladesh revolt. Side by side Sri Lanka also showed its anxiety with 
regard to the influx of refugees to India and took the attitude that this was 
a problem of humanitarian concern of the world community. The 
settlement of this problem was an urgent matter and while Sri Lanka 
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emphasized the policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states, it maintained that accelerated political and constitutional procedures 
in Pakistan might facilitate the return of the refugees/' 
One of the decisive reasons responsible for the Sri Lankan 
Government's sympathetic attitude towards the refugees, was the strong 
public opinion in favour of Bangladesh inside the island."^ Special public 
committees were formed in Sri Lanka for furtherance of the cause of 
Bangladesh. Various influential segments of society like students, women, 
religious organizations, trade unions, lawyers, teachers and 
parliamentarians, issued statements condemning 'massacre of unarmed 
people' in Bangladesh by Pakistani troops and demanded immediate 
release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was under secret military trial in 
Pakistan.'^ ^ 
The prevalence of crisis in the immediate neighbourhood and its 
internationalization through the involvement of external powers was 
viewed with great concern and anxiety by Sri Lanka. She wanted 
restoration of peace in the region. Mrs. Bandaranaike tried to act as a 
mediator between the two countries and proposed to convene a Non-
alignment conference akin to that of 1962 on Sino-Indian border crisis.'*'' 
However, the outbreak of a full-fledged war between India and 
Pakistan on 3 December 1971 culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh 
as an independent entity altered the situation. The shift in Sri Lanka's 
perception was clearly seen from the stand taken by her in the UN. 
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On 8 December 1971 in the General Assembly, Sri Lanka voted 
for the Argentina resolution'*^ which called for immediate ceasefire and 
withdrawal of Indian troops. However, while speaking in the Security 
Council for which Sri Lanka sought special permission, its delegate 
Amarasinghe maintained that political settlement of Bangladesh issue was 
the key to the Indo-Pak conflict and wanted the withdrawal of troops to 
succeed the 'settlement'. Subsequent reports indicated that Sri Lanka 
refused to comply with Pakistan's request of reopening the issue before the 
UNGA.''^ 
Thus, during the critical phase, Sri Lanka by her non-commital 
stance, tried to manipulate both India and Pakistan to keep a balance of 
power to preserve her own national security. But when Bangladesh became 
a fait accompli, Sri Lanka reformulated her stance in the context of the 
emerging power configuration in the sub-continent. 
Sri Lanka's attitude and response to developments in East 
Pakistan can be explained by a number of factors: the geopolitical 
configuration in conjunction with the socio-economic, cultural ties with 
India compelled Sri Lanka to follow a policy of both remaining 'close' to 
as well as 'apart' from India. The need to employ counter weights through 
diplomatic manoeuverability necessitated the establishment of a balanced 
relationship with both India and Pakistan to the maximum possible extent. 
Besides, struggling with ethnic and lingual diversities, the 
leaders were apprehensive of vivisection and division. They, therefore. 
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turned a blind eye to the suppression of the majority of the population in 
East Pakistan. If the Government adopted moral and political stand of 
extending support to East Pakistan, they could be embarrassing themselves 
regarding their own Tamil problem. 
Sri Lanka had also a small amount of Muslim population whose 
leadership maintained silence over the happening in East Bengal. Mrs. 
Bandaranaike also had to rely on them for political support as the Islamic 
Socialist Front was a partner of the United Front Government. But the 
Lanka Sama Samaj Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP) which 
were constituents of the UF Government, lent their support to the East 
Pakistan. UNP which was in opposition had similar views as that of the 
SLFP. 
An attempt was made in this chapter to examine the response of 
Sri Lanka on some important foreign policy issues and its convergence, 
divergence with that of India. Time to time both the countries had reacted 
on several international as well as regional issues, some times in 
conformity with each others ideas such as on issues like Non-alignment, 
NIEO, Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace etc. 
Besides, except for difference of opinion on signing NPT, and the 
issue of South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone both the countries had almost 
followed the same path so far the movement for disarmament was 
concerned. Bangladesh crisis was another issue which disclosed 
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differences between both the neighbours. But what is noticeable is that 
bilateral interactions always continued. 
The experience of colonialism, common membership of UN, 
NAM etc. and compulsions of developing economies led the two countries 
to respond in a similar way to many international crisis. There was 
consensus among them on basic tenets of Non-alignment, NIEO, Indian 
Ocean as a Zone of peace. On the broad issues of general disarmament and 
arms control, there was a near unanimity between these two countries. 
Because of the massive acquisition of arms and ammunitions both 
conventional and nuclear by the great powers the world was on the verge 
of a catastrophe. Sri Lanka and India which belonged to the third world, 
could not afford to sppnH heavily on animmems, irjecause of the inbuilt 
restrictions on their economies. Obviously any international movement for 
disarmament found an active response from these states as, in the long run, 
their own people would be saved from annihilation in a global warfare. 
However, differences in their perceptions to some multilateral 
arms control Agreements like NPT were noticeable. While Sri Lanka 
supported it by signing and ratifying at an early date, India's reluctance to 
sign it appeared to be mainly because it wanted to keep its options open 
particularly in view of the fact that China had already acquired nuclear 
capability. The issue of South Asia as a Nuclear Free Zone constituted 
another area of divergence. A possible explanation for Sri Lanka's support 
to the proposal emerged from the notion of a security threat from India. 
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Along with such a fear-psychosis it had also to be kept in mind that Sri 
Lanka had signed the NPT. But it is noteworthy that even if the respective 
stands of both the countries manifested divergence on some issues, such 
differences did not affect the basic strands of bilateral interaction. 
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CHAPTER - II 
INDO-SRI LANKA RELATIONS: BILATERAL ISSUES 
The Issue of the Possession of Kachchativu and Fisheries Rights 
in the Palk Strait Region 
"As placed by nature, and separated by the waters of the Palk 
strait, Indo-Sri Lanka relations did not suffer from any territorial dispute 
between them on attainment of independence from the British."' There 
was one small and unpopulated island i.e. Kachchativu that served as an 
irritant between the relations of two neighbouring countries. It is located 
about 20 Km. from the limlttu island ot Pamban'' and "about 11 Km. of 
Delft island on the Sri Lanka side. It has an area of 285.2 acres and is 
one mile and 300 yards at its widest."^ No permanent population resides 
here and it does not has any economic wealth not even the drinking 
water. But the waters surrounding it are known to be rich in marine life 
and is very famous as a happy haunt of fishermen from Tamil Nadu. 
Usually here the fishermen dry their nets too. There is one small church 
dedicated to St. Anthony in this island. In the month of March, during 
the annual festival of St. Anthony, about four to five thousand pilgrims 
visit this holy place. It is said that a fisherman who could survive even 
after his boat overturned, constructed this church. 
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During the British rule in India, it was the Zamindari of the 
Raja of Ramnad in the erstwhile state of Madras and present day Tamil 
Nadu, as was stated by one member in the Lok Sabha: 
"It was in the exclusive possession and 
enjoyment of the Raja of Ramnad when he was a 
Zamindar of the Ramnad estate. After 
Government assumed the Zamindari, that island 
was under the control of the Indian Government. 
It is an Indian territory."'* 
The legal dispute of the island of Kachchativu began in the 
1920s. "An important meeting took place in Colombo on October 24, 
1921 to delimit the Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar, between the 
officials of the Madras Presidency and Ceylon."^ The decisions of the 
meeting triggered considerable controversy. On behalf of Ceylon, 
Horsburgh, leader of the delegation, proposed that the "delimitation 
should follow the median line, subject to an incursion beyond that line 
so as to include the islet of Kachchativu and three miles to the 
westward."^ "The median line so drawn placed Kachchativu Island on 
Sri Lankan side, but the representative of the Madras Government 
signed the delimitation line with a proviso that, "the above is signed by 
us, representatives of the Government of Madras, without prejudice to 
any territorial claim which may be made by the Government of India to 
the island of Kachchativu."' Horsburgh or Ceylon claimed possession of 
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island. But the British Indian delegation was completely unprepared for 
such situation as they were not given any instructions "either to contest 
or to admit such a claim." However the delegation maintained that the 
island comes under the Zamindari of Raja of Ramnad who had regularly 
leased^ it and was also receiving rent from that land, but then Horsburgh 
threatened to dissolve the Conference and British Indian delegation was 
never in favour of any ferment, hence it was decided that the 
"delimitation of the new jurisdiction for fishing purpose could be 
decided independently of the question of territoriality. The delimitation 
line was accordingly fixed three miles west of Kachchativu."'° In a 
letter of 8 March 1923, the Government of India, clearly instructed the 
Government of MnHrac that "Government of India piupu^c unless ihe 
Government of Madras have further evidence to the contrary to 
recognize that the island of Kachchativu is part of Ceylon."" The 
British Indian delegation considered the claim of Ceylon to the island of 
Kachchativu as "sentimental rather than practical".'^ Although, in 1924 
the Secretary of State for India in London did not accept the validity of 
this decision. But here it may be kept in mind that as per rules the 
Secretary of State for India was not authorized to pass any order that 
may be binding on the Government of Ceylon as the latter came under 
the jurisdiction of the Colonial Secretary. But as a resuh of Secretary of 
State for India's attitude, the Agreement was not ratified by the colonial 
office. Hence, when both the countries attained independence from the 
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British rule, the position of the island regarding its ownership remained 
blurry. 
Post Independence Scene 
After the independence of the two countries, the question of 
the ownership of the island gained impetus. Both the countries within 
their own rightful territory, decided to use the island for target bombing 
and naval exercise. During world war II, Ceylon Government performed 
bombing practice in Kachchativu. And in 1949, India showed her 
willingness to carry out naval exercises in the Palk straits and expressed 
that she wanted to use Kachchativu as the target for bombardment. But 
Ceylon immediately reacted on it and stated that Kachchativu was 
Ceylonese territory and that India must ask prior permission from 
Ceylon before targeting the island. "In 1955, Ceylon wanted to use the 
island for aerial practice and firing and requested India to extend jts co-
operation as Indian planes were flying over the area".'^ The matter 
attracted great attention in the Indian Parliament in particular when, the 
Government of India highlighted the unusefulness of Kachchativu 
island, whether geographical or economical. The Government was 
accused of being soft on the ownership question in order to please 
Colombo. 
In March 1956, Ceylon informed India of her decision to use 
island for bombing practice. The matter was immediately discussed in 
59 
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations: Bilateral Issues 
the Indian Parliament. Muthuswamy Vallatharasu, an M.P. from 
Pudokkottai in the Lok Sabha, introduced an adjournment motion to 
draw the attention to alleged occupation of Kachchativu Island by 
Ceylon Government, which intended to use the island for bombing 
practice. The adjournment motion was not admitted as the Prime 
Minister and Minister of External Affairs Jawaharlal Nehru said that he 
had no adequate information.'" Few days later, Sadat Ali Khan, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of External Affairs announced 
in Lok Sabha that New Delhi through diplomatic channels had requested 
Ceylon to postpone any decision to use the island for aerial practice as 
the position with regard to the ownership was not clear.'^ 
A member of Lok Sabha Shree Narayan Das, on 14 April, 
1956, asked from the Government: 
"The Government of Ceylon made some 
reference with regard to this island to the 
Indian Government and as Government of India 
did not respond the Government of Ceylon was 
encouraged to lay claims over this island"?'^ 
On the same day Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru told 
the Parliament that: 
"There is no question of the Government of 
India or the Government of Ceylon coming 
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into conflict over a tiny little island. There 
is no national prestige involved in this 
matter, especially with our neighbour 
Ceylon."'^ 
In response, Ceylon expressed that Kachchativu was an 
integral part of Ceylon and also explained about the uncertainty of any 
decision regarding aerial practice.'* Afterwards, Ceylon entered into a 
Defence Agreement with Great Britain which made Britain's access 
possible to the ports of "Trincomalee"'' and Katunayake'. Thus it was 
estimated that Ceylon wanted to use Kachchativu for bombing practice 
in order to facilitate the use of Kachchativu by the British Air Force. In 
the Lok Sabha opposition larder expressed the fear that Britain is 
member of SEATO of which Pakistan is also a member. Thus by using 
Kachchativu for bombing practice through Ceylon, the members of 
SEATO would be trying to make their presence felt in India's southern 
neighborhood. But when Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike came to power as 
the Prime Minister of Ceylon, he asked Britain to remove all her bases 
from Ceylon. This was definitely a welcoming step ending the 
strategically irritating element from the Kachchativu controversy. 
However, Ceylon was firm on her allegations that St. Anthony's festival 
had always been used for large scale smuggling and had been the main 
point for the illegal immigrants to enter into Ceylon. 
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"In 1956, by a Presidential Proclaimation, India extended its 
territorial waters from the conventional three miles limit to six nautical 
miles"."^^ In order to protect its marine resources, in 1957, India also 
claimed jurisdiction over an adjacent area of 100 nautical miles from the 
outer limits of its territorial waters. But Ceylon took it as an anti-Ceylon 
activity, which would have an adverse effect over Ceylon's jurisdiction 
over Kachchativu. And in 1957, Ceylon did what India had done and 
extended her territorial waters to six nautical miles and claimed fishing 
right within an adjacent area of 100 miles from its territorial waters. 
"Ceylon took this step in order to strengthen its bargaining position so 
that during the time when negotiations would take place to settle 
overiappmg claims".^' 
Though Nehru was an advocate of maintaining friendly 
relations with his neighbour Sri Lanka but the kind of attitude he 
displayed in handling Kachchativu issue was certainly vague. On 9 
August 1960 when again the question of the ownership of Kachchativu 
was brought into discussion in Lok Sabha, the Government of India's 
response was as vague as before. In reply to a specific question whether 
the island belonged to India or Ceylon, Nehru said: 
"I think there is some controversy about it". 
When pointed out that the island was within the Zamindari of 
the Raja of Ramnad, Nehru's response was equally vague and he said: 
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"Ramnathapuram Samasthanam is a Zamindari, it 
is not a state.If it is a Zamindari it is a matter for 
the courts to settle it". 
When pointed out that Zamindari had since been assumed by 
the Madras state under the Zamindari Abolition Act, Nehru said: 
"I understand the question. Whether the 
Zamindari is owned by the Samasthanam or the 
state, it continues to be a Zamindari; it does not 
become something else." 
When the members still persisted with the question whether it 
was Ceyionese or Indian, Nehru said: 
"That is a matter in controversy". 
The flimsy approach in which the Indian Prime Minister dealt 
with the matter was best illustrated by his response to the question asked 
by Dr. A.N. Bose, a member of Raj'ya Sabha on 1 September 1960. He 
asked: 
"What is the distance of the island from the coast 
of India and from the coast of Ceylon"? 
Nehru Replied: 
"It is 18 miles east of Pamban. Where Pamban is 
I do not know."^'' 
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Actually Nehru wished to go for a casual approach in order to 
maintain congenial relations with Ceylon so he was never seen tense 
while answering the questions in regard to the ownership of 
Kachchativu. And this can be witnessed from the statement he made in 
the Rajya Sabha in September I960: 
"There was a claim on one of the old principal 
Zamindaries, and it was part of the Zamindari. 
The Zamindari has gone now, and I do not quite 
know as to where the matter stands".^'' 
Differences of Opinion Between Indian Central Government 
and Tamil Based Parties 
The Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu were firm supporters of 
Raja of Ramnad's claim over Kachchativu hence were in favour of the 
view that Raja of Ramnad's claim was supported by strong historical 
evidence i.e. Zamindari rights sustained by the East India Company and 
subsequently by the British Government, the large number of lease 
agreements which were entered into, collection of revenue, and above 
all non-payment of any revenue at any point of time to Governments in 
Ceylon. When Zamindari was abolished, all these rights naturally 
bestowed upon the Madras Presidency. 
Unfortunately, the then Tamil Nadu's DMK Government could 
not be able to convince New Delhi that their claim over Kachchativu 
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was just and genuine as records were available and that their possession 
over that island was essential to protect their national interest. However 
Indian Government did not reject or dispute the Zamindari Rights of the 
Raja of Ramnad, but the then Minister of State in the Ministry of 
External Affairs, Dinesh Singh stated in Raj'ya Sabha: 
"Zamindari right does not confer sovereignty. 
The position is that Zamindari right of the Raja 
of Ramnad has never been disputed. In fact, there 
was a meeting in 1921 in which there was the 
representative from the Government of Madras 
and they had agreed that while the Zamindari 
rights of the Raja of Ramnad would continue, the 
island belonged to Ceylon. This fact was not 
accepted by the Secretary of State for India and 
since then this dispute has been going on".^^ 
The issue of Kachchativu was raised by the press and in the 
Parliament at regular intervals. On 17 May 1966 when a question was 
asked in the Parliament about the ownership of the island, the 
Government responded: 
"The political status of this island has not been 
finally determined".^^ 
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Till then the Tamil based parties of Tamil Nadu started raising 
voice against India's indifferent approach towards the Kachchativu 
issue. Because of the mounting pressure from Dravidian parties and 
opposition, in "September 1967, India extended her territorial waters to 
twelve miles."^^ And in 1970, Ceylon also did the same. 
After 1967 elections, DMK members made discussions on this 
issue in Parliament. The DMK received active support from other 
opposition groups such as the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the Samyukta 
Socialist Party (SSP) and the Jana Sangh. "In March 1968, these parties 
alleged that the island, which belonged to India, was not being 
effectively controlled".^^ "In the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, the 
SSP group moved an adjournment motion on the occupation of the 
Kachchativu island by the Ceylon Government. The Deputy speaker 
ruled it out on the ground that it wa? a foreign poli>.y issue which fell 
within the jurisdiction of the Central Government".^^ 
The then Prime Minister of India Smt. Indira Gandhi followed 
the Precedent set by her father i.e. not to intensify the issue of 
Kachchativu. In March 1968, she declared, "we have very friendly 
relations with the people and Government of Ceylon. If we say more on 
this now, it may create difficulties."^° 
In reality what New Delhi followed was a policy of calculated 
indifference, an effort not to allow inculcating tensions into cordial 
bilateral relations of two countries. However, vague and ambiguous 
answers and statements were always coming from the Government of 
India so far the question of the ownership of Kachchativu was 
concerned. For instance, B.R. Bhagat, Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs while replying to a question asked by G.G. Swell, stated: 
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"It is neither under the possession of India nor of 
Ceylon".^^ 
When Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi was asked to clarify 
this statement, she mentioned that the Government did not have the full 
information at that moment. 
In order to pacify the claims and counter claims, need for 
negotiations was felt by both the sides and this desire of Sri Lanka to 
settle the matter was conveyed to the Lok Sabha by Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi on 4 March 1968. She maintained: 
"Our High commissioner called on the Hon'ble 
Prime Minister of Ceyion and iasi week our 
External Affairs Minister also called the High 
Commissioner of Ceylon in Delhi. I have now 
received a message from the Hon'ble Prime 
Minister of Ceylon both through our High 
Commissioner in Delhi that he is agreeable to 
any matter concerning Kachchativu being 
discussed in accordance with the procedure laid 
down during my meeting with him in September 
last year. Hon'ble members will recall that it was 
agreed then that senior officials of the two 
Governments should meet once a year alternately 
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in Colombo and New Delhi to review the 
progress of Indo-Ceylon relations in all fields 
and exchange views on other matters of common 
interest. We appreciate this friendly approach 
and propose to discuss this in accordance with 
the above procedure, which appears adequate to 
deal with the situation both in our opinion and in 
the opinion of the Ceylon Government. It is 
proposed to discuss the question of this island 
with the Government of Ceylon in the near 
future. Bearing in mind our fraternal relations 
wiili Ccylun and ihe faci mai we have settiea 
several difficult problems with them in a 
peaceful and friendly manner, I have every hope 
that this question also can be settled in a similar 
manner". ^ ^ 
Away from New Delhi's perplexed approach, the successive 
Governments in Ceylon maintained a logical approach on the question of 
the ownership of Kachchativu. In 1968, while speaking in the House of 
Representatives, the then Prime Minister of Ceylon Dudley Senanayake 
emphatically maintained that "Ceylon had always been in a position that 
it had exercised effective control over island and our claim is well 
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founded on historical facts''.'^'' During the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister's Conference held in London in January 1969, Indira Gandhi 
and Dudley Senanayake both agreed not to touch the issue till the time 
when an amicable settlement could be reached, also both the parties 
decided that none would take any step which could enhance or aggravate 
the issue. In March 1969, the two countries agreed "to refrain from 
taking any administrative action to alter the status quo or buttress their 
respective claims".''^ "They also agreed that there would be only plain 
clothes policemen to maintain order and regulate the movement of 
pilgrims during St. Anthony's festival".^^ By early 1974, it was clear to 
all that in order to strengthen congenial relations with her southern 
and hence exhibited her willingness to acknowledge Ceylon's claim to 
Kachchativu island and took this issue as a minor irritant. Indira Gandhi, 
the Prime Minister of India visited Sri Lanka in April 1973 and after her 
visit, a meeting of senior officials was held in October 1973 in which 
Indo-Sri Lanka relations as a whole were discussed, for example, the 
questions of citizenship to 1,50,000 stateless persons (The residue of the 
Sirimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964), repatriation of those who had been 
conferred Indian citizenship, delimitation of the Maritime boundary in 
the Palk Bay and the respective claims on Kachchativu had been the 
topic of discussion. Indira Gandhi called Kachchativu a "Sheer rock 
with no strategic significance"." At this point of time India made it very 
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clear that New Delhi would not emphasize its claim on Kachchativu 
island anymore. 
Maritime Boundary Agreement of 28 June 1974 
Sirimavo Bandaranake's state visit to India in January 1974 
ended finalizing two Agreements: 
1. "The Indira Gandhi - Sirimavo Bandaranaike Agreement of 
January 1974, by which Colombo and New Delhi agreed to 
share the burden of stateless persons equally by conferring 
citizenship on 75,000 people with their natural increase, and, 
2. The Maritime Boundary Agreement between India and Sri 
Lanka to determine the boundaries in the Palk straits, 
Kachchativu and related matters.""'^ 
Finally after low key discussions at the official level, without 
stretching the issue further, an Agreement "On the Boundary in Historic 
Waters between the two Countries and Related Matters" was signed on 
the 28 June 1974* in New Delhi. 
The Government of India justified its decision of accepting Sri 
Lanka's claim over the island as a diplomatic step to improve relations 
with the neighbours that become subject to stress for quite a some time 
during Bangladesh crisis. The former Indian High Commissioner to Sri 
For the text of the Agreement see Appendix VI. 
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Lanka, Vincent Coelho, admired the Agreement as "a master stroke of 
statesmanship to the satisfaction of both India and Ceylon".''^ 
During Indira Gandhi's regime, India gave new directions to 
her South Asian policy: 
• To strengthen relations with neighbouring countries by the 
rapid conclusion of Agreements which have been under 
negotiation for some time, 
• By giving recognition to Governments friendly to India, in 
order to improve political relations, 
• The Removal of irritants in bilateral relations by gestures of 
goodwill. 
So far policy towards Sri Lanka was concerned, Sri Lanka 
shared the larger foreign policy concerns of India so it was a type of 
duty on the part of New Delhi to help Colombo in stabilizing and 
consolidating the regime of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike.'*^ The 
Kachchativu settlement was expected to "go a long way in boosting the 
sagging morale of the Bangladesh Government". It would "enhance both 
the credibility of the Government in the country and the personal image 
of Sirimavo Bandaranaike". It would also blunt the arguments of leftist 
elements in Sri Lanka for whom issues such as Kachchativu were 
symbolic of India's hegemonistic designs towards its neighbours."^' 
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The Annual Report of the Minister of External Affairs, 1974-
75, threw light on New Delhi's position: 
"The recent Agreement with Sri Lanka on the 
division of historic waters in the Palk Bay, which 
has also settled the issue of Kachchativu 
amicably, is an indication of India's earnestness 
in evolving a policy of friendship and mutual co-
operation with her neighbours"/^ 
Sri Lanka's Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, while 
speaking in National State Assembly, on the Agreement on Kachchativu 
on 23 July 1974, in Colombo, stated: 
"I am happy to present in the Assembly the 
Agreement that I have concluded with the Prime 
Minister of India demarcating the boundary 
between Sri Lanka and India in the waters from 
Palk strait to Adam's bridge. This Agreement 
was signed on June 26 and was ratified and 
came into operation on July S"'. This Agreement 
defines once and for all our maritime boundary 
with our neighbouring country and also opens a 
new chapter in our dealings with India. In fact, it 
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constitutes a historic landmark in the relations 
between our two countries." 
I am happy that this Agreement has been 
welcomed by all sections of the people in Sri 
Lanka, and even by some of our critics."''"' 
While offering tribute to Indira Gandhi, again, Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike hailed India's "accommodative attitude": 
"In 1973, she visited Sri Lanka on my invitation. It was during 
this visit that we discussed the delay in repatriation of those who were 
registered as Indian citizens under the Sirima-Shastri Pact. We agreed 
on a suitable arrangement to facilitate the repatriation. Even the 
question of Kachchativu and the demarcation of boundaries between our 
two countries was discussed at this time. An amicable Agreement was 
reached to the benefit of both India and Sri Lanka I must say with 
the highest regard and affection that whenever there were outstanding 
matters between our two countries they were taken up directly with her 
and she was extremely understanding, appreciative and accommodating 
to Sri Lanka's point of view. She always displayed an attitude of great 
statesmanship in resolving whatever problems big or small, which we 
had with India. She never tried to adopt a big sister attitude".""^ 
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Although the Government of India took this Maritine Boundary 
Agreement as a landmark but when the Agreement was placed before the 
Parliament, it gathered great agitation. The Government was accused of 
surrendering and gifting away of Indian territory. 
One member Sezhiyan from Tamil Nadu, speaking in the Lok 
Sahha on 23 July 1974 argued: 
"We should have been consulted and the House 
should have been taken into confidence before 
they entered into this unholy Agreement for the 
surrender of territory by India" "This is an 
unholy and disgraceful act of statesmanship 
unworthy of any Government. Therefore, we do 
not want to associate ourselves with the 
statement that is going to be made by the hon. 
Minister, and we want to disassociate ourselves 
by walking out of the House"."^^ 
Another member from Tamil Nadu K. Manoharan Said that: 
"Through this unholy Agreement, the Sri Lanka 
Prime Minister has emerged as victor and the 
Prime Minster of India as a pathetic 
vanquished".''^ 
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On the same day, Atal Behari Vajpayee from the opposition 
charged that: 
"In January when Mrs. Indira Gandhi talked to 
the Sri Lanka Prime Minister it was then itself 
that it was decided to hand over Kachchativu to 
Sri Lanka".* 
He further said : 
"Friendship did not mean to give away your 
territory to another country. If grant of territory 
could promote friendship then there was no need 
to fight a neighbouring country. Relations could 
deteriorate even after giving away land." 
He also asked the Speaker to give a ruling whether : 
"The Government without amending the 
Constitution give a part of Indian territory to 
another country?"'*' 
Madhu Limaye, another prominent member of Lok Sabha 
said: 
"how far we can go on transferring territory in 
the name of border demarcation". 
* Original in Hindi 
** Original in Hindi 
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He further stated: 
"by an executive Agreement Indian territory 
cannot be transferred".'*^ 
P.K. Deo, another member of Lok Sabha said that : 
"All the revenue records of the Madras 
Government corroborate that Kachchativu was a 
part of the former Ramnad Zamindari and an 
integral part of this country. So, under no 
circumstances the Government has got any power 
under the Constitution to cede even an inch of 
our country"."" 
The Government was also charged for acting in an anti-
democratic manner, for not consulting the opposition parties before 
signing the Agreement and hence keeping the House in the dark. 
The Minister of External Affairs Sardar Swarn Singh, however, 
in his statement, maintained that the island had always been an 
uninhabited one and neither of the two countries had any presence there. 
He said the claim on the island was : 
"Closely connected with determining the 
boundary line between India and Sri Lanka in the 
waters of the Palk Bay". 
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Which is required to be settled as earliest as possible : 
"Keeping in view the claims of the two sides, 
historical evidence, legal practice and precedent 
and in the border context of our growing friendly 
relations with Sri Lanka". 
Nevertheless, the External Affairs Minister expressed that the 
Indian claim on the island was thoroughly searched in archives both in 
India and abroad including those of the Dutch, but, he very emphatically 
accepted that Indian claim was not incontestable and unquestionable. He 
further said in Lok Sabha: 
"I would particularly like to draw the attention of 
the Honourable members to the fact that when 
two sides have a good arguable case on a 
particular issue, and the problem cannot be 
resolved expeditiously through bilateral 
negotiations, there is inevitably an attempt to 
seek outside intervention by appeal either to the 
International Court of Justice or to third party 
arbitration. For our part, we have always been 
firmly of the views that in any differences with 
our neighbouring countries, we should seek to 
resolve them through bilateral discussions 
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without outside interference, on the basis of 
equality and goodwill". 
Responding the dissention of some of the members that the 
Agreement was victory of Sri Lanka, External Affairs Minister said: 
"It would be wrong to see this Agreement as a * ^ A » ' ^ 
victory of one side or the other. Both cO'iHitgies,---'*^ r \0 ' - ^A ' 
have gained as a result of the Agreement! w<hl6lT ^^- •/ . 
is a victory of mature statesmanship, a victory"^n-^ ^^-^ /' 
the cause of friendship and co-operation in the " ~ - --^^ 
area. A potential major irritant in relations 
between the two countries which had remained 
unresolved over the years, has now been removed 
and both countries can now concentrate on the 
exploitation of economic and other resources in 
these, now well defined waters and generally on 
intensifying co-operation between themselves in 
various fields. The Agreement marks an 
important step in further strengthening the close 
ties that bind India and Sri Lanka".^°* 
Hence, whatever was the reaction of the members of opposition 
in the Parliament on Maritime Boundary Agreement, both the 
See Appendix VII. 
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Governments were satisfied because after a long time, an irritant i.e. the 
issue of the ownership of Kachchativu, that continued to strain the 
cordial relations of two South Asian neighbours, met its end, but no 
doubt at the altar of Indian territory. The Agreement of 28 June 1974 
basically marked the maritime boundaries of India and Sri Lanka. 
Although the island was yielded to Sri Lanka, the Agreement 
safeguarded the rights of Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit the 
island in the same manner as they had been doing before the Agreement 
came into existence. Such Indian visitors were not required to carry 
travel documents or visas to visit the island. The Agreement also made 
the provision for the vessels of both countries, to enjoy the traditional 
rights in each other's waters what they had assunicu cailici. The 
Agreement also paved the way for a series of other related Agreements 
between the two countries: 
i) 23 March 1976 - Agreement* on boundary in the Gulf of 
Mannar and the Bay of Bangal, 
ii) 23 March 1976 - Exchange of letters on Wedge Bank 
Fisheries, 
iii) 31 July 1976 - Agreement along with Maldives on determining 
the Tri-junction in the Gulf of Mannar and 
* See Appendix VIII. 
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iv) 22 November 1976 - Supplementary Agreement* on the 
extension of the Maritime Boundary between the two countries 
in the Gulf of Mannar from position 13 m to the Tri-junction 
point between the three countries. 
Issues of Fishing in the Palk Bay Region 
The only motive of the Government of India in signing these 
Agreements with Sri Lanka, was to settle the issue of the boundary and 
fishing jurisdiction of the two countries once and for all. And there was 
definitely no problem left so far the location of maritime boundary 
between the two countries was concerned, unfortunately the same could 
not be said about the fishing. There was confusion as whatever the 
Agreements expressed was not the reality. In fact Articles 4 and 5 of the 
1974 Agreement had the potential to create some confusion. Because of 
their importance Articles 4 and 5 are quoted herein full : 
Article - 4 : 'Each country shall have sovereignty and exclusive 
jurisdiction and control over the waters, the island, the 
continental shelf and the subsoil thereof, falling on its 
own side of the aforesaid boundary'. 
Article - 5 : 'Subject to the foregoing, Indian fishermen and 
pilgrims will enjoy access to visit Kachchativu as 
* See Appendix X. 
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hitherto, and will not be required by Sri Lanka to 
obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes. 
Here one can observe that these articles do not specifically 
refer to fishing rights and a member from Tiruchirapalli asked the 
clarification from External Affairs Minister in the Lok Sabha : 
"So far, our fishermen had a right to go even 
beyond Kachchativu, fish and come back. The 
Hon. Minister says that these rights are fully 
protected. But there are problems which we 
would like our Government to take up with Sri 
Lanka and seek their solution".^' 
While replying, Sardar Swarna Singh made the members to 
remember 1921 Agreement under which : 
"The western side of the fishery line was the 
exclusive fishery right of the Indian citizens and to 
the east of that was the right of Sri Lankan fishermen. 
But in spite of that division, the fishermen generally 
were free to fish even round about Kachchativu and 
they also used the Kachchativu for drying their nets". 
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Talking about the traditional rights he maintained : 
"Although Sri Lanka's claim to sovereignty over 
Kachchativu has been recognized, the traditional 
rights of Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit 
the island will remain unaffected".^^ 
In other words, these articles and the clarification of these, 
given by Minister for External Affairs did create the impression that the 
Indian fishermen would be free to fish around the island of Kachchativu. 
But, on the contrary the Government of Sri Lanka never 
supported this view point. Higher authorities of the Ministry of External 
Affairs in Colombo interpret the Article 5 in a different manner. They 
believed "that Article 5 did not confer any fishing rights, but only the 
right to dry the fishing nets, and rights of the pilgrims to visit 
Kachchativu for religious purpose. There is a fallacy in this line of 
reasoning. Drying of nets pre-supposes that the nets had become wet and 
this could happen only if the nets had been used for fishing in and 
around Kachchativu". 
A careful examination of the available facts speaks that India 
could not maintain the principle of equidistance successfully while the 
task of determining the maritime boundaries was done. And in this 
process the interests of Tamil Nadu were sacrificed. A very well known 
82 
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations: Bilateral Issues 
scholar of International Law, D.P.O'. Connell was of the view that the 
principle of equidistance was adopted but of course "modified for 
pragmatic purposes".^"^ Basically the primary purpose of both the parties 
was to settle the dispute over the Kachchativu island which India agreed 
to cede to Sri Lanka and for that purpose the boundary line was marked 
in a way so that it pass just one mile west of the island of Kachchativu, 
and as a result the island entered within the maritime boundaries of Sri 
Lanka. An impression was allowed to be created that no restrictions 
were sought to be placed on the traditional rights of the fishermen either 
to visit the island or to fish around its waters. The provision that they 
were not required to carry any type of travel documents, gave every one 
the impression that traditional fishing rights have remained as it is. It 
would be Interesting to note that the 1976 Agreement defining the 
boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal had a clear and 
specific provision that "each party shall have sovereign rights and 
exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zone as well as over their resources, whether living or non-
living falling on its side of the aforesaid boundary".^^ Such provisions 
were absent in the 1974 Agreement which led to a great confusion on 
the part of the Indian fishermen whether they were free to fish in the 
vicinity of the Kachchativu island as in the past or not. The Indian 
fishermen carried on fishing in the waters around Kachchativu island 
thus causing immense tensions in the relation of India and Sri Lanka. 
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With the intensification of the ethnic problem of Sri Lankan Tamils, the 
problem became all the more complicated. 
1976 Agreement on Boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the 
Bay of Bengal 
Another Agreement delimiting the boundaries in the Gulf of 
Mannar and the Bay of Bengal, to the west and the east of the boundary 
line already delimited in 1974, was entered into by India and Sri Lanka 
on 23 March 1976, also there was exchange of letters, dated 23 March 
1976, itself between Kewal Singh, Foreign Secretary to the Government 
of India, and W.T. Jayasinghe, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs, Government of Sri Lanka. Indian Minister for External 
Affairs Y.B. Chavan, while speaking in Lok Sabha on 24 March 1976 
hailed : 
"This exchange of Letters also constitutes an 
Agreement between the two countries" 56 
It was hoped that complete understanding had been reached 
between the two countries and the fishermen of the two countries could 
now engage in their traditional vocation in peace and amity. Indian 
Minister for External Affairs Y.B. Chavan, further expressed his 
sentiments when he said : 
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"With the signing of the present Agreement, the 
maritime boundary between India and Sri Lanka 
stands settled along its entire length. The two 
countries shall exercise full sovereignty and 
absolute jurisdiction on their side of the maritime 
boundary. Both countries have agreed that after 
the determination of the maritime boundary, 
fishing vessels and fishermen of one country 
shall not engage in fishing in the waters of the 
other"*." 
Surprisingly 1976 Agreement, unlike 1974 Agreement, did not 
triggered agitation. Because of Emergency imposed in 1975, democratic 
rights of dissent and protest were suspended by the Government. Even 
the leading opposition leaders were imprisoned and owing to such a 
tensed atmosphere, Y.B. Chavan's statement in Parliament was not 
followed by any debate. And most surprisingly, Tamil Nadu, the most 
victimized of all these maritime Agreements, did not exhibit much open 
indignation. 
Situation 1987 onwards and Activities of LTTE in Palk Strait 
Palk strait has been used by Sri Lankan Tamils particularly 
militants and in that also particularly by LTTE, who wish to use Tamil 
Nadu as centre and support base for conducting their activities in Jaffna. 
See Appendix IX. 
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LTTE used Indian fishing boats under the guise of Indian fishermen for 
their various unlawful endeavours whether to ferry men in and out of 
Jaffna or to smuggle strategic commodities like fuel, arms and 
ammunition etc. The role of Indian fishing boats and the Indian 
fishermen gained momentum when 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was 
entered into and Indian Government adopted a strict attitude towards 
LTTE by posing restrictions on the militant organization. Some Indian 
fishermen either to keep their promise, or to get money or to save their 
lives continued to help in LTTE activities and often trapped by Sri 
Lankan navy, always quick to cut LTTE supply lines so that they could 
stop their illegal activities or otherwise be died of starvation. 
The Indian fishermen often targeted by Sri Lanka navy blamed 
it for harassing them thus creating misunderstandings in the relations of 
two countries. To come out of this situation and to protect the lives of 
Indian fishermen, the Government of India clarified that the fishermen 
were free to visit Kachchativu to dry their nets and for pilgrimage, but, 
fishing was not allowed in Sri Lankan waters as defined in 1974 and 
1976 Agreements. The Indian fishermen were warned several times to be 
away from Sri Lankan waters, by the coast guards, the Indian Navy and 
the Fisheries Department of the Government of Tamil Nadu. But most of 
them in order to earn their livelihood, obtruded into Sri Lankan waters 
as the area was rich in prawns. 
86 
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations: Bilateral Issues 
"The Government of Tamil Nadu stated in 1991 that between 
1983 and middle of 1991 there were 236 incidents involving Indian 
fishermen and the Lankan Navy, leading to destruction of 51 boats, 
death of over 50 and injury of 135 fishermen besides seizure 65 boats 
and arrest of over 200 fishermen".^^ As the number of such cases 
increased, this issue became the prime issue in Tamil Nadu politics. All 
India D.M.K. had included this issue in the party's election agenda. 
Tamil Nadu's Chief Minister J. Jayalalitha on 15 August 1991, 
addressed from the ramparts of Fort St. George, she raised the demand 
"the retrieval of the Kachchativu island ceded to Sri Lanka under the 
Treaty in 1974 in view of the adverse impact of this transfer on the 
fishermen of Rameswaram in India". She warned that "if necessary, we 
shall even launch an agitation on this issue".^^ The intensity of pressure 
increases on New Delhi by the Tamil Nadu Government whenever there 
was an incident involving the fishermen. The desire of achieving 
goodwill in domestic politics, forced the Government of India to lodge 
protests with Sri Lankan Government. Then Sri Lankan Government did 
a counter attack by blaming Indian Government for not stopping the 
fishermen carrying contraband cargo for LTTE and for intruding into Sri 
Lankan waters, and also accused Indian fishermen of not responding to 
the warnings of the Sri Lankan authorities while intruding the Sri 
Lankan waters. On such an agitated response of Colombo, New Delhi 
had almost nothing to satisfy members of Parliament whenever the issue 
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was raised up. The Government of India was accused of not 
safeguarding the rights and lives of Indian fishermen. While answering a 
question in the Raj'ya Sabha on 23 March 1992, The Minister of State in 
the Ministry of External Affairs Eduardo Faleiro stated: 
"The maritime boundary between India and Sri 
Lanka was demarcated over its entire length by 
the Agreements of 1974 and 1976. The External 
Affairs Minister while laying the Agreement of 
1976 on the table of the House on 23 July, 1974 
stated inter alia that "including this Agreement, 
the right of fishing, pilgrimage and of navigation 
which both sides have enjoyed in the past have 
been fully safeguarded for the future". While 
laying the Agreement of 1976 on the table of the 
House on 24 March, 1976, he stated inter alia 
that "the two countries shall exercise full 
sovereignty and absolute jurisdiction on their 
side of the maritime boundary. Both countries 
have agreed that after the determination of the 
maritime boundary, fishing vessels and 
fishermen of one country shall not engage in 
fishing in the waters of the other". According to 
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these Agreements, the island of Kachchativu lies 
on the Sri Lanka side of the International 
Boundary Line. The Agreement fully safeguard 
the traditional rights of our fishermen which 
include the right of access to Kachchativu for 
resting, drying of nets and for attending the 
annual St. Anthony's festival, when it is held. 
The Agreements have been given wide publicity 
by Government".^" 
But none of such clarification could stop the continuously 
occurring clashes between the Indian fishermen and the Sri Lankan 
Navy. Now Tamil Nadu Government began to insist upon the retrieval of 
the island as a final solution to the problem. Tamil Nadu's Chief 
Minister J. Jayalalitha wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of India about 
the return of the Kachchativu back from Sri Lanka. An official 
Spokesman of the Government of India said in New Delhi on 24 March 
1992 that "there has been no change in our position on the maritime 
boundary. The Prime Minister has said in his reply to the Chief Minister 
that her suggestions have important policy implications. He has, 
therefore, asked the Ministry of External Affairs to examine her 
suggestions with the greatest possible care and attention".^' However 
such an examination produced no result if at all one was conducted. But 
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in order to keep Tamil Nadu happy and satisfied, the Government of 
India did not cease discussing all the cases of Indian fishermen with the 
Government of Sri Lanka. Several bilateral discussions at the official 
and ministerial levels also took place. During the New Delhi visit of Sri 
Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, in October 1992, the problem 
of fishermen was at the top in the agenda. The joint statement issued at 
the end of his visit reads as below: 
"Practical problem faced by fishermen from both 
countries straying into each other's waters were 
discussed. The two sides agreed that these cases 
should be dealt with in a spirit of mutual 
accommodation and understanding and in 
accordance with the established legal procedures. 
The two leaders agreed that it would be useful to 
hold discussions on all relevant aspects of this 
issue, at the level of senior officials".^^ 
Again in September 1993, in New York, there was a bilateral 
discussion in which Foreign Minister of India Dinesh Singh and his Sri 
Lankan counterpart A.C.S. Hameed discussed the question of the 
fishermen as a vital problem that should be resolved. They continued 
their talks till October 1993 which concluded in New Delhi. They could 
not do much except for devising measures to iron out this irritant that 
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too only on papers, nothing was done in practice. Again an official 
discussion was held on the same topic in March 1994 in Colombo. 
However, it was very much understood that all these measures were 
taken up merely as pawns to assure Chennai that the Government of 
India was not unaware of the difficult situation of the Tamil Fishermen. 
Such incidents, however (killing of fishermen) were occurring almost 
every day. Vice Admiral P.S. Das, Flag Officer, commanding the Indian 
Eastern Naval Command, at a press briefing on 5 June 1995, confirmed 
the misuse of the Indian fishermen by the LITE for attaining essential 
and strategic supplies from India. Highlighting the need of increased 
patrolling and supervision by the Indian navy of the Palk strait he 
insisted that it was essential to protect the Indian fishermen and to stop 
smuggling of strategic material by the LTTE from Tamil Nadu to Jaffna. 
He further maintained: 
"The smuggling cannot be entirely stopped. The 
coastline is too long - 100 miles ... But despite 
the problems, the LTTE's supply lines had been 
hampered.... The very fact that the LTTE has 
been seizing Indian fishing boats and releasing 
them on condition that the fishermen supply 
petrol and diesel, shows that its movement across 
the Bay has been curbed".^'' 
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The problem of Indian fishermen has been consistently serving 
as a setback to the relation of two South Asian neighbours. The clashes 
between Indian fishermen and Sri Lankan Navy keep on occurring at 
regular intervals. The Government of India keeps on discussing the 
matter with the Government of Sri Lanka in order to keep Chennai 
happy and on the other side, Sri Lanka too keeps on investigating and 
reporting involvement of LTTE and her own helplessness in the matter. 
While replying a question in the Rajya Sabha, on 14 August 1997, the 
Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs, Kamla Sinha 
maintained: 
"The Governments are aware of and concerned 
by the reports of violence against Indian 
fishermen in the waters between India and Sri 
Lanka. • The Government of Sri Lanka have 
denied the involvement of their navy in a large 
majority of incidents reported. Of the 14 
incidents reported so far in 1997, the Sri Lanka 
Government have acknowledged the involvement 
of their forces in only 2 incidents. The Sri 
Lankan Government have conveyed that the 
LTTE is constantly looking out for opportunities 
for disrupting the good relations that exist 
between India and Sri Lanka". 
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"The problem of fishermen have been a regular 
subject of discussion between the two 
Governments. Both sides agree on the need to 
deal with these problems in a humane and 
compassionate manner. The Sri Lankan 
Government have, however emphasized that a 
grave security situation exists in Sri Lankan 
waters surrounding the north of the country and 
the steps taken by them to deal with it. They 
have also referred to the violent activities of the 
LTTE in their waters. In regard to the incidents 
where Sri Lankan naval involvement was 
acknowledged, it has been stated that these 
incidents took place when the forces were 
repulsing attacks on their naval bases. India has 
expressed its concern at the incidents of violence 
against its fishermen at recent high level 
exchanges. Discussions have also been held with 
a Sri Lanka Government delegation during which 
the need for a mechanism to prevent recurrence 
of such incidents has been reiterated".^'* 
But the members of the Parliament exhibited their discontent 
on this lengthy yet not satisfactory answer and held the Government 
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responsible for not ceasing the killings of fishermen. It was pointed out 
that in the last five years 250 fishermen^^ had been killed. Members 
again blamed 1974 and 1976 Agreement, that were signed against the 
wishes of the people as well as the then Government of Tamil Nadu. A 
plea was made to retrieve the island of Kachchativu. The then Prime 
Minister Inder Kumar Gujral himself intervened to calm down the 
agitated member. He expressed his grief on the loss of life of fishermen 
but turned aside the demand for retrieval of the island by saying that: 
"I think while the demand may be there, the 
difficulty is we are going far away from the 
question because the question is not on 
sovereignties, integrities and all those things". 
And the Speaker ruled: 
"Now that is over".^^ 
This problem is still continuing with the danger of its 
expansion as, neither the Indian fishermen have left fishing in the Sri 
Lankan waters nor the Sri Lankan Navy has broken its commitment to 
crush all such intrusions once and for all. Hence misunderstandings on 
this issue are straining the relations of India and Sri Lanka greatly. The 
compulsions of domestic politics are not allowing the central 
Government of India to ask emphatically the Tamil Nadu Government to 
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employ effective measures to stop the fishermen from intruding into the 
Sri Lankan waters. The fact cannot be denied that some boatmen 
intruded on behalf of the LTTE, and that there was always 
Government's effective ban on entry of essential commodities to the 
LTTE held areas, particularly since some of the items which happened 
to be strategic ones, like fuel, necessary for carrying on its war efforts 
against Sinhalese dominated Colombo, and LTTE never hesitated in 
procuring such items from Tamil Nadu with the help of Indian fishermen 
and boatmen. Indian Government was in a state of flux. Nevertheless it 
had not much options given to Tamil sentiments. However, occasionally 
the Government of India continued to discuss this matter with the 
Government of Sri Lanka and asked Colombo to deal with the intrusions 
legally by arresting the intruders then firing upon them, killing them or 
damaging their boats, causing discontent in Chennai. 
On the other side, the Government of Sri Lanka also faced 
criticism given to its domestic reasons. As it banned its own fishermen 
to fish in those waters that were declared prohibited zone for fishing 
given to security reasons, hence charged for depriving its own fishermen 
of their livelihood. 
J. Jayalalitha is back to Tamil Nadu politics as Chief Minister 
in May 2001, and she has once again raised the old issue of taking back 
the ownership of the Kachchativu Island in order to terminate the 
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"harassment" of Indian fishermen. However, she did not succeed in her 
earlier attempts. So far New Delhi's approach is concerned it is 
definitely in a very difficult position as after all International 
agreements and treaties are not abrogated at will and it is very tough to 
make J. Jayalalitha realize the delicacy of International politics. In the 
year 2001 about 40 Indian fishermen were arrested by Sri Lankan Navy 
with the consent of the Government of India to make the fishermen 
realize the limits of their fishing rights and this step of the Government 
of India again provided an opportunity to the Government of Tamil 
Nadu to criticize the central Government. J. Jayalalitha never miss any 
opportunity to embarrass the Government of India. It is unfortunate that 
she chose the formal occasion such as the address of the Governor to the 
newly constituted State Legislative Assembly to reiterate her demand. 
Sri Lanka out rightly rejected this demand. Sri Lanka's then Fisheries 
and Aquatic Resources, Minister Mahinda Rajapakse rejecting the 
claim said on 28 May 2001: 
"It is impossible to give it back to them as it has 
been recognized by the international community 
as an integral part of our country, since it was 
handed over by late Indira Gandhi".^'' 
* Now Mahinda Rajapakse from ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) is the 
Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. 
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After all the issue of Kachchativu island is a settled issue now 
and above all it lies in the domain of the central Government of India 
and, a state Government is not supposed to interfere in the spheres of 
the central Government, that too in such an embarrassing manner. An 
interesting development that has arisen in present scenario so far the 
problem of fishermen is concerned, is that now Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF) is siding the Indian fishermen by pleading that they 
should be treated leniently and should not be taken to prisons or courts. 
However, it is clear to every one that Sri Lanka wants to cease intrusion 
by Indian fishermen into her waters particularly for security reasons as 
many fishing boats are used by the LTTE for smuggling strategic and 
other items to keep its fight alive against the Government of Sri Lanka. 
The problem of fishermen has unfortunately got mingled with Sri 
Lanka's militant problem and once latter is solved the ways to solve the 
other will appear themselves. If peace process remain continued in the 
island country, not only the 21 years old ethnic conflict will be solved 
but the Indian as well as the Sri Lankan fishermen also, may revive their 
hopes of fishing to earn their livelihood, in each other's waters in Palk 
strait without any fear of being shot or caught by Sri Lankan navy or 
Indian navy. 
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CHAPTER - III 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF INDIAN TAMILS IN 
SRI LANKA: A REVIEW 
Whenever we analyse Indo-Sri Lanka relations right from the 
day of independence, we find that the relations of two South Asian 
neighbours have never been as friendly as were deemed to be. This state 
of relations can be attributed to several irritants, but the biggest and most 
problematic amongst them is the question of the people of Indian origin 
or Indian Tamils, which continues to strain the relations of two countries 
even today. 
Indian Tamils started migrating in the 19"' century as indentured 
labour. They made their residence' in the central and south Sri Lanka, an 
area better known as the Kandyan country which was the last to be 
subdued and integrated in the British possessions on the island and where 
the plantations were being developed by the British capitalists. They used 
to live in groups in these areas almost in isolation, with little or no social 
interaction with the local Sinhala community. Geographically they were 
isolated from the Tamils of the north and the east, so, neither there was 
any uniformity nor the clash between the interests of either of them. 
There were two Tamil communities existing in Sri Lanka in their separate 
areas isolated from each other. Owing to their long stay of centuries, Sri 
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Lankan Tamils had no contacts with the Tamils of India, on the contrary 
the Tamil estate workers never let their contacts broken with their native 
land and had regular visits and matrimonials and other social 
relationships. Despite their stay in Sri Lanka they had greatest faith in 
India that in difficulty only their native country will help them out. To 
add the Indian Tamils by their labour had made a significant contribution 
to strengthen the island's economy. 
Before discussing the issue of the Persons of Indian Origin in 
Sri Lanka, it is essential to highlight the socio-economic profile of the 
Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. A brief analysis of demographic profile of the 
Indian Tamils and some details of the plantation system would be helpful 
to understand the socio-economic conditions of the Indian Tamils. 
BACKGROUND 
Account of Population 
The Sri Lankan society displays the existence of more than half 
a dozen ethnic groups as shown in the table below: 
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Table 0.1 
SRI LANKAN POPULATION BY ETHNIC GROUP 1981 
Ethnic Group 
All Ethnic Groups 
Sinhalese 
Sri Lankan Tamils 
Sri Lankan Moors 
Indian Tamils 
Burghers 
Malays 
Others 
Number 
14846750 
10979561 
1886872 
1046926 
818656 
39374 
46963 
28398 
Percent 
100.0 
74.0 
12.7 
7.0 
5.5 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.87, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
Here we see that three fourth of the total population is 
constituted by the Sinhalese, the Sri Lankan Tamils form the largest 
minority in the island. If 5.5 percent of the Indian Tamils is added to Sri 
Lankan Tamils, the entire Tamil population will reach to 18.2 percent. 
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Origin of the Ethnic Groups 
About the ethnic groups, history speaks that Sri Lankan 
population is a mixture of the people who had migrated at different times 
in the past from India. The origin of the Sinhalese can be traced to the 
influx of emigres from the Indo-Gangetic plain and western India, which 
had occurred in the wake of the Indian Prince Vijaya's arrival in Sri 
Lanka with the purpose of establishing a Kingdom.' Similarly the Sri 
Lankan Tamils had been the immigrants from South India, whose arrival 
in the island had coincided with the establishment of powerful South 
Indian Hindu Kingdoms in the fifth century A.D., and the periodic 
invasions of the Sinhalese Kingdoms by the South Indian Kings 
(especially the Cholas who conquered most of the island in A.D. 1017 
and continued their occupation up to A.D. 1070).^ Presently, both the 
communities form Sri Lanka's indigenous population. So far the Sri 
Lankan Moors are concerned, they are the descendants of Arab traders 
who came to the island between the seventh and the fifteenth centuries 
and established inter-marrital relations with the natives. While the origin 
of the Indian Moors can be traceable to the arrival of the South Indian 
traders, in the island, mainly from western India, the Malays of recent 
origin are the descendants of Javanese mercenaries who were brought by 
the Dutch.•^  The Burghers are the descendants of the Dutch settlers who 
inter married with the Sinhalese and the Tamils. During British period. 
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Indian immigration into Sri Lanka took place in response to the 
overwhelming demand for cheap plantation workforce which was also 
supported by the fact that the Sinhalese had a great dislike to plantation 
jobs. The plantations were expanding quickly due to the nearness of Sri 
Lanka to southern India, a place of easily available work force. With the 
labour immigration to Sri Lanka, a significant number of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers and a comparatively small but quite distinct group 
of Indian businessmen too voluntarily arrived into the island. Hence, on 
the eve of Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, 11.7 percent of the total 
population of the island was of Indian Tamils. 
The term Indian Tamil was used officially as a sign of identity 
for the emigrants to Sri Lanka during the British period. This was first 
used officially in the 1911 Census to distinguish primarily the immigrant 
Indian Tamil population from the indigenous Sri Lankan Tamils, even 
though both the groups belonged to the same linguistic class. All the 
Indian Tamils were not born in India or lived there. In fact, many of them 
were born in Sri Lanka itself and had never been to India. However, they 
are Indians in a more fundamental sense that they brought with them their 
peculiar social organization, much of which still remains."* 
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Difference Between the Two Tamil Communities-The Sri Lankan 
and The Indian 
The Indian Tamils are distinguishable from the Sri Lankan 
Tamils not only in official nomenclature but also in terms of residence, 
culture, and socio-economic as well as civic status. Most of the Indian 
Tamils have had a depressed social status in comparison with the majority 
of the Sri Lankan Tamils settled in the north and east of the island.^ The 
majority of the Indian Tamil population stayed for a long time without 
any legally sanctioned civil and political rights owing to their 
statelessness. On the other hand, owing to their high levels of educational 
attainment, a large number of Sri Lankan Tamils had enjoyed important 
positions in mercantile, bureaucratic and other professional sectors during 
the post independence era.^ And rest who were non-professionals were 
land owners and farmers. Culturally, the Sri Lankan Tamils, considered 
themselves as unique, cut above the rest, from all other Tamils whom 
they consider less diligent in keeping up the ancient ways and cultural 
purity.'' However, both the communities have common language i.e. 
Tamil and common religion i.e. Hinduism and Christianity. 
Language and Religion 
Tamil is the mother tongue of about 99 percent of the Indian 
Tamil community. But some, around 8 percent of its population speak 
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English. Those who do not belong to estate workers, mainly settled in the 
Sinhalese inhabited areas and speak Sinhala (10.2 percent).^ 
So far religion is concerned, the Indian Tamils are 
predominantly Hindus as is evident from the table below: 
Table 1.1 
RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN TAMILS, 1981 
Religion 
Hindu 
Roman Catholic 
Christian 
Muslim 
Buddhist 
Others 
Total 
Percent 
90.0 
6.2 
1.4 
0.5 
1.8 
0.1 
100.0 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.90, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
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Caste 
People belonging to various low castes in south India had 
constituted the Indian Tamil community in Sri Lanka. Although all castes 
except the Brahmins had emigrated in large number to Sri Lanka, the Adi 
Dravida caste groups such as Pallan, Paraiyan and Chakkilyan constituted 
half of the total emigrants and Vellalans, Kalians, Ambalakkarans, 
Agamudaiyans and other non-Brahmin caste groups formed the bulk of 
the other half.^  An empirical study conducted on the caste system of the 
Indian Tamils in the sixties concluded that all the castes survived in 
original form as a result of the inter-play of certain factors such as the 
community's migration pattern, the relative physical, economic and 
political isolation of the estate labourers from the wider Sri Lankan 
society, formal and informal sanctions enforcing caste norms in the 
plantations, and religious ceremonies and festivals of the Indian Tamils.'° 
Dissemination of Indian Tamil Population 
The Indian Tamils are unevenly dispersed throughout the nine 
provinces of Sri Lanka and it is evident from Table 1.2. The 1981 Census 
shows, around 78 percent of them are settled in the plantation sector, the 
chief support of the islands economy. "It covers the districts of Nuwara 
Eliya, Kandy, Matale, BaduUa, Ratnapura and Kegalle. In four districts of 
the North East province they make up 7.7 percent of their total population 
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in the island. Indian Tamils slay in the areas predominantly inhabited 
either by the Sinhalese or the Sri Lankan Tamils."" 
Table 1.2 also marks a sharp decline in the Indian Tamil 
population, especially from the plantation districts, owing to a large scale 
repatriation of the stateless people to India. The table also highlights that 
roughly 80 percent of the Indian Tamil population is labour force in the 
plantation sector, which alone employed in 1981 nearly 33 percent of the 
total agricultural labour force in the island.'^ Non-estate Indian Tamils 
are either small land holders, or petty traders or workers in the urban 
sector or artisans. Although, estate and non-estate Indian Tamils have 
occupational differences and distinct areas of settlement, both share 
consciousness of a common ethnic identity. "As an ethnic group, they 
uphold a remarkable degree of internal social cohesion".'^ 
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Table 1.2 
DISTRICT WISE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION OF THE 
INDIAN TAMILS CENSUS YEARS 
Provinces 
District 
SRI LANKA 
WESTERN Colombo 
Gampaha* 
Kulutara 
CENTRAL Kandy 
Matale 
Nuwara Eliya 
SOUTHERN Galle 
Matara 
Hambantota 
NORTHERN Jaffna 
Mannar 
Vavuniya 
Mullaitivu* 
EASTERN Batticaloa 
Amparai 
Trincomalee 
NORTH Kurunegala 
WESTERN Puttalam 
NORTH Anuradhapura 
CENTRAL Polonnaruwa 
UVA Badulla 
SABARAGAMUWA 
Moneragala 
SABARA Ratnapura 
GAMUWA Kegalle 
1953 
No. 
974098 
72382 
-
34308 
255914 
40655 
192578 
11237 
11487 
261 
7589 
7979 
2339 
-
1825 
-
3482 
9892 
1077 
3378 
-
166265 
-
87088 
58247 
% 
12.0 
4.2 
-
6.6 
30.5 
20.3 
59.2 
2.1 
2.8 
0.1 
1.6 
18.3 
6.7 
-
0.7 
-
4.1 
1.6 
1.8 
1.5 
-
35.6 
-
20.7 
12.4 
1963 
No. 
1164689 
57225 
-
37661 
293741 
44206 
225728 
12579 
15841 
351 
11382 
9654 
7754 
-
1656 
1312 
3371 
11306 
7377 
1721 
216 
197269 
12006 
104632 
65973 
% 
10.6 
2.6 
-
6.0 
28.2 
17.3 
56.8 
2.0 
3.1 
0.1 
1.9 
16.1 
11.5 
-
0.8 
0.6 
2.4 
1.3 
2.4 
0.6 
0.2 
37.8 
9.1 
19.2 
11.4 
1971 
No. 
1174606 
59497 
-
38697 
286225 
46806 
235403 
15233 
18703 
308 
18033 
12974 
13828 
-
4254 
1771 
5061 
13344 
5999 
2041 
271 
209545 
11646 
113214 
61735 
% 
9.3 
2.2 
-
5.3 
24.1 
14.9 
52.3 
2.1 
3.2 
0.1 
2.6 
16.7 
14.5 
-
1.7 
0.06 
2.7 
1.3 
1.6 
0.5 
0.2 
34.0 
6.0 
17.1 
9.4 
1981 
No. 
818656 
19824 
5919 
33659 
98436 
24912 
257478 
11056 
13875 
284 
19980 
13850 
18714 
11215 
4074 
1411 
5372 
6616 
2289 
719 
124 
129498 
8859 
84740 
45752 
% 
5.5 
1.2 
0.4 
4.1 
9.4 
7.0 
42.7 
1.4 
2.2 
0.1 
2.4 
13.0 
19.6 
1-4.5 
1.2 
0.4 
2.1 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 
0.2 
20.2 
3.2 
10.6 
6.7 
* Created in 1978 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.92, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
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Plantation System 
The estate is a residential or industrial unit which is well 
planned and which has clear geographical boundary. The large one is 
divided into several diversified units which are coordinated under a 
central office. 
Three chief plantation crops are tea, rubber and coconut. Out of 
these, tea is the principal crop. "According to the tea cuUivation, tea 
estates are classified into up country, mid country and low country 
estates".'^ 
Until 1975, when the United Front (UF) Government undertook 
measures to what was then termed as 'CeyIonization' of ownership of 
land, estates had been under the ownership of foreign Agency Houses and 
individual Sri Lankan citizens.'^ With a view to maximizing agricultural 
production and employment and reduce inequalities in wealth and 
income, the Government brought the estate land under the state control.'^ 
For the purpose of managing the plantations, it also set up two state 
corporations the Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation (SLSPC) and 
Janatha Estates Development Board (JEDB).'^ 
Organizations of Estate Labourers in the Plantation Sector 
Given to the present set up of management and with the 
increasing differences of opinions between workers and management, the 
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trade union has become the chief connecting link between the two. It is an 
organization which places the grievances and demands of the workers 
before the management, in fact it is more than an organization through 
which workers can effectively participate in the decision making in the 
estate.'^ 
The first trade Union, named the All Ceylon Estate Labour 
Federation, was formed in 1931 in order to bring the needs of the estate 
workers into Government's notice. It became almost dead during the 
depression of the thirties. "However after the visit of Nehru in 1939, the 
Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC) formed the Ceylon Indian Congress 
Labour Union (CICLU) which gained immediate popularity among the 
estate workers."'' In addition, the first left party in Sri Lanka i.e. the 
Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP), formed in 1935, had also started 
agitation in the plantation sector during the same period, and by 1940 
almost every estate was organized by unions which led strikes and labour 
unrest.^" 
"After Sri Lanka's independence, the Ceylon Workers Congress 
(CWC) (the name was changed from CICLU in 1950) emerged as the 
largest trade union in the plantation sector under the leadership of S. 
Thondaman. In 1955, there occurred a split in the CWC, resulting in A. 
Aziz and his supporters leaving the organization and forming the 
Democratic Workers Congress (DWC)."^' 
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Hence, Indian Tamils are isolated from the rest of the society 
owing to their different occupation, their birth in the island, ethnic 
characteristics, absence of citizenship rights for over four decades and 
different areas of settlement. And also the fact that can not be ignored is 
that they have been treated as 'captive labour' almost limited to the 
plantations for earning their livelihood. 
Keeping in view the above discussed background, the socio-
economic conditions of the Indian Tamil community has been analysed 
below. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
Wages and Remunerations 
"The wage structure for the plantation workers is governed by 
the minimum wage regulations and controlled by the decision of a 
tripartite institution called Wage Boards.Established in 1944, it is 
composed of representatives of the Government, trade unions and the 
plantation corporations (prior to the nationalization of estates, 
employers)."^^ 
Since Sri Lanka's independence, the average minimum daily 
wages of the plantation workers continued to be very low. And the excuse 
for this was that the plantation workers had free housing and other 
welfare perks. Also, the estate owners, during the pre-nationalization 
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period, refused to depart from the statutory minima or to negotiate other 
than fringe benefits and therefore the statutory minimum rates became the 
maximum rates for the plantation worlcers.^ ^ Table 1.3 clearly shows the 
average minimum daily rate of wages for tea and rubber plantation 
workers since 1953. 
Table 1.3 
AVERAGE MINIMUM RATES OF WAGES FOR THE 
WORKERS IN THE TEA-RUBBER ESTATES 
Year 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Average Minimum 
Daily Rate of Wages 
Rs. C. 
1.95 
1.99 
2.06 
2.08 
2.10 
2.14 
2.14 
2.12 
2.13 
2.18 
2.19 
2.24 
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1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
2.25 
2.25 
2.33 
2.68 
2.68 
2.71 
2.74 
2.87 
3.25 
4.08 
5.06 
5.92 
6.17 
8.61 
11.10 
11.03 
13.96 
15.80 
17.15 
18.58 
20.17 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.95, Kalinga Publications : Delhi, 1995. 
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We can make out from the table that prior to the year 1972 the 
wages were revised only in terms of cents : between 1955 and 1972, the 
average minimum wage rate was increased by 0.81 cents (from Rs.2.06 in 
1955 to Rs.2.87 in 1972). That means, the plantation workers had to wait 
for more than thirty years (from 1945 to 1975) to achieve an increase of 
slightly more than Rs.4 over their basic daily wage in 1945. The table 
also shows that since 1977 there had been a constant hike in their average 
basic wages. The highest increase was attained in 1984, that too when the 
political campaign was launched by the CWC in the plantation sector. 
The 1984 wage rates, together with the wage rates for the pre - 1984 
period are given in Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.4 
DAILY WAGE RATES OF PLANTATION WORKERS IN 1984 
Trade 
a. Tea Growing and 
manufacturing trade 
b. Rubber growing 
and manufacturing 
trade 
c. Coconut growing 
and manufacturing 
trade 
Wage as at 
March 1984 
Male 
Rs. C. 
18.28 
20.03 
15.91 
Female 
Rs. C. 
15.21 
17.11 
13.59 
Wage effective 
from April 1984 
Male Female 
Rs. C. 
23.78 
23.93 
19.90 
Rs. C. 
23.78 
23.93 
19.90 
Percentage 
Increase 
Male Female 
Rs.C. 
30 
19 
25 
Rs. C. 
56 
40 
46 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.96, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
Apart from the increase in wages, the notable development that 
occurred in wage structure in plantations in 1984, was the equalization of 
wages of males and females. It was a victory on the part of women 
plantation workers as prior to 1984 their equal rights and dignity were 
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always ignored. Since April 1984, there has been a constant increase in 
the wage rates of the plantation workers. 
Since 1968, several allowances were included to the basic 
wages of the plantation workers. However, they were subjected to 
discrimination in the payment of allowances. "Several schemes granting 
eight or nine different kinds of cost of living allowances during 1967-82 
to meet the galloping inflation saw the plantation workers either left out 
or paid less than what the workers belonging to other sectors had 
received."^'' 
The plantation workers were the prey to discrimination in the 
sense that they were paid 0.3 cents for every 1.8 point increase in the 
Cost of Living (COL) Index, while workers in other sectors received Rs.2 
per point increase which was about 0.9 cents per day on the assumption 
that they worked for 22 days a months?^ The Government justified the 
discrimination against the plantation workers on the ground that the price 
levels for the plantation products were low in the world market.^^ 
Hence, it was the political pressure by the trade unions that 
played the key role in the wage increases over and above the minimum 
wage fixed by the Wage Boards. Besides, the world prices of tea, too, 
helped strengthening the bargaining and negotiation for high wages. This 
was because the mechanism of wage determination in the plantation 
industry had not been linked to the commodity price in the market.^^ 
119 
Socio-Economic Conditions of Indian Tamils In Sri Lanka: A Review 
Earning and Income 
The Indian Tamil plantation workers have no other source of 
income except for the salary they get for their labour in the plantations. 
However, in comparison with the workers in other sectors of the 
economy, their monthly earnings had always been very low and this is 
evident from Table 1.5. 
The Table clearly illustrates that though the earnings of the tea 
estate workers registered a significant increase from Rs.55.56 for males 
and Rs.47.15 for females in March 1970 to Rs.586.86 and Rs.604.09 for 
men and women respectively in March 1985, the income inequalities 
between workers in tea plantation and other sectors of the economy had 
always been enormous. The earnings of the tea estate workers were low 
because their monthly wages were dependent upon the number of days of 
work offered, and the basic wages and allowances fixed for the workers' 
salary had been low. 
Although the plantation worker received salary every month but 
his salary was calculated on a daily basis. It means that the payment of 
total monthly salary of a worker depended upon the number of days he 
worked in the plantation. The worker provided work every day, rather 
three or four days a week depending upon the cropping conditions which 
also varies from district to district and season to season.^^ 
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Table 1.5 
MONTHLY AVERAGE INCOME OF WORKERS IN 
DIFFERENT TRADES, 1970-85 
Trade 
Tea Growing 
Kangani 
Men 
Women 
Children-Male 
Female 
Rubber Growin 
Male 
Female 
Children 
Coconut Growir 
Kangani 
Male 
Female 
Children 
Building Trade 
Unskilled 
Male 
Unskilled 
Female 
Unskilled-Under 
18 years 
Semi-skilled-
GrU 
Semi-skilled-
Grl 
Skilled 
Engineering Tra 
Unskilled 
Labourers 
Semi - Skilled 
Skilled 
Kanganies 
Watchers 
1970 
March 
56.96 
55.56 
47.15 
41.95 
42.12 
r 
72.08 
58.53 
28.33 
S 
100.12 
61.74 
43.48 
42.11 
106.97 
102.21 
24.00 
144.75 
164.22 
177.20 
de 
170.19 
182.07 
247.48 
206.78 
245.64 
1972 
March 
68.77 
70.90 
49.30 
40.89 
32.02 
71.48 
53.84 
40.71 
101.94 
76.66 
45.47 
52.48 
119.00 
117.11 
-
170.60 
169.37 
185.22 
227.83 
218.06 
293.07 
244.00 
247.33 
1974 
March 
102.76 
69.84 
64.57 
54.78 
52.29 
124.24 
91.30 
65.00 
114.5315 
85.23 
59.45 
46.64 
137.70 
112.49 
-
115.29 
182.75 
173.72 
257.86 
247.23 
337.21 
379.50 
296.57 
1976 
March 
130.46 
103.85 
77.09 
40.271 
46.88 
175.49 
127.69 
60.00 
2.77 177.4 
125.39 
83.30 
75.00 
211.80 
187.31 
84.33 
74.67 
228.00 
286.06 
345.13 
350.46 
436.20 
467.00 
382.97 
1978 
March 
221.42 
201.49 
148.79 
27.03 
130.69 
259.19 
255.32 
97.97 
310.00 
172.24 
107.26 
119.96 
217.04 
-
400.00 
304.22 
-
171.55 
313.71 
401.66 
453.54 
693.00 
365.69 
1980 
March 
313.65 
289.20 
195.29 
182.18 
160.34 
372.06 
285.35 
183.00 
379.14 
283.00 
242.78 
-
-
-
-
-
-
720.80 
497.48 
566.20 
618.50 
1017.79 
670.17 
1982 
March 
299.05 
270.09 
244.90 
235.00 
218.00 
420.34 
325.70 
241.49 
422.46 
344.96 
293.61 
280.00 
-
-
-
-
-
-
775.75 
795.30 
949.52 
-
-
1984 
March 
518.07 
362.23 
301.27 
-
117.00 
1017.81 
407.39 
380.00 
513.80 
377.51 
274.75 
213.75 
-
-
-
-
-
1309.54 
910.50 
1082.76 
1195.19 
955.19 
946.18 
1985 
March 
692.93 
586.86 
604.09 
538.00 
564.15 
630.98 
577.55 
385.33 
450,16 
375.27 
244.00 
-
-
-
-
-
1309.54 
1764.31 
1142.19 
1926.24 
1108.00 
1174.66 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p. 100, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
The poor wage structure in the plantation sector influences the 
per-capita income level of the estate workers. Table 1.6 shows that the 
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income level of the Indian Tamil community was much lower than that of 
the other communities despite the fact that the number of income 
receivers per household in the former was much higher than that of the 
latter 30 
Table 1.6 
MEAN INCOME PER INCOME RECEIVER BY TTHINC 
GROUP AND SECTOR, 1963, 1973 AND 1981 
Ethnic 
Group 
Kandyan 
Sinhalese 
Low 
Country 
Sinhalese 
Sri Lankan 
Tamils 
Indian 
Tamils 
Moor 
Malays 
Burghers 
Others 
All Island 
1963 
215 
293 
327 
148 
414 
799 
856 
1973 
423 
522 
470 
225 
670 
1187 
471 
1981 
1064 
1213 
971 
594 
1341 
1411 
1460 
4500 
Urban 
1963 
484 
442 
518 
536 
636 
693 
2237 
1973 
640 
664 
580 
424 
596 
936 
436 
1981 
1457 
1441 
1364 
1239 
1447 
1402 
1875 
5250 
Rural 
1963 
212 
265 
302 
371 
286 
277 
396 
1973 
45 
473 
487 
320 
743 
771 
643 
1981 
1044 
1143 
854 
672 
1236 
1500 
722 
3000 
Estate 
1963 
118 
137 
136 
122 
132 
3327 
n.a. 
1973 
234 
606 
265 
208 
380 
9286 
298 
1981 
704 
571 
527 
544 
1000 
-
-
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p. 101, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
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The table reveals the fact, if the category of 'others' 
representing small groups is excluded, it is found that the highest monthly 
mean income in 1981 was enjoyed by the Burghers (Rs. 1,460) followed 
by the Malays (Rs. 1,411) and the Moors (Rs. 1,341). Next in order are the 
Low Country Sinhalese (Rs.1,213) followed by the Kandyan Sinhalese 
(Rs. 1,064) and the Sri Lankan Tamils (Rs.971). The lowest income 
receiver in 1981 were Indian Tamils (Rs.594). 
It may also be noticed that the average income of all the ethnic 
groups in every sector had increased during 1963-1981. The income level 
of the Indian Tamils settled in the urban and rural sectors was always 
higher than the community's national average because of their 
occupational difference. 
Education 
The high rate of illiteracy has served as a serious obstacle to 
social upliftment of the Indian Tamils. Table 1.7 illustrates the variations 
in the attainment of education by different ethnic groups in the island. 
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Table 1.7 
LITERACY* RATE BY ETHNIC GROUP, SECTOR AND SEX 
1981 AND 1985 
Community 
Sinhalese 
Sri Lankan 
Tamils 
Indian Tamils 
Sri Lankan 
Moors 
Burghers 
Malays 
Other 
Ethnic Group 1981 
Total 
88.4 
86.6 
66.9 
79.3 
97.1 
9L1 
86.1 
Male 
91.8 
89.4 
78.6 
86.7 
98.2 
93.2 
91.2 
Female 
84.9 
84.3 
55.2 
7L5 
96.1 
88.9 
79.8 
Sector, 1985-86 
Sector 
All 
Island 
Urban 
Rural 
Estate 
Total 
84.2 
89.1 
84.6 
59.4 
Male 
88.6 
92.4 
88.5 
74.5 
Female 
80.0 
86.1 
80.7 
45.9 
* The definition of literacy given by the Department of Census and 
Statistics of Sri Lanka is merely the ability to read and write a few 
sentences in the mother tongue. See G.A. Gnanamuttu, Education 
and the Indian plantation worker in Sri Lanka, p.69, Wesley Press: 
Colombo, 1977. 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and overseas Indians: The case of Sri 
Lanka, p. 103, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
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The table shows that in 1981 the rate of literacy among the 
Indian Tamils was the lowest in the island, with 45 percent of the women 
in the community being illiterates. The Burgher community had the 
highest literacy rate, followed by Malays, Sinhalese and Sri Lankan 
Tamils. 
Why literacy rate was so low among the Indian Tamil 
community of Sri Lanka? Several reasons could be attributed to the low 
level of educational status of the Indian Tamil community. Firstly, the 
historical legacy of neglect of education permeated the plantation sector. 
The estate schools have been provided with meagre facilities even after 
their nationalization and a large number of estate Tamils have no access 
to the better equipped Tamil medium Government schools.'^' Secondly, 
due to the value of child labour and the lack of child care responsibilities 
and domestic tasks of young children, education has received a low 
priority in the estate sector. Usually it is a sort of norm in plantations that 
the children would help their parents in household tasks and also they are 
supposed to begin working at an early age in order to supplement the poor 
family income. The result is not only the poor participation rates of 
children in educational institutions located in the plantation sector, but 
also higher rates of drop-outs from the estate schools.''^ 
Hence, out of all ethnic groups, the Indian Tamils have 
registered the worst educational record. This low level of literacy among 
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Indian Tamil estate workers has not only affected the existing generation 
but the coming generations also as many children were born to become 
labourers just like their parents. 
Housing 
After independence, nearly for three decades, the plantation 
management almost neglected estate housing. "As such, most of the 
plantation workers lived in 'line rooms' (i.e. barracks type rows of single 
rooms built originally for a migratory labour force) for several decades. 
This remained the usual form of housing despite several efforts made by 
the Government to provide separate cottages to the workers.""'^ 
"Although regulations were passed as far back as in 1950, 
stipulating the construction of double unit cottage type blocks, surveys 
and reports published from time to time showed that the line room type of 
dwelling was prominent in the estate sector."'^'' "According to the Socio-
Economic Survey of 1969-70, 225, 720 out of 255, 655 dwellings (i.e. 
89.7 percent) were of the line room type, and these housed 85 percent of 
the resident estate population.''^ The Survey of Consumer Finances in 
1973 showed that over crowding in houses (defined as more than two 
persons per room) was 35 percent in the urban areas, 37 percent in the 
rurual sector and 75 percent in the estate sector. In 1979 the Survey of 
Consumer Finances found that 23 percent of the estate households lived 
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in one room and 50 percent in two rooms, while the corresponding rural 
figures were 8.2 percent and 20.6 percent respectively.^^ 
Despite improved housing conditions in the estate sector in the 
eighties, the sectoral variations remained distinct. According to the 
Census of Population and Housing of 1981, the proportion of one room 
houses was almost double (56.8 percent) the number in other sectors (the 
rural and the urban sectors accounted for 28 percent and 30 percent 
respectively). Most of the three or more room houses were staff quarters 
and the estate superintendents' bungalows. The Census also revealed that 
there was a structural shift in the housing units between 1971 and 1981. 
The change was particularly notable in the estate sector where the 
percentage of one room units declined from 74.2 percent in 1971 to 56.8 
percent in 1981 and two room houses increased from 17.3 percent in 1971 
to 29.6 percent in 1981.^* 
In 1981 the average number of persons per room in the estate 
houses were 2.6 (declined from 3.4 persons per room in 1971) as 
compared to 2.2 and 2.0 in urban and rural houses respectively.^^ As such 
according to the 1981 statistics, the percentage of over crowded houses 
was also high (54.5 percent as against 68.3 percent in 1971) in the estate 
sector, compared to houses in urban (43.4 percent) and rural (36.4 
percent) sectors. 
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The above mentioned figures highlight a relative amelioration in 
the housing facilities of the estate workers, particularly after the 
nationalization of estates. Prior to nationalization, the estate management 
was supposed to be responsible to provide housing facilities to the 
workers. "But the management, even during the period of boom in tea 
prices, always kept the expenditure for housing and welfare of the 
workers at a very low level so as to minimize the cost of production.""*' 
Another reason for paying insufficient attention towards housing between 
1947 and 1975 was the threat of nationalization of estates that was 
awaited since the mid fifties. Nevertheless the estate corporations started 
paying attention towards improving housing structure after 
nationalization, but, the most significant feature was the Government's 
involvement in the promotion of housing conditions. However, even after 
employing several measures to improve the estate housing, the sectoral 
discrepancy remained substantial. 
It may also be noticed that the estate workers do not have 
houses of their own. Legally they are eligible to occupy the estate houses 
so long as they are employed in the plantations. "Since the entire 
household is employed as plantation workforce and the occupation in the 
estate sector has become more or less hereditary, usually the question of 
workers surrendering their houses does not arise.""^^ 
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Health 
The general health conditions of the Indian Tamil community 
have always been poor as compared to other ethnic groups. The health 
indicators-death rate, infant mortality rate, maternal mortality rate and 
quality of life-clearly examines this fact. 
In the post-independence period the death rate of the Indian 
Tamils has always been higher than that of the death rates of all other 
ethnic groups in the island. For instance, during 1952-1961, the annual all 
island average death rate was 9.9 per thousand, while the figure for the 
Indian Tamils was 13.2 (as against 9.1 for the Sinhalese and 11 for the Sri 
Lankan Tamils).'*^ In 1974 the variation was much higher: the national 
average was 9.4 and the rate for the Indian Tamils was 20.5. At the same 
time, the death rates for the Sinhalese (8.2) and the Sri Lankan Tamils 
(8.6) were less than the national average.'*'* This was owing to severe food 
shortages and the rise in the price of essential commodities which 
reduced the non-food producing plantation sector to a semi-famine 
condition.''^ In 1980 the national average death rate was 7.2 per thousand, 
but 8.1 per thousand was the rate for the Indian Tamil community.'*^ 
The plantation workers are suffering mainly from respiratory 
diseases caused by exposure to bad weather and low temperature and by 
working at high altitudes. Other prevalent scourges are intestinal diseases 
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which are caused by lack of sanitation, bad living conditions and impure 
water supplies."*^ 
The lamentable health conditions of the plantation workers are 
also visible in the infant and maternal mortality rates. Table 1.8 shows 
the variations in infant and child mortality rates between the estate sector 
and the rest of the country. 
Table 1.8 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS IN INFANT AND 
CHILD MORTALITY FOR THE TEN YEAR PERIOD, 1977-1987 
Sector 
Colombo 
Other Urban 
Rural 
Estates 
Infant 
Mortality Rate 
32.8 
36.5 
29.9 
57.5 
Child 
Mortality Rate 
6.8 
4.3 
10.3 
16.5 
Under Five 
Mortality Rate 
39.4 
40.6 
39.9 ' 
73.1 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p. 107, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
It is clear from the table that the child mortality and under five 
mortality rate for the estates were far higher than in other sectors. The 
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basic causes of the high mortality and debility of infants in estates are the 
malnutrition of mothers, lack of suitable health services (both promotive 
and preventive), poor diets for infants and pre-school children, shortage 
of qualified medical staff, and poor housing and sanitary conditions in the 
estates."^ 
Similarly, the maternal mortality rate has always been higher in 
the plantation districts than in other districts. In 1967, when the island 
figure was 1.7 deaths per thousand births, the plantation districts figures 
were: Kandy-2.3, Matale-1.8, Nuwara Eliya-2.6, BaduIla-2.1 and 
Ratnapura-2.1. Also in 1980 the national maternal mortality rate had 
dropped to 0.6 deaths per thousand births, but the rate in the plantation 
districts was still higher than that of the country's average.'*' 
One of the reasons for the higher maternal mortality rate in the 
plantation sector has been that around 30 percent of births take place in 
cramped and partly ventilated rooms with no medical supervision, 
whereas in the rest of the country only about 15 percent of births take 
place outside medical institutions.^" The other reasons have been the lack 
of awareness among mothers owing to illiteracy, and poor housing and 
sanitation, apart from the fact that the estate mothers are under nourished, 
anaemic and over worked.^' 
To assess the socio-economic conditions of the Indian Tamil 
community, it is essential to apply the quality of life indicators. "The life 
expectancy figure is considered as the most sensitive indicator reflecting 
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in the level of development and important changes in the socio-economic 
and health conditions of a community."" Table 1.9 provides life 
expectancy figures for males and females for the year 1971. 
Table 1.9 
EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT BIRTH BY SEX AND DISTRICT 1971 
District 
Colombo 
Kalutara 
Kandy 
Matale 
Nuwara Eliya 
Galle 
Matara 
Hambantota 
Jaffna 
Mannar 
Vavuniya 
Batticaloa 
Amparai 
Trincomalee 
Male 
62.5 
67.6 
60.6 
63.4 
56.6 
67.3 
68.3 
67.1 
66.0 
63.7 
64.9 
59.5 
63.8 
65.1 
Female 
67.9 
70.8 
62.2 
64.1 
55.1 
70.7 
71.4 
69.3 
67.1 
63.2 
66.0 
60.4 
66.6 
65.4 
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Kurunegala 
Puttalam 
Anuradhapura 
Polonnaruwa 
Badulla 
Moneragala 
66.4 
64.2 
65.2 
67.0 
61.2 
67.9 
69.2 
68.3 
68.6 
69.1 
61.9 
69.4 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.108, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
The table clearly illustrates while Matara district had the highest 
life expectancy for both males and females, Nuwara Eliya had the lowest, 
and this difference was definitely substantial. The life span was also 
comparatively low in other estate districts such as Kandy, Matale and 
Badulla. The Batticaloa district was an cxcqjtion, where the life 
expectancy was comparatively low. 
The 1987 life expectancy figures for males and females in low-
country and up-country estates are as follows: 
Male 
Female 
Low-country 
66.6 
68.4 
Up-country 
59.7 
63.0 
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It may be noted that the estimates for the low-country were 
close to the national figures. In 1981 the life span expected was 71.7 
years for females and 67.8 years for males, and the average of both 
females and males in 1985 was 70 years.^ '^  But the difference between the 
up-country figures and the national average was greater. 
The socio-economic profile of the Indian Tamil community 
reveals that it is a community marked with a low level of income and 
education and a high level of diseases with high death rate and high rates 
of infant and maternal mortality, as compared to other ethnic groups in 
the island. Their poor income led to a higher level of malnutrition among 
the Indian Tamil community resulting in higher infant and maternal 
mortality rates, and also to a low level of participation of the estate 
population in educational institutions as most of the estate children are 
supposed to work in the plantation industry as workforce, owing to their 
poor financial condition. Although, income is not the only factor for the 
community's socio-economic backwardness. An equally important one is 
the inadequacy in health and educational facilities and social privileges in 
the estate sector. 
Till the first part of the seventies, the condition of Indian Tamils 
was highly deplorable. But in the latter part, steps were taken to improve 
their condition. Not because that Indian Tamil community was becoming 
self-reliant or self-sufficient over the years, but the credit should be given 
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to plantation economy and the political configuration. As the purpose of 
any plantation system is to gain profit, besides other means, by 
maintaining a strict control over the cost of production. The objective of 
the Sri Lankan plantation system has also been the same. To maintain 
cost control, the system with the support of the state, adopted the method 
of flexible labour deployment by which labour inputs could be adjusted to 
the varying demands of production.^^ 
Several specific factors were responsible for the pathetic living 
conditions on the plantation during the pre-nationalization period. The 
important one was that since independence, the successive Governments 
in Sri Lanka, considered the plantation sector a place with foreign capital 
and alien labour which was artificially developed and imposed upon the 
island by Britishers whose principal objective was economic exploitation. 
So, the ruling Sinhala elites were of the view that it was the planters' 
responsibility to arrange for the welfare of the estate labourers. Since the 
vast majority of the Indian Tamils was deprived of citizenship and 
franchise rights and neither the planters' nor the Government was making 
efforts to improve their condition, they were not in a position to fight 
exploitation on the plantations and to demand emphatically for their equal 
rights and share of justice. 
After the nationalization of estates, the plantations had been 
brought under the direct control of the Government of Sri Lanka and from 
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now the welfare of the estate workers had become the responsibility of 
state. "Since the seventies, the Government has also shown interest in the 
improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the Indian Tamils 
because, after the grant of citizenship rights, their value has increased 
significantly from the electoral point of view."^^ 
To some extent, the media was also responsible for making the 
Sri Lankan Government aware of the misery of the Indian Tamil 
plantation workers. But the critics identified some other reason for these 
improvements, as a prominent social worker on the plantations, Paul 
Caspersz argued that "the main motivation of the Government in making 
improvements in the estate sector during the post-Land Reform period 
was probably to make estate labour less unattractive to an increasing 
number of recruits of Sinhalese workers and that the distribution of the 
improvements were skewed in favour of the majority ethnic group in the 
country. The improvements were therefore flawed by the intrusion of a 
discriminatory racial factor which did not exist on the plantations 
managed by the Britishers."" 
It may be stated that the living conditions on the plantations 
began to improve in the recent years not totally because of the conscious 
efforts of the Sri Lankan Government realizing its legitimate duty to 
upgrade the life of its citizens, but also owing to the several projects with 
a massive financial investment launched by various international 
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organizations and agencies (the World Bank, the UNICEF, etc.) and 
countries such as Netherlands, Japan and New Zealand.^^ Many trade 
unions, church groups and other voluntary organizations, since 1975, also 
showed their interest in the estates, so far educative propaganda and 
financial assistance to the workers was concerned. 
Although few improvements have occurred in the living 
conditions of the plantation workers, the sectoral discrimination remained 
important. Ruling Sinhala elites wanted to please the Kandayan peasentry 
whose lands were being snatched away by the British Colonial rule for 
developing tea and coffee plantations and for the settlement of the Indian 
labourers in the central highland. "The land reforms and subsequently the 
distribution of land'to the Kandyan Sinhalese (discriminating against the 
landless plantation workers) under the electoral co-operatives and 
Janawasama (People's Estate Development Board) should be viewed In 
the context of the ruling elites' policy of removing the colonial 
grievances of the Kandayan Sinhalese."^^ 
Once J.R. Jayewardene, the former President of Sri Lanka made 
a remark, "the estate workers were not poorest of the poor but richest of 
the rich in comparison with the village peasantry."^° Such comparisons 
were often made as a slogan to win elections in the post-independence 
era, by the ruling Sinhalese elites. 
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Not only, their (Indian Tamil workers) social-economic 
condition was lamentable as has been revealed in the preceding pages 
with the help of a number of tables, but they were also deprived of 
citizenship rights for a long time. The community was rather denied any 
social or economic mobility and has had little opportunity to integrate 
themselves with other sectors of economy. Indian Tamil workers' 
problems were not discussed in the Parliament as the community was not 
adequately represented there. 
The misery of leading a tough life filled with exploitation and 
the pain of losing their fundamental rights in particular the citizenship 
right, ultimately gave birth to a major irritant i.e. the citizenship status 
issue, that spoiled the cordial bilateral relations of two countries for a 
long time. In the forthcoming pages we will be discussing the issue of the 
citizenship status of the persons of Indian origin in detail. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
INDO-SRI LANKA RELATIONS AND PROBLEM OF INDIAN 
TAMILS (1947-1964) 
It was in the 19"^  century that Indian Tamils started migrating to 
Sri Lanka as estate labourers. They chose to reside in the central and 
south Sri Lanka, an area famous as the Kandyan country which was the 
last to be subdued by and integrated in the British Empire and in this area 
only the plantations were being developed by the British capitalists. In 
these areas, Indian Tamils were living with little or no social interaction 
with the local Sinhala community. Even they were isolated from the Sri 
Lankan Tamils, who were residing in the north and east of the island. Sri 
Lankan Tamils owing to their centuries old residence in Sri Lanka had 
lost their connections with Tamil mainland in India while Tamil estate 
workers kept their contacts in India alive through regular visits and 
matrimonials and other social relationships. 
The crux of the citizenship problem was that India believed that, 
owing to their long stay in Sri Lanka and keeping in view their great 
contribution in enriching and strengthening the economy of the island, 
Indian Tamils were entitled to enjoy equal rights, privileges and 
obligations of local citizenship. On the other hand Sri Lanka always 
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maintained that Indians had no interest in the country rather their 
existence was harmful for the indigenous population. John Kotelawala 
once stated, 
"Thus one finds today in the valleys, cultivating 
their ancestral lands, the Kandyans who observe 
their ancient traditions while on the hillsides 
between those valleys is a migrant population of 
South Indian wage-earners, who observe the 
social traditions of South India. There, two 
sections of the population do not mix, for they are 
different in religion, language, social traditions 
and occupation. In most countries a migrant 
population can be absorbed into the indigenous 
population in one generation. In Ceylon it is still 
"Indian" after three generations....Within the 
same province, the same district and even the 
same village area, there are thus two distinct 
communities, unable to speak each other's 
language, having no social or economic relations 
with each other, and having in fact nothing in 
common save geographical propinquity".' 
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Almost the similar sentiments were expressed by Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike in Parliament, while she spoke on the Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement of 1964 on Persons of Indian Origin (PIO's). She maintained: 
" The growing unemployment among Ceylonese, 
the pathetic conditions of the Kandyan peasantry, 
the strong communal ties among the Indians and 
the absence of any indication on the part of these 
people during a period of over a century to 
intermingle with the indigenous population, their 
continued loyalty towards their mother country 
and the creation of another minority in addition to 
the numerous minorities which already exist, 
which could wield political power far in excess of 
that which their number would entitle them to, the 
question of who if any should be absorbed, have 
been the matters which influenced the Ceylon 
Government in the talks which have taken place 
between representatives of the two countries from 
1939 to the present day".^ 
However during colonial period, the citizenship issue gave rise 
to a number of unofficial discussions as well as inter-Governmental 
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negotiations, but none could be fruitful. But since 1947, the issue of 
Indian Tamils has attained a great momentum in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. 
Origin of the Indian Tamil Problem 
Before citizenship problem enhanced and took the shape of a 
big issue, Indian Tamils wanted to solve the major problem i.e. the 
acquisition of franchise rights. The hurdle was the opposition from most 
of the Sinhala leaders to assent to the Donoughmore Commission's 
(1927) recommendations to enfranchise all those Indian Tamils who had a 
"residence of five years and an abiding interest in Sri Lanka".^ The 
Sinhala leaders argued that Indian Tamils should not be enfranchised as 
they were undomiciled and did not assimilate with the indigenous 
population of Sri Lanka, and also that the British colonial administration 
should enforce strict qualifications to acquire franchise rights. Under the 
Sinhala pressure, the colonial Secretary incorporated in the Ceylon State 
Council (Election) order in council (1931) the following modified 
qualifications : domicile of origin or choice (domicile of choice to be 
dependent on five years residence) ; literacy and property or income 
qualifications ; and possession of a certificate of permanent settlement."* 
Actually the rise of political and economic nationalism was the 
main driving force behind the Sinhala opposition to the enfranchisement 
of the Indian Tamils under the original recommendation of the 
Donoughmore Commission. What was important here was that political 
149 
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and Problem of Indian Tamils 
nationalism demanded the control of legislature by the Sinhalese and 
economic nationalism emphasized the Sri Lankanization of employment. 
" Added to it was the fact that the Indian Tamil Problem was primarily 
conditioned by the political context in which it arose".^ The 
Donoughmore Constitution had recommended the method of self 
Government for Sri Lanka and for Sinhalese leaders, the term Sri Lankan 
nationality, never included the Indian Tamils and the Indian Tamil 
community was regarded as 'alien community'^ by the Sinhala majority. 
The Sinhalese, from the vary day, they acquired majority in the 
State Council, progressively suppressed the political rights of the Indian 
Tamils. Several measures undertaken by the Government affecting their 
political and economic interests drew the serious attention of the Indian 
Government.' "However no bilateral initiative was taken either by India 
or Sri Lanka to arrive at a working compromise on 'the status and rights 
of the Indian community' in the island until a crisis like situation 
developed in 1939 when nearly 6,400 daily paid Indian workers were 
dismissed from service",* The Indian Government retaliated immediately 
by taking back her earlier offer to enter into trade talks with Sri Lanka 
and restricting unskilled labour's future immigration to the island under 
the Indian Emigration Act, 1922. To avoid further confrontation, it was 
decided that the question will be discussed at the Indo-Ceylon Relations 
Exploratory Conference, which was to be held in Delhi in November 
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1940. The actual purpose of this O^nference was to take up trade matters 
between India and Sri Lanka. 
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS 
DURING 1940-41 
Indo-Ceylon Exploratory Conference, November 1940 
In this Conference the representatives of both the Governments, 
mainly discussed the question of the future status of the Indian Tamils in 
Sri Lanka. Their aim was to seek by what principle their status, their 
economic and political rights could be regulated? How could they be 
accepted as Sri Lankan citizens? "What would be the status of the Indians 
who would remain in the island for all time Indian nationals"?^ 
The discussions on the citizenship problem of Indian Tamils in 
the Conference, revealed diverse approaches of India and Sri Lanka on 
the same question. Sri Lanka emphasized that only those Indians would 
be given the rights and privileges of citizenship who had longstanding 
and permanent interest in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, Indian delegation 
maintained that this kind of treatment with Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka 
would have an adverse impact on the overseas Indians, settled in other 
parts of the world. India further expressed that Indian Tamils deserve 
'equal rights', hence full citizenship rights should be conferred on all 
Indians who could provide proof of five years residence in Sri Lanka, and 
also of a abiding interest in the island. "As regards the Indians who did 
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not qualify for citizenship as defined above, it was suggested that they 
should be entitled to engage or continue to engage in any lawful 
avocation without discrimination".'° 
Sri Lankan delegation made it very clear that Sri Lankan 
citizenship should be conferred to those only who had a domicile of 
origin while Indian delegation emphasized that same citizenship should 
be granted to those also who had domicile of choice. The thinking and 
action of both the delegations was so much different that there was no 
reason to continue the exploratory talks any more. However, both the 
sides very frankly disclosed their approaches on the citizenship question 
but none could prepare ground for the solution. 
Indo-Ceylon Relations Conference, September 1941 
In order to control the Indian emigration to Sri Lanka, an 
Immigration Bill was introduced in the State Council. This step paved the 
way for the rebuilding of talks between the two countries in September 
1941. It's fundamental purpose was to define either to non- Sri Lankans 
or to those Indians who should be considered as Sri Lankan citizens. 
A joint report based on the Indian emigration to Sri Lanka, was 
issued after the Conference. It was agreed that persons with domicile of 
origin were treated equally at par with the permanent population. Those 
who had domicile of choice or had literacy and property qualifications 
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were granted right to vote, but their right to work was to be determined in 
accordance with the existing laws of the island. "Undomiciled Indians 
(barring assisted unskilled workers who were already covered by India's 
ban on emigration) were guranteed rights of re-entry and employment 
under their former employers or in the same field of employment"." 
In India and Sri Lanka two contradictory views as a 'mixed 
response' emerged at the joint report. On one side, Indian Tamil opinion 
criticized the report, while the Sri Lankan delegation emphatically urged 
the Board of Ministers to adopt it as was in favour of the Sinhalese 
opinions on the Indian Tamil problem. However the official Indian 
opinion was not favourable. Under the influence of the INC, the Central 
Legislative Assembly advocated a new set of contrary principles to 
govern the status of the Indian residents in Sri Lanka.'^ India therefore 
did not assent the report and finally rapudiated it in 1943. 
Therefore, no Agreement could be worked out on the Indian 
Tamil problem in the pre-independence period. Once India and Sri Lanka 
attained independence, the problem of Indian Tamils took a new 
dimension. 
The Citizenship Problem after Independence and India's Attitude 
The Soulbury Commission (1945) recognized the citizenship 
problem of the Indian Tamils as a bilateral issue and emphasized that the 
issue should be sorted out by both the Government's in consulation with 
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each other, thus did not include the controversial issues of citizenship and 
immigration in its proposals. And on the eve of independence, the need to 
settle all the outstanding issues with India was realized by the Ceylonese 
leaders. 
In December 1947 Sri Lankan Government entered into 
discussions with the Government of India at the Prime Ministerial level. 
The Nehru - Senanayake Talks, 1947 
The Government of Sri Lanka no doubt wished to find a solution 
satisfactory to it with Indian endorsement so that the number not 
acceptable to Colombo could find its way back home in India. Nehru's 
opening statement at the talks with his Ceylonese counterpart D.S. 
Senanayake that "so far as India was concerned, if all Indians in Ceylon 
wished to retain their nationality,they were welcome to do so",'-' 
reassured Senanayake of India's good-will. But here Nehru also stated 
that since "there was a large number of Indians who had made Ceylon 
their home and were, therefore, desirous of becoming citizens of Ceylon, 
India was anxious that they should be given the opportunity of doing 
so"."» 
Basically, both the Prime Ministers were aimed at determining 
the qualifications and procedure which would enable around 8 lakh Indian 
settlers in the island to attain Sri Lankan citizenship. The talks were 
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started and continued on the qualifications suggested by Senanayake and 
clauses were discussed one by one. Finally, an agreement was worked out 
on general principle regarding the acquisition of citizenship after the 
slight modification made on the original Sri Lankan proposal at the 
instance of the Indian Prime Minister.'^ 
The Nehru - Senanayake talks in December 1947 apparently 
ended on a hopeful note making Ceylonese Prime Minister to declare that 
"there would be no more Indo - Ceylon problem"."^ On 2 January 1948 
Senanayake told a press conference in Mumbai on his way back home 
after the Delhi talks, "I do not think there will be any further discussions 
or disputes between the two countries".'^ Unfortunately such optimism 
was soon found to be misplaced, as both the Governments gave different 
interpretations to the principles envisaged in the Agreement. Finally, both 
the Prime Ministers agreed to clarify their positions through a prolonged 
correspondence. 
Nehru ~ Senanayake Correspondence (1948) 
The Indian Prime Minister was in favour of a liberal and 
accomodative approach against a very restrictive approach of the Sri 
Lankan Prime Minister. Both the Prime Minister's had differences over 
the principles of 'residence test', 'means of livelihood' and 'ability of the 
immigrants to follow the Ceylonese laws'. Apart from that there remained 
a wide gulf in the perception of the two countries regarding the role and 
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contribution of Indian labour to Sri Lankan economy. India argued that 
Indian labourers had made an unforgettable contribution to develop 
plantations and strengthening the economy of the island, hence, their 
contribution could hardly be minimized. But Ceylon's opinion was very 
different and it was apparent from D.S. Senanayake's letter dated 17 
August 1948, to Jawaharlal Nehru, as he said, "I admit that Indian labour 
has made a 'substantial contribution to the economic development of 
Ceylon'. This contribution, however, I feel was incidental and 
subordinate to other considerations which attracted foreign capital and 
labour to Ceylon. This country offered a wide field for the extensive and 
lucrative investment of British Capital, which the Colonial Power did not 
fail to seize. The development and wealth that were the results did not 
accrue to the indigenous population to any appreciable degree, the latter 
being deprived of even of the opportunities for employment which, this 
enterprise created. It was Colonial development for the benefit of the 
Colonial Power and any benefits resulting to the country were 
disproportionately small and unintentional. I am sure that Indians regard 
the enterprise of the British in their country in very much the same way 
as Ceylonese do in this. That India wanted these "benefactors" to quit 
India is obviously no indication that Indians failed to appreciate the 
numerous and varied developments for which the British and their 
enterprise were responsible".'* Such was the attitude of Ceylonese 
Premeir on the Indian argument that the Indian labour deserved a better 
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treatment owing to the enormous contribution made by them to the 
island's economy. 
Residence Test 
So far the residence test was concerned, the differences were on 
the length of residence as well as on the date from which it should be 
counted up. "Contradicting his earlier stand at the Delhi talks that he 
would consider Nehru's suggestion on the residential qualification (seven 
years preceding 1 January 1948 for both married and unmarried persons), 
Senanayake stipulated seven years for married persons and ten years for 
others".'^ This period should be considered right back from 31 December 
1945. As another part of his restrictive approach, Senanayake, later 
introduced in the draft citizenship law a requirement of continuous 
residence of seven years for married persons and ten years for others at 
the time when applications for citizenship were made. Pt. Nehru reacted 
that, "This period is far longer than is common in the naturalization laws 
of other countries and seems particularly harsh when required of persons 
with the background of Indian emigrants to Ceylon".^° He was however 
prepared to agree to continuous residence for 8 years for all persons, 
whether married or unmarried, provided it was reckoned from 1 January 
1948.^' But Senanayake did not accept this proposal of Nehru and stated, 
"The naturalization laws of other countries' have no doubt shorter periods 
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of residence as the grant of citizenship by them is occasional and they 
have not the same problems to face as we have".'^ ^ 
Means of Livelihood / Means Test 
The concept of 'means' test seemed to be the same at the first 
instance, but actually differed very much. Senanayake preferred to define 
it in a positive way for the simple reason that Sri Lanka did not want to 
assume responsibility for (if and when became necessary) a large body of 
persons who were Sri Lanka's liability from the beginning.^^ Nehru, on 
the other hand, had different approach to means test as he sought to put a 
negative construction on the means test. While the former defined it in 
terms of "adequate means of livelihood" or "an assured income of a 
reasonable amount", the latter wanted the means test to "disqualify only 
destitutes or vagrants or those without means of subsistence through 
physical disability".^'* 
Compliance with the laws and customs of Sri Lanka 
Nehru further emphasized that the scope of the provision 
regarding the compliance with the laws and customs of Sri Lanka should 
be limited to include only the people with certain actual disability or 
incapacity under Sri Lankan laws. Nehru was afraid that the application 
from Indian Tamils for Sri Lankan citizenship might be rejected on the 
ground that their marriages were invalid under Sri Lankan laws and 
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therefore desired exemption on this count for such applicants. 
Senanayake however refused to grant Sri Lankan citizenship to those 
persons whose marriages might be concerned "invalid as being bigamous 
or within the prohibited degrees of kinship if (they) had been contracted 
in Ceylone",^^ and disliked any individual exceptions to the Criminal Law 
oftheland.^^ 
Both the Premiers could not reach to any consensus so far the 
nature of the proposed tests for granting Sri Lankan citizenship to the 
Indian Tamils was concerned. Senanayake, without caring for Nehru's 
disagreement, moved ahead to draw a draft citizenship law which was 
containing his own perceptions and views, with little changes that have 
been described above. 
Nehru raised objections on certain provisions of the proposed 
tests for citizenship. He stated that Citizenship Bill was not only 
extremely restrictive but it was completely in favour of Sinhalese 
nationalism also. Sri Lankan Premier D.S. Senanayake, however, 
maintained that these were the minimum qualifications which Indian 
Tamils will have to fulfill, if they wish to become Sri Lankan citizens. He 
also made it clear that only those suggestions of Indian Prime Minister 
were accepted which were consistent with the interests of the permanent 
population of Sri Lanka, and it was impossible for him to agree to any 
further modification in the qualification or procedure for admission to Sri 
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Lankan citizenship. However, he assured the Indian Prime Minister that 
Colombo did not wish to deprive any Indian from citizenship right who 
could satisfy the required parameters. 
He emphatically mentioned in a letter written to his Indian 
counterpart on 17 August 1948, that, "If I refuse to accept modification of 
any proposal, it is because the grant of citizenship is mandatory, and we 
attach the greatest importance to the rights and status of a citizen of 
Ceylon, a status of which we are justly proud and rights of which are 
naturally jealous".'^' 
Though the correspondence was very lengthy and prolonged, 
both the Prime Ministers could not work out any solution and it ended on 
a bitter note. Puzzled Nehru finally declared that, "If you do not want 
these Indians, we will take them back. What difference will seven of eight 
lakhs make in a country of four hundred million people".^* 
This statement clearly reflects Nehru's dissatisfaction to the Sri 
Lankan approach adopted to deal with the Indian Tamil problem. 
CITIZENSHIP LAWS 
Ceylon Citizenship Act-1948: After the breaking up of 
correspondence between the two Prime Ministers, the UNP Government 
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under Senanayake enacted the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948. 
The Act provided for two types of citizenships: 
• citizenship by descent and 
• citizenship by registration 
This led to a great number of persons of Indian origin being 
deprived of their citizenship since the Act was interpreted as narrowly as 
possible. 
The provisions embodied in the act were deliberately made rigid 
and restrictive primarily to deny citizenship to all those who were not 
indisputably indigenous.""' The majority of the Indian Tamils found it 
difficult to cope with the provisions of the Acts, for example, it was very 
difficult for them to prove the fact that their respective fathers were born 
in Sri Lanka. It was even more difficult for them to originate the birth 
certificate of their paternal grandfather and paternal great grand father. 
This was so because the Registration of Birth Ordinance of Ceylon came 
into force only after 1895 and arrangements for registration of births were 
not made till 1897. Nor did the birth registers mention the name of the 
child till 1908 and birth registers prior to 1920 were not available in 
many parts of the island.^' 
' For the text of the Act see Appendix-I. 
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This kind of rigid attitude of Sri Lankan Government disrupted 
the Tamil Nadu Government very much. Its Legislative assembly adopted 
an officially sponsored resolution calling upon the Prime Minister of 
India to make sure that any agreement with Sri Lanka was based on 
certain basic principles of fundamental importance to the immigrants like 
citizenship for them with residence of five years, non-discriminatory 
regime between the citizens by descent and by registration, simplified 
procedures, etc.''^ The Ceylon Indian Congress in Sri Lanka which called 
Citizenship Act 'humiliating, discriminatory and anti-social', exercised 
immense influence on the proceedings and debates of Madras Legislative 
Assembly. 
Indian and Pakistani Residents' (Citizenship) Act-1949 : Under 
such grave situations, the enactment of Indian and Pakistani Residents' 
(Citizenship) Act of 1S49 had provided the Indian. Tamils with an 
opportunity to seek Sri Lankan citizenship through domicile. The Act 
contained somewhat less rigid conditions for the grant of citizenship. The 
qualifications prescribed under the Act were: 
• "An uninterrupted residence" in Sri Lanka of ten years for the 
unmarried, widowed and divorced people, and seven years for 
married persons. In case of unmarried, widowed and divorced 
people, the period would include 1 January 1936 to 31 December 
* Tamil Nadu was then known as Madras state. 
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1945. So far the category of married persons was concerned, it 
would begin on 1 January 1939 and end on 1 January 1946. 
Absence of even one year from the country was taken as a break in 
continuous residence to qualify as a citizen. 
• An assured income of a reasonable amount, or some business, or 
some gainful employment to support himself as well as his 
family.^'* In case of married persons, sufficient evidence was 
needed to prove that his wife and minor children were "dependent" 
on him and had been "uninterruptedly resident"* with him.''^ 
• The Act prescribed a two years period reckoned from 15 August 
1949 to 14 August 1951 for filling the applications.^* 
Earlier in 1948 Sri Lanka had enacted the Immigrants and 
Emigrants Act* to regulate the flow of traffic of people between Ceylon 
and the rest of the world. One of the main reason to enact this legislation 
was to cease the entry of fresh Indian immigrants whose aim was to get 
hold of jobs that were in any case limited and caused unemployment 
among the locals. However, officially it was not declared but it was more 
than clear that it was directed solely against the Indians. The only jobs 
The provision for the 'uninterrupted residence' of an applicant's wife and dependent was 
introduced by Indian Pakistani Residents' (Citizenship) Amendment Act No. 45 of 1952. 
According to the 1949 Act, an applicant was required to prove only 'ordinary residence' of 
his wife and dependents. 
See Appendix-II for the text of the Act. 
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available in Sri Lanka were in the plantations where the Indians had 
already monopolized the available jobs and now their relatives were 
trying illegally to enter Sri Lanka to catch the job opportunities. Although 
the Indians residing in Sri Lanka criticized this enactment but Indian 
Government recognized that the problem of illegal immigration existed 
and exhibited its willingness to co-operate with Sri Lankan Government 
to control it. On several occasions the Government of India counseled 
with the state Government of Tamil Nadu on steps that were necessary to 
check the illicit traffic from that state to Sri Lanka. 
Denial of Citizenship to the Indian Tamils : Reasons Responsible 
There were several reasons, owing to that the above discussed 
citizenship laws were enacted so that the scope of Ceylonese citizenship 
could be restricted to the Indian Tamils. The reasons responsible were: 
• The Sinhalese leaders insisted that the Indian Tamil community in 
place of mingling with the indigenous population believes in 
retaining its exclusiveness in 'religion, language, social tradition 
and occupation'. 
• The UNP leadership emphasized that Indian Tamils visit India 
every year in order to keep their social as well as personal 
connection alive. And also they remitt a substantia] part of their 
income to their relatives back home in India. Sri Lankan 
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Government pointed out that they wished to render their services to 
their motherland and did not exhibit the intention to make Sri 
Lanka their permanent home. As such they were the 'residents' and 
not 'domiciles' of the island.^' 
The Sinhalese were afraid of the socio-cultural linkages of the 
Indian Tamils. That is why John Kotelawala described the India 
Tamil problem as a matter of "life and death for the Sinhalese".^^ 
The Sinhalese also expressed their apprehension that the future 
Indian leaders would use the Indian Tamils as a fifth column in the 
island if they were granted citizenship.^^ 
The Sinhalese leaders had firm faith if the Indian Tamils were not 
granted citizenship, the problem of unemployment would be solved 
easily. John Kotelawala here state that it was impossible to make 
nine lakh Indian Tamils as Sri Lankan nationals without the risk of 
"reducing the Sinhalese to buggery and losing their identity as 
Ceylonese".^" 
The Sinhalese leaders expressed the fear that the 'citizenship' of 
the Indian Tamils would lead to the swamping of the Sinhalese and 
effacement of their identity as nationals of Sri Lanka.'*' 
The denial of citizenship to the Indian Tamils was primarily 
inspired by the political reason rather than social or economic 
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reason. Sri Lankan leadership particularly UNP leaders made out 
that the citizenization and enfranchisement of the Indian Tamils 
would be fatal to the Kandyan electorates and would weaken the 
electoral strength of the UNP. Its fear got accentuated when the 
Indian Tamils won seven seats in the 1947 general elections (held 
on the basis of the 1931 electoral register) and helped the election 
of nearly fourteen Leftist candidates in constituencies which had a 
plantation population. As a whole, the Ceylon Indian Congress 
(CIC) influenced the result in one-fifth of all the constituencies of 
Sri Lanka."^ 
Several statements of the Sri Lankan leadership against the 
Indian Tamils that they did not want to assimilate with the permanent 
population of the island.were actually used as a curtain to hide their real 
intention i.e. by hook or by crook to deny their citizenship rights. "The 
pertinent question that may be asked here is that what did the term 
'assimilation' imply. As a matter of fact, assimilation is a radical process 
which rules out all diversities between the groups. This is not an amalgam 
of all groups but assimilation to the culture of the dominant group. It 
implies the disappearance of minority as distinct units in the society."'*^ 
"For the Indian Tamils, assimilation was inconceivable. With 
their bias for pluralism, they desired peaceful co-existence with other 
communities. They wished to maintain their identity and cherish certain 
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distinct characteristics which they considered as an important element for 
preserving their identity. They were not prepared to abandon their 
traditional culture and the way of life in order to ensure their survival in 
the island"/* Besides, owing to the ethnic polarization in the island, 
assimilation was difficult to achieve. 
The Sri Lankan allegation that Indian Tamils did not want to 
settle in Sri Lanka as permanent settlers was, baseless. It was baseless 
because the Donoughmore Commission itself maintained in 1928 that 
about 40-50 percent of the Indian plantation workers were settled 
permanently in Sri Lanka. Again, in 1938 the Jackson report observed 
that about 60 per cent of the Indian Tamils formed a part of the island's 
permanent population and the Soulbury Commission estimated their 
number at 80 per cent."^ Between 1944 and 1950, it was estimated that 
some 55,000 estate labourers on an average travelled to and fro each year. 
This accounted for one-seventh of the adult estate population. The 
conclusion that could be drawn from the data is that the estate population 
visited India once in every seven years; perhaps 50 per cent of the 
labourers had not been to India; and that the 55,000 annual average 
represented the mobile population who travelled back and forth in every 
two years, the remainder were considered as "permanent residents".''^ 
The fact can be mentioned in support of Indian Tamil's 
perpetual interest in the island, that while most of them had applied for 
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Sri Lankan citizenship under the Citizenship Act of 1949 within the 
stipulated period (up to 4 August 1951), the number of people who had 
registered themselves for the Indian citizenship was rather small. 
The allegation that the Indian Tamils remitt a huge amount of 
their income to India, was also, proved wrong even by the official 
statistics. In fact, it was the Indian traders, majority of whom were Indian 
nationals, who had sent more money than the estate workers. This was 
testified by the Finance Minister of Sri Lanka himself in 1948. He said 
that 1.5 lakh non-estate urban Indians had remitted Rs.54 million a year, 
and about six lakh Indian estate workers had sent Rs.l7 lakhs a year to 
India. The latter figure, in fact, worked out to be a remittance of Rs. 1.50 
per month by a worker."*^ It was not such a big amount to be considered as 
a serious drainage of Sri Lanka's money. 
Finally, the argument of Sinhalese leaders that by denying 
citizenship to the Indian Tamils the problem of unemployment would be 
solved, was not convincing on the grounds, that the majority of the Indian 
Tamils was involved in plantation jobs, which had never been liked by 
Sinhalese either in the past of or in the post-independence period. Sri 
Lankan leaders did knew it from the core that island's economy could not 
survive without Indian estate workers and also that Sinhalese could never 
substitute them full so far the plantation jobs were concerned. For this 
reason, at one point of time, D.S. Senanayake expressed his desire to 
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retain the immigrant labourers without granting citizenship to all of them. 
At the same time, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike suggested that Sri Lanka 
should absorb a certain number of Indians and repatriate the rest/^ 
Hence, it can be estimated that nothing but it was 'political' 
factor which influenced the UNP Government to enact citizenship laws 
discriminating against the PIO's. 
Public Reaction on the Citizenship Laws 
The opposition parties of Sri Lanka bitterly criticized the 
Citizenship Acts as these were openly the product of UNP Government 
meant for the Sinhala or indigenous population of Sri Lanka/' Also the 
Supreme Court and the Privy Council had criticized several provisions of 
the 1949 Act.^° 
In India too, both the people and the Government, official and 
unofficial opinion unanimously denounced the Citizenship Acts.^' 
Implementation of Citizenship Laws 
The Indian Government continued to maintain that the Indian 
Tamils were no longer Indian nationals, but the residents of Sri Lanka 
who ought to be Sri Lankan citizens owing to their long stay in the island 
and contribution to the economic buoyancy of the country." Nehru was 
of the view that Indian Tamils had spent decades in the island and they 
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had made Sri Lanka their home. He also pointed out that most of them 
were born in Sri Lanka; some of them had no roots in India, and naturally 
most of them wanted to become Sri Lankan citizens.^"' Therefore, 
according to Nehru, "any suggestion that Indian labour proceeded to Sri 
Lanka solely for temporary employment in that country would be contrary 
to the facts of history", and India always insisted that "an emigrant labour 
should be given facilities to settle in the country to which he emigrated 
on equal terms with members of the indigenous population". "The so-
called special privileges sanctioned by the Sri Lankan Government", he 
remarked, "were benefits considered necessary to attract immigrant 
labour".^* 
By 5 August 1951, when the two year mandatory period for 
filling applications for citizenship ended, 2,37,000 applications on behalf 
of the 824,430 Indians were hastily filed for citizenship under the Act of 
1949. In the anxiety to beat the deadline, the applications were filled with 
a great number of technical flaws, discrepancies, loopholes and 
deficiencies, which led to abnormal delays in processing them and also 
provided excuses for a very high rate of rejections. The Sri Lankan 
Government argued that the Ceylon Indian Congress has misguided a 
large number of persons into making too many technical faults and many 
details were left incomplete so that the Government could be discredited 
for delays and rejections. 
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During 1949-53, only 8087 applications were granted 
citizenship; 10,319 applications of 26,359 persons were rejected, and 
action was pending on the rest.^* For nine months from December 1953 to 
September 1954, around 7, 505 Indian Tamils were registered as Sri 
Lankan citizens. The number of persons whose applications were rejected 
accounted for 45,236. The proportion of registration to rejection was very 
small : 7,500 to 45,000 in nine months. Between October 1954 and 
January 1955, only 21 persons were absorbed as Sri Lankan citizens and 
the total number of applications rejected was 36,260.^^ It can be clearly 
made out from the figures that in the beginning not many applications 
were rejected but very few persons were accepted as Sri Lankan citizens 
subsequently.^' 
Under the citizenship provisions of the Indian Constitution, 
about 182,292 persons had applied for Indian citizenship during 1949-53 
of which, 155,292 applications were granted citizenship and the decision 
was pending on 27,000 applications.^^ 
The implementation of the citizenship laws gave rise to many 
questions : what would be the political status of those Indians who had 
been denied the Sri Lankan citizenship? What would be the fate of those 
who failed to apply for either Sri Lanka citizenry (within the stipulated 
time) or Indian citizenship? Was it India's or Sri Lanka's responsibility to 
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admit all those Indians whose claims for Sri Lankan citizenship were 
rejected? 
Sri Lanka took the uncompromising stand that all those who did 
not qualify for the island's citizenship are automatically Indian citizen's 
and hence should be repatriated to India. On the other hand Indian 
Government was willing to grant citizenship to those who satisfied the 
citizenship provisions (Article 8)^ ^ of the Indian Constitution/^ It also 
declared that it did not have any legal or Constitutional responsibility 
towards the Indian Tamils. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
clearly articulated Indian policy on this issue in Rajya Sabha on the 6 
September 1955. He said: 
"I would like the House to remember that the 
problem is not that of the Indian citizens, as one 
hon. Member talked about it. if it were a problem 
of the Indian citizens, there would be no problem 
to be settled immediately. It is problem of the 
people who are not Indian citizens. It is a problem 
of the people of Indian descent, who never were 
citizens of India, but in whose fate for historical, 
cultural and other reasons, we are interested. 
Naturally, we are interested in their fate".^' 
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But at the same time India made it clear that it did not deny its 
"sentimental interests" in Indian Tamils because their "country of origin 
was India".^^ Nehru maintained,' 
"There is a history behind this because of 
that history, the Government of Ceylon cannot 
dispose of it merely by saying that it is just their 
lookout and nobody else's, or by throwing out 
100,000 or 200,000 persons and making them 
stateless"." 
Indian Attitude 
In the elections of 1952, the question of citizenship for persons 
of Indian origin and the attitude of India so far this question was 
concerned, served as one of the major electoral issues. In the election 
campaign, Sri Lankan Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake tried hard to 
accentuate Sinhalese hatred against India and persons of Indian origin. He 
even made a wild charge that India had refused to supply rice to Sri 
Lanka unless Indian demands were met. At an election meeting held at 
Kurunegala he called the four members of the State Council belonging to 
the Ceylon Indian Congress as "outsiders" and indicated that he is not 
going to tolerate them anymore. On one side, he was involved in 
criticizing India and Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka, on the other hand he was 
eager to ensure India that Indian Tamils are treated very well in the 
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island. He suggested to the Indian High Commissioner that India could 
send a goodwill mission to check this fact. Nehru outrightly rejected this 
proposal. Nehru told the Indian High Commissioner; 
"We have endeavoured to treat the Ceylon 
Government with all courtesy and friendliness. 
We have had little of these in return from them 
and I have no intention of taking the initiative in 
dealing with them in any way for some time at 
least. Their only excuse is that they are a small 
and an inexperienced country and a little afraid of 
India. That is not an adequate excuse for all that 
they have done. Their references in public on 
Indian questions had been discourteous in the 
extreme, to say the- least of them. We are not used 
to such treatment from any country however big 
it may be".^^ 
However, he did not enhanced the issue much and assured 
Ceylon that India meant no harm to her despite her size. But India 
continued to insist that Indian Tamils were the responsibility of Ceylon* 
and India would not take them back. This was in sharp contrast to what 
Ceylon's official name was changed to Sri Lanka on 22 May 1972. Though in all the 
chapters we have used the term interchangeably. 
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Nehru himself said in the Lok Sabha on 30 September 1954 on the eve of 
the arrival of the Ceylonese Prime Minister in New Delhi for talks on the 
future of the Indians settled in Ceylon. Nehru recalled his own 
discussions with the Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and said: 
" In fact, in discussing other questions with 
the Prime Minister of China, I pointed out to him 
the large number of Chinese in southeast Asia 
and a fairly considerable number, not quite so 
much, of Indians too; and I said to him both 
because of the size of our respective countries-we 
are both big and because our populations have 
overflowed into other countries; it is not difficult 
to understand that the other and smaller countries 
round about us are a little afraid of us-afraid of 
China or afraid of India-it depends upon where 
geography puts them. And he said that is 
perfectly true and we must do every thing in our 
power to get rid of this fear in so far as we 
can"." 
Nehru-Senanayake Talks in London, 1953 
Again the negotiations were renewed between the Prime 
Ministers of India and Sri Lanka in June 1953, to settle long-drawn out 
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Indian Tamil problem. Dudley Senanayake explicitly drawn out a 
numerical formula which formed the basis for discussions between the 
two Prime Ministers. The proposals of this bilateral talk were: 
a) Out of an estimated 9,50,000, "4,00,000 Indian residents in 
Ceylon were expected to be registered under the Citizenship 
Act, 1949". 
b) "An additional number of 2,50,000 persons of Indian origin 
would be granted permanent resident permit, whose future 
would be reviewed after 10 years, and during this period any of 
them may desire to return to India. The Government of India 
would not raise objections". 
c) "The permissible number of persons to be granted citizenship by 
registration and permanent residence permit is in case to exceed 
6,50,000". 
d) "The balance of the Indian residents about 3,00,000 were to be 
accepted as Indian citizens by the Government of India and to 
be compulsorily repatriated to India".^^ 
Although Nehru liked the proposals but he could not accept the 
principles of compulsory repatriation of Indian residents, as "it would set 
a precedence for other countries in which about 12 million Indians 
overseas settled".^^ Also he did not agree to the Sri Lankan Prime 
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Minister's estimate of the number of Indian settlers in the island who 
could be exactly considered as Indian nationals. Nehru was prepared to 
absorb only 1.50 lakh persons as Indian nationals.^^ He also insisted that 
the total number of people who would be registered under the Indian and 
Pakistani Residents Citizenship Act and the number of persons who 
would be granted permanent residence permits should be increased to 7 
lakh.^ ^ For Sri Lanka if India would agree to this principle of compulsory 
repatriation, the issue of citizenship could be searched out. But the 
discussions could not be fruitful. 
Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement, January 1954 
With the change of Government in Sri Lanka in October 1953, 
Nehru invited John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, to 
revive talks on the outstanding matters like the citizenship question. 
Kotelawala accepted the invitation and his discussions with Nehru in 
January 1954 led to the conclusion of a new Agreement.* 
The Agreement had the following features : 
i) "Sri Lanka agreed for the expeditious registration of stateless 
persons as its citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents' 
(Citizenship) Act"; 
For the text of the Agreement see Appendix-Ill. 
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ii) "All persons who had been registered under this act would be 
placed on a separate electoral register initially for an interim 
period of 10 years. Such Indian Tamils would be entitled to 
elect a certain number of members to the House of 
Representatives, the number being determined after consultation 
with the Prime Minister of India"; 
iii) "Those Indians who were not registered as Sri Lankan citizens 
would be allowed, if they so desired to register themselves as 
Indian citizens in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of 
the Constitution of India. While Sri Lanka on its part, agreed to 
offer special inducements to increase such registrations, the 
Indian Government undertook to extend administrative and 
other facilities for the same purpose".^° 
One very significant development that was observed for the first 
time in the Agreement was that the question of 'illicit immigration', was 
discussed as a part of the Indian Tamil problem. To suppress illicit 
immigration certain measures were prescribed on the part of both the 
Governments. 
The most significant clause in the Agreement was that India 
withdrew its earlier objection to the amendment of the Immigrants and 
Emigrants Amendment Bill casting the burden of proof on the accused 
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that he was not an illegal immigrant.* One of the provisions of the 
Agreement was that the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka would be 
given an opportunity to satisfy himself that a prima facie case existed for 
the prosecution of an illegal immigrant, but the ultimate authority to take 
final decision will be the Government of Sri Lanka. Indian High 
Commissioner would be consulted either out of courtesy or out of some 
necessity as Kotelawala maintained that the Indian Government could 
decline to arrange for the transport to India of an illicit immigrant 
convicted in a prosecution.^' 
The Agreement was considered as a 'genuine attempt' for 
compromise by both India and Sri Lanka. Departing from the earlier 
stand, Nehru too acknowledged the principle of separate electorate for the 
Indian Tamils who were to be registered as Sri Lankan citizens. He 
maintained that he assented this provision at the "insistence of the Sri 
Lankan delegation", and because otherwise "the political fortunes of 
certain parties in Sri Lanka were likely to be affected".^^ But later in the 
Lok Sabha Nehru gave altogether a different explanation. He stated that 
he: 
"neither objected to the provision for the separate 
electoral register nor commented on it partly 
* Under the previous law, it was difficult to convict an illegal immigrant unless he was 
caught in the very act of arriving in Sri Lanka. 
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because it was an interim measure and partly 
because the manner in which a particular class of 
Sri Lankan citizens should be represented in the 
legislature was of domestic concern to the people 
and Government of Ceylon".'^ 
For Sri Lanka, the objective of the separate electoral register 
was to ensure that the political interests of the country were not 
"injuriously affected until the new citizens had assimilated themselves in 
some degree into their environment".''* On India's part, India endorsed 
Sri Lankan approach to deal with the question of illicit immigration as it 
was an essential part of the citizenship problem in the island. On Sri 
Lanka's part, Kotelawala did not insist on the specification in the 
Agreement of the exact number of Indians to be absorbed as Sri Lankan 
and Indian citizens. When he was asked to give the reason to denounce 
the earlier numerical formula formulated by Dudley Senanayake in 1953, 
he explained, "There is a law to be administered. It is a sieve and the 
people have to pass through it. Only then would the number eligible for 
Ceylon citizenship be known. It might be four lakh, two lakh or six 
lakhs".^^ 
Reactions to the Agreement 
The Agreement was hailed by Sri Lanka as a proposal to resolve 
the citizenship problem. What was significant about the Agreement that 
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Kotelawala declared that his Government would interpret the provisions 
of the proposal in its "own way".^^ 
The provisions of the Agreement like the system of separate 
electoral register and the counsel of India on matters such as prosecution 
of illegal immigrants and fixing the number of members to be elected 
from the separate electoral register, were bitterly criticized by the 
opposition parties in Sri Lankan Parliament.'^ The Government of India 
also regarded the Agreement not as a solution, but merely an 
understanding to reach a final solution.''^ Although the national politial 
opinion by and large favoured the Agreement, the political opinion in 
Tamil Nadu was apprehensive of the central Government's failure to 
consult the state Government before the conclusion of the Agreement.'^ 
Nehru wanted to solve the problem of Indian Tamils in Sri 
Lanka that too without sacrificing their basic interests in the island and 
for that purpose he opted for a flexible approach so that the rigid views of 
Sri Lankan Government could be harmonized. 
Nehru asserted that under the proposed arrangement, a good 
number of Indian residents would register as Sri Lankan citizens owing to 
their natural desire to settle down in the island while only a small number 
would opt for the Indian citizenship. 
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Diverse Connotations of the Agreement 
But Sri Lanka stuck to the position that those who were not 
qualified to be Sri Lankan citizens were to be Indian citizens. The 
Government of India thought otherwise and held the position that those 
who did not qualify for citizenship of either of the two countries were to 
be classed as "stateless" whose status would be determined by the two 
Governments at a later stage. 
Moreover, Sri Lanka analysed the term 'inducement' in the way 
she wished. It included not only compensation and offer of passage back 
to India to those Indians who opted for Indian nationality, but also 
withdrawal of remittance facilities, denial of documents for travel abroad 
and even withdrawal of ration cards for Government subsidised rice from 
all those Indian Tamils who had not registered themselves either as Sri 
Lankan or Indian citizens.^ ** "All these measures violating the letter and 
spirit of the Agreement were meant to pressurize the stateless PIO's to 
move out of the island.^' 
Significantly, Indian High Commissioner C.C. Desai maintained 
that most of the applications for Indian citizenship were filled under 
duress, they could not be maintained. On this the Sri Lankan Government 
expressed its discontent, that far from being helpful, the Indian High 
Commissioner not only stopped providing facilities to persons seeking 
Indian citizenship, but also was 'adding to the number of stateless 
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persons by destroying the Indian passports of Indian nationals'. In his 
reply, the Indian High Commissioner accused the Sri Lankan Government 
of 'dishonourable' action violating the letter and spirit of the Agreement 
by the large scale rejection of applications for its citizenship. 
Furthermore, when Sri Lanka suspended the renewal of 
temporary residence permits and the issue of identity cards to the Indian 
Tamils, in relation, the Indian Government introduced a visa system for 
travel between India and Sri Lanka. It also tightened the travel 
regulations so that Indian settlers in Sri Lanka would be prevented from 
returning to the island after a visit to India unless they possessed Sri 
Lankan travel documents.^'* 
The other measure which Sri Lanka adopted to violate the 
Agreement was that the separate electorates had been provided for 12 
years, instead of 10 years as envisaged in the Pact. Also without 
consulting the Indian Prime Minister, the Sri Lankan Government fixed 
four seats in the House of Representatives for the Indian Tamils who 
were registered as Sri Lankan citizens.^* 
* The rejection of applications for Sri Lankan citizenship had increased since January 1954. 
A set of comparative figures available indicate that the number of persons granted Sri 
Lankan citizenship during August-December 1953 was much more than the number 
absorbed during January-December 1954. It means that the total number of applications 
rejected during August-December 1953 was (50 per cent) less than the total number during 
January-April 1954 (150 per cent). 
183 
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and Problem of Indian Tamils 
Hence, while Indian attitude was the outcome of the Sri Lankan 
Government's own interpretation and violation of the Agreement, Sri 
Lankan stand was partly influenced by the functioning of the Agreement 
and partly administered by the Indian Government's attitude. 
Agreement of October 1954 
After January 1954 Agreement, both the Governments were 
busy blaming each other for not respecting the January Pact. Hence, the 
two Prime Ministers met again in New Delhi in October of the same year 
at Colombo's initiative. It's aim was to put the Nehru Kotelawala 
Agreement back on the rails. The result of the talks that was published in 
a Joint Statement on 10 October 1954, highlighted 'new and fundamental 
differences' that had arisen between the two Governments, but left it 
'unsettled'. 
India did not accept the Sri Lankan proposal that the PIO in the 
island continued to be Indian nationals unless they were accepted as Sri 
Lankan citizens. India persisted with its stand that it was willing to accept 
* Sri Lanka's point of view was based on the pre-supposition that the number of Indians 
opting for Indian citizenship would be substantial. John Kotelawala expected the 
consolidated figure of 3.5 lakh for this citizenship. However the working of the Agreement 
for a brief period came to disappoint the Sri Lankan authorities. Contrary to their 
expectations, during 1954, only 8,163 persons applied for Indian citizenship under Article 8 
of the Indian Constitution. Of these, 5,618 applications were accepted and 2,545 
applications were pending for scrutiny. 
•* For the text of the Joint Statement see Appendix-IV. 
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those as Indian citizens who either held an Indian passport or were 
eligible for Indian citizenship under Article 8 of the Indian Constitution. 
The rest (who were neither Sri Lankan citizens nor Indian citizens) were 
therefore regarded as 'stateless'. However, Sri Lanka declined to 
recognize the category of 'stateless persons'. 
The Indian Government also refused to accept the view that 
there could be an automatic conferment of Indian nationality on persons 
belonging to the 'stateless' category. Nevertheless, there was some 
forward movement at the talks on solving the problem of citizenship. It 
was agreed that both the countries should expeditiously proceed to give 
citizenship to those who were eligible and then determine the number 
who fail to fall in either of the two categories. To induce a large number 
of persons to apply for Indian citizenship, Ceylon agreed that all those 
who obtained the Indian citizenship would be allowed to work in Sri 
Lanka in their existing jobs until the age of 55 years when they would be 
required to go back to India. 
Implementation of the October 1954 Agreement 
The Basic aim of the October 1954 Agreement was to remove 
all the ambiguities or misunderstandings which served as stalemate in its 
implementation. But, unfortunately, none of the two Governments co-
operated for the smooth implementation of the Pact. The Indian allegation 
was that Sri Lanka continued to slow down the process of registration and 
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reject applications for its citizenship on flimsy grounds so as to really 
"limit the number of Indians acceptable, to a pre-determined figures".^^ 
Sri Lanka, on the other hand, alleged that India did not really 
fulfil its obligations to register all those Indian Tamils who sought to 
become Indian citizens. Opinions were also differed on the question of 
composition of the Adult Register, interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Immigration and Emigration Amendment Act of 1954, and guarantee 
of employment to the Indian Tamils.^^ India's proposal for 'arbitration' to 
resolve the issue of citizenship did not meet with any enthusiasm from 
Colombo as Premier S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike believed in resolving the 
entire question through mutual consultation and bilateral dialogues. 
Post-1954 Agreement Period and the Citizenship Issue 
Although, India and Sri Lanka both interpreted the provisions of 
the Agreement in a different direction, both the countries continued to 
register the stateless persons as their nationals. But the number of people 
who were registered as Sri Lankan citizens was less than the number of 
persons who were regarded as Indian nationals. And the reason was that 
the Sri Lankan Government continued to reject a large number of 
applications for its citizenship. 
For example, during January-November 1954, only around 
6,636 persons were granted Sri Lankan citizenship and about 41,548 
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persons were rejected. In the month of November 1954 alone, about 2,477 
applications were rejected and only one person was granted Sri Lankan 
citizenship.^^ All these rejections were made either on technical* or often 
flimsy*' and metaphysical*** grounds. Therefore, Indian Premier Nehru 
never declined to express his concern to the manner of rejection of the 
applications of stateless Indian Tamils. He maintained in the Lok Sabha: 
"It is obvious that while previously not many 
were registered and a large number rejected, now 
we have arrived at a stage when hardly any person 
was accepted : thirty six thousand rejections in 
four months (October 1954-January 1955) and 
twenty one registered, which comes to about five 
and a quarter a month".^° 
Nehru always desired a peaceful solution of the citizenship 
problem but he never criticized Sri Lanka for its failure to solve this issue 
as he maintained that this kind of attitude would "increase the Sri 
Lankans' fear of India swallowing them up, thereby making the solution 
* Some times the estate workers were refused citizenship because they did not take the oaths 
of allegiance before the Justice of Peace before whom he had sworn affidavits. 
** In some cases the rejection was on the ground that the worker gave impression to the 
official concerned that he would not be able to maintain his dependents in future as he had 
done in the past. 
***The applicants' alleged failure to comprehend the full implications of securing the Sri 
Lankan citizenship also led to the rejection of his application. 
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to the problem a little more difficult".^' However, the Parliamentary 
Opposition in India maintained that Indian Government should deal with 
Sri Lanka in a polite and firm manner but in this process the interests of 
the Indian Tamil community should surely not be sacrificed. 
It was only in 1962 that the need for a new initiative was 
realized to resolve the question of the stateless persons, as the Sri Lankan 
Government had completed the process of registradon as its citizens of 
those who had applied under the 1949 Citizenship Act. Till now none of 
the two Governments had left their divergent views regarding the 
recognition of the "stateless category". Also, the stateless persons in 1964 
were numerically three times (971,073) the number of people who were 
granted citizenship by the two countries (374,673) as is evident from the 
table below: 
Table 2.0 
NUMBER OF PERSONS GRANTED INDIAN AND SRI 
LANKAN CITIZENSHIP, 1949-30 NOVEMBER 1964 
1 
2 
3 
4 
No. of Indian residents in 1953 
No. of persons granted Sri Lankan citizenship (under Indian and 
Pakistan Residents Citizenship Act and Ceylon Citizenship Act) 
No. of persons granted Indian citizenship 
No. of stateless people in 1964 
1,03757 
140,185 
234,488 
971,073 
Source: P. Sahadewan, India and overseas Indians : The case of Sri 
Lanka, p. 142, Kalinga Publications : Delhi, 1995. 
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The table shows that the number of stateless persons by the end 
of 1964 was slightly less than the total Indian Tamil population in 1953, 
but almost equaled the total number of Indians in 1949. This was largely 
owing to a huge volume of natural increase in the Indian Tamil 
population. 
It was only in 1963 that Mrs. Bandaranaike took the initiative 
to suggest to Nehru a meeting to resolve the question of the stateless 
persons. Nehru formed a proposal "implicitly underlying a formula which 
stipulated that the PIO should be given two years to opt for Indian 
citizenship; if the option was not exercised, they would automatically 
become Sri Lankan citizens".^^ But Mrs. Bandaranaike rejected this 
formula out of hand and expressed that any discussion on the basis of this 
proposal would be unless without taking an overall view of all the 
ramifications of the problem at the highest level.^^ 
Nevertheless, both the leaders never denied possibilities of 
reconciling the diverse opinions so as to resolve the stateless problem. A 
meeting proposed in April 1964 could not take place because of Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike's preoccupation. Nehru passed away soon thereafter. He 
was succeeded by Lai Bahadur Shastri. It is worth mentioning here that in 
Sri Lanka John Kotelawala faced defeat in 1956 elections and UNP lost 
control of power to S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and his Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party (SLFP), a Government bent on the Sinhala chauvinist policies. 
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which left little room for any possible accommodation towards the 
persons of Indian origin. SWRD was assassinated on 26 September 1959 
and was succeeded by his wife Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Both husband and 
wife followed the non-aligned policy in the realm of foreign affairs. 
Although now there was a great symmetry in the foreign policies of two 
neighbours but the differences between them on the issue of the persons 
of Indian origin remained dormant for quite a long time. 
Lai Bahadur Shastri and the Question of Stateless Persons 
Firstly, after the Sino-Indian clash of 1962, there was quite a 
gloomy atmosphere in India and also India realized that it had failed to 
evoke any sympathetic and favourable response from any of its. 
neighbours. Nepal too exhibited the attitude of hostility. Lai Bahadur 
Shastri a mild mannered man, was not a party to any earlier Indian stand 
or commitment on the citizenship problem. This enabled him to assess the 
issue afresh. He adopted a step by step approach and decided to have the 
problem discussed at the official and Foreign Minister's levels thus 
prepared ground well for the success of the summit meeting between the 
two Prime Ministers. Now New Delhi had a qualitative change in 
standpoint of the problem. It had become clear that the old stand that 
India would accept only those who qualified for Indian citizenship under 
its laws and no more, was no longer tenable if an amicable solution was 
to be found. This change in attitude was well articulated by the Minister 
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of External Affairs Sardar Swarna Singh in his statement made in the Lok 
Sabha on 23 November 1964. Replying to the criticism that India had 
given opportunity to Sri Lanka in agreeing to accommodate a large 
number of stateless persons as Indian citizens, he stated, 
" you cannot compel another country to give 
them the citizenship right, because that is a matter 
within the sovereignty right of any country, and it 
is decided by the laws of that country, just as we 
in our country are masters of this question of 
granting Indian citizenship right to any person 
who comes and settles here. There are laws on 
that, and we can make laws, we can modify laws 
in that respect " 
He further maintained, 
"So, it is a fact that these people had not been 
given Ceylonese citizenship rights. It is 
important, therefore, to consider this, that here is 
this mass of people whose future is uncertain. 
They were not Ceylonese citizens, they were not 
on their electoral rolls, they did not participate as 
full citizens in the scheme of their civic and 
political life. Therefore, it was a matter of great 
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concern to us also that the future of these people 
of Indian origin should not remain in this 
uncertain condition; there must be some clear idea 
about their future".^ '* 
Secondly, India's defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the 
apathetic responses of India's neighbours to the conflict made Lai 
Bahadur Shastri to realize the need of having good relations with 
neighbours, and particularly with Sri Lanka as being close and cordial to 
China Sri Lanka had sought to play a key role as one of the Colombo 
Powers acting as intermediaries to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue 
after India's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese in November 
1962. Mrs. Bandaranaike categorically told the Indian Prime Minister 
that the "pre-requisite for the improvement of Indo-Lanka relations was 
the settlement of the stateless question".^^ Lai Bahadur Shastri too 
expressed almost the similar viewpoint. 
Lastly, the large scale forced exodus of Indians from Burma 
during the sixties was cited an example for the failure of Indian 
diplomacy on the 'issue of the overseas Indians'.^^ Lai Bahadur Shastri 
had an impression in mind that Sirimavo Bandaranaike just might take an 
inspiration from this Burmese stand and might expel the stateless persons 
of Indian origin from island. However Mrs. Bandaranaike herself made it 
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clear that Burmese instance was not going to influence her in handling the 
citizenship issue. 
Hence, it could be said that both the leaders exhibited firm 
intentions to arrive at a settlement. 
The Shastri-Bandaranaike Pact of 1964 
After a long series of wrangles and haggling over figures and 
endless arguments over facts and principles, the Prime Ministers of India 
and Sri Lanka concluded an Agreement* on 30 October 1964. 
The letters exchanged between Mrs. Bandaranaike and Lai 
Bahadur Shastri stated that out of 9.75 lakh stateless persons in the 
island, Sri Lanka would grant citizenship to 3 lakh (along with their 
natural increase), while India agreed to accept repatriation to India of 
5.25 lakh people (together with their natural increase) after granting its 
citizenship on them. It was agreed, that the future status of the remaining 
1.5 lakh stateless persons, was to be the subject of a separate agreement 
between the two Governments. To ensure simultaneous implementation of 
the Agreement by both the parties, it was agreed that the process of grant 
of Sri Lankan citizenship and repatriation to India would have to be in the 
ratio of 4:7. The entire process was agreed for completion in fifteen 
years. In order to bring leniency in approach, the affected persons were 
For the text of 1964 Agreement see Appendix-V. 
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allowed to repatriate their assets (including their provident fund and 
gratuity) upto specified limit of Rs.4,000 at the time of their final 
departure to India. 
It was also mentioned in the Pact that the repatriates to India 
would have to be given all the facilities by Sri Lankan Government as 
was enjoyed by the citizens of other states during the period of their 
residence in the island. However, they would not enjoy the facility for 
remittances. Ceylon also agreed that those who were gainfully employed 
on the date of this Agreement would be allowed to work in Sri Lanka 
until the date of their repatriation or until they attained the age of 55 
years, whichever is earlier. 
Regarding procedural arrangements, the two Governments 
agreed to prepare, as early as possible two registers having the names of 
persons who would be granted Sri Lankan citizenship and those who 
would be repatriated to India. 
Importantly, the Pact had imposed certain obligations on the two 
Governments under International Law to confer citizenship on a specific 
number of people.* ^^  From India's point of view this Agreement was 
very significant as it was a major step towards removing a major irritant 
from the bilateral relations of two neighbours. From Sri Lanka's view 
This was contrary to the 1954 Agreements which did not create any internationally binding 
obligations as the persons concerned were entitled to apply for the citizenship of the 
respective countries even without such Agreements. 
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point, Mrs. Bandaranaike marked following characteristics of the 
Agreement: 
(a) for the first time, the Indian Government had recognized the 
obligations towards the stateless persons in Sri Lanka, 
irrespective of their wishes, 
(b) the processes of repatriation to India and granting of Sri Lankan 
citizenship were made mutual, 
(c) no inducements for repatriation were to be offered under the 
terms of the Pact, besides the fact that there was no necessity to 
hold up repatriation until a person attained the age of 55.^^ 
Reaction to the Agreement in Sri Lanka 
The non-official reaction in Sri Lanka to the Sirimavo-Shastri 
Pact appeared to be mixed. The UNP leader, Dudley Senanayake was 
consulted by Mrs. Bandaranaike before signing the Agreement, hence 
UNP had to support it. Besides, the Sri Lankan press, the Lanka Sama 
Samaja party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP) also supported the 
Pact. 
At the same time, some of the Sinhalese political parties 
rejected the Pact as a "complete betrayal of the Ceylonese interests to the 
Indian interests".^' The Tamil parties rejected the Pact as "The principle 
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underlying the Pact was a shameless 'horse-deal', which callously 
sacrificed fundamental human rights and liberties of more than half a 
million Tamil Workers".'°° 
The CWC and the Democratic Workers Congress (DWC) 
seemed to have taken a midway approach on the Agreement. While 
accepting the numerical formula in principle and welcoming the Pact as a 
'first step towards the removal of the stigma of statelessness', the CWC 
leader, Thondaman, criticized the Agreement on the ground that both the 
Governments did not ascertain the views of the representatives of the 
people concerned prior to its conclusion.'°' The CWC charged both the 
parties to the Agreement that the Tamils were treated like a 'commodity' 
to be traded between the two parties. Later the CWC demanded that the 
implementation process should be extended to a maximum period of two 
years (instead 15 long years as stipulated in the Pact) and the grant of Sri 
Lankan citizenship should not be based on the repatriation of stateless 
persons to India after the grant of Indian citizenship. The DWC too asked 
India and Sri Lanka to remove the weaknesses of the Pact so that people 
concerned could understand the qualities of the Agreement. 
Hence, it could be made out that the political parties 
representing the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka could not admit the 
Agreement whole heartedly. 
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Reaction to the Agreement in India 
To save the Agreement from criticism, Lai Bahadur Shastri 
stated that it's purpose was to end the statelessness of the Indian Tamils 
and also to improve relations with southern neighbour of India. Although, 
he maintained that it was neither fully up to the mark from India's 
viewpoint nor did it fulfill all the needs and aspirations of the people 
concerned. 
India's External Affairs Minister Swarna Singh described the 
Agreement as a "give and take" document that sought to end the state of 
uncertainty for the Tamils. He explained the following reasons which 
influenced the Indian Government's decision to conclude the pact : 
First, a prity large portion of the stateless persons had expressed 
in the Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka, their 'desire to come' to 
India. Also the representatives of the Indian Tamils in the island 
emphatically asked both the Government's to find out a permanent and 
appropriate remedy to the problem of stateless persons. 
Second, Mrs. Bandaranaike outrightly rejected Indian proposal 
of accepting all the stateless persons as Sri Lankan citizens. Instead she 
regarded them all as Indian citizens. That is why it was essential to be 
agreed on a 'numerical formula' so that relations could be improved and 
also to solve the citizenship status issue. Swarna Singh concluded: 
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"The Agreement if properly implemented would 
yield rich dividends in friendship and good 
relations with Ceylon and in the happiness and 
contentment of the PIO in the island".'°^ 
But opposition parties could not be convinced by Swarna 
Singh's clarifications. N.G. Ranga (the Swatantra Party leader) called the 
Pact as a "shameful agreement" and another leader of the party, M.R. 
Masani criticized it as being "unsound in principle and a violation of 
basic human rights".'°^ Natha Pai of Praja Socialist Party (PSP) warned 
the Government that the "dangerous precedent by India in Ceylon would 
be followed in many other parts of the world".'^'^ 
K. Manoharan of the Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
described the Pact as a "criminal document", and stated, 
"We are completely fooled to go into this 
Agreement and we have proved ourselves to be 
little children in diplomacy". 
He further stated that, 
"Mrs. Bandaranaike was the victor and Lai 
Bahadur Shastri was the vanquished".'°^ 
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The official reaction of Tamil Nadu was favourable to the 
Agreement for two reasons. First, the Congress Party was in power in the 
state. Second, the state Government was represented by a Minister, V. 
Ramiah, in the official talks. Chief Minister M. Bhaktavatsalam, without 
whose cooperation the Agreement could not have materialized, expressed 
his satisfaction over the settlement of a long pending issue between India 
and Sri Lanka. "'^  Prior to the signing of the Agreement, he had secured 
the consent of the central Government to consider the question of 
rehabilitation of the repatriates as a national responsibility.'°^ 
But, the unofficial opinion in the state was opposed to the 
Agreement. The DMK leader, C.N. Annadurai, described it as a, 
"betrayal of the interests and human dignity of 
millions of PIO in Ceylon".'°^ 
There was a clear division in the appreciation of the Agreement 
between Chennai and Delhi based press. The Hindu in Chennai reflecting 
the Tamil sentiments did not agree with Delhi based the Indian Express, 
the Times of India or the Hindustan Times. The Delhi press felt both the 
parties gained without a sense of defeat and that the Pact represented a 
document of goodwill.'°^ The Hindu argued that much of "the giving had 
taken place on the Indian side" and it represented "weakness and 
indecision in yielding to pressure and succumbing to a policy of 
appeasement"."° 
199 
Indo-Sri Lanka Relations and Problem of Indian Tamils 
The Indian Government, in order to settle the citizenship issue, 
moved through various inter-Governmental negotiations and adopted 
three different approaches to settle 'Indian Tamil problem' during three 
different decades. During the forties, India asserted that all those Indian 
Tamils who made Sri Lanka their permanent home should be given the 
right to acquire Sri Lankan citizenship; Indian Government would bear 
the responsibility of only those persons who wished to become citizens of 
the independent India. In the fifties, India was ready to take back all 
those Indian Tamils who voluntarily opted for Indian citizenship under 
Article 8 of the Indian Constitution. In the sixties India preferred political 
principles over legal principles to search a solution of the citizenship 
problem. 
In Indian politics the Indian Tamil problem was not treated as a 
vital national issue as was in Sri Lanka. But in the electoral politics of 
Tamil Nadu it gained impetus at regular intervals, because most of the 
Indian Tamils workers had migrated to Sri Lanka from Tamil Nadu only. 
Hence public plus political authorities both had keen interest in the Indian 
Tamil problem of Sri Lanka. People of Tamil Nadu and opposition parties 
had always insisted that central Government should consult the public 
opinion in the state prior to the conclusion of any bilateral agreement on 
this issue. 
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Despite being aware of the fact that to tackle citizenship issue 
cooperation from Tamil Nadu is essential, Indian approach was not 
entirely influenced by the internal political dynamics and opinion. In fact, 
it was not the political pressure of Tamil Nadu which shaped Nehru's 
stand on the Indian Tamil problem, but his global perspective in which he 
viewed the citizenship issue in Sri Lanka. In his opinion, being a part of 
the larger overseas Indian problem, the stateless question would have a 
noticeable impact on the interests of the other overseas Indian 
communities. For this reason mainly, Nehru opposed the Sri Lankan 
Government's demand for a large scale repatriation of the stateless Indian 
Tamils from the island. 
The kind of firm attitude Nehru exhibited during the Nehru-Sri 
Lanka talks of 1953 by permitting the grant of citizenship to only 1.5 lakh 
stateless Indian Tamils and in 1963 by asking Sri Lankan Government to 
confer its citizenship on all those stateless persons who did not opt for 
Indian citizenship, it is quite apparent that he would never have promised 
to accept 5.25 lakh stateless persons as Indian nationals. 
His successor Lai Bahadur Shastri however abandoned 
Nehruvian rigid though principle based approach and adopted an 
accommodative approach to settle the citizenship issue and gave his 
consent to take back a large number of stateless Indian Tamils. 
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The conclusion of the 1964 Pact marked great changes in India 
and Sri Lanka's respective policies towards the Indian Tamils. Now both 
the Governments agreed to absorb all the stateless persons and termed 
this task as the joint responsibility of both the countries. It was also 
accepted that while one section of Indian estate labourers was 
permanently settled in Sri Lanka, the other did not have a permanent 
interest in the island. In fact Sri Lanka's acceptance to grant citizenship 
to 3 lakh stateless persons was itself a tacit admission that the earlier 
citizenship laws were unjust. 
In this chapter the 1964 pact has been discussed as a beginning 
to settle the stateless issue, in the next chapter the process of its 
implementation, its consequences and other inter-Governmental moves to 
settle citizenship issue, have been discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER-V 
PROBLEM OF INDIAN TAMILS: INTER-GOVERNMENTAL 
NEGOTIATIONS, 1965 - 1981 
The Sirimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964 provided a new dimension to 
the citizenship issue as now the issue was not to evolve a formula for 
resolving the major stateless problem (however the political status of 1.5 
lakh persons was yet to be decided), but the effective implementation of 
the Agreement concluded by India and Sri Lanka. 
After the 1965 election in Sri Lanka, the UNP-led National 
Government of Dudley Senanayake had assumed office and in India after 
the sudden death of Lai Bahadur Shastri in 1966, the Congress Party 
came into power under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. These two leaders 
were now expected to give the final shape to the task of implementation 
of the Agreement. 
But, unfortunately, divergent opinions of both the Governments 
on certain issues, continued to create hurdles in the task of 
implementation of 1964 Pact in the years which followed. 
Differences of Opinion Between India and Sri Lanka 
Soon after the conclusion of the Agreement, differences on three 
different points appeared: 
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• "the question of Parliamentary representation of persons who 
were granted Sri Lankan citizenship; 
• the mode of repatriation of PIO; 
• Sri Lanka's proposal to introduce a bill to control the 
employment of non-Sri Lankans".' 
Separate Electoral Register 
The question regarding the Parliamentary representation of the 
Indian Tamils who had already registered as Sri Lankan citizens did not 
figure in the negotiations between India and Sri Lanka in October 1964. 
In order to flatter the Sinhalese sentiments and to prevent the Indian 
Tamils to influence the vote in the Kandyan areas, Mrs. Bandaranaike 
declared her intention to introduce a separate electoral register for Indians 
who had been granted Sri Lankan citizenry.^ 
Mrs. Bandaranaike's prime motive in declaring the Indian Tamil 
Community as a separate class of voters was to minimize its influence in 
the electoral politics of the central province. The Sinhalese had a feeling 
that if those Indian Tamils who were granted Sri Lankan citizenship 
remained on the general electoral register, they would affect numerous 
election results which would certainly be detrimental to the Sinhalese 
interests in the up - country plantation areas.^ 
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India's Reaction to the Separate Electoral Register 
India sharply reacted on Mrs. Bandaranaike's declaration of 
separate electoral register and viewed the issue in the bilateral context. In 
a letter to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister on 22 November 1964, Prime 
Minister Shastri maintained that the issue of separate or common 
electoral roll for the Sri Lankan citizens of Indian origin was justifiable 
not discussed at the Delhi talks of October 1964 because there was "no 
reason for India to think that the Government of Ceylon had any intention 
of treating them in future in a manner different from Ceylonese citizens.'* 
He also informed Mrs. Bandaranaike that the "heavy burden" placed on 
India by the Pact had been counter-balanced by the "consideration that 
those accepted as Ceylon citizens would become full-fledged citizens and 
join mainstream of Ceylon's civil life."^ He warned the Sri Lankan 
Government that the implementation of separate electoral register would 
intensify separatist tendencies that would be detrimental to the unity and 
harmony of the country. Shastri further asked the Sri Lankan Government 
to leave the discriminatory tendencies against the Indian Tamils aside and 
examine the whole matter in the spirit of the 1964 Agreement. 
Subsequently, India discussed the issue at the meeting of the 
Indo-Lanka officials in December 1964. The leader of the Indian 
delegation, C.S. Jha argued that the public opinion in India would turn 
against the Pact if the PIO were given the status of 'second class 
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citizens'. If the issue was not satisfactorily resolved, he stated, 'there was 
no assurance of the Pact being implemented'.^ 
Undoubtedly it was nothing but the strong domestic public 
opinion which made India to react bitterly on this issue. Some of the Lok 
Sabha members urged the Indian Government to 'abrogate the Pact.'' 
The Indian press, too, had written bitterly against Mrs. 
Bandaranaike's proposal and had called it an "act of bad faith" and had 
also described Mrs. Bandaranaike's argumentation that the question of 
separate electoral register was an internal matter of Sri Lanka, as 
"disingenuous".* It was stated in the editorial of The Indian Express, 
entitled "second class citizens", that the adoption of a separate electoral 
register would continue the existence of a "sector of society" which 
remained unassimilated in the mainstream of the island's life.*^  
Incompatible Views of India and Sri Lanka 
Both the Government's had incompatible ideas on this question. 
India maintained that treating Indian Tamils like 'second class citizens' 
means doing injustice with the minority. While Sri Lanka expressed that 
separate electoral register did not mean the communal representation 
which was introduced by the colonial rule, on the other hand, it 
maintained that like general electorate the minority community would 
exercise the same right of franchise that was the 'true essence of 
democracy'. In this connection, the Sri Lankan High Commission in New 
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Delhi even cited the Indian Constitution to rationalize the Sri Lankan 
Government's stand on this issue.'° 
Actually Mrs. Bandaranike advocated the arrangement of 
separate electoral register by making it a matter purely of Sri Lankan 
concern, on unconvincing grounds. As Articles 5 and 6 of the Nehru-
Kotelawala Pact of 1954 made it very clear that the question of separate 
electoral register was a question of bilateral concern. Hence what was not 
an internal matter for Sri Lanka in 1954 could not become one in 1964." 
Further, Mrs. Bandaranaike's justification that this arrangement 
would be helpful in enabling the Indian Tamils to mix up with the 
indigenous population, but the fact which Sri Lanka ignored was that on 
the contrary the arrangement would have proved to be an effective barrier 
to any possible assimilation. 
Significantly, even if the aim of assimilation was achieved, as 
Mrs. Bandaranaike stated, the Indian Tamils would not get adequate 
representation in Parliament under the general electoral roll.'^ If that is 
the case, the separate electoral register arrangement would have to be 
continued indefinitely so as to ensure the Indian Tamils a sufficient 
number of seats in Parliament. And it happened so, it would prove Indian 
Government's contention true, that a separate electoral register would 
create a group of second class citizens. Notably, Mrs. Bandaranaike did 
not specify in her proposal the total duration for which the Indian Tamils 
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were to be placed on a separate electoral register. And if at all Sri Lankan 
Government was "genuinely concerned with the promotion of the 
interests of the Indian Tamils, it should have adopted the device of 
protective discrimination (i.e. reservation of seats to the minority 
community but with all the voters on a common electoral roll) and not 
discriminatory protection (i.e. separate electoral register)".''' 
The SLFP lost the general elections in 1965 and the UNP under 
Dudley Senanayake formed a new Government in coalition with some 
Tamil parties. The compulsions of coalition politics made the UNP 
Government postpone indefinitely the implementation of the separate 
electoral register. This was the political price for Tamil political support 
to the Government. When the Indo-Ceylon Bill for the implementation of 
the Pact was debated in Sri Lanka Parliament in 1967 without any 
provision for a separate electoral register, the opposition including SLFP 
did not insist for it either and the issue died a natural death in 1967, as 
the Indo-Ceylon Agreement(Implementation) Act did not embody any 
provision to create separate electoral register. 
Method of Repatriation - Voluntary or Compulsory 
India and Sri Lanka again entered into controversy due to 
inadequacy of clause 3 of the 1964 Pact. This clause did mentioned the 
number of persons to be absorbed as Indian and Sri Lankan citizens but it 
failed to express the principle which would determine the method of 
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repatriation - whether voluntary or compulsory. This was the reason 
which gave Mrs. Bandaranaike an opportunity to interpret the provision 
in her own way. In the Senate she maintained that one of the significant 
features of the 1964 Agreement was that "India acquiesced in the 
principle of compulsory repatriation".''* N.Q. Dias, Parliamentary 
Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs, maintained 
that however repatriation should "as far as possible be on a voluntary 
basis, compulsory repatriation was the only alternative if a sufficient 
number of persons did not volunteer for repatriation".'^ However, the 
unofficial opinion in the island was not totally supportive of Mrs. 
Bandaranaike's argument. While the Tamil parties pledged to oppose any 
move to repatriate the PIO compulsorily, the UN? maintained that "the 
compulsory repatriation was against the whole spirit of the Agreement.'^ 
But at the same time, SLFP's stand on this controversy was supported by 
the CP and the LSSP. 
India's Attitude to the Repatriation Issue 
India repudiated Mrs. Bandaranaike's assertion and emphasized 
that it was not going to accept any compulsory repatriation. In the Indo-
Lanka officials' talks of December 1964, C.S. Jha maintained that though 
logically one could argue that having agreed to a fixed number, there was 
a tacit acceptance of a certain degree of compulsion, the Government of 
India's approach to the Agreement was that it should be "primarily on the 
basis of voluntary applications". In case of a gap between the number 
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stipulated in the Indian quota and the number applied for repatriation, he 
said, both the countries would have to consider "in what way the number 
could be reached". He pointed out that the principle of compulsory 
repatriation was not discussed at the Delhi talks of 1964 and if it was 
highlighted, the chances of smoother implementation of the Agreement 
would have been prejudiced from the very beginning.'^ 
The Parliamentary opposition in India was critical of the Indian 
Government's failure to include a provision in the Pact to ensure the 
voluntary repatriation of the PIO.'* While Indian press criticized Sri 
Lankan Prime Minister's views on the -method of repatriation. It 
maintained that compulsory repatriation meant a gross violation of human 
rights and that India should not be a party to it.'^ 
Issue Settled 
At the time of the enactment of the Indo-Ceylon Act of 1967, 
Prime Minister Senanayake assured the FP leader, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam 
that there would not be any compulsory repatriation under the provisions 
of the Act.^° He endorsed the Indian stance that the PIO were not its 
nationals, but stateless. He argued: 
"How can I deport a man to a country which he is 
not a citizen? If he is not a citizen of any country, 
how can I deport him. First he has to become a 
citizen of a country".^' 
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He asked further, 
" if an individual objects, can that individual 
be deported to India? There may most probably be 
a writ against me by that individual".^^ 
India expressed that it would accept them only if they 
voluntarily opted for Indian citizenship. Surprisingly, the Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement(Implementation) Act of 1967 did not contain any provision to 
specify the mode of repatriation. The absence of any such provision 
confused three members of FP that indirectly the Act favoured the 
principle of compulsory repatriation. Owing to this reason they abstained 
from voting on Indo-Ceylon Agreement(Implementation) Bill in 
Parliament. 
Employment Bill 
India also did not agree with Mrs. Bandaranaike's proposal of 
introducing a Bill in Parliament to control the employment of non-
Ceylonese. As SLFP did not show much interest in this issue so it could 
not be stretched much so far the domestic politics of Ceylon was 
concerned. And for this credit was given to the clause 7 of the 1964 
Agreement which particularly guaranteed employment to the repatriates 
upto a maximum age of 55 years and as such, Mrs. Bandaranaike found it 
difficult to defend her own Government's stand on this issue. 
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At the Indo-Lanka Officials' Talks of December 1964, while 
speaking over Sri Lanka's desire for the Sri Lankanization of 
employment, C.S. Jha, the leader of the Indian delegation, expressed that 
the enactment of the Control of Employment Bill would amount to the 
violation of the clause 7 of the Pact. He argued that the repatriation 
process would be completed over a period of 15 years that means many 
persons would have to wait for their turn for repatriation. Therefore, Sri 
Lankan Government would have to guarantee that "the repatriates had 
reasonable opportunities of being gainfully employed in the island".^^ 
However this controversy came to an end with the declaration 
by Dudley Senanayake, whose National Government was under the 
influence of Tamil Parties, that no legislation would be enacted to deny 
the employment opportunities to the PIO in the island. Senanayake 
maintained himself that "there was not a word in the Pact about Indians in 
employment here. They could work till 55". '^* 
Towards Enactment of Indo-Ceylon Pact of 1964 
The process of implementation of the 1964 Agreement began 
with the talks between the officials of India and Sri Lanka in Colombo in 
December 1964. In the meeting not only the procedure for the 
implementation of the Pact was formulated but it was also decided that a 
joint committee would be setup to supervise the entire process of its 
implementation. The committee consisted of one representative each from 
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India and Sri Lanka, one alternate representative from either side, and 
several advisers. It was agreed that the Commonwealth Secretary to the 
Indian External Affairs Ministry and the Permanent Secretary to the 
Ministry of Defence and External Affairs of Sri Lanka would meet at 
least twice a year, alternately in New Delhi and Colombo, to review the 
progress and the working of the committee.^^ 
Regarding the procedure for the implementation of the Pact, the 
officials of both the countries had drawn up the following broad 
outlines^^ : 
i) A family should be considered as a unit for the purpose of 
repatriation and granting of Sri Lankan citizenship; 
ii) In case of short fall of applicants for citizenship of either 
country, each Government would explore other ways to ensure 
the fulfillment of its obligations; 
iii) Those who were issued Indian passport before 30 October 1964 
as well as the illicit immigrants should not be considered as a 
part of the total number of stateless persons (9.75 lakh) 
envisaged in the Pact; 
iv) To quicken the process of implementation of the Pact, the 
officials decided that it was open to both the Governments to 
agree to the number in excess of the stipulated annual figure of 
35,000 persons for repatriation to India (after the grant of 
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citizenship) and 20,000 persons receiving Sri Lankan 
citizenship. In case the stipulated number was not reached in 
any given year, each Government would have to devise other 
ways to make up the shortfall in the succeeding year; 
v) The repatriation should be, as far as possible, on a voluntary 
basis but, if in any year the stipulated number was not achieved, 
it would be effected in such manner as would secure the 
numbers; and 
vi) The repatriates would be permitted to carry their assets to the 
maximum worth of Rs.4,000, 
The purpose of above mentioned principles was to facilitate the 
implementation of the Agreement. Nevertheless, in the case of Sri Lanka, 
the actual process of its implementation was possible only after the 
enactment of a legislation which the Senanayake Government introduced 
in Parliament on 6 December 1966 and enacted in 1967. 
Enactment of Indo-Ceylon Agreement(Implementation) Act 
Before it was enacted in 1967, the Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement(Implementation) Bill passed through various stages in 
Parliament. After its introduction in the House of Representatives on 6 
December 1966 and Second Reading on 21 February 1967, the Bill was 
referred to a Standing Committee. The Standing Committee 'B ' received 
about 100 memoranda and heard evidences from about 15 delegations 
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representing various political parties and interest groups.^' While the 
House of Representatives adopted the Bill (after the Third Reading) on 4 
June 1967, the Senate Passed it on 19 June 1967. It became a statute 
when the Governor General gave his assent on 20 June 1967. 
Unlike the Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949, the 'enabling' 
legislation for the implementation of the Pact had neither prescribed any 
complicated procedure nor spelt out any qualification for the acquisition 
of Sri Lankan citizenship.^^ This Act only contained that the PIO who 
wish to become Sri Lankan citizens should make an application to the 
Minister concerned through the Commissioner for the Registration of 
Persons of Indian Origin (CRPIO) within a specific period (i.e. between 1 
May 1968 and 30 April 1970). It also maintained that applications of 
those who had sought and been refused citizenship in 1951 might be 
given priority over others, this is what clauses (1) and (2) of Article 7 
reads. But the Act did not contain any arrangement for those who might 
not apply for citizenship of either India or Sri Lanka, or the position of 
those whose applications for Sri Lankan citizenship would be rejected. 
Article 8 of the Act threw light on a striking feature of the Act that, in 
contrast to the earlier citizenship acts which conferred ultimate authority 
in the legal branch of the Government in place of executive, it conferred 
absolute and unquestionable authority to grant citizenship or reject 
citizenship applications on the Minister. He is not accountable to any 
court or tribunal for his decision on this matter (Article 9). 
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Article 11 maintained that no discrimination would be done, 
under this Act, with those who had been conferred citizenship by 
registration and they would be entitled to the same rights and be 
subjected to the same obligations and liabilities as other citizens of Sri 
Lanka. Article 15 of the Act provided that the stateless persons who were 
conferred Indian citizenship, would be issued temporary Residence 
Permits by the CRPIO and would be liable to repatriation to India at the 
discretion of the Government. But the period of validity of such permits 
was not specified in this Article. Article 17 of this Act made it obligatory 
on the part of the captain of any ship or aircraft to carry such persons who 
were liable to be repatriated, and if they failed to perform this duty they 
would be punished. 
Ultimately the Act empowered the Minister concerned to make 
regulations in respect of all matters related with the implementation of 
the Pact for which no provisions were made in this Act, or in respect of 
which the provisions of the present Act required to be supplemented or 
modified to meet unforeseen or special circumstances. 
Contrast Between the Original Bill and the Implementation Act 
Originally the Bill did not mention the maximum number of 
persons on whom citizenship was to be conferred, nor did it speak about 
the ratio 4:7 for naturalization and repatriation as envisaged in the Pact. 
But after two important omissions, the Act specified that, as provided in 
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the Pact, not more than three lakh PIO would be granted Sri Lankan 
citizenship, and that 4:7 ratio would be followed as far as possible to 
grant Sri Lankan and Indian citizenship. Prime Minister Senanayake made 
it clear that the tie-up (4:7) would be between the grant of Sri Lankan 
citizenship to 4 persons for every 7 registered as Indian citizens 
irrespective of the number of persons actually repatriated to India, and 
not between the conferment of Sri Lankan citizenship and physical 
repatriation to India as provided in the clause 6 of the Sirimavo-Shastri 
Pact.'^ 
Besides, the Government failed to incorporate in the Act the 
time limit stipulated in the Agreement(15 years) for its phased 
implementation and it was a deliberate action on the part of Sri Lankan 
Government. Premier Senanayake justified this divergence between 
provisions of the Pact and the Act, on the ground of country's foreign 
exchange difficulties.^ *^ 
Another important difference between the original 1964 Pact 
and the Implementation Act of 1967 was that "in the original Bill there 
was provision for only one register to be prepared by the Government of 
Ceylon, namely the Indo-Ceylon Agreement Citizenship Register". But 
the amended Bill provided for three registers, namely, "(1) Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement Ceylon Citizenship Register, (2) Indo-Ceylon Agreement 
Indian Citizenship Register, (3) Indo-Ceylon Agreement Repatriation 
Register".^' Senanayake also gave indication of "further administrative 
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arrangements without making statutory provisions to have two more 
registers of all those persons to whom the Indo-Ceylon Agreement was 
applied, and the names of persons from which future Sri Lankan citizens 
would be selected".^^ 
Reaction of Opposition on the Act in Sri Lanka 
Hence, it was made clear that there was no gurantee that the 
1964 Pact would be implemented fully within 15 years. This was against 
the desire of the Tamil leaders who wished to accelerate the process of its 
implementation. The FP wanted the repatriation to be completed in five 
years, while CWC wanted to end the statelessness of the PIO within two 
33 
years. 
During the Parliamentary debates on the Indo-Ceylon Bill the 
opposition condemned the bill for its amendments and for deviating from 
the provisions of the original Pact. SLFP criticized the Act for giving 
powers 'far in excess' to the Minister to confer citizenship to the stateless 
persons. Hence the opposition contended that the Act was an instrument 
to implement not the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact, but the "Political Pact 
between Senanayake and Thondaman for the mutual advantage of both, 
and not for the national interests".^'* 
The compulsions of electoral politics might have compelled the 
UNP Government to make certain omissions in certain provisions of the 
1964 Pact. Actually, due to the absence of any single grouping with an 
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absolute majority,' UNP leader Dudley Senanayake needed a majority to 
form the Government. As the FP's support was crucial for the 
Government formation by the UNP, Dudley Senanayake was prepared to 
accept certain demands of the Tamil leadership as a price for its political 
support. "One of the Tamil demands was the removal of what the FP 
considered as the obnoxious clauses of the 1964 Agreement from the 
Indo-Ceylon Agreement(Implementation) Act."^^ 
Dudley Senanayake, accordingly reached a secret understanding 
with Thondaman, whereby it was agreed that no hurdles would be created 
for the stateless persons who were to be repatriated under the 1964 
Agreement. It was decided that those who opted for Indian citizenship 
would be able to continue their jobs in Sri Lanka till their retirement. It 
was agreed that the element of compulsion would remain absent in the 
repatriation process of the Indian Tamils. Senanayake also promised that 
those stateless persons who had been granted Sri Lankan citizenship 
would be placed in the general electorate.^^ What was important here was 
that though UNP received electoral support of CWC but had the 
demanded concessions not been met, the FP would not have rendered 
support to the Senanayake Government.''' 
* The UNP and its allies (including the ACTC which won 3 seats) secured 76 seats, while the 
SLFP led alliance bagged 55 seats. The FP won 12 seats and 6 members were 
independents. 
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Indo-Ceylon Act and India 
The Implementation Act was bitterly criticized by opposition in 
India. The main points of criticism were that the Bill did not lay down 
any 'standard or criterion' for granting Sri Lankan citizenship. Members 
showed their discontent on granting 'absolute powers' to the Minister to 
confer citizenship on stateless persons. They argued that the PIO were 
'denied right to recourse to a court of law' if their application for Sri 
Lankan citizenship were arbitrarily rejected. Umanath held the view that 
denial of such rights would have 'dangerous implications'.''^ 
The members also pointed out that the Bill did not specify the 
principle or mode of repatriation - voluntary or compulsory. 
Nevertheless, they insisted that the principle which governed the 1964 
Agreement was voluntary repatriation, Umanath therefore insisted that 
External Affairs Minister should visit Colombo so that this gap in the Act 
could be fulfilled.^' 
But Indian Government maintained that the enactment of the 
legislation to implement the 1964 Agreement was an-internal matter of 
Sri Lanka. And India did not wish to 'interfere in the sovereign rights of 
the Sri Lankan Parliament'. However, the External Affairs Minister made 
it clear that India would express its discontent tactfully and 
diplomatically but not criticizing publically or condemning in Parliament, 
over certain provisions of the Bill in case the Sri Lankan Government 
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asked its opinion. '*° However India on its part made wide arrangements in 
the Kandy office of the Indian High Commission in order to cope up with 
a large number of applicants for Indian citizenship, and explored various 
plans to rehabilitate the repatriates in South India. 
During 30 October 1964 - 30 November 1967, under its 
Constitutional provisions, India granted citizenship to around 15,700 
stateless Indian Tamils."*' 
Implementation of the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact Under the Indira 
Gandhi Government (1966 - 77) 
When Indira Gandhi came to power in 1966, almost all the 
controversies that happened to be due to divergent opinions of two 
countries, disappeared by themselves. Hence, on such a fresh platform, 
the Indian Government decided to set in motion the process of 
implementation of the Pact. 
Initial Hardships of Implementation 
With the issuing of notification on 24 April 1968 together by the 
Indian High Commission in Colombo and the Government of Sri Lanka, 
inviting applications for both Indian and Sri Lankan citizenship, the 
formal implementation of the Agreement began. The two years time limit 
for the submission of applications ended on 30 April 1970, thereby 
marking the completion of the basic procedural requirement connected 
with the implementation of the Agreement. But the fallacy of the ground 
231 
Problem of Indian Tamils: Inter-Governmental Negotiations 
realities proved to be shocking for both the countries. At the end of the 
mandatory two year period for making applications it was found that far 
more people had applied for Sri Lankan citizenship (6.25 lakhs against 
the quota of just three lakhs) than for the Indian citizenship (4 lakhs 
against the quota of 5.25 lakhs). The figures proved the Indian External 
Affairs Minister wrong that there were several lakhs of persons of Indian 
origin who wanted to come back to India and therefore there would be no 
difficulty in achieving the targeted figure of 5.25 lakhs.''^ A large number 
of Indian Tamils had, after having suffered from various socio-economic 
problems for several decades in Sri Lanka, still expressed their deep 
desire to become legally a part of the Sri Lankan society. 
Another important point that came out of the above figures was 
that the stateless persons were 50,000 more than the figure i.e. 9.75 lakh, 
envisaged in the Agreement. However, it may be presumed that several 
stateless persons might have applied for both Indian and Sri Lankan 
citizenship. 
So far Premier Dudley Senanayake was concerned, he already 
opined an excess of applicants for Sri Lankan citizenship and a short-fall 
for Indian citizenship. Much before inviting applications, he maintained 
in Parliament that he anticipated no difficulty as far as Sri Lankan 
citizenship for 3 lakh persons was concerned, but was afraid that India 
might not be able to reach her number of 5.25 lakh persons easily."*^ It 
was in view of this that Senanayake, perhaps did not initially want to 
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specify in the Indo-Ceylon Agreement(Implementation) Act the maximum 
number of persons on whom citizenship was to be conferred by Sri 
Lanka. 
Inspite of the problem of numbers, both the countries moved 
towards granting their respective citizenship to the stateless persons. 
Although the process was slow as is evident from the table below : 
Table 2.1 
GRANT OF CITIZENSHIP: 30 OCTOBER 1964*-JUNE 1970** 
No. Registered as Indian Citizens 70,879 
No. Repatriated to India 13,733 
No. Granted Sri Lankan Citizenship 8,519 
* Date of signing the Sirimavo - Shastri Pact. 
** At the time of formation of the UF Government. 
Source: Urmila Phadnis and Lalit Kumar, "The Sirimavo-Shastri Pact of 
1964 : Problems and Prospects of Implementation", India 
Quarterly, vol.31, p.258, no.3, July - September 1975, Table A. 
The table makes it clear that both the countries had neither 
strictly observed the 4:7 ratio for granting citizenship nor followed the 
average (at the annual rate of 20,000 and 35,000 persons for Sri Lankan 
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and Indian citizenships respectively) at which the stateless persons were 
estimated to be absorbed by both the countries. According to the 
provisions of the Agreement by June 1970, both India and Sri Lanka 
should have given citizenship (apart from their natural increase) to nearly 
1.98 lakh and 1.13 lakh persons respectively. But India granted 
citizenship only to 36 percent while the latter conferred citizenship only 
on 8 percent of the stateless Indian Tamils from their respective above 
mentioned quotas stipulated for 68 months (i.e. from 30 October 1964 to 
June 1970). 
The reason for such a tardy progress in the implementation of 
the Pact, attributed to the time required by Sri Lanka to enact the 
necessary legislations for this purpose. India did not need any special 
legislation but on the part of Sri Lanka it was required and Sri Lanka 
enacted it only in June 1967. The unnecessary delay between the 
conclusion of the Agreement and enactment of the implementation Act 
was attributed to the defeat of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government 
in December 1964, the fresh elections in March 1965, the defeat of the 
SLFP in the elections, and the formation of the National Government 
headed by the UNP leader, Dudley Senanayake. The Tamil parties such as 
the FP, the ACTC and the CWC were the prominent supporters of the 
UNP. They strongly criticized the repatriation provisions of the 
Agreement being made binding. 
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After UNP's win in the elections, Senanayake made it clear that 
the Agreement could be implemented only if the differences of 
interpretation of its provisions were resolved with India.'*'' The failure in 
setting these controversial questions was owing to the political position 
of FP. Senanayake had the fear of Tamil parties withdrawing support 
from UNP led Government and this would have been an ideal situation 
for fresh elections, with the prospect of an SLFP led coalition 
Government coming to power.""^  Besides, the FP was obliged to declare 
undisputed support to the Implementation Act, "salving its conscience by 
declaring that it differed in important provisions from the Agreement"."*^ 
Furthermore, much time was invested in preparing the 
regulations to give effect to the Act after its adoption in Parliament. 
Added to it was the slow and obtrusive bureaucratic procedures that had 
been adopted in completing the initial formalities. Hence, all that the 
UNP Government could manage to achieve in its five year term was the 
"completion of the basic procedural requirements to set in motion the 
process of implementation of the Pact."'*' It was only in the subsequent 
years that the process of implementation could get actual speed. 
To some extent, India too was responsible for delay in the 
implementation of the Pact. First, previously it followed a legalistic 
* The FP supported the Bill for two reasons : First, there was no provision for compulsory 
repatriation of the Indian Tamils. Second, the plan for a separate electoral register was 
abandoned. 
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approach of the reciprocal clause of 4:7 for the grant of citizenship, thus 
failed to fulfill its obligations of absorbing the stipulated number of 
stateless persons for the period 30 October 1964 - June 1970. Second, 
India did not seem to be active in the follow up actions after signing the 
Agreement on the matters related to its implementation. Even in the Joint 
Committee too, which was constituted to supervise the implementation of 
the Pact, the issue of tardy process of implementation was not taken up. 
Perhaps, the change in leadership in India following the death of Lai 
Bahadur Shastri might be responsible for the laxity on the part of the 
Indian Government in implementing the Pact. 
Indira Gandhi-Dudley Senanayake Talks 
But in the joint communique issued after the visit of Sri Lankan 
Prime Minister to India in 1968, it was stated that the progress in 
implementing the 1964 Agreement was satisfactory.'*^ It was certainly an 
exaggerated statement as it was only in April 1968 that both the countries 
had finally called for applications for the grant of citizenship. In fact, till 
November 1968, the total number of stateless persons who had actually 
been granted Sri Lankan citizenship was less than 200, while India, 
during October 1964 - September 1968, had conferred citizenship to 
about 25,000 such persons under the citizenship clause of its 
Constitution.'*^ 
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During their discussions, the Sri Lankan Government agreed to 
accelerate the grant of Sri Lankan citizenship to persons whose 
applications were pending, while the Indian Government expressed its 
determination to consider the pending citizenship applications as quickly 
as possible.^° But in reality there was hardly any striking development 
towards a full-scale implementation of the Agreement in the subsequent 
years. 
However, Senanayake's India visit successfully solved a major 
issue concerning the repatriation of assets to India. In short the matter 
was that the Sri Lankan Government started a Foreign Exchange 
Entitlement Certificate scheme in May 1968, whereby certain specified 
foreign exchange transactions were brought within the purview of a new 
rate of exchange. The rate was at first determined by bidding for such 
certificates at public auctions and later stabilized at 40 percent above the 
official rate of exchange.^' It was also decided that the higher rate of 
exchange would apply in the case of remittances of assets of the 
repatriates to India. This would have adversely affected the repatriates 
particularly in view of the fact that the total life savings of most of them 
had hardly exceeded four or five thousand rupees. However, during the 
Indo-Sri Lanka bilateral talks in November 1968 in New Delhi, 
Senanayake agreed to reverse his Government's policy and declared that 
the repatriates to India under the 1964 Agreement would be allowed to 
transfer all their assets to the full limit (Rs.75,000) permitted under the 
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current Exchange Control Regulations without purchasing Foreign 
Exchange Entitlement Certificates.^^ 
By the time the procedural issues were sorted out, the tenure of 
the UNP Government was over. In the May 1970 general elections, 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike staged a come back and formed a United Front 
Government comprising her own SLFP, the Lanka Sama Samaja party and 
the Communist Party. As mentioned in the Governor General's speech, 
the UF Government promised to take initiatives to quicken the process of 
implementation of the Pact.^ ^ 
Sri Lankanization Policy of Mrs. Bandaranaike 
Unlike her predecessor, Sirimavo Bandaranaike did not carry 
the baggage of any of the Tamil parties and therefore felt free to pursue 
policies in favour of 'Sinhala aggrandizement'. In this process the UF 
Government adopted several measures to impose state control over the 
export-import trade and thus reduced the alien control of the private 
sector. Her Government introduced in Parliament the Business 
Undertaking (Acquisition) Bill on 27 October 1970, and proposed to end 
the system of issuing temporary Residence Permits which were granted to 
the Indian nationals. The purpose behind this proposal was, increasing 
the employment opportunities for the Sinhalese. 
In respect of the proposal of the abolition of temporary 
Residence Permit system to Indian Tamils, it is worth noticing that during 
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the time of the enactment of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement 
(Implementation) Act, the SLFP leaders bitterly criticized the UNP 
Government for not sincerely recognizing the hardships which the 
Sinhalese suffered due to the 'alleged monopolization' of employment by 
the aliens. They maintained that unless and until the Indians were 
repatriated, there were no prospects of increasing the employment 
opportunities for the Kandayan Sinhalese of the up country region.^ "^  It 
was in this context that several members criticized Premier Dudley 
Senanayake for his failure to stick to the reciprocal clause of 4:7 
envisaged in the 1964 Pact, and maintained that he agreed to leave 
enough loopholes in the Indo-Ceylon Agreement(Implementation) Act of 
1967 to allow the Indian labourers to remain in the plantation sector.^^ 
Accelerating the process of repatriation to India was therefore 
must to implement the proposal regarding the cancelation of the system of 
temporary residence permits. It must be noted that by the end of 1969, 
only about 13,000 out of 66,000 persons who were conferred Indian 
citizenship up to January 1970, were repatriated^'' to India. This made 
only 19.7 percent of the total persons who were registered as Indian 
nationals. The slow rate of repatriation might be attributed to the reason 
that the Indo-Ceylone Agreement(Implementation) Act of 1967 did not 
made the repatriation of persons (who were granted Indian citizenship) a 
pre-requisite for the granting of Sri Lankan citizenship. Rather it linked 
the latter only with the registration of stateless persons as Indian 
239 
Problem of Indian Tamils: Inter-Governmental Negotiations 
nationals. In some cases, the delay on the part of the Sri Lankan 
Government in releasing the EPF and gratuity, was responsible for not 
allowing those to repatriate who opted for physical repatriation and who 
had acquired the Indian passport too. 
Pari Plan 
Under 'Puri Plan' (named after its author Y.P. Puri, Indian High 
Commissioner in Sri Lanka), India decided to accelerate the pace of 
repatriation to India, Puri Plan maintained that India would take back 
annually 50,000 PIO who had bonafide claims for Indian citizenship, 
prior to the actual conferment of Indian nationality. The repatriates under 
this plan were to be provided with travel documents and not Indian 
passports. The provident fund claims of potential Indian citizens were to 
be decided on the recommendation of the Indian High Commissioner in 
Sri Lanka," 
But the Sri Lankan Government did not like the proposal and 
the SLFP leader, Ronnie de Mel maintained that, 
"The former Indian High Commissioner to 
Ceylon, C.C. Desai, had sabotaged the Nehru-
Kotelawala Agreement, The Government should 
not allow the present Indian High Commissioner, 
Y.P, Puri, to sabotage the Sirimavo-Shastri 
Agreement through his proposal".^* 
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In the opinion of political observers, Puri Plan was not only 
against the "letter and spirit of the Pact" but it would also serve as 
"disincentive for Indians to return home"/^ Another reason of rejection 
of Puri Plan may be attributed to Sri Lankan apprehension that the 
repatriated Indians might return to the island as illicit immigrants, as they 
would not be given citizenship before their departure to India. The other 
reason for the rejection of the plan might be the concern of the Sri 
Lankan Government vis-a-vis the large-scale exodus of workers from the 
plantation which in the opinion of some persons, would adversely affect 
the production of tea.^' 
Controversy About the Registration and Repatriation 
To fasten the implementation of the 1964 Pact, in 1971 the UF 
Government introduced an Amendment to the Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement(Implementation) Act of 1967 which associated the pace of 
conferring Sri Lankan citizenship with the number of persons repatriated 
to India and not merely with their registration in Sri Lanka as Indian 
citizens. It also included a section 15 A in the 1967 Act, which meant two 
to five years of rigorous imprisonment to employers who retained the 
services of those repatriates who even after the expiry of their residence 
permits, overstayed in the island." Mrs. Bandaranaike stated that the 
present Amendment was essential to cope up the delay caused to the 
implementation of the Agreement in the past. She maintained. 
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"The Pact is for fifteen years. We are five years 
behind time. Only 26,000 have left so far, when in 
fact more than 1,50,000 (sic) should have gone. 
These two amendments are important if we are to 
implement the Pact in the real letter and spirit".^^ 
Dudley Senanayake's UNP supported the Amendment and 
justified his action delinking the grant of Sri Lankan citizenship from the 
actual repatriation to India on the ground that the time bound repatriation 
programme was not possible at that time in view of the foreign exchange 
burden. He also maintained that the number of stateless persons who 
applied for Indian citizenship would have been less had there been an 
immediate repatriation. He expressed that four lakh people applied for 
Indian citizenship considering the fact that there was no provision for 
their immediate repatriation under the Indo-Ceylon Act of 1967.^'' 
The FP which favoured the Indo-Ceylon Act of 1967 for 
amending certain inconsistencies of 1964 Pact, completely disfavoured 
the UF Government's decision to go back to the terms of the Sirimavo-
Shastri Pact of 1964." 
DWC being a political ally to the SLFP in the 1970 general 
elections, exhibited a significant shift in this attitude and supported the 
Amendment on the ground of the deep desire of numerous stateless 
persons to repatriate to India. It also applauded UF Government for the 
conclusion of the 1964 Pact.^^ 
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At the same time, the CWC described the Amendment as an "act 
of political vengeance by using the steam-roller majority of the UF in 
Parliament".'^^ 
Over all, all the Sinhala parties whether in Government or in 
opposition, got together to deprive the Tamils of the advantages they had 
successfully extracted earlier as a price for political support to the UNP. 
The UNP after losing the elections too felt that it had indeed paid a heavy 
price for pandering to the Tamils. It had alienated the Kandyan Sinhala 
opinion, which accused it of bartering away their interests. In this 
context, it must be noted that the primary reason which governed the UF 
Government's decision to repeal the Act of 1967 was once again the 
electoral alliance factor. The SLFP considered the CWC as its bitter 
political opponent as it continued its electoral alliance with the UNP. And 
that's why UF leaders carried a massive propaganda against the UNP-
CWC alliance during the 1970 electioneering. The gist of the matter was 
that the Indian Tamils were now left without any support from any 
quarter. 
India's Reaction to tlie Amendment Act of 1971 
Opposition parties in India bitterly condemned the Amendment. 
A member of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in Parliament, M. 
* The UF's majority was beyond all expectations. It won 115 of the 151 elective seats in the 
1970 general elections. The SLFP alone obtained an overall majority (90 seats); the LSSP 
secured 19, and the CP got six seats. 
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Kalyanasundram, maintained that the "unilateral decision" of the Sri 
Lankan Government to amend the Indo-Ceylon A.greement 
(Implementation) Act of 1967 would lead to "forcible repatriation" of a 
large number of stateless persons from Sri Lanka. He also criticized the 
inclusion of a new section 15 A in the 1967 Pact.^ ^ 
DMK member Era Sezhiyan questioned the entire approach of 
the Indian Government regarding the stateless problem. He maintained 
that the present Amendment made the conditions for the repatriation of 
stateless persons 'stringent'.^^ In Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly 
several members maintained that a large-scale repatriation would make 
the task of their rehabilitation in the state difficult.^^ 
So far Indian approach was concerned, Indian Government 
maintained that the Amendment was not essentially anti-Indian and was 
in accordance with the Indo- Sri Lanka Agreement of 1964 which was the 
relevant document as far as India was concerned. India maintained that 
the present Amendment was after all a part of Sri Lanka's internal matter. 
In fact the Amendment was pre-planned and it was the result of 
the new found friendship of New Delhi with Colombo in the Non-aligned 
movement. This was evident from the statement by Felix R.D. 
Bandaranaike (Minister of Public Administration and Local Government) 
during the debate on the Indo-Ceylon Agreement Implementation 
(Amendment) Bill. He expressed the opinion of Indian Foreign Minister, 
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Swarna Singh, who maintained that the "legislation enacted by Dudley 
Senanayake, no doubt, gave India a more favourable basis (sic. Position) 
than the treaty (sic. Pact) concluded between the two countries in 
1964".'" Felix also disclosed that Swarna Singh minced no words in 
stating that "India would stand by the treaty (sic. Pact) and promise, and 
the 1971 Amendment was irrelevant as far the Indian Government was 
concerned".^^ 
Sirimavo-Indira Gandhi Talks of 1973 
Another issue which Mrs. Bandaranaike raised was the 
inadequate response of the stateless persons to the Indian citizenship. It 
has already been mentioned that the number of persons desirous of 
acquiring Sri Lankan citizenship was far in excess of the number 
stipulated in the Agreement. As such, Mrs. Bandaranaike requested the 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to extend the time limit by re-opening the 
register in the Indian High Commission, which was closed in April 1970, 
in order to enable the applicants who were rejected for Sri Lanka 
citizenship to reapply for Indian citizenship.*^^ 
At the Indo- Sri Lanka officials' talks of February 1973, the 
another issue of discussion was related to expedite the pace of 
repatriation to India. The same issues were discussed in the Sirimavo-
* Sri Lanka's argument was that whereas it was to absorb only three lakh stateless people, 
nearly double that figure had applied and that, therefore, the majority of them had to be 
inevitably rejected. Of the 2,40,000 applications covering the 625,000 persons, 55,400 had 
been rejected till the end of 1972. 
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Indira Gandhi meeting in Colombo in April 1973. Accordingly certain 
arrangements acceptable to both the sides were adopted. India agreed to 
increase progressively the number of repatriates who had opted for Indian 
nationality by a cumulative 10 percent each year over the figure of 35,000 
deemed in the Agreement; reaffirmed its commitment to absorb all the 
5.25 lakh persons provided in the Indian quota; and declared to extend the 
term of the Agreement for two more years (i.e. from 1979 to 1981).^ '* 
Here it must be noticed that during early seventies, it was the spirit of 
cordial relations between India and Sri Lanka that paved the way for 
these arrangements. 
Sirimavo-Indira Gandhi Pact of 1974 
In January 1974 during the Sri Lankan Prime Minister's visit to 
India, the prime issue was to sort out the problem of 1.5 lakh residue 
stateless people. Under the Agreement, both India and Sri Lanka agreed 
to share them in equal numbers, i.e. 75,000 persons (along with their 
natural increase) for each side. The Agreement which was to be 
implemented in two years, would begin its operation only after the 
complete implementation of the 1964 Pact. It was also maintained that the 
Sri Lankan citizenship would be conferred in the ratio of 1:1 to the 
number repatriated to India and the similar facilities would be provided to 
the repatriates under the present Pact as in the 1964 Agreement. The 1974 
Pact also provided that on the date of the conclusion of the present 
Agreement, those who were employed, would be allowed to remain in job 
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till Ihc age of 55 years or the dale of their repatriation whichever was 
earlier and that they would be allowed to transfer their assets on the same 
terms as in the original Agreement.^^ 
In order to end the 'Indian Tamil problem' at least in principle, 
the 1974 Pact was a supplementary as well as complementary to the 1964 
Agreement/^ 
Factors Responsible for the Conclusion of the 1974 Pact 
The spirit of mutual understanding and goodwill guided India 
and Sri Lanka to arrive at a settlement. In particular since 1970, both the 
countries enjoyed friendship evolved due to changing political, economic 
and strategic relations between the two countries. Besides changed 
political scenario was also responsible for evolving the gestures of 
goodwill. 
Significantly, the personal equations between Indira Gandhi and 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike had been instrumental in determining the pattern 
of Indo- Sri Lanka relations. Although the UNP Prime Ministers in the 
fifties had a great admiration for Nehru's statesmanship, their personal 
identity with him was low. They perceived India as a potential threat to 
the island's security and therefore sought to rely on Britain to protect its 
national interests. However, since 1956, Nehru maintained a good 
personal rapport with the SLFP Prime Ministers - S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike. After Nehru's death, Indira 
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Gandhi and Mrs. Bandaranaike developed a high level of personal 
equation which became a significant factor in the bilateral context during 
1971-77.•'^ 
The cordial relations between two countries could be illustrated 
from the fact that in April 1971, India was one of the very few countries 
that responded with effective military assistance to Sri Lanka's call for 
help against the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) or People's Liberation 
Front, which planned to overthrow the UF Government. While Sirimavo 
Banadaranaike remained grateful to Indira Gandhi, the latter failed to 
drive home the advantage in favour of the Indian Tamils. More 
importantly, the Indian Government bore the entire cost of the military 
assistance given to Sri Lanka. 
Besides, both the countries had a common perception and 
similarity of approach on the issue of the Indian Ocean. Realizing the 
threat posed to the littoral, hinterland, and island states by the growing 
great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, India strongly supported the Sri 
Lankan initiative to make the Indian Ocean a 'Zone of Peace' at the 
Lusaka Summit in 1970 as well as in the United Nations since 1971.''^ 
Improvements in bilateral political relations led to creation of a 
better economic cooperation between India and Sri Lanka. With the 
balance of payment situation becoming increasingly grave after 1970, Sri 
Lanka sought India's cooperation to reduce its trade imbalance.^" Also, 
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India agreed to conduct joint feasibility studies on six major industrial 
ventures, and extended a huge amount of economic credit and technical 
assistance to Sri Lanka during 1970-77.^' 
It was apparent to every one that this friendship between India 
and Sri Lanka developed despite the ambivalent attitude (obviously 
inclined towards Pakistan) adopted by Mrs. Bandaranaike on the 
Bangladesh crisis (1971). While declaring a neutral position on Indo-
Pakistan conflict and expressing its sympathy for India which supplied 
essentials to a large number of refugees, Sri Lanka considered the East 
Bengal crisis an internal affair of Pakistan and therefore insisted for a 
political settlement between the two wings of Pakistan and not by 
interference of India. It stood against the dismemberment of Pakistan and 
voted in favour of the UN ceasefire resolution. It is noteworthy that the 
Sri Lankan Government extended strategic facilities to Pakistani civil and 
military planes to use its air space despite India's protests.^^ Even after 
the crisis was over, Sri Lanka did not accord recognition to Bangladesh 
until March 1972 because it did not wish to offend Pakistan's 
susceptibilities. But all these events could not affect the friendship of 
Mrs. Gandhi and Mrs. Bandaranaike. 
It was against this background of good neighbourly relations 
between India and Sri Lanka that they arrived at a 'negotiated settlement' 
of the stateless problem. 
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Reactions to the 1974 Agreement 
Except CWC, almost all the Sri Lankan parties appreciated the 
1974 Agreement. The CP admired Mrs. Bandaranaike who successfully 
found an 'amicable solution' to the long existed problem of 
'statelessness'. Similarly, the DWC (an electoral ally of the SLFP) 
described the conclusion of the Pact as a "historic achievement" of Mrs. 
Bandaranaike.^^ 
However, Thondaman vehemently criticized the Agreement. 
While expressing the view that India made more 'concessions' to the Sri 
Lankan Government on the stateless problem of the Indian Tamils, '^* he 
maintained that : 
"Once the diplomatic dressings are removed from 
the 1974 Agreement, the fact that emerges is that 
the two Governments have continued with their 
number game in determining the future status of a 
group of human beings without any regard to their 
preference or choice in the matter!^^ 
Thondaman regretted, 
"The people of Indian origin had been reduced to 
a status of "merchandise" by the two countries in 
the name of good relations. We are a community 
of human beings with soul, mind and body, with 
personality and cannot be apportioned between 
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countries like beasts of burden at others' whims 
and fancies only to maintain good neighbourly 
relations Humanity cannot be converted 
into merchandise in this modern age."^^ 
The Agreement was also not welcomed by the Tamil Nadu 
Government. Chief Minister Karunanidhi expressed his discontent over 
the conclusion of the Pact without consulting the state Government.^' He 
contended : "...the stateless person should not be obliged to live in a 
country other than the one he opts for".^ * Karunanidhi expected the 
central Government to ascertain his views because it was the state 
Government which carried the burden of rehabilitating the repatriates in 
Tamil Nadu. 
The Sri Lankan Press however welcomed the Agreement. The 
Ceylon Daily News congratulated Mrs. Bandaranaike for what it termed 
as "completion of the unfinished task".^^ 
Also public opinion in India was by and large supportive of the 
Pact on the ground that it 'removed a major irritant' in the bilateral 
relations between the two countries.^° However, The Hindu (dated 31 
January 1974) which supported the cause of the Indian Tamils over the 
years, held the view that the Agreement was a 'distinct gain' for Mrs. 
Bandaranaike. Nevertheless the Indian Tamils were annoyed at the Indian 
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stand and felt cheated that the Government of India had turned its back on 
them in view of the new found friendship with Colombo. 
Progress in the Implementation of tlie 1964 Pact 1970-1976 
Despite all the efforts and determination of the Sri Lankan and 
Indian Government, the implementation process of the Pact was recorded 
to be unsatisfactory, as is evident from the table below: 
Table 2.2 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1964 AGREEMENT DURING 
1970-76 
Year 
From July 1970 to 
December 1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Annual Average 
No.of persons 
granted Indian 
citizenship 
1,15,062 
43,325 
34,675 
21,670 
33,035 
No. of persons 
repatriated to 
India 
92,690 
35,141 
18,511 
33,321 
27,640 
No. of persons 
granted Sri Lanlcan 
citizenship 
52,294 
20,074 
10,591 
19,033 
15,691 
Source: P. Sahadevan, India and Qverseas Indians : The Cflse of Sri 
Lanka, p. 190, Kalinga Publications : Delhi, 1995. 
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It is evident from the table that the UF Government neither 
fulfilled its commitment (except in 1974 and, to some extent, in 1976) of 
granting Sri Lankan citizenship to the stipulated 20,000 persons every 
year, nor repatriated the pre-determined number of (35,000 before 1974 
and 10 percent increase each year over this number from 1974 onwards) 
Indian nationals. Also, the annual average of repatriation for the period 
1970-76 remained low. Even though both India and Sri Lanka did not 
observe the ratio 7:4, the pace of granting Indian citizenship was 
relatively faster than the conferment of Sri Lankan citizenship. The data 
also show that although nothing great was achieved in the implementation 
of the 1964 Pact during 1970-76, the pace of registration-repatriation 
process was much speedier than that of the initial phase (i.e. 1964-70). 
Therefore, after about 12 years of the implementation of the 
1964 Agreement(October 1964-1976), India granted citizenship to about 
54 percent of the stipulated number of 5.25 lakh persons and repatriated 
only 67 percent of the total number of people registered for its 
citizenship. Sri Lanka, on its part, fulfilled only 37 percent of its 
commitment (i.e. 3 lakh persons). 
Implementation of the 1964 Pact During 1977-1981 
In India and Sri Lanka, Governments got changed owing to the 
general elections of 1977. In India, the Congress Government, which 
signed both the 1964 and 1974 Agreements with the Sri Lankan 
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Government led by the SLFP, was replaced by the Janata Government in 
March 1977 general elections. Similarly the UF Government lost power 
in July 1977 general elections and the UNP headed by J.R. Jayewardene 
came to power. Both the Governments recognized the issue of 
implementation of the 1964 Agreement as important because its 
operational validity would be expiring in another five years time. 
The Janata Government and the Implementation of the Pact 
The Janata Government decided to implement the 1964 Pact in 
its letter and spirit. During his visit to Sri Lanka in February 1979 the 
then Prime Minister Morarji Desai described the Agreement as a 'sign of 
maturity and sincerity' of both the Governments in resolving the stateless 
problem. He also expressed that the movement of the stateless population 
from the island was in 'harmony' without creating any 'rancour'.^' Here 
it could be noticed that in place of adopting Nehruvian approach which 
searched solution in legal principle, Desai endorsed, Lai Bahadur 
Shastri's principle of 'numerical formula' to settle the issue of stateless 
persons. He also favoured the method of voluntary repatriation in place of 
compulsory repatriation of stateless persons to India. 
The slow pace at which the Pact was being implemented was a 
matter of concern for India. In 1978 the two countries decided to set up a 
Joint Committee of Officials to review periodically the progress in the 
implementation of the 1964 Agreement and remove difficulties that were 
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experienced in implementation. Also both the Governments determined to 
improve various procedures with regard to the implementation of the 
Agreement.'^ ^ 
As the process of repatriation got expedited and accelerated, the 
problem raised its head on the Indian side, in terms of accommodating the 
repatriates and providing them rehabilitation facilities. Responding to the 
Sri Lankan Government's decision to offer Rs.500 each to certain 
categories of Indian residents as an inducement for repatriation, the 
External Affairs Minister, A.B. Vajpayee stated that Sri Lanka should not 
insist on sending back all the repatriates together to India unless the 
Indian Government was ready to receive more people, and properly 
rehabilitate them.^ ^ This linkage was definitely against the provisions of 
the 1964 Pact. 
The UNP Government and the Implementation of the Pact 
Previously, the UNP Government did not bother to accelerate 
the process of implementation of the Pact owing to certain reasons. First, 
UNP Government's first preference was to restructure the Sri Lankan 
political system from Parliamentary to Presidential type of Government 
(The second Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka came into force in 
September 1978).^ '* Hence almost for two years other issues like 
statelessness remained unattended. Second, the growing movement for 
"Eelam" in the island had unobstrusively set aside the problems of the 
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Indian Tamils which prominently dominated the national agenda since 
independence .^ ^ Neither the people nor the leaders gave adequate 
attention to the stateless issue. 
Yet, the compulsions of internal politics made the UNP 
Government to adopt certain measures to end the issue of statelessness as 
early as possible. Under the persuasive influence of the CWC which 
became a constituent part of the UNP Government after Thondaman's 
appointment as a Cabinet minister in September 1979, President 
Jayewardene constituted a three member committee (which included 
Thondaman also) in 1980 to explore the possibility of redressing the main 
grievance (i.e. statelessness) of the Indian Tamil community. The desire 
to gather the Indian Tamils support to win Parliamentary and Presidential 
elections originally scheduled for 1983 and 1984 respectively, directed 
UNP to think on the above explained lines. 
Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) (Amendment) Act of 1981 
Following the recommendations of the committee based on the 
CWC's suggestion, the UNP Government introduced in the Parliament an 
Amendment to the Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act of 
1967.^ ^ Reverting to the Dudley Senanayake formula by repealing the 
Indo-Ceylon Agreement Implementation (Amendment) Act of 1971, it 
The Sinhalese - Tamil ethnic rivalry attained a new dimension after 1977 general elections. 
Since 1977, the UNP Government's principle task was to manage the ethnic conflict in the 
island. 
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linked the grant of Sri Lankan citizenship 'only' with the conferment of 
Indian citizenship, and not with the number of persons repatriated to 
India.^ ^ 
Prime Minister Premadasa maintained that the fundamental 
objective of the Amendment was to increase the pace of granting Sri 
Lankan citizenship. He pointed out the legal obstacles involved in this 
task due to the stipulation of the reciprocal clause of 4:7 in the 1964 Pact, 
he maintained that the stateless people were suffering due to "no fault of 
theirs".^* 
But SLFP had vehemently opposed the Amendment on the 
ground that it had violated the 1964 Pact.^^ 
Importantly, the CP, which opposed the Indo-Ceylon Act of 
1967, supported the present Amendment. Its spokesman, however urged 
the Government to grant Sri Lankan citizenship to all those stateless 
persons who opted for it.'°° This kind of shift in the Left Party's attitude 
on the stateless issue was basically linked with the political alliance 
factor. Actually the CP broke off its relations with the SLFP in 1976 and 
formed an independent opposition group. 
Thondaman welcomed the Amendment and maintained that it 
helped granting citizenship to about 40,000 persons who otherwise would 
have continued to survive as stateless for a long time.^°' 
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Record of Progress in the Implementation of the Pact During 
1977-1981 
The unsatisfactory progress in implementation of the Agreement 
in nearly five years is evident from the table below: 
Table-2 .3 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1964 PACT DURING 1977-81 
Category 
Total Granted Indian Citizenship (a) 
Total Repatriated to India (b) 
Total Granted Sri Lankan Citizenship (c) 
Number 
96142 
99,059 
55,744 
Annual 
Average 
19,228 
19,811 
11,148 
Source : P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.195, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
The number of persons who were granted citizenship by both 
sides indicated that the ratio stipulated in this regard was not being 
strictly observed. Also, the deteriorated rate of repatriation could be 
noticed due to the reluctance of many repatriates to opt for physical 
repatriation to India. 
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The position in October 1981 was that India had granted 
citizenship to about 373,900 persons and repatriated around 284,300 
while Sri Lanka had absorbed 162,000 stateless persons as its citizens.'"^ 
Significantly, the period stipulated for operation of the 1964 Pact ended 
on 31 October 1981. 
Under these circumstances a serious disagreement arose 
between India and Sri Lanka on the matter regarding the continuation of 
the implementation of the 1964 Pact. In the year which followed October 
1981, the issue of extending the period of operation of the 1964 
Agreement became a matter of discussion between the two Governments. 
Hence, the Shastri-Bandaranaike Agreement of 1964 ran out on 
31 October 1981 after the extended life of 17 years, without providing 
any solution to end the statelessness of the Indian Tamils. As such, the 
citizenship issue attained a new dimension in Indo-Sri Lanka relations 
since 1981. This situation made one to ask a number of questions 
regarding the issue of stateless persons. Could the Pact be made 
operational? If not, how would the long drawn out citizenship problem be 
solved? Should Sri Lanka have accepted all the remaining stateless Indian 
Tamils as its citizens? If both the countries refused to accept them as 
their citizens, what kind of new approach (in form of agreements) could 
be adopted to determine their future and settle their lives? 
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Now wc would examine Indian Government's approach to the 
stateless issue in the eighties. 
The Offshoots of The Implementation of the 1964 Agreement 
The implementation of the 1964 Pact produced many categories 
of the Indian Tamils when it ceased to be operational in October 1981. 
They could be classified as those: 
a) Who had been conferred Sri Lankan citizenship under the 
Indian and Pakistani Residents' (Citizenship) Act of 1949 
as well as the Agreements of 1954; 
b) Who had been granted citizenship under the Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement (Implementation) Act of 1967; 
c) Whose applications for Sri Lankan Citizenship had been 
accepted, but citizenship had not been granted; 
d) Whose applications for Sri Lankan citizenship were 
pending decision; 
e) Whose applications had been rejected for Sri Lankan 
citizenship; 
All these were the Sri Lankan categories. The Indian categories were as 
below: 
a) Whose applications for Indian citizenship had been 
accepted, but, they had not been granted citizenship; 
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b) Whose applications for Indian citizenship were pending 
decision; 
c) Whose applications for Indian citizenship were pending 
decision; 
d) Who had been conferred Indian citizenship, but were not 
repatriated for one or the other reason; 
e) Who were conferred Indian citizenship and hence opted for 
repatriation, but withdrew their decision in favour of a 
constanc stay in Sri Lanka without the Resident Permit 
getting extended; 
f) Those who had neither applied for Indian nor Sri Lankan 
citizenship under the Pact, thus were in a state of flux; 
g) Who had been dealt with by the Sirimavo - Indira Gandhi 
Pact of 1974, but remained to be stateless. 
The effects of the implementation of the Pact for seventeen 
years were limited. Table 2.4 makes it very clear. The tardy process of 
the implementation of the Pact could be attributed to the divergent views 
of India and Sri Lanka on the provisions of the Agreement. Besides 
delays in the enactment of the Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) 
Act, associating the conferment of Sri Lankan citizenship merely with the 
granting of Indian citizenship to the stateless people (not with their 
repatriation as envisaged in the 1964 Pact) during the UNP rule, the 
261 
Problem of Indian Tamils: Inter-Governmental Negotiations 
delays in the settlement of the assets of the repatriates by the Sri Lankan 
Government and lastly, the unwillingness of the repatriates for their 
physical repatriation to India, were among the other reasons which were 
responsible for the slow process of implementation of the 1964 Pact. 
Table - 2.4 
PERSONS GRANTED CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE 1964 
AGREEMENT UP TO 1981 
Category 
No. of persons granted 
Indian Citizenship 
No. of Indians repatriated 
No. of persons granted Sri 
Lankan citizenship 
Total number of stateless 
persons absorbed as Indian 
and Sri Lankan citizens 
Accountable 
Persons 
373,912 
284,300 
162,112 
536,024 
Natural 
Increase 
124,429 
91,144 
48,548 
172,977 
Total 
498,341 
375,444 
210,660 
709,001 
Source : P. Sahadevan, India and Overseas Indians: The Case of Sri 
Lanka, p.209, Kalinga Publications: Delhi, 1995. 
The figures mentioned in the table clearly indicate that : 
(i) Only about 65 per cent of the total stateless persons, 
covered by the 1964 Agreement had been conferred either 
Indian or Sri Lankan citizenship, rest 35 per cent 
continued to be stateless. 
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(ii) According to their commitment made in the 1964 Pact 
(5.25 lakh and 3 lakh persons respectively) India and Sri 
Lanka were required to grant citizenship to about 1.51 
lakh and 1.37 lakh persons respectively. But while India 
ran short of 19,000 applicants, Sri Lanka had a surplus of 
around 3.25 lakh applicants. 
(iii) Out of 5.06 lakh persons who applied for Indian 
citizenship*,'°^ India still had to get rid of the applications 
of about 1.32 lakh persons of the 6.25 lakh applicants for 
Sri Lankan citizenship,** Sri Lanka had to finish off the 
applications of around 4.62 lakh persons. 
(iv) However, none of the two countries strictly followed the 
4:7 ratio as mentioned in the Pact, but India, no doubt, 
'appeared to be quicker than Sri Lanka in granting 
citizenship to the stateless persons, nevertheless, India 
repatriated only about 76 per cent of the total number of 
stateless persons who were granted Indian citizenship. 
Non-Implementation of the 1974 Pact 
It is important to notice that the Sirimavo-Indira Gandhi Pact 
(1974) was to be implemented only after the complete implementation of 
By May 1970, only 4 lakh persons applied for Indian citizenship. Between May 1970 and 
October 1981, about 1.06 lakh persons more applied for Indian citizenship after their 
applications for Sri Lankan citizenship were rejected. 
Out of 6.25 lakh applicants for Sri Lankan citizenship, a few thousand were rejected or 
withdrawn latter. 
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the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact (1964). The leaders of both the countries 
thought that the implementation process of the 1964 Agreement would 
not take time more than the end of October 1981 to be completed, hence, 
determined 31 October 1981 as the day for putting the 1974 Pact into 
operation. 
But, the incomplete implementation of the 1964 Pact made the 
latter Agreement (1974) a non-starter. This resulted in the accumulation 
of a large number of applicants for both Indian and Sri Lankan 
citizenship. "As per the quota prescribed for India and Sri Lanka under 
the 1964 and 1974 Agreement, the number of people still to be granted 
citizenship by the former rose to around 2.26 lakh, while the latter was to 
absorb a rough total of 2.12 lakh persons".'°'* 
Although 75,000 persons more included in India's quota, it was 
still running short of 94,000 persons to meet its commitment. So far Sri 
Lanka was concerned, it still had applicants far in excess of the stipulated 
quota. 
The Problem of Natural Increase 
The stateless issue became more complex in 1981 owing to the 
riddle of 'natural increase'. The number of 'natural increase' (those who 
were born on and after 1 November 1964) was absolutely nil on 31 
October 1964. As 17 years passed (till 1981), their number had recorded a 
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steep increase (from zero per cent in 1964 to 49.25 per cent in 1975) as 
the children of 1964 became parents.'°^ 
As a result, most of the post-1981 stateless persons were not 
only those who were born before 31 October 1964, but also their natural 
increase plus the natural increase of the natural increase. Most of their 
fathers and grandfathers who applied for either Indian or Sri Lankan 
citizenship had lived and died stateless. In the case of some people, their 
families were divided. Now one can ask here was it legally and morally 
correct to declare these 'new generations' as stateless and to ask them to 
repatriate to an alien land with which only their parents or grand parents 
had some linkages? 
Issue of Stateless Persons During the Indira Gandhi Era, 1981-1984 
New Delhi now took an uncompromising stand that it was end 
of the road as far as India was concerned and that neither the existing 
document would be extended nor another agreement on the lines of the 
lapsed one negotiated. Sri Lanka however pleaded that the Agreement 
should not be allowed to lapse until the repatriation of the required quota 
of people had been completed. 
Here one has to remember the change in circumstances that had 
taken place during the three years that Indira Gandhi was out of power. 
She had been humiliated by the needless and avoidable banter of 
Jayewardene during the time she was out of power (1977-79), for which 
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she developed complete dislike for him. She had returned to power in 
1980 in a belligerent mood and saw no reason to accommodate Colombo 
anymore. The Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka was instructed by 
the Government of India to stop issuing the passport applications under 
the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact from 31 October 1981 onwards, thereby 
indicating that the Pact was no longer operational. In an aide memoire 
delivered by the Indian High Commissioner, Thomas Abraham, to W.T. 
Jayasinghe (Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), India made it 
clear that it would accept not more than half a million* stateless Indians 
who had opted for Indian citizenship.'°^ This made only 84 per cent of 
fulfilment of India's commitment or about 1 lakh persons less than its 
commitment (i.e. 6 lakh persons) under the two Agreements. Besides, this 
figure did not include the natural increase. 
Frankly enough, India made it clear that it would neither extend 
the duration of the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact nor agree to repatriate the 
stateless persons against their wishes.'°^ 
Two factors seemed to have influenced India's decision-the 
domestic political pressure against the conclusion of a new agreement and 
India's renewed opposition to the principle of compulsory repatriation (in 
order to respect the wishes of the people concerned to make Sri Lanka 
The number included all those stateless people who were repatriated to India after the grant 
of Indian citizenship under the 1964 Pact until 30 October 1981; those who were issued 
Indian passports, and those whose applications for Indian passports were being processed. 
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their permanent home). The very day when the 1964 Pact got expired, the 
leaders of Tamil Nadu had demanded that no new agreement be signed on 
the stateless problem of the Indian Tamils. An all-party delegation led by 
Chief Minister M.G. Ramachandran met Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 
7 December 1981 and stressed this point of view.'°^ 
Moving a calling attention motion in the Rajya Sabha on 12 
March 1982, V. Gopalsamy, a DMK leader declared that the people of 
Tamil Nadu did not wish New Delhi to enter into any more agreements 
with Colombo, and sought the centre to honour their feelings and wishes. 
He emphasized that it was the moral, political and legal responsibility and 
duty of the Government of Sri Lanka to grant citizenship to all those who 
had not been conferred either Indian of Sri Lankan citizenship, except 
those who had opted for repatriation to India and who had been given 
citizenship certificates.'°^ 
On similar lines, the Communist Party leader, M. 
Kalyansundaram, vociferously criticized the Sirimavo-Shastri Pact and 
urged the Indian Government not to accept any more responsibility on 
this question. He reminded the Government: 
"The Agreement lapsed, it is no more the problem 
of the Government of India. The Government of 
India should see that the remaining people are 
given automatically the citizenship of Sri Lanka 
267 
Problem of Indian Tamils: Inter-Governmental Negotiations 
unless somebody voluntarily opts for Indian 
citizenship. That is the only way by which the 
problem can be solved"."° 
A number of other members also maintained that Sri Lankan 
Government should confer its citizenship on the stateless Indian Tamils. 
The Sri Lankan Government however did not accept the Indian 
stand. It maintained that until both the Governments accepted the agreed 
number of stateless persons, the 1964 Agreement would continue to be in 
effect. There, in Sri Lanka, leaders were all the time busy in searching 
points against India. The Minister of Justice, Nissanka Wijeyeratne, 
argued that those PIO's in Sri Lanka who were stateless reached in this 
position only because of India and only by, implementing the 1964 Pact 
as an 'honourable instrument of settlement', and granting them Indian 
citizenship, justice could be done with them. 
Hence, the difference of approach existed between the two 
countries as India, without repudiating the Agreement, considered the 
'time frame' set in it as an essential factor to determine the operational 
validity of the Agreement, while Sri Lanka emphasized that the purpose 
to be achieved was more important than the period stipulated. India also 
realized that any extension of the implementation period of the 1964 Pact 
or conclusion of a third agreement in the series of 1964 and 1974 
Agreements would mean compelling those whose applications for Sri 
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Lankan citizenship had been rejected, to opt for Indian citizenship 
because such an arrangement would not guarantee the stateless persons a 
fair choice to become either Indian or Sri Lankan citizen. That means 
in many cases voluntary repatriation would become compulsory 
deportation to India. 
Sri Lanka, on the other hand, maintained that if the 
implementation of the Pact discontinued by India without keeping its 
promise; it would amount to dishonouring the instrument of settlement 
and departing morally from the Agreement signed between the Prime 
Ministers of the two sovereign nations. However Sri Lanka expressed its 
desire for a bilateral negotiation so that a solution acceptable to both the 
Governments could be worked out to end the stateless problem once for 
all. 
India, however on several occasions expressed its willingness to 
hold a further dialogue with Sri Lanka on the residue stateless question as 
it was not against having talks with Sri Lanka on this issue. Following the 
month of October 1981, its spokesman made it clear that his Government 
would welcome any step towards finding a comprehensive solution to the 
stateless question "bearing well in mind the desires of the people 
concerned" (emphasis added)"'' Prime Minister Indira Gandhi herself 
stated "to ensure that the PIO continued to live in Sri Lanka as full 
citizens of the country"""^ as in place of opting for Indian citizenship 
under the 1964 Pact they exhibited their willingness to be citizens of Sri 
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Lanka. But due to the above mentioned reason India abandoned such an 
accommodative approach and the stateless issue was treated merely as a 
number game 'a soulless statistics'. Indian Tamils who were kept in the 
stateless category were considered as a "mass of pulsating hapless 
humanity caught in the throes of history"."^ 
Here this is worth noticing that CWC welcomed India's new 
approach to the stateless question as "refreshing". CWC President 
Thondaman proposed that "Those who opted for Indian citizenship should 
be allowed to do so with all facilities provided, while those who have 
decided to accept his country (Sri Lanka) as their home be granted their 
rights as full and equal citizens".''^ 
The former CWC leader, M.S. Sellasamy made a suggestion that 
those people whose applications were rejected for Sri Lankan citizenship 
and those persons who had failed to apply for any citizenship under the 
Agreement (in the belief that they were already the island's citizens) 
should be granted Sri Lankan nationality. This should be so because they 
had already decided their option for Sri Lankan citizenship in 1948 
(under the Citizenship Act) and again in 1967 under the Indo-Ceylon 
Agreement (Implementation Act)."'' 
Hence, it could be maintained that the leaders of the Indian 
Tamils in Sri Lanka strictly opposed both the extension of the operational 
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validity of the Agreement and any further negotiation aimed at 
concluding a fresh pact on the stateless issue. "^ 
From Bilateral to Internal 
With the change in the approach of India, the stateless question 
entered a new phase. Sri Lanka reluctantly accepted the Indian stand as 
President Jayewardene declared that "if the Government of India refused 
to consider taking more than a certain number, Sri Lanka had to adopt 
them as its citizens". He continued: "we can not have stateless people. 
We can not put people in a ship and send them to India. We need them in 
our country also"."^ 
As such Jayewardene accepted that the stateless question was no 
more a bilateral issue between India and Sri Lanka, but an internal 
problem of the island. 
Here it must be noticed that Sri Lanka's decision to grant 
citizenship to the residue stateless persons was not solely influenced by 
the Indian Government's refusal to extend the operational validity of the 
1964 Pact. The UNP Government's electoral strategies also formed an 
important factor in this regard. President Jayewardene could ill afford to 
ignore the importance of the Indian Tamil votes in the forthcoming 
Presidential election and the subsequent referendum in 1982 to extend the 
tenure of Parliament for another six years. By promising to end the 
residue stateless problem, the UNP enlisted the electoral support of the 
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Indian Tamils in 1982*.'^° In 1982 President Jayewardene set the year 
1988 as a deadline to end the statelessness of the Indian Tamils. 
However, no action plan was worked out until January 1986. Under these 
circumstances Thondaman became the principal negotiator with the Sri 
Lankan Government on this issue. 
A Road to Solution 
In the meantime Sri Lanka was facing a new problem on another 
Tamil front that of the Sri Lankan Tamils living in the northern and the 
eastern provinces. The Sri Lankan Government was put on defensive 
owing to India's gradual involvement in the ethnic conflict on the side of 
the Sri Lankan Tamils. With the escalation of the ethnic conflict, 
Colombo began to turn to flexibility on the citizenship question. As we 
have already discussed that India adopted an uncompromising stand that 
after she had granted citizenship to those who had applied for Indian 
citizenship, the residual problem of persons of Indian origin resident in 
Sri Lanka was that of Colombo, Colombo decided to move intelligently 
on this issue by not involving India any more, and therefore adjusted 
herself to the changing scenario. On 15 January 1986 Sri Lanka and India 
after four days talks in Colombo agreed that in exchange for India 
granting Indian citizenship to all those who had applied before October, 
The Presidential election results revealed that Jayewardene won largely owing to the shift 
of the bulk vote of plantation workers to the UNP. Similarly without the Indian Tamil 
votes, the UNP Government would have found it difficult to swing the referendum. 
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1981, the Government of Sri Lanka would grant its citizenship to all the 
remaining persons of Indian origin. The talks in Colombo were preceded 
by talks between S. Thondaman, President of the Ceylon Worker's 
Congress and a Minister in the Jayewardene Cabinet and the Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In fact it was one of the most fruitful by-product 
of the All Party Conference of 1984 which had been convened to find a 
solution to the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka Tamils. 
If 'thesis' were the Sinhala oriented policies of Mrs. 
Bandaranaike, 'antithesis' was the accommodative approach of UNP 
towards Indian Tamils in the island. But Mrs. Bandaranaike was not 
ready to develop a 'synthesis' by accepting this approach of UNP and 
thus called upon the Kandyans living in the highlands to prepare for a 
"war" with the estate workers. Political observers described it an "open 
incitement to racial violence". "Mrs. Bandaranaike who regained her 
civic rights on 1 January following a Presidential "free pardon" warned 
that "Tamil MPs will come to Parliament from Nuwara Eliya, 
Bandarawela, Moneagala and even Ratnapura" following the 
Government's decision to give citizenship to the Stateless Tamils".'^' She 
declared, "today we are being attacked from the North, if we get attacked 
from the hill country in addition, the Sinhalese will have no alternative 
but to jump into the sea."'" While other political parties and trade unions 
welcomed the new decision on the remaining persons of Indian origin, 
Bandaranaike wanted the question of granting citizenship and voting 
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rights to another 94,000 estate workers to be placed before the people. 
The Government's decision meant granting citizenship rights to 4,70,000 
persons, she said and alleged that President Jayewardene had 
'contravened the "carefully considered legally valid" accord on a "single 
request" by the Rural Industries Development Minster and Ceylon 
Workers' Congress leader, Mr. S. Thondaman. Therefore, the President 
has no right to remain one more minute in the office", she roared 'and 
asked the people to compel the ruling United National Party MPs to vote 
against the proposed bill on the subject".'^'' 
Although the political dust was raised on the final solution, 
internally. Sri Lanka had a gloomy environment. The Government was 
already struggling hard to overcome the ethnic problem, which had raised 
its head in a very serious manner. India had involved itself in the internal 
problem of Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan Government was trying to use 
India's good offices to find out a solution acceptable to both the Tamils 
and the Sinhalese. However it was a matter of great relief for Sri Lankan 
Government that not yet settled long existed problem of persons of Indian 
origin was moving towards a final solution. By 31 March 1995 the Indian 
Mission in Colombo and Kandy had registered and granted Indian 
citizenship to "5,92,919 persons of Indian origin (accountable 4,20,319 
plus natural increase of 1,72,600)". The number of persons who were 
repatriated to India was "4,61,999". So far the citizenship of Sri Lanka 
was concerned under the various Agreements, it was to grant citizenship 
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to "4,69,000" accountable persons of Indian origin". "Out of this figure 
up to 31-12-88, 3,37,620 (accountable 2,37,151 plus natural increase of 
1,00,469)" had been granted Sri Lankan citizenship. "The balance of 
2,31,849 stateless persons of Indian origin have been absorbed as Sri 
Lankans under the grant of citizenship to stateless persons (Special 
Provisions) Act no.39 of 1988",'^'* the Agreement which was arrived at in 
January 1986 and the legislation passed to implement it. In principle this 
meant that there were no stateless persons of Indian origin left in Sri 
Lanka. Now Sri Lanka was left with the task of completing the paper 
work to grant its citizenship to all the remaining persons. 
Re-establishment of the Nehruvian Approach 
The Post-1981 period was to be known for bringing about 
changes in the policies of both India and Sri Lanka so far stateless 
question was concerned. Both the countries finally gave weightage to the 
needs and wishes of the Indian Tamils in their talks and negotiations of 
their (Indian Tamils) settlement. 
Nehru, throughout his life span, never accepted the principle of 
compulsory repatriation. He maintained that Indian Tamils should be 
treated as 'human beings' thus never favoured forceful repatriation. In 
eighties, and post-1981 period India again maintained that PIO's would 
not be repatriated against their wishes, thus a shift could be noticed 
clearly from the policy, pursued by Lai Bahadur Shastri. Hence, post-
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1981 Indian leadership reflected a similarity in their 'Indian Tamil' 
policy, with the Nehruvian approach on the stateless question in Sri 
Lanka. 
Simultaneously, a shift could also be noticed in the approach of 
UNP Government of 1948 and the UNP Government of 1988. In 1948, 
D.S. Senanayake denied citizenship to Indian Tamils on the ground that 
the citizenization and enfranchisement of the Indian Tamils would lead to 
the swamping of the kandyan electorates and to the breakdown of the 
electoral strength of UNP. After forty years, in 1988, the same UNP 
Government but under the leadership of J.R. Jayewardene, recognized 
injustice done by the D.S. Senanayake Government to the Indian Tamils 
and rectified this mistake by granting citizenship rights to the stateless 
persons because the UNP's political survival was dependent on the Indian 
Tamil votes. 
Why political parties recognized the importance of the Indian 
Tamil votes, could be best understood in the context of the changed 
political position of CWC. In the sixties and the seventies, CWC's views 
were not considered important by the two major Sinhala parties - the 
UNP and the SLFP, because that time CWC was considered as an 
insignificant force from electoral point of view. 
But in eighties, CWC emerged as a substantial political force 
from electoral point of view. Now the minority community votes were 
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desperately desired by the Sinhalese political parties to win the elections. 
Owing to this electoral reality CWC pressurized the UNP Government to 
accept its demands on the citizenship issue. As Thondaman stated, "we 
have got citizenship and equal status and are in a position to live in 
equality with everyone in the island ... If any party wants to form 
Government, they have also to depend on our votes. Such is the situation. 
Most people realized this truth".'^^ With the emergence of ethnic crisis in 
the island and its consequent aggravation, the stateless question became 
more complicated ever before. The community which was deprived of 
citizenship was the Indian Tamil plantation workers. They were not only 
'Indian's in origin, but also 'Tamil' and it was this ethnic factor which 
made the community a vital part of the larger equation of the Sri Lankan 
ethnic crisis".'^^ This factor plus the possibility of Indian armed 
intervention for the purpose of safeguarding the Indian Tamil interests, 
might have compelled the elites led political parties of Sinhalese to 
accept CWC's demands on the stateless question. 
Besides, all other opposition parties excluding SLFP and MEP, 
and including LSSP and CP which earlier in sixties supported the 
principle of compulsory repatriation, too supported CWC's demand of 
ending the issue of statelessness amicably and as earliest as possible. 
Now Sri Lankan press too exposed the plight of the stateless people. 
India too, under the influence of certain factors, changed its 
policy towards the 'Indian Tamils'. First, it was difficult to resist 
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domestic political pressure, thus, India checked itself from committing 
further on the repatriation of the stateless persons from Sri Lanka. 
Second, by adding one more bilateral agreement in the series of 1964 and 
1974 Pacts, India did not intend to be a party to the compulsory 
repatriation of the stateless Indian Tamils from Sri Lanka. Third, moving 
diplomatically, in a changed atmosphere of UNP-CWC political relations, 
India gave favourable response to the views of CWC on the question of 
stateless persons of Indian origin. 
Hence, it could be maintained that to some extent post 1981 
period, from India's point of view, witnessed the revival of Nehruvian 
stand on the stateless question. Perhaps, India's firm determination of not 
entering into any new bilateral agreement with Sri Lanka and not 
accepting the principle of compulsory repatriation, would have been the 
substantial reason for compelling Sri Lanka to resolve the stateless 
question as earliest as possible. 
Besides, ethnic crisis, which was aggravating quickly in the 
north and the east of the island and India's day by day increasing 
indulgence into it might also be considered as one of the major reasons 
for resolving the citizenship question. As the ethnic crisis deepened, India 
reacted stridently on the citizenship question. India's refusal to extend the 
Shastri - Bandaranaike Agreement beyond October 1981, was an example 
of this strident attitude. In a way, it was a sort of compulsion on the part 
of Colombo to accept all the remaining stateless persons still left in Sri 
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Lanka as its citizens irrespective of the fact that India had failed to fulfill 
its quota as accepted in the 1964 and the 1974 Agreements. India's 
argument was that Sri Lanka had to be equal in its treatment with all the 
Tamils whether estate workers o Sri Lankan Tamils ^ h o migrated to Sri 
Lanka centuries back and later on being considered as a part of 
indigenous population) given strong ties of ethnicity, culture and kinship. 
Sri Lanka found it difficult to resist this argument of India, and the reason 
was that Sri Lanka had asked India for providing good offices so that an 
early political solution of this communal problem could be sought. 
Simultaneously, there was a lack of understanding on the part of both the 
neighbours, so far the issues like "security in the region involving the use 
of Trincomalee naval base and Oil Tank Farm, the up-gradation of Voice 
of America facilities, and arms assistance from Pakistan",'^^ were 
concerned. India was however convinced that while being accommodative 
on the Indian Tamil question, Sri Lanka wanted to put India down on 
other issues. But at the same time, the refugee problem gave India an 
opportunity to assert its inherent right to press for a resolution of island's 
communal problem that too in a manner which India considered to be fair 
and just so that the refugees could return to their homes with dignity and 
in full security of their lives and property. A situation parallel to 
Bangladesh which was fast growing in Sri Lanka and the detection of 
training camps in India for the Tamil militants, feared Sri Lanka quite a 
lot. It was also a fact that Sri Lanka could not collect any type of 
279 
Problem of Indian Tamils: Inter-Governmental Negotiations 
assistance from any other country rather received advice to search a 
solution of the ethnic crisis along with India. Perhaps this than anything 
else would have been the major pulling force to prompt Sri Lanka to 
adopt an accommodative and extra lenient attitude on the question of 
citizenship at the end. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
ETHNIC CONFLICT; INDIA AND SRI LANKA 
The violent ethnic conflict that has tumbled Sri Lanka for a 
decade and more, actually rooted itself in the island, centuries back. 
History if honours a nation, it also discloses the wrongs done in the past. 
The history of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is the history of emergence of 
consciousness among the majority community, the Sinhala, which defined 
the Sri Lankan society as 'Sinhala-Buddhist', thereby denying its multi-
ethnic character. The growth of this consciousness affected the minorities 
in Sri Lanka to the extent that internal resolution of the problems has 
become impossible. 
The Sinhala dominated the country from about 5 century B.C. 
and succeeded in establishing a kingdom with its centre in the north-
central province of the island. "The term 'Sinhala' was first used to 
indicate the royal family of the island, then extended to cover the royal 
retinue and then further extended to include the people; this social 
process dating to about the 6 century B.C. is simultaneously the process 
of the ethnic consolidation of the Sinhala people".' The Sinhala Kingdom 
which controlled the entire island most of the time, and the Chola, 
Pandiya and Chera Kingdoms of South India, shared the relations of 
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affinity and hostility both at various periods. There were frequent 
invasions from these kingdoms, and also frequent alliances and 
intermarriages of the four royal families. There were thus strong links 
with India, especially South India. 
As the Sinhala kingdom had little control over the northern and 
eastern coastal regions, the Tamil people got settled there owing to its 
closeness to Indian mainland. By the end of the 13 Century, the Tamils of 
northern region established the Jaffna kingdom. In the 12 and 13 
centuries, the demographic distribution provided a territorial basis for the 
major ethnic groups. The territorial concentration of the Tamils 
developed into a concept of a 'traditional Tamil Homeland'. Muslims 
however could not claim for such kind of homeland as they were 
scattered over the whole island, with a majority presence in only a part of 
the eastern province. 
Religion too affected the ideologies of majority Sinhalas and 
minority Tamils, so far the ethnic consolidation was concerned. In the 3 
century B.C., the Buddhism was introduced from India and it became the 
religion of the Sinhala as well as the state religion. Tamils continued 
following Hinduism. Apart from the section of those Sinhalese and 
Tamils who converted to Christianity, in general Sinhalese identity with 
Buddhism and Tamils identity with Hinduism was accepted. 
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Ethnic Scenario Under the Colonial Period 
The Portuguese arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505 and occupied the 
south-western region of the island and in due course, the northern and 
eastern coastal regions. The Dutch succeeded them in 1658 and, as did 
Portuguese, ruled the Sinhala and Tamil areas as separate regions. During 
this period, the Sinhala kingdom continued to exist, first in the south-west 
and then in the hill country in Kandy. The British succeeded the Dutch in 
1796 and ultimately subdued the Kandyan kingdom in 1815. In 1833 they 
brought the whole island, i.e., the areas occupied by the Sinhala and 
Tamils, within one administrative unit. 
Social and economic developments, introduced by the 
Portuguese and then by the Dutch, such as commercialization of 
agriculture, the registration of title to land, registration of births and 
deaths, proselytization, did nothing except for freezing of ethnic 
boundaries, which meant in effect the consolidation of the Sinhala 
community in the central and south-western parts of the island and of the 
Tamil community in the northern and eastern provinces. Britishers while 
occupied the island, introduced a number of economic developments, 
which in turn gave rise to two other counter-developments which made 
the ethnic picture in Sri Lanka even more complex. 
Firstly, majority of over one million Tamil workers who had 
been brought to Sri Lanka by Britishers as seasonal labourers to work on 
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tea and coffee plantations, became permanently domiciled on the 
plantations. It was the question of the citizenship of these plantation 
workers which, in future vitiated the relations of India and Sri Lanka. 
Secondly, during the colonial period economic developments 
took place primarily in the central and western areas of the island giving 
way to the disadvantaged position of the Tamil community. To overcome 
such adversity, a large number of Tamil community began to move in 
employment in state services, in the private sector and in other learned 
professions. The developed educational facilities in English in the Tamil 
areas, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula, helped this process of 
professional and occupational advancement. This process of professional 
and occupational advancement, in turn motivated the Tamil employers 
and Tamil traders to establish themselves in the southern and central 
regions of the island. 
The opening up of the plantations transformed the economy of 
Sri Lanka and created opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs to make 
large fortunes. Some of them converted to Christianity and sent their 
children to Britain for education. This educated class filled the expanding 
need for doctors, engineers, lawyers etc. "The local bourgeoisie thus 
created was multi-ethnic, but predominantly Sinhala, with Burghers and 
Tamils too entering the various professions and the state services".^ 
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The Sinhala people considered increasing Tamil influence both 
in trade and employment, as a great threat for Sinhala progress. Trade 
was basically controlled by British bankers or South Indian Chettiars. The 
professional and educated Sinhalas too found themselves in tough 
competition with Burghers and Tamils so far state and private 
employment was concerned. Even workers too had to face competition 
from migrant labourers from Kerala and Tamil Nadu as well as from 
workers of indigenous minority groups. 
Such were Sinhala apprehensions against the non-Sinhala 
elements particularly the Indian Tamils. It was this economic antagonism 
which deepened the roots of ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka and which 
motivated the Sinhala elites to wield all political power so that minority 
groups could not affect Sinhala decisions and also, so that Sinhalese 
could mould the things the way they desired to. 
Early Tamil Apprehensions 
The British effort of treating Ceylon as one single unit of 
administration under one central authority, could not be successful in 
creating national consciousness in Sri Lankan society. A large number of 
Tamils due to their advancement in education and preferred treatment 
from the British took up employment in the civil services to emerge as a 
special privileged social class. The Sinhalese on the other hand remained 
a backward feudal class lacking in modern education involved in 
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agriculture and other rural jobs. Hence two different communities moving 
in two different directions could not form an interactive society filled 
with national cultural consciousness. The highly centralized structure of 
administration which was introduced by British was actually misfit for Sri 
Lankan society. However, through Donoughmore Commission, provincial 
councils were established and certain important and crucial functions of 
the central Government were delegated to the councils but this 
arrangement failed to achieve the desired balance and objective. Another 
important recommendation of the Donoughmore Commission that was 
never implemented related to the suggestion that the central legislature 
meet not only in Colombo but periodically also in Kandy and Jaffna. It 
was not only the Tamils that were unhappy with the highly centralized 
setup, even the Kandyan Sinhalese were unhappy. The Kandyan Sinhalese 
wanted the Donoughmore Commission to establish three autonomous 
regions representing the Tamil, Kandyan and other Sinhala interest, but 
the opportunity was not availed. 
The Portuguese and Dutches, however did not interfere with the 
administrative structure inherited by them, that means Jaffna while being 
part of the Portuguese or Dutch rule in the Island, kept its administrative 
identity intact. But highly centralized setup of administration and 
introduction of democratic institutions including adult suffrage under 
British rule, encouraged people to participate in the mainstream of 
interactive politics. When in 1946 there were clear indications of British 
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withdrawing from Ceylon, Indian Tamils had a fear of being suppressed 
due to lack of enough safeguards against the majority rule of the 
Sinhalese. Their apprehension was that they would be deprived of the 
advantages they had enjoyed under the British in terms of employment in 
public services. The All Ceylon Tamil Congress expressed their 
apprehension in a Memorandum dated the 15 January 1946 submitted to 
the British Prime Minister Attlee. It said : 
"First it must be said that the proposed 
Constitution does not in reality grant a truly 
democratic form of self-Government. It has 
further failed to provide for just and equitable 
distribution of power among the various sections 
of the people on the basis of a spirit of 
enlightened democracy. On the contrary it sets up 
an irremovable communal oligarchy in perpetual 
power and paves the way for an immutable 
succession of Sinhalese Buddhist Prime 
Ministers. To hold that the proposed Constitution 
confers self-Government on the Ceylon people is, 
to say the least, disingenuous; it is in fact the 
substitution of Sinhalese rule to British rule, 
which is not the same as Ceylonese self-
Government".^ 
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The Memorandum clarified: 
"The opposition by the Tamils to the proposal 
does not, however, involve an opposition to 
Constitutional advance or the attainment of 
Dominion Status. The opposition is to rule by one 
community and at that by an oligarchy composed 
from members of that community, over all other 
communities"." 
The Soulbury Commission, which provided the island with a 
new Constitution on the eve of the transfer of power and lasted until 
1972, definitely talked about certain safeguards for Tamils, but it failed 
to prevent the inevitable majority factor of the Sinhala community to 
expand its role in post-independent Sri Lanka. And the inevitable always 
happens. To adjust themselves and to strengthen their bargaining position 
in the new power structure of the island, Tamils formed an alliance with 
the Sinhalese Party, the United National Party (UNP) in the hope of 
establishing a spirit of mutual coexistence between Sinhala and Tamil 
communities. SJV Chelvanayakam, father of the Tamil nationalism in Sri 
Lanka encouraged the spirit of Tamil identity assertion and asked "why 
the Tamils should not have the right to secede from the rest of the country 
if they desired to do so".^ This Tamil assertion continued when a national 
flag for the new nation was to be decided upon. 
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Keeping aside the Tamil demand of inclusion of Nandi and 
Crescent and Star representing Hindu and Muslim sentiments in the 
proposed flag, the Lion flag with two strips representing minorities was 
accepted through the stratagem of a committee. But the Tamil federalists 
took this flag as a symbol of disunity of Ceylon. 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party and The 'Only Sinhala' Policy 
The failure of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike to succeed the ailing 
Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, who had backed his son Dudley 
Senanayake, led to the split in the United National Party (UNP) in 1951. 
But these hostilities for succession in the ruling UNP, proved to be 
disastrous for the ethnic peace of Sri Lanka. Bandaranaike broke away to 
form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Although failed in 1952 
elections, Bandaranaike's SLFP did well in 1956 by following the policy 
of Sinhala favourism and by aggravating Sinhala hatred against Tamils so 
far professional jobs and admission to the professional courses in the 
institute of higher learning were concerned. Ironically the same 
Bandaranaike had, before independence realized and accepted the need 
for parity of treatment to both the languages as essential to bring about 
amity and understanding between the two principal communities. The 
hunger of power made a brilliant politician and strategist S.W.R.D., to 
change his attitude on the language issue. For the 1956 elections he 
adopted a one-point program - "Sinhala Only" and proclaimed that 
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within 24 hours of his coming to power he would make the language of 
the majority community the sole official language of the country. His 
actual motive was to reach out to a very important constituency of 
Buddhist clergy who were the standard bearers of Sinhala chauvinism and 
culture. The inclusion of religious flavour to politics, definitely gave 
political benefits to SLFP but it was certainly an unhealthy development 
in the politics of Sri Lanka. One section of the Buddhist clergy that was 
highly influential and very rigid defenders of the faith against any threats 
(whether imaginary or substantial) to the holy trinity of the 'Land (Sri 
Lanka), Race (Sinhalese) and Faith (Buddhism)', greatly opposed any 
concessions to or compromise with the Tamils on any issue whatsoever. 
And certainly their main purpose was to suppress the Tamils the most. 
Naturally Tamils regarded this action as anti-Tamil. This step denied 
their language the equality of treatment and it sought to hit - where it 
hurt the most - at their almost total monopoly on jobs in the Government 
sector, the largest employer. The UNP, on the other hand, previously tried 
to follow the policy of parity of the languages to keep the support of the 
traditional Tamil voters but with the progress of electioneering, UNP 
realized the loosening of the Sinhala vote bank to the SLFP, hence the 
midstream change of plan to enter into Sinhala court could not be fruitful 
and SLFP emerged as winner of 1956 elections following the "Sinhala 
Only" slogan. 
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Although Sinhala parties most of the times neglected the interest 
of Tamils in order to grab power and to keep the majority Sinhala 
community at their side, but on 23 May 1951 the UNP Government in a 
conciliatory move towards their fellow Tamils, appointed an Official 
Language Commission, which had to suggest measures necessary for 
transition from English to Sinhalese and Tamil with the object of making 
the two languages official languages of the administration. The 
Commission submitted the final report on 1 October 1953. Some 
important recommendations of the commission were: 
a) "All letters or petitions received in Sinhalese or Tamil should be 
replied in the same language; all forms to be made available in 
English, Sinhalese and Tamil; all sign boards etc. of any nature 
should be in all the three languages". 
b) "There are some important corollaries to the adoption of 
Sinhalese and Tamil as the official languages of the country. 
One of the most obvious of them is that all examinations by 
which officers are recruited to the public services must be 
eventually held entirely through the medium of the two 
languages, namely, Sinhalese and Tamil". 
c) "All bills, whether private or public, should be presented in 
Parliament in all the three languages - English, Sinhalese and 
Tamil - and the bills submitted to the Governor General for his 
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assent should be in all the three languages; interpretation 
facilities for speeches in Parliament in all the three languages to 
be provided". 
d) Language of the majority within the local body to be the official 
language of that local body; proceedings of the municipalities to 
be conducted in Sinhalese, Tamil or English; all public notices, 
publications, road signs and so on issued by the local bodies 
should be in all the three languages". 
e) "The commission had noted that the Muslims had demanded that 
in their case English be recognized as their language instead of 
Tamil or Sinhalese, which they normally spoke and used. 
Commission turning down this suggestion ruled that "it is well 
known that their home language is either Tamil or Sinhalese and 
it is highly unrealistic for them to act as if English has ever 
been or can ever be the home language of the large majority of 
them".^ 
But Government did not follow these recommendations. It is 
worth noticing here that in 1944, J.R. Jayewardene had sought to move a 
motion in the State Council that Sinhalese should be made the official 
language of the island instead of English, but S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
along with others opposed this proposal as they wanted English to be 
replaced both by Sinhala and Tamil. But unfortunately the same 
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Bandaranaike in order to grab political power after independence 
changed his earlier prudent attitude and followed "Sinhala Only" policy. 
Tamil's Antagonism 
The Tamils registered great opposition against the "Sinhala 
Only" policy when it first came into existence in 1956. The Tamils also 
warned Sinhalese of grave consequences which that policy could lead to. 
To overcome such a grave situation, on 20 January 1956 the Tamil 
members of Parliament finally gave shape to a United Front and the 
purposes to form such United Front were : 
(1) preservance and advancement of their language and culture, 
(2) to keep the identity and freedom of the Tamils intact, 
(3) to keep inviolate their traditional homeland.'' 
They felt the need to all the Tamils to be united in order to 
struggle for the creation of a Tamil state "which will offer to federate 
with the Sinhalese State on terms of complete equality if acceptable to 
both the nations or elect to remain independent".^ 
Right from the very beginning, Tamil nationalism had been 
marked with the feature of stridency. As Tamils could never reconcile to 
a majority rule, they reduced to the status of second class citizens. The 
"Sinhala Only" policy was the first challenge to their status as equal 
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citizens of Sri Lanka. They warned in a high tone so what if the Tamils 
were only 12 percent of the total population. They could be satisfied only 
when they would be treated equally with rest 74 percent Sinhalese. Of 
course initial noises were for autonomous state and when that autonomy 
failed to materialize, separatist tendencies did not take time to creep in. 
On 29 January 1956 the Federal Party Working Committee meeting in 
Jaffna decided that it was unnecessary to think of Tamil independent state 
at that stage "in the interest of the unity of Ceylon as well as in the 
interest of peace, concord and amity between Tamil and Sinhala speaking 
peoples". A day earlier on 28 January a Conference of Jaffna lawyers 
unanimously decided to form an assembly immediately to protect the 
Tamil language and the rights of the Tamil speaking people of Ceylon. 
Mr. S. Netesan a former Minister speaking at the Conference said that "it 
was testing time for the Tamil people who had for centuries lived and 
used their language in Ceylon without hindrance and on terms of 
complete equality with the Sinhalese".'° On 20 February 1956 the Tamil 
speaking northern and eastern provinces observed hartal in protest against 
the decision of UNP to declare Sinhala as the only official language of 
the country." In order to pacify the Tamil protest against the declaration 
of Sinhala as the only official language of Sri Lanka, Prime Minister 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike appointed a committee to suggest steps essential 
for the "reasonable use" of Tamil but he clearly maintained that Sinhalese 
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only should be the official language was a settled fact and "we are not 
prepared to discuss that".'^ 
The House of Representatives passed on 14 June 1956 the 
Official Language Bill by 65 to 28 votes, declaring Sinhalese as the only 
state language and asking for its implementation by the end of December 
I960.''' "Introducing the Bill on June 5, 1956, the Prime Minister, Mr. 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike said he was determined to see that justice was 
done to everybody".''* Adversely the Government neither noticed the 
pressure mounted by the Federal Party against the bill, nor did it notice 
the Satyagraha launched by the party in opposition to the same. Its 
volunteers who protested the bill were roughed up both by the Sinhalese 
and the police. Its warning that "the struggle to secure for Tamils a status 
of equality with Sinhalese would be carried out beyond the island and, if 
necessary, the issue should be taken to the United Nations"'^ went 
unnoticed. Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike did nothing but 
blamed previous Prime Minister for making contradictory declarations, 
which further inflamed the feelings of both the Sinhalese and Tamils. 
However, very diplomatically he continued to assure that the Government 
would not cease the reasonable use of Tamil even after the Bill became 
law. He also maintained that he bore personal responsibility for the 
implementation of the language policy and he would not allow any 
injustice done to the minorities. 
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The Tamils however did not get affected by the assurances 
given by Prime Minister. In the Federal Party's Convention held at 
Trincomalee on 18-19 August 1956, a former Minister, Sir Kanthia 
Vaithianathan, described "the "Sinhalese Act" was the most iniquitous 
and worst piece of injustice perpetrated on the Tamils in the last 300 or 
more years of their connection with the island".'^ The Convention called 
upon the Government to take necessary steps to constitute a "Tamil 
linguistic state incorporating all geographically contiguous areas in which 
the Tamil speaking people are numerically in a majority"'^ and give 
Tamils their rightful treatment in equality with Sinhalese language. The 
time limit which was given by the Convention to the Government to 
achieve this target was 20 August 1957. 
Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact 
The Tamil demand that all the Tamil majority areas be 
incorporated into a single Tamil region was indigestible to the Sinhalese. 
The historical memories of Sinhala-Tamil rivalry filled the majority 
community with fear of Tamil separatism. The efforts of the Tamil 
Federal Party under the leadership of Chelvanayakam were actually made 
to prepare Tamil nationalism to challenge Sinhalese chauvinism, however 
indirectly it was the sign of Tamils propounding the theory of Tamil 
homeland. During the time when the British were withdrawing from the 
island, the demand for reversion of the Tamil areas to the Tamils, caused 
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a great fear among the majority community regarding the intentions of the 
minority. Actually the lack of confidence among the two communities 
and the continued discriminatory policies of the Sri Lankan Government 
which began from the "Sinhala Only" slogan, never allowed two 
communities to reconcile. Such situations actually prepared path for an 
unending civil war. The backing that the SLFP received from the 
Buddhist clergy in its pursuit of pro-Sinhala agenda in long run not only 
strengthened the role of the Buddhist clergy in state politics but denied 
any space for accommodation with the minority Tamil community. Very 
soon the policy of Sinhala colonization emerged to give another setback 
to Tamils. 
"The upsurge of Sinhala chauvinism saw the first anti-Tamil 
riots in 1956 in the East when over 150 Tamils were killed by the 
Sinhalese settled under the state sponsored scheme of Gal Oya in the 
district of Amparai, otherwise dominated by the Tamils".'^ Felling prey 
to his ambition, an enlightened cosmopolitan, liberal, Oxford-educated 
gentleman S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike backed the obscurantist forces that 
were not ready to accommodate Tamil interest at any cost and these 
killings were the result of such uncompromising attitude. In order to 
regain his past image of a cosmopolitan liberal among the Tamils, 
Bandaranaike entered into a Pact with the Federal Party leader SJV 
Chelvanayakam on 26 July 1957. The Pact was popularized as the 
Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact. The Pact aimed at softening the 
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agitated Tamils by promising them regional councils with devolution of 
substantial powers and power to raise necessary finances, use of Tamil in 
the north and east etc., authority to the regional council for the selection 
of suitable persons for the alienation of land in a particular area; "the 
Northern Province is to form one regional area whilst the Eastern 
Province is to be divided into one or more regional areas''.'^ 
The Joint Statement issued by the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka 
and representatives of the Federal Party, "was unanimously approved by a 
special session of the National Convention of the Federal Party at 
Batticaloa on July 28",^" 1957 describing it as "an interim adjustment" 
which remained united to the party's ultimate objective of attaining a 
Tamil linguistic state or states within a Federal Union and ensuring parity 
of status for the Tamil language throughout the island. While majority of 
the Tamils took the Agreement as an advance and improvement on the 
existing state of affairs, some criticized it describing it as "contemptible 
capitulation of the Tamil cause".^' 
Although the Tamils regarded the Pact as an interim measure, 
but Sinhalese completely discarded it considering it as an open threat to 
Sinhala supremacy established by the "Sinhala Only" policy. Now 
Bandaranaike found himself trapped by the dynamics of Sinhala 
chauvinism. The UNP and the clergy joined hands against his 
"capitulation" to the Tamils. His house was besieged by hundreds of 
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Buddhist priests. To save himself from occurance of such incidents, on 12 
August 1957, the Prime Minister made an official statement that the 
regional councils would be subject to close supervision and control of the 
central Government. He also maintained that their powers would be 
strictly and carefully defined by special legislation. He guaranteed that 
the rights of the Sinhalese speaking people in the north and east would be 
protected fully. He assured that necessary steps would be taken to ensure 
that the regional use of Tamil did not surpass the position of the 
Sinhalese as the only official language and that except for the small 
development schemes initiated by the local bodies, colonization would be 
directly controlled by the central Government. 
The reaction of the Tamils was quick and swift. Within 12 hours 
of the Prime Minister's clarification, the Tamil Federal Party repudiated 
the Agreement, The Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact, had it been 
materialized, it would have saved the country from unnecessary 
bloodshed in the subsequent years. As a part of its chauvinistic agenda, 
the Government introduced new number plates with marking "SRI" on 
Government owned vehicles. The Tamils took this step as their insult. To 
protest against the Government's decision on number plates, the Federal 
Party launched its Satyagraha in April 1958. "On April 11, the Federal 
Party leader, Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, announced that the Tamils had 
reached "the parting of the ways", and the time had come for all Tamil 
speaking people to fight for the recognition of their community and the 
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granting of an equal place to the Tamil language with the Sinhalese". He 
further said, "the Tamils were prepared to be destroyed with honour 
rather than accept subjugation by the Sinhalese".'^^ On 4 July the Prime 
Minister finally told the Parliament that parity status for Tamil and 
Sinhalese could not be a solution to Ceylon's language problem and that 
such a solution would lead the country to chaos. On 17 July 1958, the 
Prime Minister introduced in the Parliament a Bill for the "reasonable" 
use of Tamil language. It provided for its use as a medium of instructions 
in schools as well for examinations for admission to public services; as a 
medium of correspondence with Government and for prescribed 
administrative purposes in the Tamil-speaking northern and eastern 
provinces of the island. But the Federal Party rejected it. Nevertheless the 
Bill was passed by Parliament on 8 August 1958. The Prime Minister 
declared that the bill sought to give to the Tamils "fundamental human 
rights as laid down by the United Nations" and if the people were 
opposed to the measure, the machinery of democracy was available to 
them at the next general elections and added sarcastically : "I wish them 
good luck".^^ 
Senanayake - Chelvanayakam Pact 
Another attempt to accommodate Tamil aspirations came out in 
the form of Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact (24 March 1965), but the 
same competitive chauvinism that spelled the doom of Bandaranaike -
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Chevanayakam Pact, affected the fate of 24 March 1965 Pact too. 
However, it is a different matter that UNP had to enter into one or the 
other agreement with the Tamils represented by the Federal Party. And 
the reason was that.it could not gather a clear majority in the Parliament 
on its own, hence needed outside support. Thus the UNP needed the 
support of Tamil members elected from the north and east. This time the 
Pact envisaged a moderate degree of devolution at the district councils' 
level and a compromise on the question of land alienation for the Sinhala 
in the north and east by setting out priorities on the basis of which land 
would be allotted to landless persons. In this compromise formula the 
Tamils were given assurances that they would be getting priority 
treatment for allotment whether they lived in the northeast or elsewhere. 
But anti-Tamil sentiments again emerged at the forefront like the earlier 
Pact of 1957. Both the parties the UNP and the SLFP were busy in 
exploiting anti-Tamil and anti-Sinhala feelings to grab power. It was the 
beginning of an uncompromising two-party competition for the Sinhala 
votes. The thing which was in a small shape in the past, gradually 
converted into a full-fledged movement. It has already been discussed 
why and how Sinhala and Tamil sentiments could not be reconciled, but it 
is a fact that the task of building the Sri Lankan nation ended up creating 
not one but two nations. Historical expression of separatist sentiment 
developed into a full-fledged separatist movement which passed through 
several phases and took over 25 years to get complete shape. 
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The emergence of a United Front Government in Colombo in the 
1970 comprising Mrs. Bandaranaike's SLFP, the TLSSP (Trotskyist 
Lanka Sama Samaja Party) and the Communist Party (Moscow) with 125 
scats in the House of Representatives of 151, was definitely a sign to set 
an "ultra-Sinhala" agenda into motion. The foremost task which United 
Front Government kept at the top of its agenda was outlining a new 
Constitution to replace the one given at the time of independence by the 
British. It was an ominous indication for Tamils. They found that the 
Government intended to establish in the proposed new Constitution 
Sinhalese language as the only official language reducing Tamil to the 
permanent status of a second class language. The coalition parties of 
United Front Government proposed to enshrine special provisions for 
Buddhism and leave off the features of the existing Constitution, which 
gave some protection to minority rights, the Federal Party however 
asserted that Tamils had a right to self-determination but the Government 
fully repudiated all such arguments and went ahead with the task of 
formation and adoption of a new Constitution, obviously leaving Tamils 
in a discontented and resentful position. 
The Tamil psyche was highly influenced by the events in the 
erstwhile East Pakistan from the language riots in the fifties to the 
formation of Bangladesh in 1971. The Tamils felt that the stubbornness of 
Sinhala majority would lead them to the state of suppression as the ethnic 
majority see the Tamils' demand for equality of their language and 
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autonomy with deep cynicism and distrust paving the way for further 
separatism. Such rigid separatist tendencies of majority Sinhala gave rise 
to Tamil sub-nationalism and then in turn to a full-fledged Tamil 
nationalism as the Tamils were now convinced that merely the principle 
of federalism would not provide them the status of equality nor would 
meet their aspirations. The increasing influence of the Buddhist clergy 
and its support to the myth that with no space for the Tamils, Sinhalese 
were the chosen people of Buddha, was another setback for the Tamils. 
The anti-Tamil riots of the fifties, anti-Tamil discriminatory policies in 
every field and failure of Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam and 
Senanayake - Chelvanayakam Pacts, convinced the Tamils that majority 
community did not believe in accomodation and in the principle of 
federal polity. It is no wonder that the Tamils raised voice gradually from 
the demand of autonomy for the Tamil areas in the north and the east to 
the goal of a separate and sovereign State of Eelam. 
In the hope of gathering all the possible support from India, the 
Federal Party leader SJV Chelvanayakam visited Chennai in February 
1972 but Indian assurances remained unclear. He met all the Tamil 
leaders particularly M. Karunanidhi of the DMK and M.G. Ramachandran 
of the AIADMK. Mrs. Gandhi being in close terms with Mrs. 
Bandaranaike, did not wish spoil relations with a friendly neighbouring 
country by intervening into it. Moreover India failed to draw any parallel 
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between the situation that had led to the Indian intervention in East 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
Besides, Mrs. Bandaranaike's rising image as a leading light of 
the Non-alignment movement, was a factor that could hardly be ignored. 
Hence Chelvanayakam's trip failed to gather any enthusiastic results. But 
this trip of Federal Party's leader was more than enough to convince 
Tamils in Sri Lanka that they had to fight by their own and on their own 
ground. 
Formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
The Sinhalese Buddhist hegemonism continued and the 
Government instituted measures for the Sinhalizing of the plantations and 
future avenues of employment on the plantations were left unaccessable 
to their fellow Tamils. A stratagem was introduced in the infamous 
system of "standardization" of marks so that Tamil students with better 
marks could be stopped from taking admissions in the science based 
courses to make way for Sinhalese students with lower marks. The impact 
of this policy is apparent from figures that during 1965-70 before the 
standardization system was introduced in medicine alone the share of 
Tamils was 53 percent against 41 percent for the Sinhalese and in 
engineering courses it was 50 percent against 48 percent for the 
Sinhalese. With the introduction of the standardization system Tamil 
share subsequently reduced to 33 percent and 25 percent in medical and 
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in engineering.^ "* Here it should be kept in mind that the indigenous 
Tamils were only 12.6 percent of the population against the 74 percent 
Sinhalese. However, it had a disastrous impact on the young aspiring 
Tamils who valued merit. 
The Tamils also viewed the Constitution of 1972 as being anti-
minority. It not only reaffirmed the policies pertaining to 'Sinhala Only' 
or the special status that Buddhism deserved in the state, it contained no 
provision to protect minority rights. Colvin R. de Silva, who became the 
Minister of Constitutional Affairs in the United Front (UF) Government 
that came to power in 1970 and presided over the formulation of the 1972 
Constitution, had already shown his anti-minority prejudice. On 
September 1970, in a broadcast to the nation he underlined the 
shortcomings of the Soulbury Constitution as the UF saw them - the most 
significant being clause 29 (2) (b) which safeguarded minorities against 
discriminatory legislation.^^ This clause did not find place in the new 
Constitution. 
Various Tamil youth organizations, including the TUF (Tamil 
United Front) youth Organization, were increasingly becoming critical of 
the Constitutional path followed by the Tamil parties to demand redress 
of their grievances. Prescribing direct militant action they indulged in a 
form of extremism which included the murder of police and 
administrative officers and band robberies. The incidents surrounding the 
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police firing in early 1974 following an international conference of Tamil 
studies held in Jaffna seemed to be a landmark in the development of 
extremism.^^ 
"In the 1975 Kankesanthurai by election, in which 
Chelvanayakam was a TUF candidate, the campaign centred around the 
six point plan".^^ But the demand was rejected by SLFP and its allies 
(then in power) arguing that a vote for the plan would mean a vote for 
separatism. By winning the election with a thumping victory 
Chelvanayakam could easily appropriate the argument. He said : "I wish 
to announce to my people and the country that the Eelam Tamil Nation 
should exercise the sovereignty already vested in the Tamil people and 
become free". •^^ The statement represented a conceptual shift from 
equality of status for Tamils to their right of self-determination. This 
conceptual shift got consolidated by two subsequent events, viz. The 
formation of the TULF and the trial-at-bar challenging the Constitution 
itself. 
In 1975, the TUF changed its name to the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF), it was an organization which provided a 
common platform for all shades of Tamil opinion. It was a type of 
warning to the Government that the Tamils were entering a new phase of 
their struggle against the Sinhala state. At a Conference held on 14 May 
1976 a resolution was adopted at the convention of the Tamil United 
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Liberation Front at Vaddukoddai. The resolution contained a long list of 
grievances and charged that : 
".... the Republican Constitution of 1972 has 
made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new 
colonial masters the Sinhalese who are using the 
power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the 
Tamil Nation of its territory, language, 
citizenship, economic life, opportunities of 
employment and education thereby destroying all 
the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people". 
The resolution concluded by saying that : 
" the restoration and reconstitution of the Free, 
Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil 
Eelam based on the right of self determination 
inherent to every nation has become inevitable in 
order to safeguard the very existence of the Tamil 
Nation in this country."^^ 
The political organization of the Indian Tamils, the Ceylon 
Workers Congress (CWC), did not endorse the demand for a separate 
state of Tamil Eelam and withdrew from the TULF. So far education and 
standard of living was concerned, CWC members were relatively 
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backward. Moreover they were residing in an area not adjacent to the 
proposed Tamil state, hence, their problems were natuarally different 
from those of the Jaffna Tamils. They were more interested in the 
question of labour relations and were either seeking Sri Lankan 
citizenship or preparing to leave for India.^° 
"In the trial-at-bar, three Tamil MPs^ including a former Tamil 
MP were charged with sedition."^' In the case, a legal challenge was 
made to the validity of the Constitution itself. The trial underlined the 
juridical and historical bases of the corporate identity of the Tamils. It 
was this assertion of judicial identity that was reflected in the TULF 
refusal to participate in the deliberations of the Constitutional Select 
Committee that was set up by the UNP Government following its victory 
at the 1977 election.^^ 
The Parliamentary election of 1977 was the first test of TULF 
popularity among Tamil voters and in particular its platform for 
separation. The SLFP Government lost the election and the UNP under 
J.R. Jayewardene formed the Government. Over all in the northern 
province TULF won all the 14 seats with 68.5 percent votes while in the 
eastern province it won 3 seats out of 4. The constituency where it lost 
was a Muslim majority constituency." During the election campaign 
Jayewardene had pledged to set up a "righteous society" where all 
citizens would be equal. He promised to remove all the Tamil grievances 
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over language, education, jobs and colonization. On 23 August 1977 the 
leader of the House Ranasinghe Premadasa, who later became Prime 
Minister and President of Sri Lanka winding up the debate in Parliament 
on the Government's policy statement tried to soothe the ruffled 
sentiments of the Tamils by suggesting: 
"Let us forget the past dark period. Let us find a 
fair and just solution to the problem. Let us not 
go into the rights and wrongs of the past. We seek 
your cooperation now to solve the issue. I do not 
think the problem is beyond solution". 
But Tamil leader Amrithalingum, the leader of the opposition too made it 
very clear that the Tamils were hardly befooled. He stated : 
"We have been used as pawns in the Sinhalese 
political game. We had been victims of violence 
several times. Law and order is one thing for the 
Sinhalese population, and another thing for the 
Tamils. For the last 30 years we have tried to live 
in peace and harmony with the Sinhalese people. 
We are the most peaceful people. But we do not 
want peace at any cost, not at the cost of our 
honour, self-respect or freedom".'''' 
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The election was followed by the outbreak of communal riots in 
many parts of the island leaving an estimated 300 Tamils killed and 
thousands homeless. 
Growth of Tamil Militancy 
Till now India treated Sri Lanka's ethnic problem as its internal 
matter thus followed a policy of non-interference. But with the 
enhancement of riots in which some Indian nationals in Colombo also 
suffered, protests in India began. Indian Government however did not 
sound loudly for diplomatic reasons, but the Tamil Nadu Legislative 
Assembly on 24 August 1977 unanimously passed an official resolution 
expressing its "rude shock" at the happenings in Sri Lanka and urged the 
Government of India to ask the Sri Lankan Government to stop 
immediately "violence and atrocities which the Tamils in Sri Lanka are 
subjected to". The resolution called upon the Government of India and 
the Prime Minister to appoint a representative of the status of a Cabinet 
Minister to Sri Lanka to search the actual state of affairs and have direct 
talks with Sri Lankan Government "by way of assuaging the feelings of 
the Tamils"^^ there. Indian Government instructed the Indian High 
Commissioner in Colombo Gurbachan Singh to visit the affected areas of 
Tamils to create confidence among them; and in replying to Tamil Nadu 
maintained that it did not consider the deputation of a Minister to Sri 
Lanka as necessary. 
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The UNP Government in its efforts to cool down the Tamils 
adopted a new Constitution to assure greater protection to some of the 
concerns of the Tamils. To make this arrangement more effective, the 
Tamils were given protection by the Supreme Court against infringement 
or even imminent infringement of such rights by either executive or 
administrative action. But results were almost nill and the two 
communities remained far apart as ever. The gap between Government's 
promise and performance continued to widen thus giving birth to 
militancy among the Tamil youth. 
The historical Sinhala chauvinism gave birth to many militant 
organizations and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or the LTTE is 
one of them. Though emerged in 1972 it worked along with other Tamil 
organizations until 1976 when it started employing violent methods to 
achieve the goal of independent Eelam State as propounded in the 
Vaddukoddai Resolution. Victimized by police brutality, economic 
hardships caused due to high rate of unemployment, failure to get 
admission in universities despite securing good percentage in 
examination, cultural and linguistic discrimination, all together gave rise 
to revolutionary thinking among the Tamil youths who found best and 
concrete expression in militancy and guerrilla activism which began for 
the aim of Tamils liberation but finally degenerated into international 
terrorism. At the previous stage there were two leaders of this militant 
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organization Prabhakaran and Uma Maheswaran, but the personality clash 
between the two led to a split in the LTTE and the formation of the 
People's Liberation Organization of the Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) under the 
leadership of Uma Maheswaran. Among the other militant organizations 
of Tamils are, Eelam Revolutionary Organizations of Students (EROS); 
the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO); the Eelam People's 
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF); the Eelam National Democratic 
Liberation Front (ENDLF) and many more. 
As the years passed, LTTE easily surpassed rather destroyed all 
other militant organizations and emerged as the sole Tamil power without 
which no solution of Sri Lanka's ethnic strife could be materialized. It 
has gained defacto international recognition. It has organized itself as a 
state within a state by controlling territory, organizing civil 
administration in the areas controlled by it and collecting taxes. The 
people of Jaffna respect the LTTE owing to the fear of this organization 
and its unquestioned leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. The LTTE has left no 
place for any moderate or democratic Tamil opinion. The Tigers have 
pretty good storage of all the modernized weapons. Above all they apply 
a unique technique of using the cyanide capsule. A Sri Lanka Tamil 
journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj has described the potential of the cyanide 
capsule thus: 
For details see Appendix-XI. 
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"From the Tigers perspective it is this readiness 
to die for the cause that elevates the LITE 
member from his surroundings. It is the cyanide 
capsule that symbolises the Tiger's superiority to 
the others and signifies the dedicated mission in 
life a curious blend of rational obscurantism, 
absolute nihilism and revolutionary commitment 
that has succeeded in making a fetish of the 
cyanide capsule principle and cult of suicide 
killing missions".'"^ 
In the later part of seventies, TULF completely lost ground as 
its moderate methods of democratically articulating Tamil grievances had 
become irrelevant as the time passed and as the violent activities of LTTE 
for fighting for the Tamil cause became popular among Jaffna people. 
The LTTE ridiculed the TULF as a "Tamil United Lawyers' Front"." The 
violent methods of LTTE to articulate Tamil demands, invited repressive 
measures from the central Government like dispatch of army units to the 
north to support the police force already deployed in strength. Since both 
the police and army are for all practical purposes completely Sinhalese, 
they adopted repressive measures on a scale not normally deployed 
against the civilian population thus inviting a charge of genocide. 
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All efforts to resolve the ethnic conflict through constitutional 
and political means became ineffective when the country was rocked by 
anti Tamil riots in July 1983. Riots had taken place earlier also, but the 
1983 riots were unprecedented in the sense that in this case even the 
elites were targeted which was usually not the case.'* The year 1983 was 
one of the most tragic periods in the history of ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka. From the beginning of the year there were cases of ethnic 
violence. In January a UNP worker was killed in Vavuniya, and the next 
month a police inspector and the month after that an army vehicle was 
attacked. As the law and order situation was getting worse, S. 
Thondaman, President- of CWC who had brokered an agreement between 
the TULF and the UNP on the eve of 1977 elections wrote to the 
President. He pointed out the inadequacy of the steps taken in the 
previous five years to resolve the ethnic strife in the island, and reminded 
him that "this issue has to be resolved, not only in the interest of the 
Tamil community, but in the larger interest of national unity and 
development".'^ In April 83, three UNP candidates for the local bodies 
elections were shot dead in Jaffna district. The press raised voice for 
deploying larger units of armed forces in the northern province to 
eliminate the Tamil terrorist threat. On 9 July President Jayewardene told 
Daily Telegraph of London that there "are no areas of negotiations as 
long as the terrorists are active". He further stated: 
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"We are not interested in the terrorists' views. 
We are going to eliminate them. It is no longer 
possible to argue, debate or talk with them. They 
must give up their violence. The TULF also, it 
appears, don't want to talk to them. We have been 
moving a lot with the TULF. We used to have 
dialogues and so on. They used to speak on 
behalf of the terrorists. But now all that is going 
to cease. Not on the political issues. We will still 
talk to them as M.Ps. and so on. But on the 
terrorist issue, this we are going to deal with 
ourselves. Without any quarter. Because unless 
the terrorists are eliminated, the TULF is useless. 
They are in fear of their lives. They say one thing 
to me and something else to somebody else. I am 
sorry for them. They wanted the Development 
Councils. We gave it to them. Of course, we have 
not transferred all powers, the money and so on. 
We are doing it. we do not do it quickly. It can 
not be done overnight. Laws have to be passed. 
Something entirely new, it applied to the whole 
island. We are doing it. now we are going to the 
fullest extent in giving autonomy to their 
Development Councils. The language question 
also. If they want a political solution, that is the 
political solution".''^ 
On 20 July 1983, President Jayewardene had a meeting with the 
leaders of some of the political parties who showed their willingness to 
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join the Round Table Conference to find a solution to the ethnic problem. 
In view of the CWC's suggestion to enlarge the agenda of the Conference 
by including wider Tamil concerns, the Conference was referred to be 
held on some other day. But in July, 1983, a military convoy was attacked 
by the LTTE killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers which proved to be a great 
interruption. The Sinhalese retaliation was terrific. It was an anti Tamil 
Pogrom that became a watershed in the history of ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka. No authentic figures of people killed are available. Approximately 
2000 Tamils alone in Colombo area were reported killed. The most 
terrific incident of bloodshed occurred on 25 July and 27 when 53 Tamil 
inmates of the Welikade prison were said to have been massacred by their 
fellow prisoners. The estimated value of the property lost or damaged 
during the disturbances was over 2,000 million Sri Lankan rupees, about 
79,000 persons were rendered homeless, and over 1,50,000 persons lost 
their jobs and the plantation industry principally tea, suffered huge losses 
with an estimated tea stocks worth Rs.50 million going up in flames. 
The Secretary General of the TULF A. Amrithalingum described 
the LTTE ambush on the security men as a product of the atmosphere of 
long existed harassment of the Tamils on their hands and the 
Government's failure to remedy the grievances of the Tamils against the 
security forces. On 22 August 1983, in his address to the nation. 
President Jayewardene maintained: 
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" there has been growing tension between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamil people in the last thirty 
five to forty years". 
But he blamed the violent activities of Tamils for advocating 
separatism. Speaking of the Indian interest in the problem, the President 
said : 
" for the first time, the Central Government 
of India has specifically stated that they do not 
support the separation of our country, will not 
help in such a movement and further that they 
stand for the unity and integrity and the 
independence of Sri Lanka". 
Although he stated very decisively that: 
".... in future also we will not have any talks with 
any party that wants to advocate the separation of 
Sri Lanka".'*' 
But actually he could not provide any concrete suggestion that 
would resolve the ethnic problem, the root cause of the separatism of the 
Tamils. Another setback for Tamils was the proscription of the moderate 
TULF in August 1983 for inciting anti-Tamil riots. After that TULF 
shifted to Chennai in Tamil Nadu. Thereafter the Government introduced 
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the second amendment to the Constitution, disqualifying the sitting Tamil 
members as they failed to take an oath giving up separatism as a means to 
redress their grievances. 
India Enters to Ethnic Crisis 
The Government of India emphasized the need of territorial 
integrity and opposed the demand for Tamil Eelam. The Government of 
India had to cope up the pressure from two sides from Tamil Nadu owing 
to its emotional ties with the Tamils in Sri Lanka and from equally 
surcharged debates in Parliament in support of the Tamils who had been 
made victims of untold atrocities in Sri Lanka. As a result, to resist the 
pressure, Government of India had to reconsider its policy in Sri Lanka. 
The arrival of thousands of Sri Lankan refugees in Tamil Nadu in the 
wake of anti-Tamil riots only sharpened the edge in favour of the Tamils. 
Now Indian Government began to analyse the situation in Sri Lanka more 
seriously. TULF which had made its base in Chennai now, was busy 
stoking the anti-Lankan sentiments among the Tamils in Tamil Nadu. All 
these things together made India's domestic politics' scene more 
complex. 
Assessing all the developments in Sri Lanka, India conveyed to 
Sri Lanka that being a regional power, India had a right to intervene in 
the settlement of a potentially destabilizing conflict of a neighbouring 
state specially to prevent the region from its adverse effect or even to 
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deny an opportunity to any outside power to step into the region. Besides, 
India insisted that one of the party to the conflict, the Tamils had shared 
linguistic, cultural and religious ties with the Indian Tamils, a politically 
important segment of the Indian population, which had been emotionally 
upset at the happenings in the island. This change in the attitude of the 
Government of India could be attributed to a special reason viz. when 
Mrs. Gandhi lost the general election of 1977, among all the states of 
Indian Union, southern states supported Mrs. Gandhi and Tamil Nadu was 
one of these states, hence now it was Mrs. Gandhi's turn to give a 
positive answer to the state of Tamil Nadu with her return to power at the 
beginning of 1980. 
What is noticeable here is Mrs. Gandhi-Sirimavo Bandaranaike 
equation. Both the women were out of power in 1977. Here in New Delhi 
Morarji Desai and there in Colombo Jayewardene emerged on the 
political scenario. Right from the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, some kind of 
cosy relationship had developed between the Nehru-Gandhi family and 
the Bandaranaike family and the relationship continued thereafter under 
Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Although India did not forget 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike's role during Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 and 
the Bangladesh crisis* of 1971, but at the personal level the friendship of 
the duo continued. Jayewardene, however failed to develop such personal 
During both the crucial periods, Bandaranaike Government did not support India rather 
preferred sort of neutral attitude. 
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relations with Indian leaders. Although in the pre-independence period he 
was very close to Nehru and he also attended the Ramgarh session of the 
Indian National Congress in 1940. But with the withdrawal of the British 
rule from South Asia, he developed major reservations towards India. 
Now he began to believe that India being the biggest power in South Asia 
would definitely dominate the smaller countries of the region, hence the 
small countries had to devise strategies to restrain Indian hegemony. 
Jayewardene, when Mrs. Gandhi was out of power, for no 
particular reasons, indulged in avoidable witticism against her. In an 
election meeting at Galle he said, 'there was a cow and a calf in India and 
a cow and a calf in Sri Lanka'. Besides, both the leaders Jayewardene and 
Morarji Desai used to drew critical parallels much to the dislike of Mrs. 
Gandhi. During his state visit to New Delhi, on 27 October 1978, J.R. 
Jayewardene referred to the recent change of Government in India and Sri 
Lanka and stated: 
"I will not go into recent history, but there are 
many parallels that can be drawn between the 
events that took place in our country during the 
same period. You may not know but my one and 
only son was put into jail and up to date he has 
not been charged for any offence I was not 
put into jail because our position was too 
powerful to put the leader of the opposition into 
jail, as they did in the case of Morarji Desai".'*^ 
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Mrs. Gandhi could not forget all such wits and comments easily. 
Now she started keeping critical eye on every event concerning Tamils 
and on 27 August 1979, referring to the violence against the Tamils in the 
north, she doubted that in the wake of newly found friendship of Janta 
Party with the Jayewardene Government of Sri Lanka, they just might 
neglect the issue of the sufferings of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
Again in May-June 1981 anti-Tamil riots broke out. India did 
not show its concern and considered it as an internal matter of Sri Lanka. 
India did not consider the time appropriate as to get involved in the Tamil 
problem of the island. When young Jaffna Tamils sought refuge in Tamil 
Nadu to escape from the repression in Jaffna, the leaders of 20 political 
parties appealed to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to grant them political 
asylum.'*^ These Tamil youths after getting refuge in India, organized and 
trained themselves in the use of firearms and other tactics of guerrilla 
warfare to be able to battle an armed struggle back home, if necessary. 
The Government of India denied'*'* the existence of such training camps 
on the Indian soil. By the time, as militant activity increased on the 
island, the training camps became more and more visible. They were well 
documented by the Indian and international media, which provided 
incontrovertible evidence of their existence. Obviously such camps could 
not continue to exist and flourish without the tacit consent of the 
Government of India. As Mr. J.N. Dixit stated in an interview: 
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everybody says we trained LTTE, we 
trained all the Tamil groups* about 18 groups".'*^ 
This naturally raised the ethical question whether such camps 
were justified? Were these not the facilities for the Sri Lanka Tamils to 
train themselves for armed incursion into Sri Lanka? Was it not a cross-
border terrorism, a charge made by India against another of her neighbour 
for providing facilities to militants and terrorists to fight against India in 
pursuit of their sectarian interests. However such indirect involvement 
made India to get deeply involved in the Sinhala-Tamil politics of Sri 
Lanka. 
When the riots broke out in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and 
the Sinhalese on 24-25 July 1983, the Government of India found itself in 
a delicate situation. On one hand, it desired to secure the rights of the 
Indian citizens in Sri Lanka, especially the people whose mother tongue 
was Tamil and on the other hand to help its neighbour to solve its ethnic 
problems. But if a request for help is received from the Indian citizens in 
Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan Government should not interpret it as an act of 
interference in its internal affairs. However, the Indian Government 
which on other occasions might not have bothered about the happenings 
in Sri Lanka, could not sit idle now.''^ One reason was the image that 
India had acquired the status of Chairman of the Non-alignment 
For the list of 37 Tamil Political and Militant Groups see Appendix-XIII. 
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Movement (NAM). Secondly, India could not afford to meet the situation 
arising out of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka passing into Indian territory. 
Thirdly, prolonging the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka might result in a 
direct involvement of other countries which was not to the liking of India 
and its much desired policy of keeping the Indian Ocean a Zone of 
Peace.'^ ^ Fourthly, with a non-Congress Government in Tamil Nadu and 
the next general election not far away, Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister, 
found it opportune to act to save the Tamils of Sri Lanka and win the 
Tamils of Tamil Nadu to the Congress Party. 
The July 1983 massacre evoked a dramatic response to Sri 
Lanka's ethnic conflict in Tamil Nadu. In Tamil Nadu, the Chief 
Minister, M.G. Ramachandran, convened an all party meeting on 28 July 
1983, in Madras, which condemned, in no uncertain terms, the killing of 
Tamils in Sri Lanka."*^  It was decided in that meeting to send a delegation 
to New Delhi to seek India's intervention to end the ethnic violence in Sri 
Lanka. M.G. Ramachandran not only sent a telegram to Indira Gandhi 
requesting her to take up the matter in the United Nations but also led a 
delegation to New Delhi on 31 July 1983, representing different political 
parties in Tamil Nadu. The delegation submitted a memorandum to the 
Prime Minister which stated among other things that: 
"The grim inhuman killings in Sri Lanka cannot 
be dismissed as the internal affair of the country 
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we definitely feel that the time has come for 
the Indian Government to intervene effectively, 
actively and urgently to save the Tamils in Sri 
Lanka". 
Further the memorandum demanded : 
"The immediate appointment of a team of 
international observers from the United Nations 
to catalyse restoration of normalcy in the civil 
administration and to ensure the safety of Tamils 
in Sri Lanka, raising of the issue in the United 
Nations and the Security Council for putting an 
end to the massacre, of sending UN troops to Sri 
Lanka, convening of the NAM meeting and 
sending of a high level international delegation 
including the Indian External Affairs Minister, 
Minister for Defence and a few representatives 
from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka immediately"/^ 
The Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly moved a 
resolution on 24 October 1983, expressing the condolence for innocent 
Tamils who died in Sri Lanka.^° The DMK with the cooperation of Tamil 
Nadu Gandhi Kamaraj Congress Party under P. Nedumaran and Kumari 
Ananthan advocated in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly the theory 
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of intervention and urged a Bangladesh type of action against Sri Lanka 
on 25 October 1983. However, the ruling AIADMK party was not in 
favour of such a course of action. It's stand became clear when S. 
Ramchandran, the Minister for Electricity in the Tamil Nadu 
Government, made a speech at the UN Special Political Committee (he 
was included in the Indian delegation to UN in 1983). In the course of his 
speech on the Sri Lankan Tamil problem he said that: 
"As has been stated categorically by our Prime 
Minister India does not want to intervene in the 
internal affairs of Sri Lanka or indeed any other 
country. India does not support or condone resort 
to violence of any kind ... we confined ourselves 
only to the extent of flow of refugees from Sri 
Lanka".^' 
The DMK on the other hand, conducted a signature campaign 
and collected ten million signatures to send to the UN requesting it to call 
upon the Government of Sri Lanka to grant self-determination to the 
Tamils in Sri Lanka." The DMK President M. Karunanidhi, and the 
deputy leader of the party in the State Assembly K. Anbazhagan resigned 
from the Assembly in protest against AIADMK's alleged apathy to the 
Sri Lanka Tamils. The AIADMK Government countered this by declaring 
a week long mourning in the state and issued a call for a statewide bandh 
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on 2 August 1983. The bandh was supported by all the political parties 
and by the centre as well, a clear indication of how Congress (I) 
Government considered it wise to go along with Tamil mainstream 
opinion. It was the first time in independent India's history that the 
central Government officially participated in a bandh called by a state 
Government. All central offices and undertakings were closed and train 
services to and from the state were suspended for the day.^ ^ 
The DMK formed an association with the help of pro-Eelam 
political parties in the state to help the Tamils in Sri Lanka, namely, the 
Tamil Eelam Supporters Organization (TESO). It believed that only 
through the creation of Eelam, the problem of Tamils in Sri Lanka could 
be solved. It advocated armed intervention by India in Sri Lanka along 
the lines of Bangladesh. But what was more important was that both the 
AIADMK and DMK apart from their sympathy towards the TULF had 
their clients among the militant groups. The DMK had been promoting 
the TELO led by Sabaratnam, while the AIADMK had been supporting 
the powerful LTTE led by V. Prabhakaran.^'* Thus it was quite apparent 
that both the DMK and AIADMK used the concern for Sri Lankan Tamils 
as a pawn to strengthen their own political position. 
For obvious political reasons. New Delhi could not ignore Tamil 
Nadu's demands. Soon after the July massacre. Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi assured an all party delegation from the state that her Government 
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was equally concerned about the fate of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and 
efforts were continued through diplomatic channel to impress upon 
Colombo the need to settle the ethnic issue. She also promised more 
ships, as requested by the delegation, to be sent to Sri Lanka to evacuate 
displaced Tamils from the southern parts of the island to Jaffna district. 
In addition India wanted to ascertain her position of regional supremacy 
in the South Asian region. In response to Tamil Nadu's pressure Indira 
Gandhi said : 
"I am aware of the great concern of the people of 
Tamil Nadu at recent developments regarding the 
Tamil population of Sri Lanka. Its concern is 
shared by people in other parts of India also. This 
is an internal problem of Sri Lanka. India does 
not wish to, nor does it, interfere in the domestic 
affairs of another country .... However, the 
reports appearing in the foreign press about the 
situation in Sri Lanka are disturbing. We cannot 
help feeling distressed".^^ 
Commenting on Indira Gandhi's support for the Tamil Nadu, the 
Indian Express asked whether "the Government of India is playing to the 
Tamil Nadu gallery. Indeed it may even appear that the timing of the 
latest Indian communication of the Ministry of External Affairs was 
337 
Ethnic Conflict: India And Sri Lanka 
influenced by Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Madras and by the exigencies of the 
approaching general election".^^ 
On 27 July 1983, the External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narasimha 
Rao, presented a statement on the Sri Lankan situation in the Lok Sabha. 
He said, that : 
"....Developments affecting the Tamil population 
in Sri Lanka give rise to feelings on the Indian 
side and can create situations of strain. The 
Government of India conveyed their views to the 
Government of Sri Lanka in a constructive spirit 
having regard to the way these developments can 
impinge in our relations. In this instance, 
therefore, we felt it was our duty to draw 
attention to possible repercussion of recent 
events, especially the ordinance provisions. We 
conveyed our concern about these developments, 
making it clear at the same time that it is an 
internal matter of Sri Lanka Government and that 
it is entirely for them to safeguard unity and deal 
with the situation".^^ 
Participating in the special discussion on the Sri Lanka situation 
in the Lok Sabha on 27 July 1983, the Janata Party deputy leader 
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Subramaniam Swamy asked the Government whether it would consider 
sending our evacuation force to Sri Lanka to rescue Tamils.^^ 
C.T. Dhandapani of the DMK said, "we have to solve it either at 
diplomatic level or the UNO level".^^ But, A. Neelalohidasan Nadar of 
the Democratic Socialist Party did not agree with the view that the issue 
should be taken to the United Nations. He said it should be taken up with 
the Human Rights Commission.^° 
It may however be said that the Tamil Nadu factor had played 
an important role in the development of Eelam politics. The Dravidian 
movement in Tamil Nadu and the Eelam movement in Jaffna followed 
two totally different paths. The former "started as secessionist and ended 
up as pliant to national politics, the other started as nationalistic and 
ended up secessionist because of the two different kinds of politics 
played in two different nations".^' Actually what Eelamists hoped it was 
not from Tamil Nadu but from India following the creation of 
Bangladesh. Eelamists believed that being a big regional power if India 
could help partition of Pakistan and create Bangladesh, same performance 
could be expected from India in Sri Lanka by breaking it into two and 
creating a separate Eelam state. 
In such an atmosphere Indira Gandhi proposed an immediate 
visit of Sri Lanka by the External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. 
Violence continued in Sri Lanka when Narasimha Rao was visiting the 
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island and on returning home he informed the Prime Minister that the Sri 
Lankan situation was serious indeed and the Government of Sri Lanka 
had failed to bring the ethnic violence under control. India's foreign 
policy has always been to prevent any external involvement in South 
Asia. India's External Affairs Minister stated : 
"This is a human problem and we in India cannot 
remain impervious to the sufferings of large 
number of people in our immediate neighbours, 
though separated by boundaries of nationality and 
citizenship .... it is evident that anxiety on this 
score can only be heightened by the news report 
that Sri Lankan Government has sought the 
assistance of some foreign powers to deal with 
their situation"." 
.Sri Lanka however had accepted the visit of the Indian External 
Affairs Minister perhaps out of courtesy, but was quite annoyed at India's 
undue concern for the ethnic Tamils. According to press reports leaked to 
media, while preparing to receive the Indian EAM, President 
Jayewardene addressed his Cabinet and told his Foreign Minister to : 
"ascertain from India how they solved their communal problem when the 
extremists asked for a separate state. We will ask India what help they 
can give us. He will ask the same from the Soviet Union and the United 
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States - we will ask all our friends how they can help us settle these 
problems. If India, by some chance, even decide to invade us, we will 
fight - we may lose; but with dignity. Then we will go into exile and 
come back to our country later".^^ 
Colombo expressed its annoyance on reports based on a story 
circulated by the New Delhi based American correspondent of the United 
Press International (UPI) that Sri Lanka had asked for military assistance 
from the USA, the U.K., Pakistan and Bangladesh. The report was 
however found as false and the UPI correspondent was expelled from 
Colombo. Immediately, Mrs. Gandhi assured Jayewardene on telephone 
that India meant no harm to Sri Lanka. Media reported that India had 
made it very clear to all the four (USA, U.K., Pakistan and Bangladesh) 
countries that while being deeply concerned with developments in Sri 
Lanka, it had absolutely no intention of intervening. Indira Gandhi, 
hoping for an early restoration of normalcy, candidly expressed her 
disapproval of the Sri Lankan move to seek foreign assistance, to meet "a 
non-existent Indian intervention".^'* The Government of India had shown, 
however, greater concern, at the involvement of Israeli commandos in 
strengthening the intelligence gathering and operational efficiency of Sri 
Lankan security forces in particular the services of Sin Beth, the internal 
security agency which specialized in counter terrorist commando 
operations. The agency operated in Sri Lanka through an Israeli "Interest 
Section" in the American embassy; it had a staff of twenty five and a 
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regular courier service between Colombo and Tel Aviv. It was also 
reported that arms and ammunition, came from Israel by unmarked 
Hercules aircrafts.^^ But President Jayewardene defended the Israeli 
connection claiming that since similar assistance was not available 
elsewhere he had to seek it from Israel and Britain.^^ The Hindu on 21 
October 1983, revealed that there was evidence that moral and material 
support was also received by Colombo from China, Pakistan, the United 
States, Great Britain, South Africa, Singapore and South Korea.^^ India 
maintained that it would not tolerate intervention by any other country 
within or outside the region. It was made clear by implication that 
intervention by a third party might compel India to intervene. In so doing 
the Government of India wished to localise the issue and avoid at all cost 
any outside involvement or intervention and reiterated the doctrine of 
regional security in which India had a dominant role and position.^* 
After External Affairs Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao's reply to 
the debate on the situation in Sri Lanka on the 5 August, Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi spoke over the doctrine of regional security and India's 
central role and stated : 
"As you know, we have made it clear in every 
forum and in every possible way that India does 
not pose any threat to Sri Lanka, nor do we want 
to interfere in their internal affairs. I reassured 
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the president on this. We want the unity and 
national integrity of Sri Lanka to be preserved. At 
the same time, I pointed out to the president that 
developments in Sri Lanka affect us also. In this 
matter India cannot be regarded as just any 
country. Sri Lanka and India are the two 
countries who are directly concerned. Any 
extraneous involvement will complicate matters 
for both our countries. We live in the region 
where many forces are at work, not all of whom 
wish India or our neighbours well. Forces of 
destabilization are at work. Hence, we must make 
every effort to minimize any opportunity for 
foreign elements to weaken us".^^ 
As a reaction to this loud and clear message from India, 
President Jayewardene called up Mrs. Gandhi on 6 August 1983 and 
maintained that : 
" the rumours that had been spread regarding 
Sri Lanka requesting military assistance from 
foreign countries were untrue as such assistance 
was not necessary since our own Armed Forces 
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and Police were capable of meeting any situation 
that could arise".^^ 
The members of Parliament expressed grave concern towards 
deteriorating condition of Tamils in Sri Lanka irrespective of party 
affiliation and the state they belonged to. 
It was however clear to Sri Lanka that India was no more a 
disinterested party, India offered its good offices to resolve Sri Lanka's 
ethnic conflict and surprisingly Sri Lanka accepted the same. And it was 
the beginning of the direct involvement of India into the ethnic strife of 
the island as a mediator. 
It is ironic that despite being in close personal touch with 
Bandaranaike's, the Nehru-Gandhi family could not get any advantage for 
the Tamils. On the contrary, Bandaranaike regime gave shape to the 
highly discriminatory policies against Tamils. However, with the return 
to power the UNP Government under J.R. Jayewardene who had 
campaigned during elections on the policy of reconciliation that partially 
led to dismantling of the discriminatory regime. Tamil language was 
given its due recognition and the standardization scheme for admission to 
universities in science courses, which had worked against the Tamils was 
abandoned. But it was too little too late. The Sri Lankan Tamils had 
already adopted the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976 asking for 
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separation and a Sovereign Eelam State. Through the militant movements 
Tamil youths started fighting for their rightful due. 
The news of Indian involvement in settling the ethnic problem 
of Sri Lanka, generated a gentle reaction from the Tamil community. 
Although the move of Indian Government was welcomed by the Tamils, 
the majority community condemned the same. Colombo daily SU}^ 
commenting on the situation said on 25 August 1983: 
"The problems of the Tamils can of course be 
solved by the Tamils in a meaningful dialogue 
with the Government and the members of other 
political parties within the country. It should not 
be inter-nationalized or even regionalised for the 
simple reason that it is an internal affair of Sri 
Lanka". 
It further maintained : 
"Lankans who have experienced five centuries of 
colonial domination would naturally be averse to 
any foreign power giving them advice on how to 
run their affairs-however much altruistic it may 
be". 
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On 3 September the editorial of SUN said: 
"India cannot and must not think that it could 
play a role in solving Lanka's ethnic problem. It 
must not once think of playing politics with a 
friendly neighbour". 
However the members of Parliament did not appreciate India's 
optimism as they had doubts about Sri Lanka's intentions since the past 
record of Colombo did not inspire much confidence. In the mean time, 
there were demands from certain quarters of deployment of multi-national 
force or an Indian peace-keeping force to give the Tamils a better sense 
of security. But India repudiated the demand of a multi-national force as 
the record of such forces had not been noteworthy. The Indian Defence 
Minister R. Venkataraman too described the demand for an Indian peace 
keeping force for Sri Lanka as "ridiculous", as he believed that its 
consequences would be worst. It is unfortunate that a few years later, 
Rajiv Gandhi ignored this well considered view and the entire world 
witnessed the disaster and humiliation India faced during IPKF operation 
in Sri Lanka. 
However as further developments. President Jayewardene sent 
his brother, H.W. Jayewardene, as his personal envoy to India on August 
10-12. The latter demanded that the Indian Government should stop the 
Tamil militant groups based in Tamil Nadu from operating against Sri 
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Lanka, and conveyed to the Indian Prime Minister about Sri Lanka's 
readiness for talks with Tamil leaders and about Sri Lanka's preparedness 
to accept India's offer of good offices.^^ Following her talks with H.W. 
Jayewardene, Indira Gandhi told Parliament that India was opposed to a 
separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka, and that President Jayewardene 
was willing to make major concessions to the TULF if it renounced its 
separatist demands.''^ The TULF leader, Amrithalingam later on met 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 14 August. Though he refused to 
renounce the demand for Eelam, he expressed his readiness, after a 
second meeting with her, to negotiate with the Sri Lankan Government 
without preconditions and to consider any reasonable offer that 
Government of Sri Lanka was prepared to make to meet the aspirations of 
the people of Eelam.^ '^  
India's Good Offices 
In late 1983 there occurred a series of talks between India and 
Sri Lanka, the ultimate result of which was the so called 'non-paper' of 
G. Parthasarathy, the principal negotiator on India's behalf. In these talks 
the document most discussed was the "Annexure C" while the principal 
document and Annexures "A" and "B"'^ had been hardly discussed ever. 
The essential factors of the 'non-paper' were as following : 
1) "The Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka shall be a Union of States. 
The Republic may be demarcated into a number of appropriate 
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states each of which will have a State Assembly and a Council of 
Ministers". 
2) "The Northern and Eastern provinces which have been recognized 
in the Constitution as the area in which the Tamil language shall 
also be a language of Administration and of the courts shall 
constitute one State. In order to satisfy the aspirations of the 
Muslims who form a majority in the Ampara District, the Ampara 
District may form a separate state". 
The proposals of "Annexure C" indicated devolution of powers 
at the provincial and district levels as well as measures to neutralize the 
disadvantages imposed on the Tamils by the pursuit of 'Only Sinhala' 
policies of the past discriminating against the Tamils and their language. 
But the performance of the All Party Conference (APC) where "Annexure 
C" was discussed remained unsubstantial owing to the absence of the 
principal rival Sinhala Party, the SLFP. 
President Jayewardene too deviated from the "Annexure C" 
proposals declaring that the Conference did not provide an acceptable 
solution to the ethnic problem. The waterish proposals that he placed 
before the Conference were unacceptable to both the Tamils and the 
Sinhala parties. Even within the Government there was a lack of 
unanimity. It was however more or less clear that no Sinhala leader from 
any quarter was willing to accommodate the Tamil aspirations. According 
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to them any accommodation to Tamils meant stepping towards 
disintegration of Sri Lanka particularly after the adoption of the 
Vaddukoddai resolution in 1976, which bordered on secession. 
Though the Sri Lankan Government was not much enthusiastic 
about India's involvement in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict yet it 
accepted India's good offices, received the TULF leaders, and accepted 
the India initiated "Annexure-C" as the basis for negotiation with Tamils 
due to the following reasons: 
Firstly, Sri Lanka's exports and tourism, the island's major 
foreign exchange earners had suffered badly because of the ethnic 
conflict. Between 1976 and 1982 the number of tourist arrivals expanded 
at an annual rate of just under 24 percent. The rate of growth which had 
been declerating considerably since 1981, suffered a severe set back in 
1983 when the total number of arrivals, at 337,530 was 17 percent below 
the previous year - the first actual decline was since 1971. The reversal 
was largely due to the July 1983 ethnic conflict.''^ 
Secondly, the International Monetary Fund, cautioned Sri Lanka 
against further worsening of the domestic situation that could damage the 
island's economy. Further, Sri Lanka's aid donors, who pledged nearly 
500 million dollars in 1984 were seriously worried about the disruption to 
the economy.'^ 
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Thirdly, the response of foreign powers, western and South 
Asian, to Sri Lanka's request for militant assistance was quite 
discouraging. The United States, Great Britain and West Germany, the 
three western powers that Sri Lanka approached, declined its plea for 
military assistance. President Ershad of Bangladesh, cancelled his 
proposed state visit to Sri Lanka, alleging that Muslims were being killed. 
Pakistan's response too, initially was not encouraging to Sri Lanka.^^ 
Finally, India's behaviour was a significant factor in driving Sri 
Lanka towards a dialogue with Tamils. Following the July 1983 ethnic 
riots, India came up with its "Indira Doctrine" to assert its regional pre-
eminence. The Doctrine was taken as the Indian equivalent of the 
"Monroe Doctrine". It reads: 
"India will neither intervene in the domestic 
affairs of any States in the region, unless 
requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention 
by an outside power; if external assistance is 
needed to meet an internal crisis, States should 
first look within the region for help".^° 
Thus, it appeared that Sri Lanka hardly had any options in 
dealing with its ethnic conflict without Indian involvement. 
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Meanwhile the Tamil militants developed a major international 
network of support through the Tamil Diaspora, which carried their 
grievances in the councils of the world and international media. Soon the 
Diaspora became a major source of funding for the Eelam movement led 
by the LTTE. Gradually the Diaspora became more uncompromising on 
the Eelam question than the Tamils in Sri Lanka. But without thinking of 
the consequences, it continued to be the powerhouse of the LTTE. Now 
ethnic crisis of Sri Lanka started catching adverse international attention. 
Sri Lankan Government however explained that it had been "balanced 
and impartial in its handling of this difficult question" and made it clear 
that "under no circumstances can we or will we accept the division of the 
country".*' 
The efforts of G. Parthasarathy could not produce any 
meaningful and immediate results. Sri Lanka insisted that unless TULF 
abrogate its demand for Eelam and enter to the mainstream of the national 
politics, it would not enter into any meaningful discussions with TULF. 
TULF too remained debarred from Parliament since it failed to take an 
oath pledging allegiance to the unitary Constitution. A powerful group 
within UNP was opposed to any mediation by the Indian special envoy 
and they called it a type of "foreign interference" in the internal affairs of 
Sri Lanka. To remove this deadlock in Colombo, President Jayewardene 
visited New Delhi in November 1983 for the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister's Conference for summit level discussions with the Indian Prime 
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Minister. The TULF leaders were in Delhi and also involved in the 
triangular discussions. But the package offered by the Sri Lanka 
Government involving regional councils and some devolution of powers 
for local autonomy, was found unacceptable to the Tamils. 
The Tamils demanded a larger regional council comprising the 
two northern and eastern provinces instead of a separate council for each 
of the two provinces as offered in the package. They were also opposed to 
the referendum to confirm the wishes of the people for merger of district 
councils into regional council, since it would only enhance ethnic 
passions and increase tension. The Tamils had the fear that the 
colonization scheme in the newly developed areas would definitely be 
inclined in favour of the Sinhalese or of the traditional Tamil majority 
areas. Mrs. Gandhi however made it very clear that India did not intend to 
interfere in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka but at the same time the 
legitimate aspirations of the Tamil community should be met in order to 
ensure peace and harmony to all the sections of Sri Lankan social 
structure. 
The Tamil militant camps operating at Vadapalani (Madras) in 
August 1984 and in September 1984, made it very clear that Tamil 
militants who took refuge in Tamil Nadu were given military training by 
M.G. Ramachandran Government ever since 1983. By the end of 1983 all 
over Tamil Nadu about twenty militant camps were established with the 
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support and tacit consent of the Tamil Nadu Government to train the 
militants to oppose by force the Sri Lankan forces who were killing the 
Sri Lankan Tamils; Despite various denials by the Government of India 
about the training given to militants in various camps, by the retired army 
officers, it is evident that the Government of India was looking the other 
way. Considering the thousands of Tamilians who were killed and only 
one tenth of the Sinhalese lost their lives with a large number of refugees 
coming to Tamil Nadu, and the existence of a favourable climate of 
opinion in the world in favour of the Sri Lankan Tamils, India was in a 
better position to take a strong step by step action against Sri Lanka on 
humanitarian ground. Indian Government decided to ask Jayewardene to 
create a council in the northern and eastern districts so that 
decentralization of power can be achieved in Sri Lanka. The original plan 
of creating a true federal structure was watered down by G. Parthasarathy 
to the district councils which are almost similar to that of the councils 
found in the sixth schedule to the Constitution of India. Such institutional 
arrangement did not satisfy most of the influential groups of the Sri 
Lankan Tamils though moderate leaders like Amrithalingam and 
Sivachidambaram of the TULF were persuaded by G. Parthasarathy to 
agree to this. In such a political atmosphere which had been created ever 
since 1956 in which the economic and political rights of the Tamils were 
eroded slowly, any formula without a real federal set-up was doomed to 
fail. The failure of Parthasarathy formula was clearly seen by his 
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watering down of the federal set-up to 'worse than municipal set-up' as 
rightly pointed out by the DMK leader M. Karunanidhi. 
Actually, G. Parthasarathy's formula to resolve the ethnic 
conflict should have conferred a true federation powers to the constituting 
units even more than the powers conferred by the Indian Constitution on 
the states. The preparedness of G. Parthasarathy to create councils with 
little powers indicating to the Sri Lankan Government that India was not 
taking seriously the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
Escalation of Violence and India's Concern 
Ethnic violence again raised its head in April 1984 with the 
killing of seven persons by troops after the militants had thrown a bomb 
at an army truck, injuring 15 soldiers. Almost every day bombs were 
blasting claiming lives of innocent people. The violence was growing 
every day, in such an atmosphere Jayewardene told a UNP rally on April 
1984 that no outside force "not even one hundred Indians will be able to 
subjugate Sri Lanka He said there were several international 
organizations backing the terrorists and they were attempting a similar-
revolution in South India".^^ 
On 3 April 1984, Minister of State in the Ministry of External 
Affairs, A.A. Rahim stated in the Lok Sabha: 
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" the gravity of the situation is the fact that 
there has been hardly any progress in the search 
for a lasting political solution to the ethnic 
problem in Sri Lanka"/^ 
Sri Lanka, on the other hand accused India of interference in Sri 
Lanka and providing arms and training to the militants. However India 
contradicted this allegation, and once again assured Colombo that India 
never intended to hurt the unity and integrity of the nation. It never 
favoured violent activities of militants. But as the developments in the 
neighbouring country affected India closely, India had abiding interest in 
the restoration of peace and tranquility in Sri Lanka. In response, 
Jayewardene's special envoy Lalith Athulathmudali, who was sent to 
New Delhi on 15 April 1984, too disclosed the steps taken to settle the 
issue as soon as possible that too without hurting the sentiments of any 
community. Discussions on the situation in Sri Lanka took place in Lok 
Sabha on 6 April 1984^ "* and in Rajya Sabha on 7 May 1984.*^ The 
members from Tamil Nadu were greatly agitated and asked the 
Government of India to employ extreme measures to deal with the 
situation in Sri Lanka. The External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao 
tried to cool down the members from Tamil Nadu. He maintained that the 
deployment of a large number of troops in Jaffna area was aggravating 
ethnic violence. He expressed his discontent that the atmosphere for a 
political dialogue had been vitiated. Rao also conveyed the talks held 
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with Athulathmudali that Colombo was forced to take action against the 
Tamils in order to cease the recurrance of ethnic violence in Sinhala 
majority areas in the south and in the plantations. But members from 
Tamil Nadu remained dissatisfied and maintained that Indian Government 
did not wish to fight for Tamil cause and unfortunately members from 
other states while sympathizing with the Tamil cause, repudiated the idea 
of a military alternative or call to the United Nations and favoured a 
political solution only. 
India's increasing support of the Tamil cause, the 
misunderstanding on the lease of the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm, the 
Voice of America broadcasting facilities, the military help from Israel 
and other restricted agencies from the West and South Africa, Sri Lanka's 
charge against India for facilitate armed trainings to the militants on the 
Indian soil and simultaneously India's denial of the same, further made 
the situation worse. Sri Lanka's Prime Minister Premadasa often justified 
Colombo's action against Tamils by referring the situation in Punjab and 
deployment of army over there. He even challenged India to 'openly 
invade' Sri Lanka and not play 'hide and seek'. 
The state of Tamil Nadu registered its protest against Sri 
Lankan army in favour of Tamils overthere at regular intervals. 
Visualizing grave situation in Sri Lanka Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi delivered speech from the ramparts of the historic Red Fort in 
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Delhi on the pious occasion of the anniversary of India's independence. 
She maintained : 
"The situation in Sri Lanka is quite grave and my 
heart is full of grief for those innocent people 
who are being attacked without having done 
anything wrong. There are extremists and 
terrorists there as well and it is evident that a 
Government is required to counter them. But the 
manner in which a particular community is being 
attacked for the last so many years has come in 
the way of restoration of peace and the situation 
had gradually deteriorated. We do not want to 
interfere. We do not want to put any obstacles in 
the unity of another country. That would not be in 
our interest. We want our neighbouring countries 
to be stable and friendly towards us. We extended 
our hand of friendship and offered help in having 
a dialogue and arriving at some conclusions 
acceptable to all.*^ 
In Sri Lanka the area of operation of army was enlarged which 
worried the Sri Lankan Tamils who were residing as refugees into Tamil 
Nadu. The Government of India repeated it time and again that : 
357 
Ethnic Conflict: India And Sri Lanka 
"The ethnic problem in Sri Lanka cannot be 
solved by military action. It is a political problem 
involving the just rights of the Tamil minority 
and only the determined pursuit of the political 
process of consultations and mutual 
accommodation can lead to a constructive way 
out. This has been our view all along and we have 
repeatedly conveyed it to the President of Sri 
Lanka". 
Regretting the involvement of outside agencies in the island, 
Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Ram Niwas Mirdha said : 
"We have taken steps of curb activities which 
may be directed against Sri Lanka from our soil. 
Nevertheless to our profound regret and unease, 
we find that the Sri Lankan Government has 
thought it fit to induct outside security agencies 
into a domestic political situation. This can only 
aggravate matter not only in Sri Lanka but also in 
the region".^' 
The later half of 1984 witnessed some tragic events occurring in 
India viz. the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by some Sikh 
extremists. And for once Sri Lanka felt that India had met its inevitable 
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retribution. Sri Lankan President Jayewardene who had come to attend 
Mrs. Gandhi's funeral, did not let the opportunity go and reminded India 
that the two countries faced similar problem of terrorism and in that 
situation how unjustified was India's support to the Tamil cause in Sri 
Lanka. 
New Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi felt insulted at the 
parallel drawn by Jayewardene and bluntly said that India had no personal 
interest in Sri Lanka nor did it favour separatism but successful 
conclusion of the process of political negotiations is essential since India 
believed "an early settlement would satisfy the Tamils and wean away the 
overwhelming majority of the militants"^^ from violence. 
The ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka is nothing but an outcome of 
the Sinhala chauvinism. The discriminatory policies of early Sri Lankan 
Governments paved the way for Tamil militancy. As the ethnic crisis is 
the outcome of the suppressed aspirations of the Indian Tamils in Sri 
Lanka, India has to be associated with it directly or indirectly, willingly 
or unwillingly. 
Right from the beginning India maintained the policy of non-
interference. In 1956 when "Sinhala Only" policy was introduced, India 
was one to criticize it but it did not involve itself directly in the Sinhala-
Tamil controversy. It was only in the year 1977 that India realized the 
need to play active role to remove ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka. The year 
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demand for Eelam. Being relatively backward in education and in their 
standard of living while residing in an area not contiguous to the 
proposed Tamil state, their problems were naturally different from those 
of Jaffna Tamils. They were interested in the question of labour relations 
and were either seeking Sri Lankan citizenship or preparing to leave for 
India. Similar was the reaction in ethnically mixed eastern province 
either. In fact the core of the Tamil protest and dissent has been from the 
Jaffna peninsula. 
In India the Janata Government which came to power in 1977 by 
surpassing the three decade old Congress party rule continued to have 
good relations with the Sri Lankan Government. The developments of Sri 
Lanka's ethnic conflict had made the Tamil community of India sensitive. 
Thus, in 1977 when ethnic riots rocked Sri Lanka there was a wave of 
protest against atrocities committed against Tamils in Sri Lanka. Indian 
Prime Minister Morarji Desai never entertained the idea of a separate 
state. While discussing the Tamil problem with the TULF leader 
Amrithalingam and offering his good offices towards bringing President 
Jayewardene and the TULF to the negotiating table, Prime Minister Desai 
rejected and criticized the notion of a separate sovereign state.^^ 
Thus, the sensitive issue of the demand of TULF for a separate 
state in Sri Lanka was repudiated by the Janata Government. And the 
main reason behind this approach was the policy of non-interference. In 
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the 1960s when there was an active separatist movement in Tamil Nadu, 
which found its most militant expression during the anti-Hindi riots, the 
central Government in New Delhi was careful not to meddle with the Sri 
Lankan Tamil problem. Hence the Janata Government might have had the 
fear that any support to the Sri Lankan Tamil militants might encourage 
separatist tendencies in Tamil Nadu. 
Second, since the Janata Government made it clear in its 
election manifesto that it wanted to have a policy of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of the neighbouring countries, it appears that it did not 
support the Sri Lankan Tamil cause for separation, which might create 
another Bangladesh crisis like situation. 
The sixth Lok Sabha was dissolved on 22 August 1979, and 
fresh elections were ordered in January 1980. In the meantime, Indo Sri 
Lanka relations continued to be cordial and friendly. 
The 1979 general elections in India paved the way for Congress 
to form a Government with a massive majority. Hence, after a lapse of 
twenty eight months Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India 
for the second time in January 1980. Till the summer of 1983, the Indian 
Government adopted the policy of non-interference and non-intervention 
and considered the ethnic conflict as an internal affair of Sri Lanka. But 
then political pressure from Tamil Nadu, the inflow of refugees into India 
particularly into Tamil Nadu, the human rights violation by the Sri 
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Lankan security forces and the geo-political impacts of the ethnic conflict 
compelled India to express its concern to the Sri Lankan Government. 
In July-August 1983, the massacre of Tamils made India to react 
sharply for the first time on the incidents of ethnic violence taking place 
in Sri Lanka. Addressing the SAARC Foreign Minister's Conference in 
New Delhi on 1 August 1983, she maintained : 
"Ours is a troubled region. Most of our countries 
are multi-racial and multi-religious. It would be 
idle to pretend that we are not affected by what 
happens elsewhere".^" 
From the above analysis it can be estimated that Indira Gandhi's 
Sri Lanka Policy had three basic considerations : 
1) Sri Lanka's contacts with foreign countries to the extent so as 
not to affect India's security concerns in the region, 
2) its federal imperatives, 
3) the thrust of geographical proximity and ethnic ties across the 
border.^' 
Following these three considerations, India included three main 
objectives into its approach towards Sri Lanka. Firstly, India tried to 
search ways to restrict foreign powers from interfering in the ethnic 
conflict. Secondly, to mount pressure on the Sri Lankan Government, so 
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that Tamils can get genuine and legitimate concessions from the 
Government. Thirdly, to signalize its intention to make the unity and 
integrity of the island intact. 
Very important development that took place during Indira 
Gandhi's period was that India simultaneously took up the role of a 
mediator along with the role of a military supportive. On the one hand the 
External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and India's special envoy 
G. Parthasarathy visited Sri Lanka to mediate between the Sri Lankan 
Government and the Tamil parties/groups and on the other hand India 
trained militants on Indian soil to exert military pressure on Jayewardene 
Government. 
Thus we can say that during Indira Gandhi's rule, India adopted 
coercive diplomacy to compell Jayewardene to accommodate the genuine 
aspirations of the Tamils within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. 
However, she never supported the idea of a separate sovereign state but 
favoured a genuine treatment and allocation of genuine political and 
economic rights to the Tamils in Sri Lanka. It is however a different issue 
that her prudent coercive diplomacy turned into a major diplomatic 
failure while operated by her successor Rajiv Gandhi. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
CURRENT TRENDS IN INDO-SRl LANKA RELATIONS 
Without discussing the current trends in Indo-Sri Lanka 
relations, the study will not be considered as complete. This chapter 
basically focuses upon the regional security implications of the Peace 
Agreement of 1987, new peace initiatives, LTTE's role in the decade of 
90s and 2000, devolution package and other events related to ethnic mess. 
The bilateral strategic issues in the eighties, stemmed from the 
ethnic conflict into which India was drawn to become a key actor. India's 
high stakes and interest in the conflict developed from Sri Lanka's 
strategic policy as well as the spill-over effect of violence in the island 
since 1983. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rightly pointed out, India 
could not be treated as 'just any other country' in view of the fact that Sri 
Lanka's large-scale search for strategic patrons aroused India's regional 
security concern and violence and military operations posed a threat to its 
internal stability and cohesion. Thus, India was an affected country, 
whose involvement in the conflict as peacemaker was, therefore, easily 
justifiable even to a worst critic. It is true that Sri Lanka was initially 
reluctant to accept India's self-invited mediation because of its suspicions 
about the latter's support and sympathy for the Tamils, its expectations of 
external support for a military solution to the conflict, and strained 
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personal equation between Indira Gandhi and J.R. Jayewardene. But its 
resistance was siiort-lived. An anti-India feeling had gripped the Sri 
Lankan Government and the Sinhalese-Buddhist constituency so much 
that the positive aspect of India's policy i.e., promotion and preservation 
of Sri Lanka's sovereignty was not acknowledged and appreciated. 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, a promising young man 
decided to involve India actively in Sri Lanka's ethnic mess and for that 
purpose he met Sri Lankan President in early June 1985 in New Delhi 
which accelerated the efforts of mediation. Peace talks followed between 
the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil political and military organizations 
in Thimpu (Bhutan), but these failed too. Many attempts in 1986 to solve 
the conflict proved abortive. Moreover, Sri Lanka found itself under great 
pressure from donor countries to solve the conflict specially in view of 
economic devastation (the war has caused) and military expenditure. The 
Indian Government thus found itself in a position from where it could 
enforce willingness both from Sri Lankan Government and from the main 
military group, the LTTE. The Agreement which was signed in July 1987* 
was the result. Now India had moved from the position of mediator to 
that of direct participant, a participant with separate and specific interests 
of its own. 
The Agreement had Three Components: 
For the text of the Agreement see Appendix XII. 
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First, "the 'modalities' of settling the ethnic conflicts through 
devolution of power to a Tamil region combining the northern and eastern 
provinces"; 
Second, "the guarantees and obligations of the government of 
India with regard to the implementation of the accord" ; 
Third, "(in letters exchanged along with the Agreement), the 
undertakings given by the government of Sri Lanka to India which are not 
related to the ethnic conflict but concern India's security interest's in the 
region."' The provisions of the July 1987 Agreement concerned with 
India's security interests are as follows: 
(i) "an early understanding about the relevance and 
employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with 
a view to ensuring that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri 
Lanka relations;" 
(ii) "Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made 
available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial 
to India's interests;" 
(iii) "the work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank 
farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri 
Lanka;" 
(iv) "Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations 
will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in 
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Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and 
not for any military or intelligence purpose."^ 
That means the Agreement ensured that Pakistani, Israeli and 
other foreign influences on the armed forces of Sri Lanka as hostile to 
India are removed. Agreement also established that Trincomalee would 
not be used in a way harmful to India's interests and also that the Tank 
Farm would be under India's partial control. It also ensured that the US 
and West German broadcasting facilities would not be used to spy on 
India. 
By the Agreement India not only removed the hostile influences 
on Sri Lanka's security forces thus removing perceived threat to its 
security but offered as a reciprocal gesture, the training facilities and 
military supplies for Sri Lanka security forces. India also sent its troops 
in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka as a peace keeping 
force. 
India entered in the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka as a mediator. 
As the ethnic strife had become significant factor in the politics of Tamil 
Nadu and there were possibilities of separatist tendencies becoming 
inspired in Tamil Nadu by the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. It was neither 
in the interest of India nor of Tamil Nadu to allow Sri Lankan 
Government to perish Tamil opposition and impose Sinhala domination 
rather hegemony over them. Tamils in India would have never liked such 
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situation. India perhaps trained the militant groups to cease Sinhala 
Government's hegemony but at the same time militant's victory would 
have resulted in the formation of a separate state. The Indian state which 
is and was plagued with a number of separatist and secessionist strifes 
and in this context, the emergence of a small state in northern Sri Lanka 
would not have been in India's interest by any means. 
Hence, India desired neither the victory of Sri Lankan military 
forces nor of the militants, but only a resolution asserting unity and 
territorial integrity of the island and at the same time recognizing 
democratic, political and economic rights of the Tamil people as a 
collectivity. India also looked on this problem as one of human right and 
it raised the issue at US Commission for Human Rights. 
Moreover, Sri Lanka's growing links with Pakistan, Israel, 
China and some of the western powers, signalled security threat on 
India's southern region which was perceived to be safe previously. Thus, 
the resolution of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was directly related with 
the safety of India's security interests. 
Although, many persons perceived that not to solve the ethnic 
havoc but to safeguard its security interests, India entered into 1987 
Accord with Sri Lanka. The LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran maintained that 
the temporary arrangement of the merger between the northern and 
eastern province was not satisfactory and LTTE would continue to work 
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towards a separate state. He also declared openly that under certain 
compulsions he had to assent the Agreement even though it sacrificed 
Tamil aspirations and inclined towards accommodating India's security 
concerns. Sinhala opinion too criticized the Agreement vehemently and 
accused the Jayewardene Government for accommodating Indian security 
concerns to the extent of seriously compromising Sri Lanka's sovereignty 
and independence. Sinhalese opponents argued that India agreed to ruin 
Tamil militant camps in India only when Sri Lanka agreed to give priority 
to its security interests. 
The India-Sri Lanka efforts to resolve the ethnic conflict got 
materialized in the form the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987. This 
Agreement also had many implications for the security of South Asian 
region. It is a known fact that all of India's neighbours had problems 
which involved India in some or the other way. Nepal to meet the threats 
arising out of its internal unrest, needed India's support. That was the 
reason Nepal tried to made attempts to modify some of the provisions of 
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship entered into with India in 1950, 
particularly those with regard to security affairs. Bangladesh had 
problems with its Chakma ethnic group in the Chittagong hill areas and 
had been following a foreign policy favourable to the U.S. The tensions 
in Indo-Pakistan relations had been known to all. The Indo-Sri Lanka 
Agreement could be taken by all these countries as a indication that their 
internal and foreign policies had to be adjusted in a manner so as not to 
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affect significantly India's security concerns. It is interesting to note that, 
while most countries were not happy with India's violation of Sri Lankan 
air space in dropping food supplies, most countries had expressed their 
support for the Peace Agreement. However China and Pakistan had 
voiced their reservations on the Accord. The signing of Agreement made 
Sri Lanka to realize the need of designing its foreign relations in a 
manner so as not to affect its big and powerful neighbour India. It was 
actually an acceptance of India's role as the regional power. The USA 
and The USSR (now Russia), too welcomed the Accord which meant that 
even super powers accepted India's prominent role in the South Asian 
region and also meant that only by recognizing India's dominant place in 
the region, instability could be removed from here. 
The Agreement had implications for regional co-operation too. 
Sri Lanka, despite knowing that bilateral issues could not be discussed in 
SAARC forum, had tried to override this and had brought the ethnic 
issue for discussion. These efforts of Sri Lanka had generally been 
supported by Pakistan who had always articulated that SAARC forum 
should be open to the consideration of bilateral issues. But India has 
never entertained this view and has maintained that issue between any 
two countries of the region could best be settled on a bilateral basis and 
regional co-operation should never be affected by such bilateral issues. 
Another area of concern on which the Agreement may have 
some impact is the project to keep the Indian Ocean as a 'Zone of Peace'. 
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This idea was first advanced by Sirimavo Bandaranaike at the Non-
aligned Summits at Nairobi and Cairo, and later at the United Nations in 
1971 where it was generally received with favour. India too supported the 
project, seeing it in a way of keeping the Indian Ocean free from naval 
deployments by both superpowers. The US has established a naval base 
on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Although most 
countries still back the proposal in principle, it has been found difficult to 
get to the next stage of the project-namely a meeting in Colombo to work 
out the details. India has shown herself deeply suspicious of Sri Lanka's 
stand and refused to attend meetings in Colombo of technical groups 
concerned with research into aspects of Indian Ocean activities. India still 
appears keen to pursue this project and Sri Lanka's re-structured 
relationship with India will possibly be of help. 
Mediation, which was taken over by India, was a complex 
exercise. Especially it is more so in ethnic conflicts like the one which 
broke out in Sri Lanka with all intensity and vigour. The role and 
strategies of a mediator cannot be uniform throughout the period of its 
involvement in the conflict, and "role expansion is often necessitated by 
the ineffectivity of its earlier strategies to break the intransigent position 
of adversaries and the imperative of peace widely felt by all sections of 
the strife-torn society as well as the mediator".^ Initially, when India 
began the peace process in August 1983, its intention was to play a 
limited role of facilitator of communication between the adversaries. But 
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soon it had become clear, especially after the failure of two rounds of 
Thimpu talks'* in July-August 1985, that this limited intermediary role 
would not yield any concrete result and India was compelled to gradually 
expand its role-from that of a facilitator of communication to an actual 
participant in the conflict by becoming a signatory to a bilateral Peace 
Agreement in July 1987. Thus, it took almost three years for India to 
change its role, much against its desire and interest and at the initiative of 
the Sri Lankan Government. 
Before giving a critical account of the Indo-Lanka Agreement, 
first we shall analyse various strategies which India employed in pursuit 
of peace. Since 1984, India adopted a two pronged strategy of 
'persuation' and 'coercion' both against the Sri Lankan Government and 
the Tamil groups on different occasions. And the objective was to evolve 
a viable structure of political settlement through negotiations and not to 
weaken or strengthen one party against another. Thus, if India supplied 
arms and extended training facilities to the militants, it was to increase 
the Sri Lankan bargaining power in connection with the Sri Lankan 
Government. The underlying assumption was that the militants' 
empowerment would intensify in the north-east. This coupled with the 
international pressure, especially from Sri Lanka's aid donors, would 
form a greater force to compel the Sri Lankan Government not only to 
give up its military approach but also its tough position in negotiations 
with the Tamils. Many in the island did not understand the real purpose of 
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India's strategy of empowerment and misinterpreted it as a regressive 
step to divide Sri Lanka. 
Besides, operation Eagle-paradroping of food and medicine, 
undertaken by the Indian Air Force on 4 June 1987 should have been 
viewed in the correct perspective. Though the mission amounted to be a 
direct violation of Sri Lanka's air space, it had a limited but important 
positive objective, viz, both the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil 
militants give up their military approach and accept India's mediation to 
find a political solution. Though it is a fact that Indian intervention 
appeared to be supportive of the Tamil militants when they were also 
equally rigid in their attitude on the peace process. But it was so because 
Sri Lankan Government launched an offensive in Jaffna and New Delhi's 
view was that the army's victory over the Tamil would lead to its 
complete alienation from the conflict. If the militants lost their military 
strength, the Tamils would lose their bargaining power and such a 
situation would enable the Sri Lankan Government to impose a settlement 
on the Tamils from a position of strength. And this was the very goal of 
Jayewardene administration. India's limited military intervention did 
achieve its objectives, viz, the Jayewardene administration stopped its 
military offensive, lifted the economic blockade on the Jaffna peninsula 
and accepted India's mediation. 
Most of the times, the Sri Lankan leaders did not notice the fact 
that India exerted pressure on the Tamil militants whenever they were 
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found to be drifting from their commitment to the peace process. Just 
because of central Government's directions, the Tamil Nadu Government 
raided LTTE camps to capture their communication equipment when 
Prabhakaran rejected the Sri Lankan Government's proposal in 1986. 
Also, in August 1985, India ordered the deportation of three Tamil 
leaders for their alleged role in dismantling the Thimpu talks. It however 
revoked the order later under Tamil Nadu's pressure. But unfortunately 
India's strategy of empowerment turned out to be a double-edged weapon 
and India could not understand the real motive and character of some of 
the militant groups like the LTTE. India's moral and material support 
sustained the Tamil struggle and exerted pressure on the Sri Lankan 
Government and it led to the marginalization of the moderate Tamil 
Untied Liberation Front (TULF). It was a grave mistake that the Indian 
leaders in the conflict had sidelined leaders like A. Amrithalingam and, 
instead, promoted the militants to become the sole representatives of the 
Sri Lankan Tamils. In the process, India unconsciously helped what the 
LTTE had been trying to achieve. Even the emergence of the LTTE as a 
pre-eminent group was a failure of the Indian intelligence agency, the 
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). It could not intrude the ranks of the 
LTTE to find out its real military strength, sources of arms supply and 
overall long-term plans. 
Besides, due to the frequent replacement of Indian mediators the 
consistency could not be maintained in dialogue and negotiations. Each 
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mediator evolved his own perspectives on the conflict and adopted 
different approaches to contentious issues. It was unfortunate that the 
Indian Government, under Colombo's pressure, had to replace G. 
Parthasarathy that too at a time when he was efficiently trying to break 
new ground for reconciliation between the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan 
Tamils. Romesh Bhandari was unpopular among the militant leaders for 
his 'pressure tactics' and insensitivity to the legitimate aspirations of the 
Tamils. But the Jayewardene administration's first choice was he only. 
Here New Delhi's mistake was that, in place of a bureaucrat some highly 
respectable public figure should have been choosen for the job of the 
mediator. The entry of Chidambram-Natwar Singh mission definitely 
injected seriousness into the peace process conducted within the bilateral 
framework, but unfortunately they too could not allay the growing sense 
of alienation and discontent among the Tamil leaders. 
Though, India was charged for playing a participants role for its 
own interests as it wanted to perpetuate its policy of hegemonism in the 
region. But the fact of the matter was that it was Jayewardene who 
proposed the same role for India as early as in August 1986.^ India 
actually hesitantly accepted to become a direct participant in the conflict 
by signing the July 1987 Agreement. And in forseeing such a role, the Sri 
Lankan President's objective was very clear. He wanted to use Indian 
power to disarm the Tamil militants, especially the LTTE. 
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By early 1987, it was clear that the LITE would not accept 
peace without achieving Eelam, here lies India's fault. It should have 
encouraged non-LTTE Tamil group leaders to become signatories to the 
Agreement with Jayewardene. And in such circumstances India's role 
would have been to be a guarantor to implement the Agreement. This 
mistake later on proved to be very harmful on India's part. 
India's former Foreign Secretary and presently National 
Security Advisor J.N. Dixit has mentioned in his book Assignment 
Colombo, "Though the Minister for External Affairs did not actively 
participate in these Core Group Meetings, he was present during the 
meetings chaired by the Prime Minister. I was asked to show the outline 
draft to him before I left for Sri Lanka which I did. Narasimha Rao made 
three points about the whole process of negotiations about to start. First, 
we should not rush into this agreement. Second, we should carefully 
consider the wisdom of being direct signatories to this agreement. He was 
of the view that Sri Lankan Tamils should sign this agreement with Sri 
Lankan Government and we should just be guarantors. Thirdly, he felt 
that we must carefully assess whether the willingness of the LTTE and 
Sri Lankan Government to come to an agreement at that point of time was 
based on a genuine desire for peace and a durable settlement or was it just 
an interim tactical move. He asked me to keep these points at the back of 
mind while negotiating the agreement".* 
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It was a prudent advice of an old war-horse which was neglected 
by a youthful but impetuous Prime Minister who was all the time 
surrounded by impetuous persons wanting to please the power that was. 
Hence it is clear that India actually prepared and signed the Agreement in 
a great hurry. As a result it was full of impracticable and unreasonable 
provisions, viz.: 
• cessation of hostilities within 48 hours of the signing of the 
Agreement, 
• surrendering of arms by the Tamil militants and the withdrawal 
of the Sri Lankan security forces to barracks within 72 hours of 
the cessation of hostilities, 
• finalisation of residual devolution of powers to the provincial 
councils that too within six weeks. 
Nevertheless, the provision of temporary merger of north-east 
was a good compromise formula but it could neither please the Tamils 
nor the Sinhalese. Even the amount of power to be devolved to the 
provinces was not spelt out in clear terms in the Agreement. Rajiv Gandhi 
however considered the Agreement as a "major landmark in the four 
decades of India's freedom" which "not only rendered justice to the 
minority communities on the island but also removed the opportunity for 
hostile forces to destabilize the region".^ 
3-84 
Current Trends in Indo-Sri Lanka Relations 
On India's part the most crucial and diplomatically wrong 
decision was sending of Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to 
implement the Agreement. The IPKF operation proved to be a thankless 
job. Approximately 1,155 soldiers, of which the officers were 55, were 
killed and about 2,854 injured.^ India spent more than $180 million on the 
operation. The IPKF had killed 2,592 Tamil guerrillas, wounded 1,159 
and captured 1,185.^  Above all, several hundreds of civilians were dead 
or injured in the IPKF-LTTE war. The IPKF was hated by the Sri Lankan 
Tamils and the Sinhalese alike, and was characterized 'as an army of 
occupation' by the Premadasa, the newly elected President of Sri Lanka. 
The Premadasa Government employed all undignified means to send the 
IPKF off the island. The most unfavourable way was arming of the LTTE 
against the IPKF and normalization of relations with the LTTE leadership 
by holding peace talks during May 1989-June 1990. When India rightly 
insisted on the full implementation of the Agreement as a pre-requisite 
for the withdrawal of the IPKF, the same Government that had invited 
India to underwrite the Agreement now asked India to abandon it. 
IPKF episode taught India a lesson which was worth-
remembering that not to involve the Indian army in a military operation 
of the kind undertaken in Sri Lanka without a proper and careful cost-
benefit analysis and correct assessment of the ground reality. 
After the withdrawal of the IPKF in March 1990, India having 
disengaged itself from the ethnic conflict felt prudent to enter into a more 
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enduring relationship with Sri Lanka which would endure long term 
prosperity of the island nation. It was the strengthening of economic 
bonds by developing greater trade relations. During the visit of the Sri 
Lanka Foreign Minister Herat to New Delhi in August 1991, it was 
decided to develop and enhance cooperation in the economic, financial 
and commercial spheres and a joint commission at ministerial level, was 
formally set up. In 1998, in the same spirit, India and Sri Lanka entered 
into an Agreement to provide for free trade between the two countries and 
generous duty concessions were given to the Sri Lanka products for entry 
into India. 
Indo-Sri Lanka relations entered into new phase when Rajiv 
Gandhi the former Prime Minister of India was assassinated by the LTTE. 
While in Sri Lanka in a sudden turn of events, President Premadasa was 
also assassinated. Rajiv Gandhi had paid with his life for distrusting the 
LTTE; Premadasa now paid with his life for trusting the LTTE. After a 
short interregnum the administration in Colombo passed into the hands of 
a coalition of parties viz, People's Alliance in which the principal party 
was the Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by the youthful Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the daughter of the two previous chief 
executives of the state-SWRD and Sirimavo Bandaranaike. On 19 
August 1994 she vowed to end the 11 year old ethnic conflict and 
extended her "hand of friendship"'" to the LTTE. She declared that she 
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would "build a society without any discrimination where all the minority 
communities would enjoy equal rights as equal citizens"." 
On the other hand LTTE too in a positive manner, offered to 
accept a "substantial package" as an alternative to its demand for an 
independent Eelam state. LTTE's spokesman in London, Balasingham 
surprised everybody by stating that the original demand for Eelam was 
raised by Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and that the LTTE came 
later and carried forward the issue of self-determination. 
Sri Lanka Government sought to get the Indian endorsement to 
her peace efforts with the LTTE. On 6 October 1994 an unidentified 
source in Colombo told the Sunday Observer that Colombo had been 
assured of India's support for the peace process.'^ India however declined 
to publicly endorse the peace process, yet it indicated that it would not 
stand in the way of the negotiating process. The LTTE too was keen that 
the proposed talks should be blessed by India. 
For about eight months, both the parties remained involved in 
lengthy correspondence and meetings. Sri Lankan Government made 
certain relaxations for LTTE and LTTE too reciprocated in the same 
manner. But when the correspondence continued for too long, the 
President on 20 February 1995 proposed to Prabhakaran the "use of good 
offices of a neutral and uncommitted person who would serve as an 
intermediary" between the two "to carry directly any ideas, proposals and 
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explanations we might wish to convey to each other concerning the 
elements of a political solution to the ethnic problem".''' After consulting 
with the French President she proposed the name of a retired French 
diplomat. But LTTE outrightly rejected this proposal and termed this 
proposal as a conspiracy against Tamil aspirations. Then the president 
suggested the names of Government delegation and the dates (March 23, 
24, and 25) for talks at Jaffna and requested Prabhakaran to nominate his 
representatives for this purpose. But Prabhakaran was not willing to 
continue the peace talks any more. 
Failure of the Second Peace Effort 
Chandrika Kumaratunga's all efforts of resolving the issue by 
peaceful means proved fruitless. There were enough reports that New 
Delhi is pressurizing Colombo to hand over Prabhakaran for his 
extradition. Nevertheless, Colombo appeared to reassure him that there 
was nothing for him to fear. The President of Sri Lanka issued a press 
note that the President would discuss the issue at all in New Delhi and it 
was also maintained in the report that the reports were "designed 
mischievously with the intention of sabotaging the peace initiates pursued 
by the government and to create distrust between the government and the 
LTTE". Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar assured 
Prabhakaran that New Delhi did not ask for his extradition even during 
his recent visit to New Delhi. He pointed out that infact Prime Minister 
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Narasimha Rao encouraged the peace initiative and maintained, "if you 
solve your problem, it will be one problem less for us". 
At the end of her visit to New Delhi, Kumaratunga herself told a 
news conference in New Delhi on 28 March 1995 that "the question of 
extradition did not come out, because the legal processes are still not 
finalized".'^ But in reality the extradition was discussed, it was however 
another attempt from Sri Lankan side to reassure Prabhakaran that he had 
nothing to fear. Prabhakaran, however, once again exhibited his 
willingness to resume the dialogue as from 1 April 1995. With this, the 
Government too appeared keen to accommodate the LTTE's demand on 
two crucial issues.* But on 27 April 1995, in an interview to the BBC 
broadcast, Prabhakaran made the declaration of ending the peace talks by 
charging the Government of delay, he maintained, " giving pledges 
and implementing those pledges are two different things. It is true that 
President Chandrika gave us pledges. But she has not taken constructive 
measures to implement them. In the past the Tamil people have been 
betrayed several times by the previous Sinhalese regimes. Agreements 
were made but not implemented. Pacts were signed and abrogated. This is 
our history. Chandrika government is not an exception."'^ 
Once the peace process collapsed, Sri Lankan President without 
further delay declared Prabhakaran responsible for Rajiv Gandhi's 
assassination. India, on the other hand finding it a favourable time 
* Removal of the Pooneryn camp and the free movement of armed LITE cadres. 
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extended its request for Prabhakaran's extradition. Besides Prabhakaran 
India sought the extradition of two other LTTE leaders-Tigers' 
Intelligence Chief Pottu Amman and LTTE Women Wing's leader 
Akila.'* 
India, however expressed hopes for a political settlement and 
ruled out every possibility of Indian intervention in Sri Lanka and made it 
clear that there had been no such request from Colombo. Sri Lankan 
President too appreciated India's stand of considering ethnic strife as an 
internal matter of the island. 
On 3 August 1995, in a conciliatory move Sri Lankan President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga announced a package of devolution proposals 
envisaging establishment of regional councils. As was expected the LTTE 
officially rejected the package as a plan of betrayal and an attempt to 
isolate the LTTE from the Tamils. India, however on 11 August 1995 
expressed strong support to President's proposals giving autonomy to Sri 
Lankan Tamils in a bid to end the dragging ethnic conflict in the island 
nation.'^ 
Why the Peace Talks Failed 
A number of reasons may be attributed to rationalize the failure 
of the peace talks. First, the devolution package of Chandrika 
Kumaratunga ignored the specificity of the Tamil case and treated all the 
provinces at par. The Tamils were asking for the status of a nationality 
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and self determination which they did not achieve through the devolution 
package. Second, the unit of devolution was also in violation of the 
traditional LITE position. The latter had consistently demanded a Tamil 
homeland corresponding to the northern and eastern Provinces.* Third, 
the package was so detailed that it left little, scope for the LTTE to 
manipulate its provisions.^° Besides, the negotiation style also created 
certain problems. The negotiating team on behalf of the Government did 
not include any veteran of the trade nor was the negotiation kept totally 
secret. The negotiating team was advised not to seek the assistance of any 
previous negotiator and report to the president directly.^' Nevertheless, 
when the negotiations did not move fast enough to Kumaratunga's 
satisfaction and when the LTTE refused to respond to her devolution 
plan, she entered into direct correspondence with the LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran. Then in defence to her own commitment to an 'open' 
process she released the letters to the press but LTTE considered it as a 
deliberate attempt to embarrass Prabhakaran.^^ Moreover the perceptional 
gap that was prevailing between both the parties was evident from the 
fact that while Kumaratunga seemed to be serious, the LTTE treated it as 
her ploy to dilute its national struggle. Its insistence to raise the level of 
the negotiating team to a political level by including a minister could 
again be interpreted either way. It appeared that the LTTE was either 
The devolution package, however, tended to excise the Sinhala majority Ampara district from the 
eastern province and also carved out a separate area for the Muslims from the same province before 
amalgamating the two provinces as one north-eastern province to which power would be devolved. 
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looking for an opportunity to scuttle the talks or it was actually convinced 
that Kumaratunga was taking it too easy. 
Since the withdrawal of the IPKF and failure of the peace 
processes in 1990 and 1995, LITE has emerged the most important party 
holding the key to a political solution and peace in the island. The TULF 
and other Tamil groups have been completely marginalized. India having 
put a ban on the LTTE holding it responsible for the assassination of 
former Primer Minister Rajiv Gandhi and in the background of the 
confrontation in 1987-89 period which undermined the Indo-Sri Lanka 
Accord has lost much of its clout with that organization. It is no wonder 
that India discreetly surrendered the initiative for a peace in the island to 
the Norwegians who plunged themselves as peacemakers in the island in 
the aftermath of their success with the West Asia peace initiative. Despite 
pitfalls and setbacks though not of her making but inherent in the 
situation, Norway has shown no sign of weariness or fatigue, rather 
remarkable patience expected of a peacemaker. She has the backing and 
blessings of the United States and even of the other western powers in her 
endeavour. 
So far India's role is concerned, despite the fact that India has 
lost much of its initiative in the Sri Lanka crisis, Colombo is not 
unmindful of the Indian sensitivities. It has made sure that in every 
mitiative India's blessings were ensured and that New Delhi was kept in 
the picture and on the right side. 
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The year 1996 was particularly a difficult year politically when 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) under the leadership of M. 
Karunanidhi emerged victorious in Tamil Nadu and also was an alliance 
partner at the centre in the United Front Government under Deve Gowda. 
Karunanidhi and the DMK were known sympathizers of the Tamil cause 
in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, the party had of late moved away from its 
outright support to the LTTE since its involvement in the assassination of 
Rajiv Gandhi, as it is evident from Karunanidhi's remark made on 2 May 
1996 that although he was supportive of the interests of the Tamil 
community in Sri Lanka, he would not extend any support to the LTTE 
since "we have had enough of the LTTE and we are now fed up with 
him".^^ This statement really created hopes in the Sinhalese regime in 
Colombo. 
Paradoxically while India's assurance to respect Island's 
territorial integrity and unity were welcome in Colombo, her assurance of 
not interfering in the internal affairs of the island did not create a very 
comfortable feeling among the leadership in Colombo, as it hold India 
responsible for creating the LTTE monster and the President and other 
leaders declared more than once, publicly that India was guilty of this 
unpardonable sin and they would not allow India to wash her hands of the 
mess. The Government owned paper Sunday Times editorially argued that 
merely saying that "India will not interfere in Sri Lanka's internal affairs 
IS not enough" and opined "having interfered, India must undo the 
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damage it inflicted on its southern neighbour".^ "* It was an amusing 
situation that the media and Sri Lankan leaders who were earlier accusing 
New Delhi of interfering in the internal affairs of the island by 
pressurizing Colombo for a political settlement of the ethnic conflict, 
now argued India could not evade its responsibility to its neighbour. 
But India remained firm on its position that it would not 
interfere and would not involve itself in the ethnic riddle. Although, Sri 
Lankan media did riot miss any chance of reminding that the first cry for 
separatism in India echoed from Tamils in South India. They pointed out 
that the implications for India for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka 
comprising less than two million Tamils were ominous. There were other 
separatist movements in India as in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam etc., which 
might flourish, if they received support from abroad. 
With the continuance of deadlock in the ethnic conflict, the 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government both felt and articulated the need 
for a third party involvement in finding a solution to the ethnic problem. 
However, they differed completely with the LTTE on the role of the third 
party. Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Kadirgamar articulated the difference 
between mediation and facilitation, in an interview with the Colombo 
based Sunday Times of 17 October 1999 and said that "the government 
has made it clear that it favours facilitation at the appropriate time and 
not mediation at any time".^^ 
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Fall of the Elephant Pass 
In April 2000 the LITE in a surprise move stormed the Elephant 
Pass, the gateway to the Jaffna peninsula from the mainland and 
threatened to destroy everything before it thus entrapping 20,000 to 
30,000 troops. Sri Lanka, in this hour of island's crisis, pleaded for 
assistance from India. But India's response was one of extreme caution 
and it totally ruled out military intervention but expressed its willingness 
to render humanitarian assistance. What that humanitarian assistance 
would be was left vague. In this critical hour India was caught in the web 
of domestic coalition politics. Some important constituents of the ruling 
National Democratic Alliance in New Delhi were sympathetic to the 
Tamil cause for Eelam and the Prime Minister had no choice but to take 
them along. India however, gave an assurance to Sri Lanka that it 
remained committed to the unity and integrity of the island by observing 
the re-notification of the ban on the LITE on 14 May 2000 for another 
two years. 
The determination shown by Sri Lanka in response to the crisis 
and help received from "friendly"* countries went a long way to save 
Colombo from the crisis situation. Despite occasional military successes, 
Sri Lanka realized it very well that not the military solution but 
negotiations with LTTE were must if the ethnic conflict was to be solved. 
* Israel and Pakistan both were approached by Sri Lanka and these countries sent urgent 
military supplies too. 
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Past experience of negotiating with the LTTE was not a happy one. It 
therefore needed someone else to take initiative to float the idea of talks 
and bring the two parties to the table. Norway was already in scene as a 
peace-maker. But India could never entertain the idea of a country outside 
the region and that too from the European bloc, intruding into the internal 
matters of the closest southern neighbour of India. But ignoring the 
Indian sensitivities Sri Lanka had ensured that the Norwegians consulted 
New Delhi and kept India informed. India also did not give up so easily 
when it concerned something at its doorsteps. 
In the wake of the fall of the Elephant Pass and with the 
deepening of the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, India once again visualized 
opportunity to expropriate the initiative from Norway and offered to 
facilitate the talks should both the LTTE and Colombo approach her. Sri 
Lanka's Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar told Daily News on 23 
May 2000 that Norwegians had "recognized India's valuable position in 
this region, they have recognized the inevitability of Indian involvement 
in this issue. You cannot have a political solution to this problem without 
at least the consent of India."^^ But Kadirgamar was not happy the way 
India had offered to facilitate talks. Instead of making any formal offer 
through an official communication or in conversation with any senior 
Minister or functionary of the Government, India merely made the offer 
in a T.V. news channel and left it at that. The Sri Lankan Foreign 
Minister bemoaned the lack of diplomatic subtlety in the manner India 
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made her offer. The offer was formally picked up neither by Colombo nor 
by the LITE and the initiative proved abortive. 
The Norwegians appearing to be serious about their initiative 
have pursued their interest to facilitate the peace process most untiringly. 
India's stake in the peace process was recognized both by Sri Lanka and 
Norway. The USA too has been conscious of India's interest. India no 
doubt realized its limitations but did not wish to be left out completely 
while others come and fish in its waters. During his official visit to Sri 
Lanka in June 2000, India's External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, 
offered to the President Kumaratunga "assistance in the humanitarian and 
economic spheres to ease any constraints that may be currently faced by 
Sri Lanka" ^^  and announced a credit facility of US $100 million.^* India 
also offered to consider the appointment of a special envoy for Sri Lanka 
to facilitate the process of advice. But Colombo had no interest in mere 
advice and the offer of a special envoy never took off. It was another 
failure on India's part. 
In July 2001, India had to suffer yet another shock from' 
Colombo when it expressed disappointment on air raids made by Sri 
Lanka air force in self defence on LTTE targets at the end of June and 
beginning of July 2001 to pre-empt LTTE attack in Jaffna peninsula. But 
Sri Lanka on the other hand criticizing Indian attitude, declared that it 
was the unquestioned right of any sovereign state to defend its territorial 
integrity and stressed that it was a right India had often exercised. In 
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support of its contention, Sri Lanka maintained that even United States 
respected Sri Lanka's right to defend its territorial integrity. Therefore 
Sri Lanka described American response as 'principled and realistic' and 
Indian stand as 'unacceptable and unrealistic'. 
The acquisition of new weapon-systems and better strategy and 
intelligence to some extent enabled Sri Lankan Government to control the 
initial LTTE tide beyond the Elephant Pass. This is however a different 
matter that LTTE remained firm in its gains. In the resultant stalemate 
both sides had shown some serious and positive indications to the 
Norwegian peace initiative and had agreed to sit on the negotiating table. 
Unfortunately, the Norweign initiative had run into trouble. 
Colombo charged Eric Solheim, the Norweign facilitator of being too 
sympathetic to the LTTE given his past role as a human right activist. To 
oblige Colombo, Norway had put in place a multi-member facilitation 
team in which Solheim was one of the four members. The team was now 
headed by Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister Raymond Johanssen. The 
other two members were : Jon Westborg Norweign Ambassador in 
Colombo and Kjersti Tromsdal, an Executive officer in the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway.^^ But LTTE took it as a conspiracy on the part of Sri 
Lanka in which added its consent. Nevertheless, LTTE does not have too 
many options in the face of loss of international sympathy and erosion in 
confidence of the Tamils whom it was firmly seeking to represent. 
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On the use of violence to settle the ethnic issue, the LTTE today 
stands completely isolated from the international community which was 
unable to appreciate its agenda that has accounted for loss of innumerable 
precious civilian lives with no end in sight. The British Government's 
action to ban LTTE in Britain had been another blow to them. An 
important and safe base for international operations now stood denied to 
it and it found itself somewhat in a weak position. 
Besides, the failed May 2001 - military offensive had 
considerably weakened the position of Colombo in dictating terms to the 
LTTE. It kept the LTTE in a better position once again from which it 
would, as in the past, seek to extract benefits. The three conditions that 
the LTTE wanted to be fulfilled are: 
• easing of restrictions on some commodities for entry into the 
LTTE held areas, 
• cessation of hostilities and 
• removal of proscription on the LTTE before talks could begin. 
Of these the first two are not difficult to meet and even at the time of the 
1994-95 talks these concessions were made on LTTE's insistence but the 
Government could not lift its ban when it has been going round the world 
in its efforts to isolate the LTTE and get it proscribed by other 
governments, particularly so soon after achieving success in London. 
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There was an opportunity to de-proscribe the LTTE without 
much ado if the Chandrika Government had wished to. In June 2001, the 
people's Alliance Government lost its majority in the Parliament. The 
Government apprehensive of an adverse vote did not seek Parliamentary 
endorsement of the emergency in the month of July 2001, as required 
under the Constitution. With that the state of emergency lapsed. The ban 
on the LTTE too should have automatically lapsed. But the Government 
did not allow the LTTE to come out of the stigma of a banned 
organization. 
The year 2002* brought certain remarkable changes so far. The 
Sri Lankan Government - LTTE strife was concerned. In February 2002, 
Sri Lanka entered into a "historic ceasefire deal with Tamil Tiger rebels 
as part of attempt by Norway to broker peace after three decades of 
conflict".^" In a press conference organized by LTTE on 10 April 2002, 
LTTE chief Prabhakaran insisted that India should facilitate talks 
between LTTE and Sri Lanka and also made it clear that unless Sri 
Lankan Government did lift the ban imposed on LTTE, it would not 
participate in Norwegian brokered peace talks proposed to be held in 
Thailand in the month of May. Though India humbly rejected this 
demand. Owing to the mounting pressure from west especially from 
America, LTTE entered into peace-talks with Sri Lankan Government 
which were facilitated by Norway. At this point of time LTTE realized its 
relatively weaker position as America, Britain and Australia declared it a 
See Appendix XIV. 
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terrorist organization and imposed ban on it. Besides LTTE's de-
proscription by Sri Lankan Government was another reason which 
brought LITE to negotiating table. In the mean time India kept assuring 
Sri Lanka that it stood by Lanka talks.^^ Peace talks began but could not 
be successful. Though LITE dropped Eelam demand but alienated itself 
from the talks due to certain reasons: First that Sri Lankan Government 
and Norway both failed in associating LTTE as an equal partner in 
Donors meeting which was held in Washington on 14"" September 2002. 
Secondly, the presence of army in Jaffna even after Ceasefire Pact was 
nothing but the violation of Ceasefire Pact. Thirdly, that Sri Lankan 
Government had appealed to the international community for economic 
and political help for the purpose of rebuilding the war-torn country, but 
it had completely neglected those Tamil areas which suffered great 
financial setbacks owing to Sri Lankan army's activities. The way LTTE 
withdrew from the peace talks made it clear that it participated in order to 
get certain conditions fulfilled, but when its expectations were not met it 
preferred to withdraw. The basic prospects in the immediate future seem 
to be that of a stalemate in the negotiations and intense political 
uncertainties. 
In the month of November, 2003, it became clear that a bitter 
power struggle is at the heart of the crisis in Colombo. The then Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and the President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga do not belong to same political party. The president had 
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precipitated a dangerous constitutional impasse by striking at the heart of 
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremsinghe's popularly elected Government. In 
an extraordinary series of moves, she had sacked three key ministers in 
the UNP Government, suspended Parliament, called out the army and 
declared a state of 'short-term' emergency. Ms. Kumaratunga's coup was 
staged at a time when the Prime Minister was away on a state visit to the 
US, ironically to solicit support for the peace process. In the recent past, 
the Lankan President had voiced increasing impatience with the peace 
negotiations, charging Mr. Wickremesinghe with ceding far too much 
ground to the Tigers Ms. Kumaratunga had claimed that her actions are 
aimed at "preventing a further deterioration of the security situation" in 
the island nation.^^ But given the long history of friction between the two 
leaders, a major reason for the showdown lies in Lanka's system of 
political diarchy-an institutional arrangement, cutting across many South 
Asian states, which allows more than one centre of legitimate 
constitutional authority, inevitably giving rise to a fraught and unstable 
environment. 
The Government of India after discussions with the then Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe in October 2003, had declared that the interim 
arrangement should be an integral part of a final settlement and should be 
within the framework of the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. 
India really has a complex and difficult situation to deal with. One can 
only hope that India does not have to face the dilemmas which it faced in 
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1983 and 1988, again. Though US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage is 
insisting that India has a stake in Sri Lanka, yet, India should give 
priority to its national interest first. The kind of statements New Delhi 
issued during November 2003, political crisis in Colombo, that we hope 
that ongoing peace process would not be affected by the political crisis 
which has emerged in Colombo, might create problems for India in near 
future because LTTE's demand for the right to interim self-Government 
for northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka is nothing but the demand 
for a separate 'Eelam' though the form is different. That means Sri 
Lanka's unity and integrity is at stake. Here New Delhi needs to be very 
careful as acceptance of LTTE's demands would not only create tensions 
in Tamil Nadu next door to Sri Lanka but it would also gather sympathies 
of the people of Tamil Nadu for LTTE. Hence, New Delhi should adopt a 
bit more courageous attitude and should repeat that India favours a final 
settlement that is within the framework of the unity and territorial 
integrity of Sri Lanka. 
In April 2004, again there was a change in Sri Lankan regime 
from United National Party (UNP) to United People's Freedom Alliance 
(UPFA), a newly formed alliance, comprising Chandrika Kumaratunga's 
left-of-centre Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the Marxist Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). New Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda 
Rajapaksa has appealed India to play maximum role so far Sri Lanka's 
peace process is concerned. Though he has not made it clear in what way 
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does he want to include India in the peace process. He has also 
maintained that UPFA Government will seek close defence cooperation 
with India, 
In the month of June 2004, New Delhi has also witnessed a 
change in regime from National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to Congress 
led United Progressive Alliance (UFA). New Government's foreign 
policy is yet to be determined. Hence, several questions are there at the 
forefront: what would be new Government's policy towards neighbouring 
countries? Whether Congress Government would actively participate in 
Sri Lanka's peace-process or it would prefer to be neutral. Would it go 
against giving concessions to LITE and so on so forth. All such questions 
are yet to be answered. Still one thing is for sure whether directly or 
indirectly, unless India participate in Sri Lanka's peace-process, all the 
peace initiatives would go in vein. 
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CONCLUSION 
"Today, when we speak of the security of a state we no longer 
mean its physical security alone. When we speak of strategy we no longer 
mean military or defence strategy alone. The concepts of security and 
strategy have acquired a wider connotation. They involve all matters 
relating to the maintenance of stability and the enhancement of prosperity 
of a country and its region".' 
We cannot ignore the fact that the ongoing process of 
globalization has inculcated an awareness of interdependence among 
countries, certainly in regional terms if not yet fully in global terms. Thus, 
political instability in a country threatens not only its own security but the 
security of its neighbours. 
India and Sri Lanka two South Asian neighbours closely linked 
with several cultural, ethnic, linguistic and social ties for centuries, their 
relations have witnessed various phases, phases of neutrality, phases of 
friendship and phases of tensions. Despite having a number of affinities a 
puzzling question has always remained at the forefront why their relations 
could not become very congenial? And the answer is 'India factor' or the 
concept of big power hegemonism in the South Asian region. 
Though the experience of colonialism, common membership of 
UN , NAM etc. and compulsions of developing economies led the two 
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countries to respond in a similar way to many international crisis. There 
was consensus among them on basic tenets of Non-alignment, NIEO, 
Indian Ocean as a 'Zone of Peace'. On the broader issues of general 
disarmament and arms control, there was a near unanimity between these 
two countries. Because of the massive acquisition of arms and 
ammunitions both conventional and nuclear by the great powers the world 
was on the verge of a catastrophe. Sri Lanka and India which belonged to 
the third world, could not afford to spend heavily on armaments because of 
the inbuilt restrictions on their economies. Obviously any international 
movement for disarmament found an active response from these states as, 
in the long run, their own people would be saved from annihilation in a 
global warfare. 
However, differences in their perceptions to some multilateral 
arms control agreements like NPT were noticeable. While Sri Lanka 
supported it by signing and ratifying at an early date, India's reluctance to 
sign it appeared to be mainly because it wanted to keep its options open 
particularly in view of the fact that China had already acquired nuclear 
capability. The issue of South Asia as a nuclear free zone constituted 
another area of divergence. A possible explanation for Sri Lanka's support 
to the proposal emerged from the notion of a security threat from India. 
Along with such a fear-psychosis it had also to be kept in mind that Sri 
Lanka had signed the NPT. But it is noteworthy that even if the respective 
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stands of both the countries manifested divergence on some issues, such 
differences did not affect the basic strands of bilateral interaction. 
However, certain bilateral issues like the issue of Kachchativu 
and the citizenship status issue, have definitely enhanced the tensions 
between two neighbours. Both the countries expressed their claim over a 
small and unpopulated island of Kachchativu which is situated at the Palk 
strait region. The Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accepted Sri Lankan claim 
over the island as she did not want to spoil her friendship with Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike. For that purpose India entered into the Indira Gandhi-
Sirimavo Bandaranaike Agreement of January 1974, which not only settled 
the issue of Kachchativu but also indicated India's willingness for 
evolving a policy of friendship and mutual co-operation with its 
neighbours. Though no problem was left so far the location of maritime 
boundary between the two countries was concerned but because of the 
confusing language of Article 4 and 5 of the 1974 Agreement, Indian 
fishermen particularly from Tamil Nadu suffered a great setback as they 
were deprived of their traditional right of fishing in the surrounding 
waters. 1976 Agreement delimiting the boundaries in the Gulf of Mannar 
and the Bay of Bangal to the west and the east of the boundary line already 
delimited in 1974, was a step further in this direction. 
With the intensification of ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka and with the 
aggravation of LTTE's activities in the palk strait, (Who are willing to use 
Tamil Nadu as a support base for executing their activities in Jaffna), the 
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condition of Indian fishermen has worsened. Either because of financial 
compulsions or because of the terror of LTTE, Indian fishermen are 
compelled to help LTTE and this has resulted in often clashes between 
Indian fishermen and Sri Lankan navy. The combined efforts of both the 
Governments to cease the occurrence of such incidents have not helped 
much. The problem is still persisting and hopes can be done only from the 
restoration of peace and the end of ethnic war. 
Another irritant between Indo- Sri Lanka relations was the 
question of stateless persons of Indian origin. Just after its independence in 
1948, the discriminatory policies of Sri Lankan Government, resulted in 
the loosening of citizenship by the people of Indian origin. To sort out the 
problem Jawahar Lai Nehru pursued a number of bilateral talks with his Sri 
Lankan counterpart but he could never accept the principle of compulsory 
repatriation as it might have set an example for other African and Asian 
countries. Besides he always believed that those who had contributed in 
strengthening the economy of Sri Lanka and stayed their for generations, 
could not be taken off the right of citizenship all of a sudden and that Sri 
Lanka just wanted to lessen the number of the people of Indian origin, thus 
regarded these proposals as discriminatory. Even Nehru-Kotelawala Pact 
of January 1954 could not be implemented as Sri Lankan Government 
accepted only two categories i.e. Indian Nationals and Ceylon Nationals 
but completely neglected the third category of 'stateless persons'. As 
compared to Nehru's firm approach, Lai Bahadur Shastri preferred an 
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accommodative approach by entering in 1964 Shastri-Bandaranaike Pact. 
In fact to settle citizenship issue, India made three compromises. Firstly, 
adoption of political principles or a 'number formula' in place of legal 
principles. Secondly, despite being the specification of 'absorbable 
maximum' between two countries, India had to bear a heavy burden of 
Indian Tamil population. Thirdly, against Nehruvian approach, Indian 
Government agreed for a large-scale repatriation of the Indian Tamils from 
Sri Lanka. Significantly, Sri Lanka was the only country with which India 
entered into an agreement for the repatriation of the overseas Indians. But 
during Indira Gandhi's rule India exposed a rigid approach and refused to 
extend the Shastri-Bandaranaike Agreement beyond October 1981. By this 
time it had become clear to Sri Lankan Government that it had to accept all 
the remaining stateless persons as its citizens irrespective of the fact that 
India had failed to fulfill its quota as accepted in the 1964 and 1974 
Agreements. And reason for this shift in Sri Lankan Government's attitude 
was quick aggravation of ethnic mess in the northern and eastern region of 
Sri Lanka and India's increasing interest and involvement into it. Besides, 
Colombo also realized that without New Delhi's good offices communal 
problem of the island would not be resolved as the attitude of western 
powers was quite discouraging. 
The Sinhala-Tamil conflict was getting intensified everyday. 
From the day of independence of Sri Lanka, the discriminatory policies of 
Sri Lankan Government, like the denial of citizenship to estate Tamil 
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workers, 'Sinhala only' policy etc. prepared ground for this communal 
conflict. And these policies were also responsible for the rise of Tamil 
militancy. Tamil organizations like TULF, LTTE etc. sprang up very 
quickly to fight discrimination done by the Sinhala Sri Lankan 
Government. As the communal problem originated due to injustice done 
with Tamils of Indian origin or estate workers, Indian Government directly 
or indirectly has always been involved in this problem. Indira Gandhi 
offered India's good offices and appointed G. Parthasarathy as the Chief 
negotiator. However, this is also a reality that during her times, India 
provided training to Tamil militants on Indian soil in order to militarily 
pressurize the Jayewardene Government. Indira Gandhi wanted the 
legitimate and genuine demands of the Tamils to be met but within the 
framework of a united Sri Lanka. Her successor Rajiv Gandhi, however, 
treated the subject in a different manner and involved India militarily in 
the ethnic havoc of the island, and faced a great diplomatic failure. As it 
has already been discussed how IPKF operation proved to be a big failure, 
both Tamil militants and Sri Lankan Government turned hostile to India 
and ultimately India faced great embarrassment and it had to call IPKF 
back from Sri Lanka. It did not stop here but Rajiv Gandhi paid a heavy 
price as he was killed by one suicide bomber of LTTE. Till then all the 
successive Indian Governments have maintained sort of neutral stand and 
have avoided (generally) reacting on developments occurring in the island. 
Let it be western powers or Sri Lankan Government or LTTE or Indian 
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Government itself, every body knows that without Indian involvement it 
will be very difficult to settle the ethnic problem. Realizing this fact only 
LITE asked India to be involved in the peace process, Sri Lankan 
Government too under the western pressure, requested India to play an 
active role in the peace process, but India has preferred to watch all the 
developments quietly. Therefore, US backed Norway has taken over the 
responsibility of peace-brokers. Even Norweigians keep India informed of 
all the developments which occur in peace process. In February 2002 Sri 
Lankan Government and LTTE signed Norwegian-brokered peace truce. 
Things were about to be finalized but first due to some ingenuine and 
unnecessary demands of LTTE and then due to bitter power politics of Sri 
Lanka, thus created a stalemate in peace talks. A special Norwegian envoy 
Eric Solheim "failed to clinch any agreement between Sri Lanka's warring 
parties despite his second attempt in a month to revive stalled peace 
talks''.^ 
Though, it may sound ironical, but Sri Lanka's Tamil Tiger 
guerrillas swore allegiance to peace even as they marked yet another 
anniversary of their highly feared suicide squads known as the Black 
Tigers. But this year "Black Tiger Day" celebration was marred, probably 
for the first time in rebel history, by two attacks' that threaten to 
* In Sri Lanka's Blood soaked history, every Black Tiger anniversary is a day when security 
forces fear attack by the LTTE-a situation changed by the Norwegian-brokered truce of 
February 2002. But this year on 5"" July unidentified gunmen shot dead an LTTE activist and 
wounded three others, including a local leader, in two well coordinated attacks in the eastern 
district of Batticaloa. 
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destabilize over two years peace in ttie nation. As a retaliatory action, a 
Tamil Tiger suicide bomber blew herself up inside a police station in 
Colombo claiming lives of at least five people and shattering more than 
two years of relative peace.* LTTE warned in clear terms that while it was 
"fully aware of our people's desire for peace", "we also want to express in 
no uncertain terms that if war is thrust on us, we are prepared to respond". 
The unfortunate part of this long story is that when the Tamils 
had put forward their reasonable demands, the Sinhalese were adamant and 
unyielding. When the Government for once appeared serious and acting 
reasonably and willing to go the extra mile and the international 
community is keeping a vigilant eye to ensure that the Government indeed 
acted reasonable, LTTE's unaccommodating attitude is subverting the 
peace process. Unless both give up their mulishness and act in the larger 
interest of the people whom they pretend to represent, peace would 
continue to evade the island and both the Tamils and the Sinhalese would 
continue to bleed. As it is recognized by Colombo and the outside world 
that only a settlement acceptable to the LTTE can bring peace to the 
island. In such conditions major responsibility is cast on the LTTE. It has 
over the years by its stubbornness and free resort to the gun even against 
the Tamils, alienated the Tamil community. Besides, LTTE is not unaware 
of the fact that gradually it is loosing the support of Tamil community. But 
* The target of this attack was Government Minister Douglas Devananda, a Tamil who is a 
vocal opponent of LTTE. 
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the problem on the Sinhala side continues to be no less acute. There are 
many parties representing the Sinhalese and there is no consensus on how 
far they would agree to go in accommodating Tamil aspirations. It is the 
lack of consensus among them on the extent of devolution and 
accommodation that can be reached with the Tamils that continues to 
hamper the peace process. 
In such difficult situations the most vital question before India is 
how to sustain its indisputable pre-eminent position as a regional power as 
well as how to secure the region along with maintaining congenial 
relations with its immediate neighbour Sri Lanka. Its high time when we 
should realize that LTTE has become a dangerous power which is posing a 
serious threat not just to Sri Lanka but to the South Asian region as a 
whole since everyone's security is interlinked. It is evident that even after 
the ceasefire which was signed in February 2002, LTTE has committed 
numerous violations both of the spirit and the letter of the ceasefire by 
continuing to smuggle in arms by sea, assassinating political opponents, 
harassing Muslims in the east and expanding a so called Navy which 
consists of a large number of small boats of various kinds driven by 
outboard motors. 
Besides, the security of Trincomalee harbour, one of the best and 
deepest natural harbours, is in danger, as a large number of camps and 
other LTTE military installations have arisen around the southern rim of 
the harbour since the ceasefire. LTTE's suicide boats hidden in the 
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mangrove swamps of the inner rim of the harbour have been spotted. The 
famous collection of oil tanks built by the British, which have now been 
leased to the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), are situated on the rim of the 
harbour. Hence, India now has a legal stake in the oil tanks and the 
security of the oil tanks becomes a matter of direct concern to India. 
Nevertheless, the presence of a third so-called Navy in the 
region, however rudimentary it might be for the moment, poses a threat 
which cannot be discounted. "A retired Indian Admiral speaking at a 
seminar in Volombo drew pointed attention to this naval threat".'* 
Therefore, being the biggest power in South Asia, this is sort of 
duty on the part of New Delhi, not to encourage LTTE's ingenuine 
demands as well as to observe that LTTE is not receiving any help from 
the state of Tamil Nadu as since March 2001, there have been reports that 
"Mr. Vaiko, the leader of MDMK, and Mr. P. Nedumaran, who heads the 
Tamil Nationalist Movement in Tamil Nadu, have sought the support of the 
Convenor of the ruling National Democratic Alliance of India, former 
Defence Minister George Fernandes, in their initiative to rehabilitate the 
LTTE".^ This is however, important to note that later on Mr. Vaiko was 
imprisoned in POTA for allegedly supporting LTTE. The observance of 
such arrangements is must as any kind of leniency with LTTE would 
definitely encourage separatist movement in Tamil Nadu, next door to 
Colombo. Here our Government might follow Nehruvian approach viz. 
preservation of national interest first thereafter rest other things. 
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Besides, being the pre-eminent regional power, India should 
observe that no outside power is entering as well as interfering into the 
region. Here it should be noticed, that right from the beginning Chandrika 
Kumaratunga Government has displayed faith in western powers in place 
of India, so far the settlement of ethnic mess is concerned. But here Indian 
Government should also be blamed as over the years it has exhibited 
highly indifferent attitude so far Sri Lanka's civil war is concerned. Here 
our Government should realize that military resort is not the only way of 
helping out Sri Lanka, there are other ways out too. We can always go for 
consultations, talks. Here the question is; shall we take initiative and offer 
our good offices to Colombo? No definitely not especially after IPKF 
embarrassment. But once the needy country is urging for help, (as several 
times this kind of situation has arisen viz. during the fall of Elephant Pass 
in the year 2000) being the biggest power of the region, India should 
accept this request and should offer every possible assistance to its 
neighbouring country. This is the only way of keeping outside powers 
away from the region. Even at this point of time when peace talks are 
stalled, India may play an active role by having consultations with all the 
concerned parties as well as by offering its suggestions to them for ending 
20 years long ethnic havoc. 
Furthermore this must be noted that New Delhi will have to 
improve its intelligence network if it really wishes to be updated about the 
region. The political crisis which occured in Sri Lanka in November 2003, 
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highlighted the loopholes of our intelligence agency RAW, when our 
leaders expressed complete unawareness to the political happenings in the 
island. 
In addition, New Delhi and Colombo both should concentrate 
over strengthening the trade relations. Indo- Sri Lanka Free Trade 
Agreement has proved to be a great success and it has greatly encouraged 
both the Governments to expand its scope to cover services and investment 
in a comprehensive economic partnership agreement. Both the countries 
should enter into new bilateral as well as multilateral trade Pacts. Once all 
the members of South Asia concentrate on making the region more and 
more prosperous, they would definitely come out of their prejudices 
against each other. Hence, improved trade relations particularly improved 
export-import, is the greatest need of the time. 
Moreover, the civil war of Sri Lanka has claimed numerous 
innocent lives. Gross human rights violation in the island has made the 
ethnic issue a matter of great concern to different international 
organizations. A number of human rights agencies and activists are 
working there for displaced persons' rehabilitation. If the war ends, the 
whole South Asia in fact the entire world will take a sigh of relief. Here it 
should be kept in mind that slowly but firmly, terrorism is permeating 
South Asia, be it the case of Kashmir in India or recently emerged 
insurgency in Bhutan or maoists' terrorism in Nepal or LTTE's terrorist 
activities in Sri Lanka. As the security of all the neighbouring countries is 
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interconnected, all the South Asian countries should work together to 
perish terrorism. Though bilateral issues cannot be discussed in UN, 
SAARC etc. but when the safety of all the countries of a region is 
involved, the issue should certainly be raised, be discussed in all these 
world forums. By this method only South Asian countries may devise 
measures to curb terrorism. 
To add, what is noteworthy here is, western powers like USA and 
UK, should give up their double standards particularly while dealing with 
small countries. As it has been proved that USA and UK were the one who 
provided LTTE with arms and ammunitions, playing different cards, now 
they have banned this organization. Now these countries are backing, 
Norway brokered peace talks but this should not be forgotten that they 
were the one who once backed LTTE also and prepared it against Sri 
Lankan Government. However, now the western powers are exerting 
pressure on Sri Lankan Government to be in harmony with India for the 
materialization of any peace process. Hence, its right time when Colombo 
should realize that first the help should come from within the region then 
from somewhere else. So, its right time to recognize each other's potential 
as well as each other's importance. 
On internal front, Indian Government has to be very careful as 
the state of Tamil Nadu keeps sympathy with LTTE and it was the pressure 
of Tamil Nadu Government which worked in the year 2000 during the fall 
of Elephant Pass and despite earnest requests, India offered only 
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humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka. In all such matters, Indian 
Government should adopt comparatively strict approach and state 
Governments should also realize their limits as dealing of foreign affairs 
lie in central Government's domain. 
India should also keep in view the problems of Indian fishermen 
in the Palk Strait region. Only pursuing formal talks can never be helpful 
what is must is concrete agreements or amendment in earlier agreements, 
so that Indian fishermen could regain their genuine right of fishing around 
Kachchativu. So far occurrence of frequent clashes between Indian 
fishermen and Sri Lankan Navy is concerned, Tamil Nadu Government 
should strictly observe that no Indian fisherman's boat is being used by 
LTTE. Besides, some awareness programmes should also be initiated by 
the state Government so that the fishermen could understand the dangers of 
helping LTTE and intruding the Sri Lankan waters. Here some humane 
treatment is also expected from Sri Lankan Navy as shoting or killing 
Indian fishermen is not the solution of increasing illegal activities of 
LTTE. 
So far India is concerned, India cannot wish away this 
undesirable reality and be indifferent to the developments in the island, 
especially when its stakes and interest in the resolution of the conflict are 
quite clearly high. There are about two lakh Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in 
India whose voluntary repatriation is contingent upon the return of peace 
in the island. The Tamil political constituency in India is watching 
carefully all the developments regarding peace process, in the island. 
Tamil Nadu's Ex-Chief Minister Karunanidhi has already registered his 
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support for the division of Sri Lanka. In such a situation, the Indian 
Government cannot be indifferent and inactive. 
India has to analyse both the aspects of the ethnic crisis, viz., the 
victory of the Sri Lankan Army will strengthen the Sinhalese hegemonic 
state. At the same time, the LTTE's victory will not only marginalize and 
eliminate the moderate Tamil society but also possibly unleash potential 
forces of destabilization in India. Though New Delhi has assured Colombo 
to provide all possible help to strengthen the peace bid, but we are not very 
enthusiastic about our contribution to the peace bid. We want to keep the 
Indian Tamil political lobby happy, at the same time we want to have 
cordial relations with Sri Lankan Government. So first India has to make 
its stand clear. Our leaders will have to display the similar kind of vision 
which Nehru had. We have already discussed that Nehru as a statesman 
had always been appreciated even by D.S. Senanayake and Kotelawala, 
and also that he never compromised where national prestige and national 
interest were involved. But today our leadership has no clear vision. We 
should realize this fact that we can not follow the policy of non-
involvement anymore. In November 2003 Sri Lankan President, giving to 
bitter power struggle between the President and Prime Minister, declared 
emergency in the island and RAW has once again proved to be 
unsuccessful in keeping an eye on all the developments occurring in Sri 
Lanka. Rather our Ministry for External Affairs got surprised for this was 
totally unexpected political move for them. Means we don't want to 
involve ourselves into the political developments of the island. But here 
Indian leadership should realize that any Indian policy of involvement 
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need not be anit - Sri Lankan Government or anti - Sri Lankan Tamils. It 
can be 'pro-peace' and not 'pro-active interventionist' which India 
undertook in the late eighties. Indian involvement can be executed at the 
policy level, that is, by constantly pronouncing India's deep interest and 
desire for a honourable settlement of the conflict,Besides, India has to 
build up confidence into the Sri Lankan Government that it is a staunch 
supporter of the island's unity and integrity and should utilize its resources 
to prepare LTTE so that it could be agreed for autonomy within the 
country, as Mr. Wickremesinghc's peace strategy, based on extending the 
greatest possible political autonomy to the Tigers within the framework of 
a unified Sri Lanka remains the only reasonable basis for a negotiated 
settlement to the Tamil question. Before supporting LTTE or by not 
reacting on political happenings in Sri Lanka, New Delhi should consider 
that the problem of secessionist movements cannot be resolved through the 
creation of more states as Tamil Nadu is next door to Sri Lanka and this 
kind of situation may arise there also. Hence, New Delhi should support 
the principle that no independence but unlimited devolution is the exact 
answer to the Tamil question in Sri Lanka as it is of the separatist 
movement in Kashmir. 
We should never forget that our region is heir to a centuries-old 
tradition of tolerance, pluralism and creative interaction. We need to 
recapture this ethos in the modern context. In the post-cold war world of 
globalization, countries around the world are increasingly focusing on 
regional economics. Political disputes have been resolved diplomatically or 
quietly deferred for tackling at a more opportune time. Conflict has given 
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way to cooperation; dialogue moderates differences. There is a clear 
recognition that hostility only stunts economies, inhibits trade and retards 
progress. In words of Former Prime Minister Atal Behar Vajpayee : "If we 
in South Asia look back objectively at the experiences of our freedom 
struggles and of our nation building, the one stark lesson that stands out is 
the imperative of forging a unity based on our commonalities. Whenever we 
have dissipated our energies in internal squabbling, external forces have 
come in to sort our differences and stayed on to exploit our resources"^ 
Hence, both India and Sri Lanka should understand that their 
search for pragmatism, maturity and wisdom will have to involve both 
Governments and civil society. It will also require a widespread 
understanding that in today's contest, collective regional interest is an 
expression of enlightened self-interest. Both the Governments may avoid the 
mistakes committed by predecessors as time has provided them with full 
opportunity to work together to make Indian Ocean a 'Zone of Peace' as 
well as South Asia a safe and prosperous region. 
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Appendix - 1 
The Citizenship Act of Sri Lanica, November 15, 1948 
CITIZENSHIP 
An Act to make Provision for Citizenship 
of Ceylon and for Matters connected therewith 
[IS'''November 1948] 
1. This may be cited as the Citizenship Act. (Short title) 
Part-I 
CITIZENSHIP OF CEYLON 
2. (1) With effect from the appointed date, there Status shall be a status to 
be known as "the status of a citizen of Ceylon". 
(2) A person shall be or become entitled to the status of a citizen of 
Ceylon in one of the following ways only: 
(a) by right of descent as provided by this Act; 
(b) by virtue of registration as provided by this Act or by any other 
act authorizing the grant of such status by registration in any 
special case of a specified description. 
(3) Every person who is possessed of the aforesaid status is herein after 
referred to as a "citizen of Ceylon". In any context in which a distinction 
is drawn according as that status is based on descent or registration, a 
citizen of Ceylon is referred to as "citizen by descent" or "citizen by 
registration", and the status of such citizen is in the like context referred 
to as "citizenship by descent" or "citizenship by registration". 
3. A citizen of Ceylon may for any purpose Citizenship and 
in Ceylon describe his nationality by the , , . 
use of the expression "Citizen of Nationality 
Ceylon". 
Part-II 
CITIZENSHIP BY DESCENT 
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(1) Subject to the other provisions of 
this Part, a person born in Ceylon 
before the appointed date shall have 
the status of a citizen of Ceylon by 
descent, if— 
Citizenship by 
descent in the 
case of persons 
born before the 
appointed date. 
(a) his father was born in Ceylon, or 
(b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in 
Ceylon. 
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a person born outside Ceylon 
before the appointed date shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by 
descent, if-
(a) his father and paternal grandfather were born in Ceylon, or 
(b) his paternal grandfather and paternal great grandfather were born in 
Ceylon. 
5. (1) Subject to the other provisions of 
this Part, a person born in Ceylon 
on or after the appointed date 
shall have the status of a citizen 
of Ceylon by descent if at the 
time of his birth his father is a 
citizen of Ceylon. 
Citizenship by 
descent in the 
case of persons 
born on or after 
the appointed 
date. 
426 
Appendices 
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a person born 
outside Ceylon on or after the appointed date shall have 
the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent if at the time 
of his birth his father is a citizen of Ceylon and if, within 
one year from the date of birth, or within such further 
period as Minister may for good cause allow, the birth is 
registered in the prescribed manner -
(a) at the office of a consular officer of Ceylon in the country of birth, or 
(b)at the office of the Minister in Ceylon. 
Upon application made in that behalf in 
the prescribed manner, the Minister may, 
in his discretion, grant, in the prescribed 
form, a certificate of citizenship of 
Ceylon by descent to a person with 
respect to whose status as a citizen of 
Ceylon by descent a doubt exists; and a 
certificate issued under this section to 
any person was a citizen of Ceylon by 
descent on the date thereof, but without 
prejudice to any evidence that he was 
such a citizen at an earlier date. 
Every person first found in Ceylon as a 
newly born deserted infant of unknown 
and unascertainable parentage shall, 
until the contrary is proved, be deemed 
to have the status of a citizen of Ceylon 
by descent. 
(1) Any person who ceases under section 
19 or section 20 to be a citizen of 
Ceylon by descent may at any time 
thereafter make application to the 
Minister for a declaration that such 
person has resumed the status of a 
citizen of Ceylon by descent; and 
the Minister may make the 
declaration for which the 
application is made -
Certificate of 
citizenship of 
Ceylon by 
descent in case 
of doubt. 
Foundlings 
Resumption of 
citizenship by 
descent. 
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(a) if that person renounces citizenship of any other country of 
which he is a citizen, in accordance with the law in force in 
that behalf in that other country; and 
(b) if that person is, and intends to continue to be, ordinarily 
resident in Ceylon. 
(2) Where a declaration is made in relation to any person under 
subsection (1), that person shall, with effect from such date 
as may be specified in the declaration, again have the status 
of a citizen of Ceylon by descent. 
(3) Any person who makes or has made an application under 
subsection (1) may, in his application or by subsequent 
letter, make a request for the grant to any minor child of that 
person of the status of a citizen of Ceylon by descent; and if 
in any such case a declaration under subsection (1) is made 
in relation to that person each minor child specified in the 
declaration shall have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by 
descent. 
(4) The Minister may in his discretion exempt any person from 
the requirements of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this 
section, and make a declaration under that subsection 
notwithstanding that such person does not comply with the 
said requirements. 
9. (1) Any reference to father, paternal Persons born 
grandfather, or paternal great out of wedlock 
grandfather in any of the provisions 
of this Part relating to citizenship 
by descent shall, in regard to a 
person born out of wedlock and not 
legitimated, be deemed to be a 
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reference to mother, maternal 
grandfather, or maternal great 
grandfather respectively. 
(2) A person shall be deemed, for the 
purposes of this section, to have 
been legitimated if his parents 
married each other subsequent to 
his birth. 
10. Any reference in this Part to the status 
or description of the father of a person 
at the time of that person's birth shall, 
in regard to a person born after the death 
of his father, be deemed to be a 
reference to the status or description of 
the father at the time of the father's 
death; and where that death occurred 
before, and the birth occurs on or after 
the appointed date, the status or 
description which would have been 
applicable to the father had he died on 
or after that date shall be deemed to be 
the status or description applicable to 
him at the time of his death. 
Posthoumous 
persons. 
Part-Ill 
CITIZENSHIP BY REGISTRATION 
11. (1) This section shall apply to any 
applicant for registration as a 
citizen of Ceylon who has the 
following qualifications : 
(a) that the applicant is of full age and 
of sound mind; 
(b) that the applicant-
Persons entitled 
to registration as 
citizens. 
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i. is a person whose mother is or was a citizen of Ceylon by 
descent or would have been a citizen of Ceylon by descent 
if she had been alive on the appointed date, and who, 
being married, has been resident in Ceylon throughout a 
period of seven years immediately preceding the date of 
the application, or, being unmarried, has been resident in 
Ceylon throughout a period of ten years immediately 
preceding the date of the application, or 
ii) is a person, whose father was a citizen of Ceylon by 
descent, and who would have been a citizen of Ceylon 
under subsection (2) of section 5 if his birth had been 
registered in accordance with the provisions of that 
subsection, or 
iii) is a person, whose father having been a citizen of Ceylon 
by descent whether at or before the time of the birth of 
that person, ceased under section 20 to be a citizen of 
Ceylon; and 
(c) that the applicant is, and intends to continue to be, 
ordinarily resident in Ceylon. 
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Part, a person to 
whom this section applies shall-
(a) if he has the qualification set out in sub-paragraph (i) of 
paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section, be 
registered as a citizen of Ceylon on his making application 
in that behalf to the Minister in the prescribed manner, or 
(b) if he has the qualification set out in sub-paragraph (iii) or 
sub-paragraph (iv) of the aforesaid paragraph (b), be so 
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registered on his making such application, unless the 
Minister decided to disallow such application on grounds 
of public policy, 
(3) The Minister's refusal, under subsection (2) (b) of this 
section to allow the application of any person for 
registration as a citizen of Ceylon shall be final and shall 
not be contested in any court. 
12. (1) Subject to the other provisions of Registration of 
this Part, no person who is the spouse, widow or 
spouse, or the widow or widower of citizen 
widower, of a citizen of Ceylon of Ceylon 
by descent or registration, shall 
be registered as a citizen of 
Ceylon under this Act, except in 
accordance with the succeeding 
provisions of this section. 
(2) A person who desires to be registered as a citizen of Ceylon 
under this section shall send an application in the prescribed 
form and manner to the prescribed officer. 
(3) After the receipt of the application under subsection (2) the 
prescribed officer shall send the application to the Minister, if 
he is satisfied that the applicant has the following 
qualifications : 
(a) that the applicant has the qualifications specified in paragraphs 
(a) and (c) of sub-section (1) of section II; 
(b) that the applicant has been resident in Ceylon throughout a 
period of one year preceding the date of the application of such 
applicant; and 
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(c) that the applicant is the spouse, or the widow or widower, of a 
citizen of Ceylon by descent or registration. 
(4) The Minister may refuse an application sent to him under 
subsection (3), if he is satisfied that it is not in the public 
interest to grant the application. 
(5) Where the Minister grants an application for registration made 
under this section by any person, such person shall be registered 
as a citizen of Ceylon. 
(6) The Minister's refusal under subsection (4) of this section to 
allow the application of a person for registration as citizen of 
Ceylon shall be final and shall not be contested in any Court. 
13. (1) Subject to the other provisions of Registration, as 
this Part, a person to whom section citizen of 
11 or section 12 does not apply persons to 
may, on his making application in whom sections 
that behalf to the Minister in the 11 or 12 do not 
prescribed manner, be registered as apply 
a citizen of Ceylon if the Minister 
is satisfied -
(a) that he is a person who -
i) has rendered distinguished public service or is eminent in 
professional, commercial, industrial, or agricultural life, or 
ii) has been granted in Ceylon a certificate of naturalization under the 
British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914*, of the United 
Kingdom, or Letters Patent under the Naturalization Ordinance, 
1890 , and has not ceased to be a British subject, and 
Repealed to the extent indicated in Part II of the Fourth Schedule to the British Nationality Act, 
1948[ll&12Geo.vi,c.56]. 
Repeated by Act No. 18 of 1948. 
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(b) that he is, and intends to continue to be, ordinarily resident in 
Ceylon. 
(2) The number of persons registered as citizens of Ceylon under this 
section shall not exceed twenty-five in any year. 
(3) The Minister's refusal under this section to allow the application of any 
person for registration as a citizen of Ceylon shall be final and shall not 
be contested in any court. 
14. (1) Where an applicant for registration 
as a citizen of Ceylon has any 
minor child, he may in his 
application or by subsequent letter 
make a request for the inclusion of 
the name of that child in the 
certificate of registration which 
may be granted to him under this 
Part. 
Minor children of 
applicants for 
registration as 
citizens of Ceylon 
(2) Where a request as aforesaid is made by an applicant under 
section 11 or section 12 or section 13, the Minister may, subject 
to the other provisions of this part, comply with the request if 
the applicant is registered as a citizen of Ceylon. 
15. (1) Save as provided in section 11, 
a person who has ceased to be a 
citizen of Ceylon shall not be 
granted citizenship by 
registration. 
Persons who are 
not to be granted 
citizenship by 
Registration. 
(2) A person who is a citizen of any country other than Ceylon 
under any law in force in that country shall not be granted 
citizenship by registration unless he renounces citizenship of 
that country in accordance with that law. 
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(3) The Minister may in his discretion exempt any person from the 
provisions of subsection (2) of this section; and nothing in that 
subsection shall prevent the registration as a citizen of Ceylon 
of any person so exempted. 
Register. 
Certificate 
registration. 
of 
16. There shall be kept and maintained, 
in the prescribed form, a register of 
persons who are granted citizenship 
by registration. 
17. The Minister shall grant, in the 
prescribed form, a certificate of 
registration as a citizen of Ceylon 
to every person who is registered 
under section 11 or section 12 or 
section 13 and, where he decides to 
comply with a request made by that 
person under section 14, shall 
include in the certificate the name 
of every minor child to whom the 
request relates. 
18. (1) A British subject to whom a 
certificate of registration as a 
citizen of Ceylon is granted 
shall, on subscribing the 
prescribed oath or affirmation 
of citizenship, have the status 
of a citizen of Ceylon by 
registration as from the date of 
that certificate. 
(2) An alien to whom a certificate of registration as a citizen of 
Ceylon is granted shall, on subscribing the prescribed oath or 
affirmation of allegiance and the prescribed oath or affirmation 
of citizenship, have the status of a citizen of Ceylon by 
registration as from the date of that certificate. 
(3) A minor child whose name is included in a certificate of 
registration as a citizen of Ceylon shall have the status of a 
Effect of certificate of 
registration. 
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citizen of Ceylon by registration as from the date of that 
certificate. 
PART - IV 
LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP 
19. If a citizen of Ceylon of full age Renunciation of 
and of sound mind makes a citizenship of 
declaration of renunciation of Ceylon, 
citizenship of Ceylon in the 
prescribed manner, the Minister 
shall cause the declaration to be 
registered; and, upon registration 
thereof, the declarant shall cease to 
be a citizen of Ceylon : 
Provided however that the Minister may withhold registration of such 
declaration if it is made during the continuance of any war in which Ceylon is 
engaged and if, by the operation of any law enacted in consequence of that 
war, the declarant is deemed for the time being to be an enemy. 
20. (1) Where a person born before the Restrictions against 
appointed date is a citizen of dual citizenship of 
Ceylon by descent and is also on persons who are 
that date a citizen of any other citizens by descent 
country, that person shall -
(a) on the 31 day of December, 1952, or 
(b) on the day on which he attains the age of twenty two years, 
whichever day is in his case the later, cease to be a citizen of 
Ceylon, unless before that day he renounces citizenship of that 
other country in accordance with the law therein in force in that 
behalf and notifies such renunciation to a prescribed officer. 
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(2) Where a person is a citizen of Ceylon by descent and that person, by 
operation of law, is at the time of his birth or becomes thereafter, also a 
citizen of any other country, that person shall-
(a) on the 31 day of December, 1952, or 
(b) on the day immediately succeeding the date of the expiration of a 
period of twelve months from the date on which he so becomes a 
citizen of that other country, or 
(c) on the day on which he attains the age of twenty-two years, 
whichever day is in his case the latest, cease to be citizen of 
Ceylon, unless before that day he renounces citizenship of that 
other country, in accordance with the law therein in force in that 
behalf and notifies such renunciation to a prescribed officer. 
(3) A person who, under subsection (2) of section, 5, is a citizen of Ceylon 
by descent but whose father is or was a citizen of Ceylon by registration 
shall, on the day on which he attains the age of twenty-two years, cease 
to be a citizen of Ceylon, unless before that day he transmits to the 
Minister in the prescribed manner and forms declaration of retention of 
citizenship of Ceylon. 
(4) In the case of any person to whom the provisions of any of the preceding 
subsections apply, the Minister may in his discretion direct that those 
provisions shall apply in that case subject to the modification that the 
reference therein to the age of twenty-two years shall be construed as a 
reference to such higher age as may be specified in the direction. 
(5) A person who is a citizen of Ceylon by descent shall cease to be a 
citizen of Ceylon if he voluntarily becomes a citizen of any other 
country. 
436 
Appendices 
(6) Where a person who, having been exempted from the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 8, resumes the status of a 
citizen of Ceylon by descent by virtue of a declaration under that 
subsection, that person shall, on the day immediately succeeding the 
date of the expiration of a period of three months (or such longer period 
as the Minister may for good cause allow) from the date of the 
declaration, cease to be a citizen of Ceylon, unless he earlier complies 
with the requirements of the aforesaid paragraph (a). 
21. (1) A person who is a citizen of Ceylon Restrictions against dual 
by registration shall cease to be a citizenship of persons 
citizen of Ceylon if he voluntarily who are citizens by 
becomes a citizen of any other Registration, 
country. 
(2) Where a person who is registered as a citizen of Ceylon 
thereafter becomes, by operation of law, also a citizen of any 
other country, that persons shall -
(a) on the day immediately succeeding the date of the expiration of a 
period of three months (or such longer period as the Minister may 
for good cause allow) from the date on which he so becomes a 
citizen of that other country, or 
(b) on the day on which he attains the age of twenty-two years, 
whichever day is in his case the later, cease to be a citizen of 
Ceylon, unless before that day he renounces citizenship of that 
other country in accordance with the law therein in force in that 
behalf and notifies such renunciation to a prescribed officer. 
(3) Where any person -
(a) who, having been exempted from the provisions of subsection 
(2) of section 15, is registered under this act as a citizen of 
Ceylon; or 
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(b) who is registered under the Indian and Pakistani Residents 
(Citizenship) Act as a citizen of Ceylon, continues after such 
registration to be a citizen of any other country, that person shall -
i) on the day immediately succeeding the date of the expiration of 
a period of three months (or such longer period as the Minister 
may for good cause allow) from the date of his registration as a 
citizen of Ceylon, or 
ii) on the day on which he attains the age of twenty-two years, 
whichever day is in his case the later, cease to be a citizen of 
Ceylon, unless before that day he renounces citizenship of that 
other country in accordance with the law therein in force in that 
behalf and notifies such renunciation to a prescribed officer. 
22. (l)In any case where any person 
purports to renounce citizenship of 
any country for the purpose of 
acquiring, retaining or resuming, 
under any provision of this Act, the 
status of a citizen of Ceylon, and it is 
found at any time that the 
renunciation was not in accordance 
with or not effective under the law in 
force in that behalf in such other 
country, that person shall be deemed 
never to have acquired, retained or 
resumed, under that provision, the 
status of a citizen of Ceylon; and if 
the Minister makes a declaration to 
that effect in any such case, the 
declaration shall be final and shall 
not be contested in any court. 
23. A person who is a citizen by registration 
shall cease to be a citizen of Ceylon if 
that person resides outside Ceylon for 
fine consecutive years or more, 
exclusive of any period during which 
that person -
Cases of invalid or 
ineffective renunciations 
of foreign citizenship 
Residence outside 
Ceylon for five 
consecutive years 
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(a) is employed abroad as an officer in the service of the 
Government of Ceylon, or 
(b) is abroad as a representative of the Government of Ceylon, or 
(c) being the spouse or minor child of a citizen of Ceylon who is 
abioad in any of the capacities specified in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of this section, resides abroad with that citizen, or 
(d) resides abroad on a holiday or for reasons of health, or 
(e) is a student at an educational institution abroad, or 
(f) resides abroad with a spouse who is a citizen of Ceylon by 
descent, or 
(g) is abroad for any prescribed purpose. 
24. (1) Where the Minister is satisfied that Declaration by Minister 
a person who is a citizen of Ceylon of loss of citizenship in 
by registration - specified circumstances. 
(a) has been convicted of an offence under this Act; or 
(b) has been convicted of any offence under Chapter VI of the 
Penal Code; or 
(c) was registered as a citizen of Ceylon by means of fraud, false 
representation, or the concealment of material circumstances 
or by mistake; or 
(d) has, within five years after the date of registration as a citizen of 
Ceylon, been sentenced in any court to imprisonment for a term of 
twelve months or more; or 
(e) has, since the date of his becoming a citizen of Ceylon by 
registration, been for a period of not less than two years ordinarily 
resident in a foreign country of which he was a national or citizen 
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at any time prior to that date, and has not maintained a substantial 
connection with Ceylon; or 
(f) has taken an oath or affirmation of, or made a declaration of, 
allegiance to a foreign country; or 
(g) has so conducted himself that his continuance as a citizen of 
Ceylon is detrimental to the interests of Ceylon, the Minister may 
by order declare that such person shall cease to be such a citizen, 
and thereupon the person in respect of whom the order is made 
shall cease to be a citizen of Ceylon by registration. 
(2) Before the Minister makes any order in relation to a person to whom 
paragraph (g) of subsection (1) of this section applies, he shall refer that 
person's case for inquiry by one or more persons appointed by him, with 
such qualifications as may be prescribed. The person or persons who 
have been authorized to make an inquiry under the preceding provisions 
of this section shall, as soon as the inquiry is completed, make a written 
report to the Minister. He shall not make any order under subsection (1) 
of this section without carefully considering such report. 
(3) Where a person ceases to be a citizen of Ceylon under subsection (1) of 
this section, the Minister may by order direct that all or any of the 
persons specified in the following paragraphs shall cease to be citizens 
of Ceylon, and thereupon they shall cease to be citizens -
(a) all or any of the minor children of such person who have been 
included in the certificate of registration issued to him at the time 
of his registration, and 
(b) the spouse, widow or widower of such person, if such spouse, 
widow or widower was registered under this Act. 
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PART - V 
MISCELLANEOUS 
25. Any person who, for the purpose of 
procuring anything to be done or not to 
be done under this Act, makes any 
statement which he knows to be false in 
a material particular shall be guilty of 
an offence and shall on conviction after 
summary trial before a Magistrate, be 
liable to imprisonment of either 
description for a term not exceeding 
three months. 
26. Every person to whom a certificate 
under this Act is granted shall, in 
respect of that certificate, pay, in the 
prescribed manner, a fee according to 
the prescribed rates. 
27. (l)The Minister may make all such 
regulations as may be necessary for 
giving effect to the provisions of 
this Act, and in particular for 
prescribing any matter which is 
stated or required to be prescribed. 
(2) No regulation made by the Minister 
shall have effect until it has 
received the approval of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives 
and notification of such approval is 
published in the Gazette. 
28. (l)In this Act, unless the context 
otherwise requires -
Offence. 
Fees. 
Regulations. 
Interpretation. 
"alien" means a person who is not a British subject; 
"appointed date" means the 15 day of November, 1948; 
"British subject" has the same meaning as in the law of the United 
Kingdom; 
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"consular officer of Ceylon" includes an Ambassador, 
a High Commissioner, a Commissioner, a Representative, or a Trade 
Commissioner, of Ceylon; 
"Minor child" means a person who has not attained the age of twenty-
one years; 
"prescribed" means prescribed by regulation made under this Act. 
(2) For the purpose of this Act a person of full age is a person who has 
attained the age of twenty-one years. 
Source: A.S. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic 
Conflict Documents - 1947^2000, vol.11, India Research Press : New 
Delhi, 2001, pp.552-62. 
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Appendix - II 
CEYLON IMMIGRANTS AND EMIGRANTS ACT OF 1948 
In his letter dated 22"''* June 1948 regarding citizenship rights for 
Indians in Ceylon, the Prime Minister of Ceylon had stated that those Indian 
residents who do not choose or are not admitted to Ceylon citizenship would 
continue to be allowed to remain in the island as Indian citizens and to pursue 
their lawful avocations without any interference. The Government of India 
regret to note that this assurance of the Ceylon Prime Minister is not being 
observed in practice in the working of the Ceylon Immigrants and Emigrants 
Act of 1948. 
When the Government of Ceylon sent a copy of the proposed 
Immigrants and Emigrants Bill in August 1948 the Government of India 
through their High Commissioner suggested the postponement of the 
consideration of the Bill pending the settlement of the question of citizenship 
rights. In his reply dated 17"^  August** 1948 the Ceylon Prime Minister stated 
that no restrictions were contemplated either in the Bill or in the proposed 
Regulations under it as regards Indians already in Ceylon. He however pointed 
out that Indians would come under notice as regards re-entry if and when they 
wished to leave the island. He pointed out that the proposed Bill provided that 
no temporary residence permit shall be refused in the case of a person who, 
being a British subject, was ordinarily resident in Ceylon for at least 5 years 
immediately preceding the appointed date. The Prime Minister stated that this 
would cover all Indians who are likely to become Ceylon citizens and that any 
arrangements which may be made in the future and even with regard to other 
Indians who had any connection with Ceylon it was not proposed, pending the 
settlement of the question of the registration of Indian residents as citizens, to 
* Document No.216. 
** Document No.223. 
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refuse entry permits except in exceptional circumstances. In view of the 
assurance of the Ceylon Prime Minister dated 22"'' June 1948 the Government 
of India presume that all those persons who were in Ceylon on the appointed 
date would automatically be given temporary residence permits to enable them 
to make short visits to India. The Government of India were however 
particular that those Indians who had stayed in Ceylon for a prescribed period 
should be given permanent residence permits and therefore made 
representations to this effect through their High Commissioner in Ceylon. The 
High Commissioner discussed this matter with the Ceylon Prime Minister who 
was inclined to make such a provision in the regulations under the Act. But the 
government of India were anxious that the provision should be incorporated in 
the Act rather than in the regulations there under. In reply to this the Ceylon 
Prime Minister stated that Indians who had been in Ceylon for a prescribed 
period would only be entitled to a temporary residence permit as a matter of 
right, but this did not mean that permanent residence permits would not 
ordinarily be issued to Indians who have more than a temporary interest in the 
island. 
The Ceylon Immigrants and Emigrants Act came into force on the 1^ ' 
November 1949. The Government of India found that temporary residence 
permits were as a rule being refused to persons who had been residing in 
Ceylon for less than 5 years and that even those who had resided for more than 
5 years experienced difficulty in obtaining residence permits as they were 
unable to prove their residence to the satisfaction of the Immigration 
authorities. The Government of India therefore represented to the Ceylon 
Government through their High Commissioner in Ceylon that residence 
permits should not be refused to those persons who were in Ceylon on the date 
of commencement of the Act should be allowed to return to Ceylon. In reply to 
this the Ceylon Prime Minister stated that it was not possible to lay down that 
every Indian who was resident in Ceylon on the appointed date should have a 
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right of re-entry and indefinite residence irrespective of the previous residence 
and the nature of his business in the island. The Prime Minister of Ceylon 
however added that even in regard to persons who were not resident in Ceylon 
for the prescribed period of five years the fact that a person was returning to an 
employment he had previously held would give him a better claim to obtain a 
residence permit than in the case of one who is in every respect a new comer to 
Ceylon. 
The Government of India have been watching the administration of 
the Act in the last 7 months. They wish to point out the hardship to Indians 
resident in Ceylon in the administration of the Act. 
Permanent Residence Permits: It is found that very few 
permanent residence permits have been issued so far. According to the 
Immigration regulations permanent residence permits would be issued only to 
those who have a permanent and abiding interest Ceylon. The term "permanent 
and abiding interest" is very vague. It is an admitted fact that there are large 
numbers of Indians who have made Ceylon their home. Some of ihem may not 
be qualified to be Ceylon citizens under the Indian and Pakistani Residents 
(Citizenship) Act, 1949 owing to the stringent qualifications prescribed under 
that Act. Some may, for sentimental or other reasons, prefer to remain as 
Indian nationals, though qualified to become Ceylon citizens and though they 
are permanently settled in this country. The Government of India feels that all 
persons who consider themselves permanently settled and who have resided in 
Ceylon for a period of five years should be given Permanent Residence 
Permits without being asked to submit proof of a 'permanent and abiding 
interest in Ceylon'. 
Temporary Residence Permits: Under the Act Temporary 
Residence Permits should not be refused for persons who have been in Ceylon 
for a period of 5 years prior to l" November 1948. No distinction is being 
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drawn between persons who have been residing in Ceylon for less than 5 years 
and those who are entirely new to Ceylon in the matter of residence permits. 
Indians resident in Ceylon have to apply for temporary residence permits only 
when they desire to pay a short visit to India either on business or for domestic 
reasons. The Government of India wish to reiterate that even persons who have 
been in Ceylon for less than 5 years should be issued temporary residence 
permits. If the Government of Ceylon consider that all those persons who were 
in Ceylon on the T' November 1949 should not be issued such permits in view 
of the fact that nearly one year had passed since the passage of the Act, the 
Government of India would press that at least all those persons who were in 
Ceylon on the V^ of November 1948 should be issued temporary residence 
permits as a matter of course irrespective of their occupation in life. 
The Government of India fully appreciate the Ceylon Government's 
anxiety to restrict immigration into Ceylon with a view to provide employment 
for their own nationals. It should be observed that the Government of India are 
not asking for residence permits for persons who are new to Ceylon and who 
desire to enter the country after the coming into force of the Immigrants and 
Emigrants Act for purposes of employment or business. All that they are 
asking is that persons already in Ceylon should be allowed to continue their 
residence and also to pay short visits to their families in India. As persons who 
are leaving Ceylon for good will not be replaced by new immigrants from 
India therefore trust that the Government of Ceylon will find their way to 
accept their suggestions given in this note. 
Source: A.S. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic 
Conflict Documents - 1947-200 , vol.11, India Research Press: New 
Delhi, 2001, pp.578-80. 
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Appendix - III 
INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND 
CEYLON REGARDING PROPOSALS FOR IMMIGRATION INTO 
CEYLON AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF PERSONS OF INDIAN 
ORIGIN 
New Delhi, 18 January 1954* 
WHEREAS certain proposals relating to illicit immigration of Indians 
into and citizenship rights for persons of Indian origin in Ceylon were made in 
an instrument signed at New Delhi on the eighteenth day of January in the year 
one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four by the respective Plenipotentiaries 
and Representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Ceylon 
duly authorised for that purpose, which instrument is, word for word, as 
follows: 
•"The Prime Ministers of Ceylon and India accompanied by some of 
their colleagues, met in conference in New Delhi on January 16, 17 and 18, 
1954. and considered fully the problems of people of Indian origin in Ceylon. 
As a result of these discussions, certain proposals were framed by them, which 
•:•.:'.] now be placed before their respective Government. 
These Proposals are : 
Illicit Immigration 
1. Both Governments are determined to suppress illicit immigration traffic 
between the two countries and will take all possible steps, in close 
cooperation with each other towards that end. Periodical meetings 
between high Police authorities on either side of the Palk Strait may be 
held and information relating to illicit movements exchanged. 
* Ratified by Government of India on 13 February, 1954; Implementing acts passed by Ceylon in 
June 1954. 
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2. The Government of Ceylon propose to undertake the preparation of a 
register of all adult residents who are not already on the electoral 
register and will maintain such registers up-to-date. When this 
registration is completed, any person not so registered will, if his 
mother-tongue is an Indian language, be presumed to be an illicit 
immigrant from India and liable to deportation and the Indian High 
Commissioner will extend all facilities for implementation of such 
deportation. 
3. The Government of Ceylon may proceed with the Immigrants and 
Emigrants Amendment Bill which throws on the accused the onus of 
proof that he is not an illicit immigrant; but before that the Government 
of Ceylon will give an opportunity to the Indian High Commissioner to 
satisfy himself that a prime facie case exists for such prosecution, the 
final decision being that of the Government of Ceylon. 
Citizenship 
4. The registration of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) 
Act will be expedited and every endeavour will be made to complete the 
disposal of pending applications within two years. 
5. All persons registered under this Act may be placed by the Government 
of Ceylon on a separate electoral register, particularly in view of the fact 
that the bulk of the citizens do not speak the language of the area in 
which they reside. This arrangement will last for a period of only 10 
years. The Government of Ceylon agree that in certain constituencies 
where the number of registered citizen voters is not likely to exceed 
250, they will be put on the national register. 
6. Citizens whose names are placed in the separate electoral register will 
be entitled to elect a certain number of members to the House of 
Representatives, the number being determined after consultation with 
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the Prime Minister of India. The Government of Ceylon expect to 
complete their action in this respect before the present Parliament is 
dissolved in 1957. 
7. In regard to those persons who are not so registered, it would be open to 
them to register themselves as Indian citizens, if they so choose, at the 
office of the Indian High Commissioner in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 8 of the Constitution of India. It is noted that 
Ceylon proposes to offer special inducements to encourage such 
registration and that these inducements will be announced from time to 
time. The Government of India will offer administrative and similar 
facilities to all persons of Indian Constitution of India, if they so choose, 
and will also give publicity to the availability of such facilities. 
8. Both Prime Ministers are desirous of continuing the present practice of 
close consultation between the two Governments in mattes affecting 
their mutual interests. 
I Sd.) JOHN KOTELAWAL.A, 
Prime Minister of Ceylon 
New Delhi: 
18'-'- January, 1954. 
(Sd.) JAWAHARLAL NEHRU 
Prime Minister of India 
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RATIFICATION BY INDIA 
AND WHEREAS these proposals having been accepted by the 
Government of India have become an agreement, and whereas it is fit and 
expedient to confirm and ratify the aforesaid agreement relating to illicit 
immigration of Indians into and citizenship rights for persons of Indian origin 
in Ceylon. 
Now, THEREFORE, be it known that the Government of India, having 
seen and considered the said agreement relating to illicit immigration of 
Indians into and citizenship rights for persons of Indian origin in Ceylon, do 
hereby confirm and ratify the same, in every Article and Clause thereof; 
faithfully undertaking to perform and observe all the stipulations therein 
contained. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, Rajendra Prasad, President of India, have 
signed these Presents and affixed hereunto my seal at New Delhi, this 13"^  day 
of February of the year one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four. 
(Sd.) RAJENDRA PRASAD 
President of India 
Source; INDIA Bilateral Treaties and Agreements, vol.2: 1953-57,Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, pp. 133-35. 
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Appendix - IV 
"INDIA-BILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS" 
VOL.2 : 1953-1957 
AGREED DECISIONS AT THE INDIA-CEYLON CONFERENCE 
RELATING TO PERSONS OF INDIAN ORIGIN RESIDENT IN CEYLON 
New Delhi, 9 and 10 October 1954 
1. A Conference was held on October 9"" and 10'\ 1954 in New Delhi, to 
consider certain problems relating to persons of Indian origin resident in 
Ceylon. The Conference was attended by a delegation from Ceylon led 
by the Prime Minister of Ceylon and a delegation led by the Prime 
Minster of India. The Conference discussed their problems fully and 
frankly, and in a spirit of friendly and cooperative endeavour to 
overcome the difficulties that had arisen. 
2. There was a basic difference of opinion between the two delegations in 
regard to the status of people of Indian origin in Ceylon. The Ceylon 
Delegation stated that it has always been the position of Ceylon, as it 
still is, that such persons continue to be citizens or nationals of India 
unless and until they are accepted as Ceylon citizens. The Ceylon 
Delegation could not therefore accept the position that any of these 
persons are stateless. The Indian Delegation stated that only those 
persons of Indian origin who are already in possession of Indian 
passports and passes, or who have been registered at the Indian High 
Commission under Article 8 of the Constitution of India are Indian 
citizens. Other persons of Indian origin who are not either Ceylon 
citizens or Indian citizens are therefore at present stateless. It was 
further stated that there could be no automatic conferment of Indian 
nationality on persons belonging to this category. 
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3. The Conference also considered the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of January 
18, 1954, *and the misunderstandings that had arisen in regard to its 
implementation. In that agreement it was provided that the registration 
of citizens under the Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act would be 
expedited, and every endeavour would be made to complete the disposal 
of pending applications within two years. It was further stated that in 
regard to persons not so registered it would be open to them to register 
themselves as Indian citizens, if they so chose, at the office of the Indian 
High Commissioner in Ceylon in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 8 of the Constitution of India. It was further provided that the 
Government of India would offer administrative and similar facilities to 
all persons of Indian origin to register themselves as Indian citizens 
under the Constitution of India, if they so chose, and would also give 
publicity to the availability of such facilities. 
4. While these two processes of registration have continued, the pace of 
such registration has been slow and certain difficulties have arisen. 
Complaints have been made by both sides about certain procedures 
which come in the way of full implementation of the Agreement and 
have created misunderstandings. 
5. As there appeared to be a basic difference in the approach of the two 
countries to the problem of the status of persons of Indian origin 
resident in Ceylon, it was decided that the practical course was to 
recognise this difference and to proceed as rapidly as possible with the 
two processes of registration as Ceylon citizens or as Indian citizens, 
and thus to reduce the number of these persons who at present were not 
accepted either as Ceylon citizens or as Indian citizens. In this way the 
number of such persons would be progressively reduced and would be 
* See Doc. No.90, vol.11. 
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more amenable to further consideration at a later stage. It was 
recognised by both Governments that it was undesirable to have a large 
group of persons who could not be accepted as citizens of either 
country. It was agreed, therefore, that these processes of registration 
should be expedited. 
6. It was agreed that in regard to those persons who are not registered as 
Ceylon citizens, it would be open to them to register themselves as 
Indian citizens if they so chose. The Indian High Commissioner will 
entertain all applications made to him for registration as Indian citizens 
under Article 8 of the Constitution of India, and will grant every facility 
for this purpose, subject to satisfying himself that the applicants have 
the prescribed qualifications under the Indian law. Applications will not 
be refused on the ground that an applicant had earlier applied to the 
authorities in Ceylon for registration as a citizen under the law of 
Ceylon. 
7. The procedure for registration as citizens of Ceylon will be simplified as 
far as is possible, within the terms of the law, so as to complete, as far 
as may be practicable, the disposal of applications within the time 
mentioned in the Indo-Ceylon Agreement of 1954. The Ceylon 
Government will examine, with a view to their withdrawal, any 
executive instructions of a restrictive nature, issued by the Ceylon 
authorities, which result in the rejection of such applications on purely 
technical grounds. 
8. The Ceylon Government will resume the practice of issuing Identity 
Certificates for travel abroad to all persons of Indian origin resident in 
Ceylon whose applications for Ceylon citizenship are pending. The issue 
of such certificates will be governed by the rules and conditions which 
apply to Ceylon citizens. Exchange facilities for remittances of money 
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out of Ceylon by such persons will be the same as those available to 
Ceylon citizens. 
The Indian High Commissioner will issue Identity Certificates for 
purposes of travel to persons of Indian origin whose applications for 
registration as Indian citizens are pending before him. 
The Indian authorities will provide travel facilities and the Ceylon 
Government will give such persons remittance facilities, as before. 
9. The Government of the two countries earnestly hope that the steps 
mentioned above will in the time contemplated, i.e., 2 years resolve to a 
substantial degree the problem of persons of Indian origin resident in 
Ceylon by their registration either as Ceylon citizens or as Indian 
citizens. At the end of this period and when the registrations under the 
Indian and Pakistani (Citizenship) Act are completed, the position will 
be reviewed with a view to deciding what further steps may be needed to 
deal with the problems of the residue that may be left. The Ceylon 
Government for its part states that it will in addition have to consider 
what steps may be necessary at that stage to safeguard the interests of its 
own citizens in regard to such matters as employment. It was stated on 
behalf of the Government of India that while every effort should be 
made to promote employment, as stated by the Ceylon Government, this 
should not involve, in their opinion, any coercion or victimization of 
those persons of Indian origin who may still remain unregistered either 
as Ceylon citizens or Indian citizens. The measure of success attained in 
dealing with this problem will depend largely on a friendly and co-
operative approach of all parties and every effort should be made to 
encourage this friendly approach. 
10. It was stated on behalf of the Ceylon Government that it intends in the 
meanwhile to introduce a scheme enabling persons of Indian origin now 
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in employment in Ceylon who may hereafter acquire Indian citizenship 
to continue in such employment till the age of that it has under 
consideration a scheme for the payment, under such conditions as may 
be prescribed, of gratuities to such persons when they leave the country. 
Such persons will also be given social and medical benefits no less 
favourable than those which may be provided for workers of the same 
category who are Ceylon citizens. 
11. The two Governments will exchange information regarding lists of 
registration etc. from time to time to ensure effective co-operation in 
carrying out these arrangements. 
Source: INDIA Bilateral Treaties and Agreements, vol.2: 1953-57, Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, pp.230-33. 
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Appendix - V 
"INDIA-BILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS" 
VOL.5 : 1964-1966 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF 
PERSONS OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN CEYLON BY EXCHANGE OF 
LETTERS 
New Delhi, 30 October 1964 
LETTERS 
PRIME MINISTER, INDIA 
N0.446/PMO/64 
New Delhi, 
30"^  October, 1964 
Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter 
No.CIT/ICP/62 of date, which reads as follows: 
"I have the honour to refer to the discussions which we have had 
from the 24"' to the 30"' October, 1964 regarding the status and future of 
persons of Indian origin in Ceylon and to refer to the main heads of agreement 
between us which are as follows: 
(1) The declared objective of this agreement is that all persons of Indian 
origin in Ceylon who have not been recognised either as citizens of 
Ceylon or as citizens of India should become citizens either of Ceylon or 
of India. 
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(2) The number of such persons is approximately 975,000 as of date. This 
figure does not include illicit immigrants and Indian passport holders. 
(3) 300,000 of these persons together with the natural increase in that 
number will be granted Ceylon citizenship by the Government of 
Ceylon; the Government of India will accept repatriation to India of 
525,000 of these persons together with the natural increase in that 
number. The Government of India will confer citizenship on these 
persons. 
(4) The status and future of the remaining 150,000 of these persons will be 
the subject matter of a separate agreement between the two 
Governments. 
(5) The Government of India will accept repatriation of the persons to be 
repatriated within a period of 15 years from the date of this Agreement 
according to a programme as evenly phased as possible. 
(6) The grant of Ceylon citizenship under paragraph 3 and the process of 
repatriation under paragraph 5 shall both be phased over the period of 15 
years and shall, as far as possible, keep pace with each other in 
proportion to the relative numbers to be granted citizenship and to be 
repatriated respectively. 
(7) The Government of Ceylon will grant to the persons to be repatriated to 
India during the period of their residence in Ceylon the same facilities 
as are enjoyed by citizens of other states except facilities for remittances 
and normal facilities for their continued residence, including free visas. 
The Government of Ceylon agrees that such of these persons as are 
gainfully employed on the date of this Agreement shall continue in their 
employment until the date of their repatriation in accordance with the 
date of their repatriation in accordance with the requirements of the 
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phased programme or until they attain the age of 55 years, whichever is 
earlier. 
(8) Subject to the Exchange Control Regulations for the time being in force 
which will not be discriminatory against the persons to be repatriated to 
India, the Government of Ceylon agrees to permit these persons to 
repatriate, at the time of their final departure for India, all their assets 
including their Provident Fund and gratuity amounts. The Government 
of Ceylon agrees that the maximum amount of assets which any family 
shall be permitted to repatriate shall not be reduced to less than 
Rs.4,000. 
(9) Two registers will be prepared as early as possible, one containing the 
names of persons who will be granted Ceylon citizenship, the other 
containing the names of persons to be repatriated to India. The 
completion of these registers, however, is not a condition precedent to 
the commencement of the grant of Ceylon citizenship and the process of 
repatriation. 
(10) This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the date hereof 
and the two Governments shall proceed with all despatch to implement 
this Agreement and, to that end, the officials of the two Governments 
shall meet as soon as possible to establish joint machinery and to 
formulate the appropriate procedures for the implementation of this 
Agreement. 
I h ave the honour to propose that the above sets out correctly the 
Agreement reached between us. My letter and your reply thereto shall 
constitute an Agreement between the Government of India and the Government 
of Ceylon. 
Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
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I have the honour to confirm that the above correctly sets out the 
Agreement reached between us. Your letter and my reply thereto shall 
constitute an Agreement between the Government of India and the Government 
of Ceylon. 
Accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Sd.) LAL BAHADUR 
Prime Minister of India 
Her Excellency 
Sirimavo R.D. BANDARANAIKE, 
Prime Minister of Ceylon, New Delhi. 
Source: INDIA Bilateral Treaties and Agreements, vol.5: 1964-66, Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, pp. 182-84. 
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Appendix - VI 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA ON THE 
BOUNDARY IN HISTORIC WATERS 
New Delhi, 26 June 1974 
Colombo, 28 June 1974 
The Government of the Republic of India 
And 
The Government of the Republic of Sri Lanka Desiring to determine 
The boundary line in the historic waters between India and Sri Lanka 
and to settle the related matters in a manner which is fair and equitable to both 
sides. Ha\mg exammed the entire question from all angles and taken into 
account the historical and other evidence and legal aspects thereof, 
Ha\e agreed as follows : 
ARTICLE 1 
The boundary between India and Sri Lanka in the waters from 
Adam's Bridge to Palk Strait shall be arcs of Great Circles between the 
following positions, in the sequence given below, defined by latitude and 
longitude: 
lO'* 05'North, 80° 03 East 
09° 57'North, 79° 35'East 
09°40.15'North, 79°22.60'East 
09° 21.80'North, 79° 30.70'East 
09° 13'North, 79° 32'East 
09° 06'North, 79° 32'East 
Position 1 
Position 2 
Position 3 
Position 4 
Position 5 
Position 6 
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ARTICLE 2 
The coordinates of the positions specified in Article I are 
geographical coordinates and the straight lines connecting them are indicated 
in the chart annexed hereto which has been signed by the surveyors authorized 
by the two Governments, respectively. 
ARTICLE 3 
The actual location of the aforementioned positions at sea and on the 
seabed shall be determined by a method to be mutually agreed upon by the 
surveyors authorized for the purpose by the two Governments, respectively. 
ARTICLE 4 
Each country shall have sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction and 
control over the waters, the islands, the continental shelf and the subsoil 
thereof, falling on its own side of the aforesaid boundary. 
ARTICLE 5 
Subject to the foregoing, Indian fishermen and pilgrims will enjoy 
access to visit Kachchativu as hitherto, and will not be required by Sri Lanka 
to obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes. 
ARTICLE 6 
The vessels of India and Sri Lanka will enjoy in each other's waters 
such rights as they have traditionally enjoyed therein. 
ARTICLE 7 
If any single geological petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or 
any single geological structure or field of any other mineral deposit, including 
sand or gravel, extends across the boundary referred to in Article 1 and the 
part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of the boundary, is 
exploited, in whole or in part, from the other side of the boundary, the two 
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countries shall seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure 
or field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the 
proceeds deriving there from shall be apportioned. 
ARTICLE 8 
This agreement shall be subject to ratification. It shall enter into 
force on the date of exchange of the instruments of the ratification which will 
take place as soon as possible. 
For the Government of the 
Republic of India 
Sd/- Indira Gandhi 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Sri Lanka 
Sd/- Srimavo R.D. Bandaranaike 
Source: INDIA Bilateral Treaties and Agreements, vol.8 : 1974-75, Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, pp. 143-145. 
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Appendix - VII 
STATEMENT RE-AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND SRI LANKA 
ON BOUNDARY IN HISTORIC WATERS BETWEEN THE TWO 
COUNTRIES AND RELATED MATTERS 
Mr. SPEAKER : Now, Shri Swaran Singh will make a statement.... 
SHRI MADHU LIMA YE (Banka) : On a point of order. I had 
already given you notice. 
SHRI K. MANOHARAN (Madras North) : Each Member must be 
given a proper opportunity to express his views. 
SHRI SEZHIYAN (Kumbakonam) : Before the Hon. Minister 
makes his statement, I want to submit that we should have been consulted and 
the House should have been taken into confidence before they entered into this 
unholy agreement for the surrender of territory by India. While we are anxious 
that friendly and cordial relations should be maintained with Sri Lanka, the 
legal and constitutional proprieties involved have to be taken into account. 
This agreement goes against the interests of the country since it amounts to 
pure surrender of our territory without going through any of the norms. This is 
an unholy and disgraceful act of statesmanship unworthy of any government. 
Therefore, we do not want to associate ourselves with the statement that is 
going to be made by the Hon. Minister, and we want to disassociate ourselves 
by walking out of the House. 
SHRI K. MANOHARAN : Please allow one Member from each 
party to express his views. We have decided to stage a walk-out, and, 
therefore, before we walk out we want to tell you the reasons which have 
prompted us to walk out. 
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The agreement entered into between Sri Lanka Government and the 
Government of India is anti-national and unpatriotic; it is the worst agreement 
ever signed by any civilised country of the world. I do not like to insult or hurt 
the feelings of either the people of Sri Lanka or the Prime Minister of Sri 
Lanka 
MR. SPEAKER : Hon. Members are going to have a debate on 
foreign affairs when they can raise all these points. 
SHRI K. MANOHARAN : I must be permitted to speak now. 
Through this unholy agreement, the Sri Lanka Prime Minister has emerged as 
victor and the Prime Minister of India as a pathetic vanquished. It is an assault 
on the integrity of the country. In view of this, we have decided to stage a walk 
out and we are walking out. 
^ ^^^ feFl^: SieJfaT ^ " ^ , T ^ CSTCR^ TT cf>T y?^ 11 ^'^ SfTtT cfrt 
MR. SPEAKER : The Minister has the right to make a statement in 
the House. 
^ # ^ ? f ^ ^ t f r 3 i k ?ftcf^ ^ ytTR Tf^ ^ 6iidx}ld f^ sir, ^r^!^ 
arri v j ^ c^ 6fK vjR IT? TrrFfeTT -w^ '^ vddmi Tnjj_ -^ -^^ i^m f^ B^T^ 
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^ ^ ^ 6fK ^fr ^WET f e r ^ r^Tcf>^  f i m rw^ f f ^ f^rercf>T ci^  ^ s r ^ ^ 
cf?r t^ r r f f cf^ ^cn s-ni 1880 ^' XUHHIV^ ^ T M T ^ vjfFfk ^ "^[F ^^JT % ^ ^ 
a-TTI (cZfcTtTFT) 
^f^t-TPT ^ ' ^ ? f r e R f ^ ^R^ -dp] cfTT^ ^TTT ^ ^ ^?T cfTt ^ ' " ^ ^ffcfnfT t ? F R ^ 
t ? ^Fm T R ^ f^qPT ^^TT3T1^ cf?r ^ WT^ ^ ' TRT ^ eft ^JTPft ^ f l ^ ? F^ T ? ^ 
^ W^^ •$ fercTT^ f I ^ F ^^TTcf7 ^fFT??tcrr 1 1 ^ F ^ ^ T ^ ^ %cT c^ feldiq^ 
MR. SPEAKER : The Minister has the right to make a statement. 
^ ^tT feTfT^ : Sie^I^T W T ^ ^ , 3mT T?cf7 XJcp cf^ t ^ ^ e f t f ^ I 
(cZicftTFT) : ^ q ^ ^^r^ - ^ i ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
3 n ^ 3Trg^ T j ^ cfn ^ 3if^R?K 1 1 snt? v j ^ c^  BTTT? artpft ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ f ^ ^ 
t I (cJTcTtTH) 3TFf XJcp TTC}^  cfTT ^efT?^? | 
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SHRI P.K.N. THEVAR (Ramanathapuram) : Kachchativu forms 
part of my constituency. You are acting like a dictator. You are speaking like a 
democrat, but at the same time you are acting like a dictator. The whole life of 
thousands of fishermen Today the Ceylon Government has moved their 
forces, their military, towards that island. Thousands of mechanised boats were 
stopped; movements were restricted. Their lives are in danger. You have 
simply betrayed. You have no sympathy and courtesy to consult those people. 
You are thinking of it as a part of Tamil Nadu. Do not think it as part of Tamil 
Nadu. It is going to be the base for a future war. It is going to be the base and 
challenge the life of the nation. I have to warn all these things because in the 
past it has been the tradition of our Government to give bhoodan of the 
northern borders. (Interruptions). 
MR. SPEAKER : Kindly sit down. 
SHRI P.K.N. THEVAR : The division of India has cost the life of 
Mahatma Gandhi. It is not a part of Tamil Nadu but it is a part of the holy land 
of India. You are betraying On behalf of the constituency and on behalf of 
the Forward Block, I walk out. 
SHRI MUHAMMED SHERIFF (Periakulam) : Even on the 1 '^ 
April 1968, I produced sufficient records in this House to show that 
Kachchativu belongs to the Raja of Ramnad. Government has failed to go 
through those records. I was the elected representative of that constituency 
here previously. It is a shame on the part of the Government that they have not 
consulted the people of the place and the Chief Minister of the State. We 
condemn this action of Government and along with my friends, I also walk out 
in protest. (Shri P.K.N. Thevar and Shri Muhammed Sheriff then left the 
House). 
^ ^% feR^ : 3TL1I5T WT^^, ^ r f WcT ^T?^ -^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ afr f^ 
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3TT^  f I W f^TTer ^ 1 ^ fcT^^T ^ ^ ^ ? ^ W ^ ^' cJTFT a-TT f ^ "Wc^\f^ cf^ t 
^ ^ f 1 ^ ? ^ f ^ ^ 1^? ^ , ^3^ "m^ ^ f ^ ? T H ^ s^ r, ^ f r 1?^ ^ ? ^ 
^ v3?R ^ ^ ^TR^ ^' clT^ srf cfr 3TFI v31Tcf^  3Tq^ ^TPrd t eft cfzn 
HPTerr " ^ ^ cfft€ c^  'm^^ 'n^\ a f k ^ ^ cf7t€ c^  •^ fTFr=^  vfrrar? ^JRCFR ^ 
^m^ c{7^  ^ ' T f afh? ^ cRW VRcT ^ £Rcfr ^ ^T^fTtR c j r ^ cfft 3 ^ ^vjIMd 
^^r eft ^ ? R^TfTelT ^ cfcp uTT^Tn ^ W^ ^ ^ 3n?m STW cf^ f^TcT^ 
Mf^RHiiT ^ ^ 5 T cfv?K fXT cfjn ^cj7 vfr C^^R s m ^ ^ wcn ^ f r ^ t IURT^' 
f%^^ ^ Frar ^ E^Tcfr vifT Tfr 11 P^eT TTT^ TfTuT •^'^ cp^Tf f ^ ifTif^ CITT TTcfj 
^^T T^FT IFfRT fl^ FfTT t eft ^3^3^ f^cil<K-M< ^ ^ ^ t f ^ ^ ^ x f 
f % ^ ^ ? f ^ ^ ^^ fFT q^ ^ J ^ cfft ^ t % ^ cf5=t -^ f t f ^ I eft -^^ f^cpf vjft ccFefcZf f 
W^ ^T^ ^' ^ IT? an^q t f% TTTvift^ftc[ TTTfrtic: ^ , ^-l^cbl^ chKHHI c^  
antfR IR, ^TRef g>t tpfcft ^ f ^ H ^ ^ -Ef^  vJfT W^ % I ^^ FTfeH? ^m ? ^ ^ 
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^ t f ^ l ^ % f^^ RT f ^ ? T T f ^ ^ IT? cPBT arr fcf> ^ F r^qFTT ^eJIcbl t 3f1^ 
^ f ! r t T R ^ ^i\\\<\ cfTT THePf c { r ^ cf^ SieZfST W t ^ ^ , 3 n ^ cF fR ^ t , 
^ f ^CTR c^ T^qf^ cPT 3 n w r T^TeFT cb>lc|M| t , ^TrfeHT ^ SfPq ^ t^PTO 
f ^ ^ ^ t % STFT f ^ ^ T T f ^ ^ ?^>? ^ \ f ^ f ^ ^ ^ ccfcTcJI H^oiSTT ^TCcT ^ ^ 
^ war ^FT^ oJIFT ^'Tf | 
SHRI P.K. DEO (Kalahandi) : On a point of order, Sir. The 
statement that the Foreign Minister is going to make deals with cession of 
Indian territory. In this regard, two important issues are involved. The first is 
the constitutional issue. Article 1 of the Constitution says : 
"The territory of India shall comprise 
a. the territories of the States; 
b. the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule; and 
c. such other territories as may be acquired". 
So, further acquisition of territory can be accepted, but nowhere does 
the Constitution provide for cession of even an inch of Indian territory. The 
Kachchativu controversy was raised only a few years ago by the Ceylonese 
Government when the Bandaranaike Minister came into power. All the revenue 
records of the Madras Government corroborate that Kachchativu was a part of 
the former Ramnad Zamindary and an integral part of this country. So, under 
no circumstances the Government has got any power under the Constitution to 
cede even an inch of our country. Sir they cannot consider this country as the 
Zamindari of the Congress party. A few days back the Coco Island, which is 
part of the Andaman group of islands, was ceded to Burma. The question of 
Beru Bari was raised by the previous speaker. Now has come the question of 
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Kachchativu. If we go on ceding our territory like this, what will be left of this 
country? 
Secondly, it is utter contempt and disrespect shown to this House by 
not taking the House into confidence and facing us with a fait accompli. The 
shutting out of the views of the opposition parties in this manner is most anti-
democratic. So, I would say that the statement which is going to be laid on the 
Table of the Lok Sabha is not worth the paper on which it has been typed. 
Therefore, I would submit that the External Affairs Minister should consider 
these matters and should not lay the statement on the Table of the House. 
Otherwise, we will be forced to take the extreme step of walking out. 
MR. SPEAKER : My ruling is that the Minister has a right to make 
a statement. When the Government enters into an agreement with another 
Government, that must come before this House. The Members must be 
informed of what is taking place. 
SHRI SEZHIYAN : But the agreement is unconstitutional. 
MR. SPEAKER : How can we know it? 
SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE : It is published in newspapers. 
MR. SPEAKER : How can the House be seized of the matter unless 
the Minister makes a statement? 
SHRI ATAL BIHARI VAJPAYEE : Can they violate the 
Constitution? 
MR. SPEAKER : I have given the ruling. Now, the Minister. 
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(At this stage Shri Kachwai tore up some papers and threw them 
away). 
(Some Hon. Members left the House at the stage). 
SHRI K. LAKKAPPA : Sir the tearing of papers by an Hon. 
Member is contempt of the House. I want your ruling on this. 
MR. SPEAKER : My ruling is that tearing of papers is not in 
keeping with the decorum or dignity of the House. 
THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI SWARAN 
SINGH) : Over the years, since our independence, there have been a number 
of questions and discussions in the House regarding the Island of Kachchativu. 
Government have of course fully shared this interest and concern for arriving 
at an early and amicable solution of this long-outstanding matter; and I am 
happy to say that an agreement was signed between the two Prime Ministers on 
28"' June, a copy of which I am laying on the table of the House. 
The Island of Kachchativu, about % of a square mile in extent, is 
situated in the Palk Bay; it is about 10'/z miles for the nearest landfall in Sri 
Lanka and about 121/2 miles from the nearest Indian shore. The Palk Bay, 
which constitutes historic waters of India and Sri Lanka, is some 18 miles wide 
at its entrance through the Palk Straits, and has an average width of some 28 
miles. 
The issue of deciding Indian and Sri Lanka claims to Kachchativu 
was closely connected with determining the boundary line between India and 
Sri Lanka in the waters of the Palk Bay. The entire question of the maritime 
boundary in the historic waters of the Palk Bay required urgently to be settled, 
keeping in view the claims of the two sides, historical evidence, legal practice 
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and precedent and in the broader context of our growing friendly relations with 
Sri Lanka. 
Kachchativu has always been an uninhabited island. Neither Sri 
Lanka nor India has had any permanent presence there. During the long 
colonial period the question whether Kachchativu was part of India or part of 
Ceylon was frequently discussed, with the Governments of the day putting 
forward claims and counter claims. In recent years, both countries had agreed 
that there should be no unilateral action which would seek to change the 
undetermined status of Kachchativu pending a final solution to be reached 
through amicable bilateral efforts. 
I would particularly like to draw the attention of Honourable 
Members to the fact that when two sides have a good arguable case on a 
particular issue, and the problem cannot be resolved expeditiously through 
bilateral negotiations, there is inevitably an attempt to seek outside 
intervention by appeal either to the International Court of Justice or to third 
party arbitration. For our part, we have always been firmly of the view that in 
any differences with our neighbouring countries, we should seek to resolve 
them through bilateral discussions without outside interference, on the basis of 
equality and goodwill. It is a matter of satisfaction to us that our Prime 
Minister's resolve to settle this issue through direct bilateral talks met with an 
equally warm response from the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, and the 
agreement could be reached in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual 
understanding. 
Exhaustive research of historical and other records was made by our 
experts on Kachchativu and every available piece of evidence collected from 
various record offices in India, such as in Tamil Nadu, Goa and Bombay, as 
well as abroad in British and Dutch archives. An intensive examination of 
evidence and exchange of views took place, specially during the past year. 
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between senior officials of the two Governments. This question of 
Kachchativu, for the reasons I have just explained, had necessarily to be dealt 
with as part of the broader question of the boundary in the Palk Bay so as to 
eliminate the possibility of any further disputes on similar matters in these 
historic waters. 
On the basis of dispassionate examination of the historical records 
and other evidence, and keeping in mind the legal principles and also keeping 
in mind our policy and principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, I feel 
confident that the Agreement demarcating the maritime boundary in the Palk 
Bay, will be considered as fair, just and equitable to both countries. At the 
same time, I wish to remind the Hon'ble Members that in concluding this 
Agreement the rights of fishing, pilgrimage and navigation, which both sides 
have enjoyed in the past, have been fully safeguarded for the future. It would 
be wrong to see this Agreement as a victory for one side or the other. Both 
countries have gained as a result of the agreement, which is a victory of mature 
statesmanship, a victory in the cause of friendship and cooperation in the area. 
A potential major irritant in relations between the two countries, which had 
remained unresolved over the years, has now been removed, and both countries 
can now concentrate on the exploitation of economic and other resources in 
these, now well-defined, waters and generally on intensifying cooperation 
between themselves in various fields. The Agreement marks an important step 
in further strengthening the close ties that bind India and Sri Lanka. 
SHRI M. KALYANASUNDARAM (Tiruchirapalli) ; Sir, while my 
party welcomes the Agreements reached between Sri Lanka and India, there 
are problems to come up during the implementation of the Agreements. So far, 
our fishermen had a right to go even beyond Kachchativu, fish and come back. 
The Hon. Minister says that these rights are fully protected. But there are 
problems which we would like our Government to take up with Sri Lanka and 
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seek their soulution. For that reason, I submit, there should be a discussion on 
this statement. I have given notice of a motion, I would request you to allow a 
discussion on that. 
MR. SPEAKER : The general debate on foreign affairs is coming up 
next week. 
SHRI DINEN BHATTACHARYA (Serampore) : I want to seek 
one clarification. In the statement he has mentioned that Kachchativu has 
always been an uninhabited island. But an Hon. Member had said that it was 
within his constituency. If that is so, I do not know how it could be said that it 
has not been inhabited by any human being. How could it then be a part of his 
constituency? 
SHRI M. KALYANASUNDRAM : The Tamil Nadu Government 
has a grievance that it has not been consulted properly. May I know what is the 
actual fact in regard to that? I also want to know the details about the 
protection given with regard to fishing rights. 
SHRI SWARAN SINGH : The Hon. Member would no doubt be 
aware that in the year 1921 when both Sri Lanka and India were under British 
rule, fishery line had been decided by the British Government because they 
had control over both Sri Lanka as well as India. I am sure that the Hon. 
Member knows that the 1921 fishery line was a line which was about three or 
three and a half miles west of the Kachchativu. That is, to the western side of 
the fishery line was the exclusive fishery right of the Indian citizens and to the 
east of that was the right of Sri Lanka fishermen. But in spite of that division, 
the fishermen generally were free to fish even round about Kachchativu and 
they also used the Kachchativu island for drying their nets. As would be 
known to the House there is no fresh water available there. Mostly they used it 
for spreading their nets and trying to dry the nets, etc. 
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About the traditional rights, if the Hon. Members goes through the 
terms of the agreement, a copy of which has been placed on the Table of the 
House, he will get the answer because it is mentioned there that, although Sri 
Lanka's claim to sovereignty over Kachchativu has been recognised, the 
traditional rights of Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit that island will 
remain unaffected. Similarly, the traditional navigation rights exercised by 
India and Sri Lanka in each other's water will remain unaffected 
(Interruptions). 
MR. SPEAKER : Later on we may have debate on this, but not now. 
I am not allowing any more. 
Mr. Kureel 
Source : Lok Sabha Debates, July 23, 1974, Cols.186-201. 
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Appendix - VIII 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA ON THE 
MARITIME BOUNDARY IN THE GULF OF MANNAR AND THE 
BAY OF BENGAL 
New Delhi, 23 March, 1976 
The Government of the RepubUc of India 
And 
The Government of the Republic of Sri Lanica 
RECALLING that the boundary in the Palk Strait has been settled 
by the Agreement between the Republic of India and the Republic of Sri Lanka 
on the boundan.' in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related 
Matters, signed on 26 28 June, 1974. 
AND DESIRING TO extend that boundary by determining the 
maritime boundan.- between the two countries in the Gulf of Manaar and the 
Bay of Bengal. 
HAVE AGREED as follows : 
ARTICLE - 1 
The maritime boundary between India and Sri Lanka in the Gulf of 
Manaar shall be arcs of Great Circles between the following positions, in the 
sequence given below, defined by latitude and longitude : 
Position 1 m : 09° OS.'O N., 79° 32.'0 E 
Position 2 m : 09° OO'O N., 79° 31'.2 E 
Position 3 m : 08° 53'.0 N., 79° 29'3 E 
Position 4 m : 08° 40.'0 N., 79° 18'.2 E 
Position 5 m : 08° 37^2 N., 79° 13'0 E 
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Position 6 m : 08*^  31'.2 N., 79** 04'.? E 
Position? m:08°22'.2N., 79°55!4E 
Positions m : 08° 12'.2 N., 79^ SS!? E 
Position 9 m:07''35.'3N., 78°45'.7E 
Position 10 m : 07° 2l'.0 N., 78° 38^8 E 
Position 11m: 06° 30!8 N., 71° 12'.2 E 
Position 12 m : 05° 53.'9 N., 77° 50!7 E 
Position 13 m : 05° OO'.O N., 77° 10.6 E 
The extension of the boundary beyond Position 13ni will be done 
subsequently. 
ARTICLE - II 
The maritime boundary between India and Sri Lanka in the Bay of 
Bengal shall be arcs of Great Circles between the following positions, in the 
sequence given below, defined by latitude and longitude: 
Position 1 b : 10°05!o N., 80°03.'o E 
Position 1 ba : 10°05.'9 N., 80°05.'0 E 
Position 1 bb : 10°08.'4 N., 80°09.'5 E 
Position 2 b : 10°33'.0 N., 80°46.0 E 
Position 3 b : 10''-'4l'.7 N., 81°02.'5 E 
Position 4 b :11°02'.7 N., 81°56:0 E 
Position 5 b : 11°16.'0 N., 82°24;4 E 
Position 6 b :11°26!6 N., 83°22!o E 
ARTICLE - III 
The coordinates of the positions specified in Articles I and II are 
geographical coordinates and the straight lines connecting them are indicated 
in the chart annexed hereto, which has been signed by the surveyors duly 
authorised by the two Governments respectively. 
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ARTICLE - IV 
The actual location at sea and on the seabed of the positions specified 
in Articles I and U shall be determined by a method to be mutually agreed 
upon by the surveyors authorised for the purpose by the two Governments, 
respectively. 
ARTICLE - V 
1. Each Party shall have sovereignty over the historic waters and territorial 
sea, as well as over the islands, falling on its side of the aforesaid 
boundary. 
2. Each Party shall have sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone as well as over 
their resources, whether living or non-living, falling on its side of the 
aforesaid boundary. 
3. Each Party shall respect rights of navigation through its territorial sea 
and exclusive economic zone in accordance with its laws and regulations 
and the rules of international law. 
ARTICLE - VI 
If any single geological petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or 
any single geological structure or field of any mineral deposit, including sand 
or gravel, extends across the boundary referred to in Articles I and 11 and the 
Part of such structure or field which is situated on one side of the boundary is 
exploited, in whole or in part, from the other side of the boundary, the two 
countries shall seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which the structure 
or field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner in which the 
proceeds deriving therefrom shall be apportioned. 
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ARTICLE - VII 
The Agreement shall be subject to ratification. It shall enter into 
force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take 
place as soon as possible. 
Sd/- Kewal Singh Sd/- W.T. Jayasinghe 
For the Government of the For the Government of the 
Republic of India Republic of Sri Lanka 
Source: INDIA Bilateral Treaties and Agreements, vol.9 : 1976-77, Ministry of 
External Affairs, Government of India, pp.30-32. 
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Appendix - IX 
STATEMENT REGARDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND 
SRI LANKA ON MARITIME BOUNDARY IN GULF OF MANAAR 
AND BAY OF BENGAL 
THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRIYESHWANTHRAO CHAVAN): 
I rise to place before the House the two Agreements that have been signed with 
Sri Lanka on 23"^  March, 1976 in New Delhi. The first Agreement relates to 
the Maritime Boundary between India and Sri Lanka in the Gulf of Manaar and 
the Bay of Bengal and Related Matters. Consequent upon the signing of the 
Agreement, there was also an Exchange of Letters regarding the regulation of 
fishing by Sri Lanka fishing vessels in the Wadge Bank. This Exchange of 
Letters also constitutes an agreement between the two countries. 
The maritime boundary between India and Sri Lanka in the Palk Bay 
\\as settled b\ a similar Agreement in June 1974. With the signing of the 
present Agreement, the maritime boundary between India and Sri Lanka stands 
senled along us entire length. The two countries shall exercise full sovereignty 
and absolute jurisdiction on their side of the maritime boundary. Both 
countries have agreed that after the determination of the maritime boundary, 
fishing vessels and fishermen of one country shall not engage in fishing in the 
waters of the other. However, the immediate extinction of fishing activity by 
Sri Lanka would have caused certain amount of economic dislocation. As a 
gesture of goodwill towards a friendly neighbour, we have agreed that the 
fishing activity by Sri Lanka in the Wadge Bank may be phased out within a 
period of three years from the date of establishment by India of its exclusive 
economic zone. During this period of three years, Sri Lanka may continue to 
fish at the same level of activity as at present. 
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Though the documents will speak for themselves, I would like to 
record that along with the Agreement of June 1974, these two Agreements 
constitute an important milestone in the strengthening of friendly relations 
between India and Sri Lanka. 
With these words, I beg to lay the texts of the two Agreements before 
the House. 
Source : Lok Sabha Debates, March 24 1976, Cols. 130-31. 
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Appendix - X 
SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT 
Colombo, 22 November 1976 
The Government of the Republic of INDIA 
And 
The Government of the Republic of SRI LANKA, 
RECALLING the Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the 
Maritime Boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Manaar and the 
Bay of Bengal and related matters, which was signed in March 1976, and 
which, in Article I, provides that "The extension of the boundary beyond 
position 13m will be done subsequently". 
RECALLING the Agreement between India Sri Lanka and Maldives 
concerning the determination of the trijunction point between the three 
countries in the Gulf of Manaar, which was signed by the representatives of 
the three Governments in July 1976, 
AND DESIRING to extend the maritime boundary between India and 
Sri Lanka in the Gulf of Manaar from position 13m to the trijunction point 
(Point T), 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS 
ARTICLE - 1 
The maritime boundary between India and Sri Lanka in the Gulf of 
Manaar beyond position 13m, defined in the Maritime Boundary Agreement of 
March 1976, up to the trijunction point (Point T) defined in the trilateral 
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Agreement of July 1976, (Annex), shall be arcs of Great circles between the 
following positions, defined by latitude and longitude: 
Position 13m : 05°00'.0 N, 77°10 .^6 E 
ARTICLE - II 
The provisions of Article III to Article VII of the Maritime Boundary 
Agreement of March 1976 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Agreement, as 
if this Agreement were supplementary to and an integral part of that 
Agreement. 
Sd/- Sd/-
For the Government of the For the Government of the 
Republic of India Republic of Sri Lanka 
Place : Colombo 
Date : 22""^  November, 1976 
Source : INDIA Bilateral Treaties and Agreements, vol.9 : 1976-77, 
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, pp.34-35. 
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Appendix - XI 
THE STRUGGLE FOR TAMIL EELAM AND THE LIBERATION 
TIGERS 
This political pamphlet attempts to sketch a brief outline of this 
political pamphlet attempts to sketch a brief outline of the Tamil National 
Independence struggle in Sri Lanka and the revolutionary armed struggle 
advanced for that cause by the LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM. AS a 
liberation movement the Tigers constitute themselves as the authentic 
revolutionary vanguard of the struggling masses, who, by their deep dedication 
and commitment to the revolutionary tasks of national emancipation and 
socialist revolution have earned the name of FREEDOM FIGHTERS of the people. 
The movement emerged at the peak of national oppression as the militant 
expression of the determined will of our people to fight the oppressive 
bourgeois state machinery with armed struggle, which Lenin taught us, is the 
highest expression of revolutionary political practice. We wish to introduce 
our revolutionary organization with its historical genesis, its militant struggles 
and its aims and objectives with a brief historical note on the national struggle 
of the masses of Tamil Eelam. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
THE TAMIL NATIONAL QUESTION in Sri Lanka is the burning political 
issue, and the most crucial national problem confronted by the present 
dictatorship in that country. The Tamil nation as a whole is agitating for 
political independence on the basis of a universal democratic principle, on the 
basis of a nation's sacred right, that is, the right self-determination, the right to 
secede and form an independent sovereign state. The Tamil speaking nation 
was forced into this inevitable political choice as a consequence of nearly 
thirty years of violent and brutal oppression practised by the successive 
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chauvinistic ruling classes of the Sinhala nation. Years of peaceful struggle to 
gain the very basic human rights were met with vicious forms of suppression 
and the national friction between two nations became the major contradiction 
leading to the demand for secession by the oppressed. 
The island, formerly called Ceylon is the traditional homeland of two 
nations. Tamil Eelam and Sri Lanka; tow distinct social formations with 
distinct culture and language; having their own unique historical past. The 
Tamils have been living in the island from pre-historic times long before the 
arrival of the Sinhalese people from Northern India in the 6"" Century B.C. The 
Sinhal ese historical chronicles, 'Mahawamsa' and 'Culavamsa' record the 
turbulent historical past of the island, of centuries of violent power struggles 
and wars between Tamil and Sinhalese kings for political hegemony. The 
island was ruled by both Tamil and Sinhalese kings. From the 13"' Century 
onwards, until the penetration of Portuguese colonialism, Tamil Eelam lived as 
a stable national entity, ruled by its own kings. The Portuguese annexed the 
Tamil Kingdom yet ruled it as a separate national formation, as the traditional 
homelands of the Tamil speaking people. Dutch colonialism too, did not 
violate the territorial integrity of the Tamil Kingdom until British imperialism 
in the 19' Century brought about a unified State structure amalgamating the 
two kingdoms irrespective of ethnic differences laying the foundation for the 
present national conflict. 
NATIONAL OPPRESSION AND DEMAND FOR SECESSION 
The Sinhala chauvinist oppression against the Tamil nation began to 
unfold in its devious forms soon after the so-called national independence in 
1948 when the State power was transferred to the Sinhala national bourgeoisie. 
The first major assault of this notorious racialist programme was directed at 
the Tamil plantation workers through a legislation in 1949 which 
disenfranchised more than a million people, reduced them to statelessness and 
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debased them without any civic rights. This infamous act of inhumanity 
marked the beginning of a thirty year history of national oppression, a planned 
systematic oppression, that seriously undermined the very foundation of the 
social, political, economic and cultural life of the Tamil speaking masses. The 
oppression, penetrated into various spheres of the conditions of social 
existence of our people and threatened the very survival of our nation. The 
gradual annexation of the traditional Tamil lands by Sinhala colonisation aided 
by the state; the forceful imposition of the Sinhala languages on the Tamil 
speaking people; blatant discrimination and injustice practised against the 
Tamil youth in the sphere of education and employment; planned economic 
strangulation of Tamil areas - all these vicious forms of national oppression 
practised by all successive Governments aggravated the national conflict. The 
worst of all, is the State inspired racial conflagrations, which unleashed its 
terror against the Tamil speaking masses (particularly in 1958 and 1977) with 
mass murder, looting, arson and rape, with abominable crimes of genocide in 
which the State police openly colluded with the vandals. Such racial holocaust 
aimed at the annihilation of our national identity made unitary existence a 
political and social impossibility. 
At the height of national oppression, when the struggle for political 
independence became the inevitable alternative, the Tamil political parties 
converged into a single national movement with the formation of the Tamil 
United liberation Front in 1976. Confronted with steadily mounting national 
oppression, frustrated with failures of political agitations demanding basic 
human rights, the Tamil nationalist movement resolved to fight for political 
independence on the basis of the nation's right to self-determination. It was 
primarily a decision to secede and form an independent sovereign state over 
which the 1977 elections were fought and endorsed overwhelmingly by the 
Tamil speaking masses. Thus, it was the intolerable national oppression and 
the emergence of national conflict as the major contradiction that led to this 
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era in Tamil politics, a new historical epoch to launch a revolutionary struggle 
for national independence. 
THE BIRTH OF THE TAMIL TIGERS 
THE TAMIL LIBERATION TIGERS are the historical product of the 
Sinhala chauvinistic oppression. They were the product of a revolutionary 
situation generated by the contradictions of national conflict. Caught up at the 
peak of national oppression, constantly victimised by police brutality for 
political actions, the revolutionary ardour of the militant Tamil youth sought 
concrete political expression to register their protest. Disenchantment with the 
political strategy of non-violence, confronted with the demand for 
revolutionary political practice, the Tiger Movement gave its historical birth in 
1972 as the armed resistance movement of the people. Structured as an urban 
guerrilla force, disciplined with an iron will to fight for the cause of national 
freedom, the Tigers launched a series of attacks against the armed forces of the 
oppressive regime. 
The Government became alarmed at the growth and strength of the 
Movement, angered at the success of its military operations on the Government 
property and personnel, and above all, horrified of its growing support among 
the wider sections of the Tamil masses. On April this year (1978), when the 
Liberation Tigers launched a tactical attack of self defence and destroyed a 
party of police personnel which was in hot pursuit to track them down, the 
ruling bourgeois dictatorship utilised the situation to intensify its policy of 
national suppression. A repressive legislation was rushed through the 
Parliament which proscribed the Tiger Movement. At the same time, the 
Government dispatched large contingents of military personnel to Tamil areas 
to keep Tamil Eelam under constant military surveillance and domination. 
Even with the intensification of the military and the tight screen of 
surveillance the Freedom Fights continue with their armed struggle, launch 
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occasional strikes at chosen targets and evade all possible tactics to hunt them 
down. Though confronted with all odds, and obstacles, the Tiger Movement 
grows in its strength as the armed vanguard of the mass struggle, grows as the 
authentic national liberation movement to advance the cause of national 
freedom through armed struggle. 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The revolutionary political objectives of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam express the profound aspirations of the Tamil speaking masses to 
gain political independence from the autocratic domination and oppression of 
the Sinhala chauvinistic regime. As a liberation movement we are pledged to 
the tasks of national emancipation and socialist revolution. Our fundamental 
objectives are: 
Total independence of Tamil Eelam. The 
establishment of a sovereign, socialist 
democratic people's Government. 
Abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man and the 
establishment of a socialist mode of production ensuring that the means of 
production and exchange of our country becomes the ownership of our people. 
To achieve these revolutionary tasks we firmly uphold that armed 
revolutionary struggle is the only viable and effective path open to us to 
liberate our homeland. The armed revolutionary struggle advanced by our 
movement is the extension of the political struggle for liberation. Our guerrilla 
warfare, which is the mode of armed revolutionary struggle suited to our 
situation, will be gradually and systematically transformed into a genuine 
people's war of liberation. To this end, our liberation movement is working 
persistently to mobilise and organize the broad masses to actively participate 
in the national struggle. 
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The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eeiam lias resolved to work in 
solidarity with the world national liberation movements, socialist states, 
international working class parties. We uphold an anti-imperialist policy and 
therefore, we pledge our militant solidarity with the oppressed humankind in 
the Third World in their struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, 
Zionism, racism and other forces of reaction. 
[This document was released by the Political Committee of the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in November 1978] 
AN OPEN LETTER TO PREMADASA FROM LTTE 
Dear Sir 
A very grave and explosive situation has arisen in Tamil Eelam as a 
consequence of your Government's determination to stifle and stamp out, by 
violent means, the legitmate struggle of the oppressed Tamil nation for 
political independence. The intensified military occupation of Tamil lands, the 
increased terrorism of the State police against the innocent Tamil masses, the 
implementation of new repressive legislations that annuls the very freedom of 
political agitations - all such devious methods of totalitarian tyranny signify 
that your Government has mounted a massive scale oppression to strangle the 
will of a nation of people and silence their political aspirations. In view of the 
fact that your Government has embarked on a policy of eliminating, by brute 
force, a legitimate political struggle based on a democratic principle of 
national self-determination and that your Government has been using the name 
of our revolutionary movement as a pretext to invoke such repressive measures 
and to inflame the fires of Sinhala chauvinism, the Liberation Tigers are 
compelled to counter such vicious allegations and insinuations. 
The most important factor that we wish to state clearly and 
emphatically is that we are not a group of amateur armed adventurists roaming 
in the jungles with romantic political illusions, nor are we a band of terrorists 
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or vandals who kill and destroy at random for anarchic reasons. We are neither 
murderers nor criminals or violent fanatics as your Government often attempts 
to portray us. On the contrary, we are revolutionaries committed to 
revolutionary political practice. We represent the most powerful extra-
parliamentary liberation movement in the Tamil nation. We represent the 
militant expression of the collective will of our people who are determined to 
fight for freedom, dignity and justice. We are the armed vanguard of the 
struggling masses, the freedom fighters of the oppressed. Wc arc not in any 
way isolated and alienated from the popular masses but immersed and 
integrated with the popular will, with the collective soul of our nation. Our 
revolutionary organization is built through revolutionary struggles based on a 
revolutionary theory. We hold a firm conviction that armed resistance to the 
Sinhala military occupation and repression is the only viable and effective 
means to achieve the national liberation of Tamil Eelam. Against the 
reactionary violence and terrorism perpetrated against our people by your 
Government we have the right of armed defence and decisive masses of people 
are behind our revolutionary struggle. 
WHY WE ARE COMMITTED TO ARMED STRUGGLE 
The Tamil political history of recent times will certainly indicate to 
you that our people have exhausted all forms of peaceful struggles, all forms 
of parliamentary agitations, all forms of negotiations and pacts. For nearly a 
quarter of a century the Tamil nationalist movement fought decisively 
encompassing a variety of forms of struggles from peaceful picketings to mass 
hartals, from mass demonstrations to general strikes-all aspects of peaceful 
political practice have been expressed and exhausted. The more the Tamil 
masses sought non-violent methods to redress their grievances, the more the 
Sinhala ruling classes sought violent methods of military oppression and 
subjugation; the more they called for national emancipation the more the 
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military invasion, occupation and repression. It is because of the heightened 
condition of this savage oppression, of the exhaustion and frustration of 
peaceful agitations that prompted our movement to engage in revolutionary 
armed resistance which we hold is a continuation of the political struggle of 
our oppressed people. The guerrilla warfare, the form of the popular struggle 
we are committed to is not borne out of blind militancy or adventurism but 
arose out of the historical necessity, out of the concrete conditions of into 
lerable national oppression. Our actions and operations, as your Government 
attempts to paint, are not indiscriminate bursts of irrational violence or 
terrorism; they are acts of revolutionary violence of the oppressed against the 
reactionary violence of the oppressor. We are waging a heroic struggle against 
the oppressive instruments of the state, against those who try to hunt us down, 
against those who plot to wipe us out, against those who betray us and against 
those traitors and opportunists who betray the noble cause of our national 
liberation struggle. 
WHO ARE THE TERRORISTS? 
The first piece of draconian legislation enacted by our Government 
was to proscribe the Tiger movement alleging that we are dangerous terrorists 
threatening the very foundation of the so-called national unity and territorial 
integrity. Such a legislation was, in actual fact, aimed not only to suppress the 
revolutionary armed struggle of the Tamils but also to consolidate an 
unpopular bourgeois dictatorship against the possible uprising of the oppressed 
Sinhala masses. The new Emergency Regulations aim to combat terrorism, but 
in reality it is primarily motivated to crush and destroy the Tamil national 
movement along with all forms of popular class struggle against the State. 
Such totalitarian legislations negate the very freedom of political expression 
and contravene the basic principles of human right and liberty. 
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In the deluded eyes of your Government our movement appears to be 
a spectre of terrorism and anarchy. In reality, who are these terrorists? We 
assert, and we hold that we are right in our assertion, that it is the state police 
and the armed forces and those who poison the minds of the innocent Sinhala 
masses with racial fanaticism and chauvinism are the real terrorists. There has 
been innumerable incidents of such acts of terrorism perpetrated against our 
people, incidents of mass murder, looting and arson by racist terrorists aided 
and abetted by the armed forces, incidents of shooting and killing of innocent 
Tamil people, incidents of sadistic murders and barbaric torture by the police. 
These violent acts certainly fall within the category of terrorism and these 
terrorists are none other than the instruments of state oppression and the 
reactionary forces of racism. It is upon these terrorist forces that your 
Government has bestowed extraordinary powers to ensure the peace and 
security of our people. Therefore, it is beyond reasonable doubt that your 
Government's objective is not to wipe out a non-existent terrorism but to 
unleash actual terrorism and violence to create panic among the Tamil masses. 
By such a high-handed act, the Sinhala ruling class aims to destroy the 
determined will of our nation to fight for political independence. But the 
Government has failed to comprehend the historical truth that the more a 
nation of people are oppressed the more they become determined to fight back 
the oppression. By intensifying oppression your Government will never be able 
to achieve its aims of enslaving our people but will certainly open the 
prospective of prolonged popular armed struggle, a strategic objective to which 
we are already committed to. 
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION PARTIALLY PARALYSED 
Your Government has closed several banks and the airport in the 
North placing the blame on our liberation movement. A state of emergency has 
been declared claiming that criminal acts are on the increase in Tamil areas. 
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The Government's motive behind such strategy is well known to our people. It 
is the calculated aim of your Government to place more hardship and 
inconvenience on our people hoping that the Tamil masses might feel the pinch 
and gradually turn critical of us and finally betray us. Such a devious strategy, 
we are certain, will never work. It simply exposes the impotency of your 
Government's civil administration which was been partially paralysed. The 
declaration of the state of Emergency bares ample testimony that your 
Government is totally incapable of exercising any form of civil authority in the 
Tamil nation other than by military occupation and repression. 
Acts of violence emanating from the most oppressed and deprived 
sections of the masses are not typical symptoms in the North alone. They are 
more pervasive in Sri Lanka signifying the socio-economic crisis your 
Government is confronted with. This fact is amply illustrated by a statement 
made in Parliament recently by the Minister of Justice that between January 
and April of 1978 there have been 474 homicides and 214 incidents of 
robberies and burglaries throughout the island. Your Government has been 
using the Tamil revolutionary youth as scape-goats for civil unrest that is 
boiling throughout Tamil Eelam and Sri Lanka. The truth is that your capitalist 
regime is faced with a major crisis and the downtrodden classes are becoming 
impatient and disgruntled. The increasing criminal violence is an external 
manifestation of the internal frustrations of the masses. Unable to resolve the 
national economic crisis and the mounting social problems, your Government 
is adopting the reactionary strategy of intensifying the national oppression of 
the Tamils and invoking the Tiger phobia. The Sinhala national bourgeoisie 
always descends to such dirty politics of racism and chauvinism as a desperate 
means to turn the tide of Sinhala mass resentment against the state, towards the 
Tamils. Such a strategy, we are certain, will not work in the long run since the 
revolutionary proletariat in Sri Lanka is becoming ideologically conscious of 
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the dangers of chauvinism that divide and immobilise the Sinhala working 
class. 
We are fighting for a noble cause, a right cause, the cause of national 
freedom of the oppressed nation - Tamil Eelam. The revolutionary process 
towards which we work to achieve national liberation and socialism will be 
long and arduous. Yet, we are certain that no force on earth, however 
repressive it may be, can stop us from the revolutionary struggle we are 
committed to. 
LONG LIVE TAMIL EELAM 
Chairman 
Central Committee 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
[This Letter of protest addressed to Mr. R. Premadasa, the Prime Minister of 
Sri Lanka was handed over to him by LTTE in London when he visited UK in 
July 1979] 
THE HONOURABLE CHAIRMAN, 
RESPECTED LEADERS OF THE THIRD WORLD, DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES 
We wish to submit for your kind attention and urgent consideration a 
very grave and potentially explosive situation in Sri Lanka. It is the plight of 
the Tamil nation of four million people and their legitimate struggle for 
political independence based on the democratic principle of national self 
determination. The Tamil nation was forced into this political path as a 
consequence of nearly thirty five years or violent and brutal oppression 
practised by successive Sri Lankan Governments aimed at the annihilation of 
the national entity of the Tamils. Decades of peaceful, non-violent, democratic 
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political struggles to gain the very basic human rights were met with vicious 
forms of military suppression. The intensified military occupation of Tamil 
lands, the intolerable terrorism of the armed forces, the implementation of 
racist and repressive legislations, the mass arrest and detention of political 
activists - all these draconian methods were employed to stifle and subjugate 
the will of our people to live free, and stamp out their legitimate struggle for 
justice. This ever unfolding thrust of national oppression made unitary 
existence intolerable and finally led to the demand for secession by the 
oppressed Tamil people. 
You are certainly aware that in the contemporary conjuncture 
national liberation struggles have assumed world historical significance. The 
right of nations to self-determination is the cardinal principle upon which 
many struggles for national emancipation are being fought today. It is the 
principle that upholds the sacred right of a nation to decide its own political 
destiny, a universal socialist principle that guarantees the right of a nation to 
political independence. The Tamil national independence struggle is fought on 
the very basis of our nation's right to political independence. 
To the community of world nations Sri Lanka attempts to portray 
itself as a paradise island, cherishing the Buddhist ideals of peace and dharma, 
adhering to a noble political doctrine of socialist democracy and pursuing a 
neutral path of non-alignment. Paradoxically behind this political fa9ade lines 
the tactual reality, the reality of racial repression of the blatant violation of 
basic human rights, of police and military brutality, of attempted genocide. 
Master-minding a totalitarian political system with the collusion of U.S. 
imperialism, the Sri Lankan ruling elite since 'independence' wielded their 
political power by invoking the ideology of national chauvinism and religious 
fanaticism and by actually practising a vicious and calculated policy of racial 
repression against the Tamil people. It is a tragic paradox that dictatorial 
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regimes like Sri Lanka who stands indicted by world humanist movements for 
crimes against humanity could parade on a world forum with the mantle of 
democracy and dharma. Our objective is to expose this hypocrisy and place 
before you the authentic story, the story of the immense sufferings as well as 
the heroic struggles of our people who have no choice but to fight for dignity 
and freedom rather than reduced to slavery and slow death. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Tamils of the island of Ceylon (now called Sri Lanka) constitute 
themselves as a nation of people, forming into a coherent social entity with 
their own history, tradition, culture, language and economic life. The nation is 
popularly called Tamil Eelam. Tamils have been living in the island from 
prehistoric times before the arrival of the Sinhalese from northern India in the 
6"^  century B.C. The Sinhalese people who constitute the majority nation often 
million have a distinct language, culture and history of their own. Historical 
chronicles document that the island was ruled by both Tamil and Sinhalese 
Kings. From the 13"' century onwards, until the penetration of foreign 
colonialism Tamil Eelam lived as a stable national entity with a state structure 
and was ruled by its own kings. The Portuguese annexed the territory in 1619 
yet ruled it as a separate national entity, as the traditional home lands of the 
Tamils. Dutch colonialism, which followed did not violate the national and 
territorial autonomy, until British imperialism in 1833 brought about a unified 
state structure amalgamating the Tamil and Sinhala kingdoms laying the 
foundation for the present national conflict. Another significant event in the 
British imperialist rule was the creation of an exploitative plantation economy 
for which a million Tamils from South India were brought as workers and 
settled in the island. Constituting a crucial part of the Tamil Eelam national 
totality, this huge mass of Tamil labourers who produce the wealth of the 
island yet subjected to most sinister from of racial repression. 
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DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL OPPRESSION 
The Sinhala chauvinistic oppression against the Tamil nation began 
to unfold its ugly forms soon after national 'independence' in 1948 when the 
British handed over state power to the Sinhalese ruling elite. This oppression 
was not simply an expression of racial prejudice, but a well calculated 
genocidal plan aimed at the gradual and systematic destruction of the essential 
foundations of national community. The oppression, therefore assumed a 
multi-dimensional thrust, attacking simultaneously on the different structural 
levels of the national foundation, the levels of the conditions of existence of a 
nation, its language, education, culture, economy and territory. As part of this 
genocidal programme formed the state inspired communal riots, which led to 
the mass destruction of life and property of the Tamils. 
ONE MILLION WORKERS DISENFRANCHISED 
The first major onslaught of this genocidal oppression was directed 
against the Tamil plantation workers, who as the only organised proletariat 
wielded immense political power which the Sinhalese ruling class wanted to 
castigate. By enacting notorious citizenship laws (Citizenship Acts of 1948 
and 1949) the Sri Lankan Government disenfranchised more than a million 
Tamil plantation workers. This repressive measure reduced these people to a 
condition of statelessness and dehumanised them without any basic human or 
civil rights. 
PLANNED ANNEXATION OF TAMIL LANDS 
The most vicious form of oppression calculated to destroy the 
national identity of the Tamils was the state aided aggressive colonisation 
which began soon after 'independence' and now swallowed nearly three 
thousand square miles of Tamil Eelam. This planned occupation of Tamil lands 
by hundreds of thousands of Sinhala people aided and abetted by the state was 
aimed to annihilate the geographical entity of the Tamil nation. 
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REPRESSION ON LANGUAGE, EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION 
Sinhala chauvinism struck deeply into the spheres of language, 
education and employment of the Tamils. Championing the ideology of ultra-
nationalism, Mr. Bandaranayake came to political power in 1956 with the 
pledge to install Sinhala language and Buddhist religion as the only official 
language and state religion of the island. His first Act in Parliament, the 
Sinhala Only Act, put an end to the equality of status enjoyed by the Tamil 
language and made Sinhala the only state language. This infamous legislation 
had disastrous consequences. It forced the Tamil public servants to learn 
Sinhala language or leave employment. In the decades that followed all 
employment opportunities in the public service were practically closed to the 
Tamils. They were gradually rooted out from positions of power in the public 
sector as well as in the armed services. 
Education was the crucial area in which the onslaught of racism 
deprived a vast population of Tamil youth from access to higher education. A 
notorious discriminatory selective device called "Standardisation" was 
introduced in 1970 which demanded higher merits of marks from Tamil 
students for university admissions whereas the Sinhala students were admitted 
with lower grades. The present regime introduced a new scheme which turned 
out to be far more discriminatory than the earlier one denying thousands of 
deserving Tamil students the right to higher education, and created a huge 
army of unemployed youth. 
ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION 
The thrust of national oppression that penetrated into the spheres of 
language, educational and employment had far reaching consequences on the 
economic life of the Tamil speaking people as a whole. For more than three 
decades all successive Sri Lankan Governments pursued a deliberate policy of 
totally isolating Tamil areas from all the national development projects. While 
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the state poured all the economic aid into the South, while the Sinhala nation 
flourished with massive development programmes, the nation of Tamil Eelam 
was isolated as an unwanted colony and left to suffer the worst form of 
economic deprivation. 
RACIAL RIOTS AND MASSACRE OF TAMILS 
The racial riots that constantly plague the island should not be 
viewed as spontaneous outbursts of inter-communal hatred between the two 
communities. All major racial conflagrations that erupted violently against the 
Tamil speaking people were inspired and master-minded by the Sinhala ruling 
regimes as part of the grand genocidal programme. Violent anti-Tamil racial 
riots exploded in the island in 1956, 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, 1979 and in 
1981. In these racial holocausts thousands of Tamil, including women and 
children were mercilessly massacred, millions worth of Tamil property 
destroyed and hundreds of thousands made refugees. The state and the armed 
forces colluded with hooligans in their barbaric acts of arson, rape and murder. 
Instead of containing the violence, the Sinhala Government leaders made 
inflammatory statements adding fuel to the fire. The violent riots of 1981 
showed the genocidal character of this horrifying phenomenon. It was during 
these riots the Sinhala police went on a wild rampage burning down the Tamil 
city of Jaffna, destroying completely the public liberary with all its treasures 
of historical learning, set fire to a national newspaper office and burnt to ashes 
hundreds of shops. The alarming aspect of this state terrorism was that it 
aimed at the destruction of the cultural foundations of the Tamil nation. 
The cumulative effect of this multi-dimensional oppression 
threatened the very survival of the Tamils. It aggravated the national conflict 
and the struggle for secession became the only and the inevitable choice. 
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PEACEFUL CAMPAIGNS FOR FEDERAL AUTONOMY 
Following the implementation of the Sinhala Only Act in 1956, the 
Tamil Parliamentary leadership organised mass agitational campaigns 
demanding a federal form of autonomy for the Tamil nation. The satyagraha 
(peaceful picketing) campaigns of 1961 was a great event in the history of the 
Tamil freedom struggle. This civil disobedience campaign unfolded into a 
massive national uprising, participated by hundreds of thousands of Tamil 
people, symbolising the collective resentment of the whole nation against the 
oppressive policies of the Sinhala rulers. Within a few months this successful 
satyagraha campaign paralysed the whole government administrative 
machinery in Tamil Eelam. Alarmed by the success of the Civil disobedience 
Campaign the state oppressive machinery reacted swiftly. Under the guise of 
Emergency and Curfew, military terrorism was let loose on the peaceful 
satyagrahies. Hundreds of these non-violent agitators sustained serious 
injuries, and their leaders arrested. Thus, state violence finally succeeded in 
silencing the non-violent campaign of the oppressed; the armed terror 
ultimately crushed the ahimsa of the Tamils. The success of this violent 
repression encouraged the Sri Lankan state to utilise military terror against all 
forms of democratic political campaigns of the Tamils. Large contingents of 
armed forces were poured into Tamil areas and the Tamil nation was finally 
brought under military siege. 
THE DEMAND FOR SECESSION 
In 1972, a new republican constitution was adopted which removed 
the fundamental rights and privileges accorded to national minorities. This 
infamous constitution created the conditions for the political alienation of the 
Tamils and cut a deep wedge between the two nations. Confronted with 
steadily mounting national oppression, frustrated with the failures of 
democratic political struggles demanding basic human rights, the Tamil 
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nationalist parties converged into a single movement (The Tamil United 
Liberation Front) and resolved to fight for political independence on the basis 
of the nation's right to self-determination. At the general elections of 1977 the 
Front demanded a clear mandate from the people to launch a national struggle 
to establish sovereignty in theTamil homeland. These elections took the 
character of a referendum and the Tamil speaking people voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of secession. Thus a new historical era in Tamil 
politics began, ushering a revolutionary struggle for a national independence. 
ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE TIGER MOVEMENT 
The struggle for national freedom having failed in its democratic 
popular agitations, having exhausted its moral power to mobilise the masses 
for peaceful campaigns, gave rise to the emergence of armed resistance 
movement in Tamil Eelam in the early seventies. Armed resistance as a mode 
of popular struggle arose when our people were presented with no alternative 
other than to resort to revolutionary resistance to defend themselves against a 
savage form of state terrorism. The armed struggle, therefore is the historical 
product of intolerable national oppression; it is an extension, continuation and 
advancement of the political struggle of our oppressed people. Our liberation 
movement which spearheads the revolutionary armed struggle in Tamil Eelam 
is the armed vanguard of the national struggle. The strategy of armed struggle 
was formulated by us after a careful and cautious appraisal of the specific 
concrete conditions of our struggle, with the fullest comprehension of the 
historical situation which masses of our people have no choice other than to 
fight decisively to advance the cause of national freedom. Our total strategy 
integrates both national struggle and class struggle, interlinks the progressive 
patriotic feeling of the masses with proletarian class consciousness to 
accelerate the process of socialist revolution and national liberation. 
The armed struggle of our liberation movement is sustained and 
supported by wider sections of the Tamil masses, since our revolutionary 
political project expresses the profound aspirations of our people to gain 
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political independence from the autocratic domination and repression of the Sri 
Lankan state. To achieve the revolutionary tasks of national emancipation and 
socialist revolution, our project aims at the extension and transformation of our 
protracted guerrilla warfare into a people's war of national liberation. 
WORLD'S CONSCIENCE CONDEMNS SRI LANKA 
The development of Tamil liberation struggle into a dimension of 
armed resistance of the people alarmed the Sri Lankan repressive state. The 
Government responded with extreme repressive measures against our people, 
using all means in its power to crush the freedom struggle. Draconian laws 
were rushed through Parliament to proscribe our movement, and the state 
controlled media is utilized to slander the freedom fighters and all the political 
activists as "terrorists". Mass arrests of innocent people, trials without jury, 
inhuman torture, death sentences have become the order of the day. 
The most notorious law is the Prevention of Terrorism Act which 
denies trial by jury, enables the detention of people for a period of eighteen 
months and allows confessions extracted under torture as admissible in 
evidence. Hundreds of youths are being held behind bars and subjected to 
torture under this draconian law. In a recent wave of repression, the Sri Lankan 
armed forces have arrested several members of the Catholic and Methodist 
clergy and prominent Tamil educationists and charged them under the 
Terrorism Act. This oppressive measure has caused massive outcry in Tamil 
Eelam, Tamil Nadu, and all over the world. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 
has been universally condemned by the world human rights movements, 
pa r t i cu l a r ly by the INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS and by AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL as violating fundamental human liberties. Amnesty 
International in an appeal to the Government of Sri Lanka has expressed grave 
concern about those who were arrested under this law and held 
incommunicado. The International Commission of Jurists, in a report, has 
condemned the state terrorism of the Sinhala armed forces unleashed against 
the Tamils and has denounced the Prevention of Terrorism Act as a piece of 
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legislation that violates Sri Lanka's obligation under the international covenant 
on civil and political rights. 
AN APPEAL TO THE WORLD LEADERS 
Our liberation struggle, as an oppressed fighting against the 
oppressor, constitutes an integral part of the international struggle, the struggle 
of the revolutionary forces against the forces of reaction, the forces of 
imperialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism and racism. Though each liberation 
struggle has its own historical specificity and its unique conditions, in their 
essence they articulate a universal historical tendency of the human aspiration 
for freedom from all systems of oppression and exploitation. In this context, 
Tamil Eelam' national struggle is similar in content to that of the Palestinian 
struggle or Namibian struggle or any national struggle of the oppressed people 
based on their right to national self-determination. 
W E THEREFORE APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, WHO HOSTS 
THIS G R E A T F O R U M , AND TO THE LEADERS OF THE THIRD WORLD TO 
SYMPATHISE AND SUPPORT THE FREEDOM STRUGGLE OF THE EELAM TAMILS. IN 
THE NAME OF HUMANITY, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, WE CALL UPON YOU TO 
CONDEMN THE GENOCIDAL OPPRESSIVE POLICIES OF THE SIR LANKAN 
GOVERNMENT AND TO RECOGNISE OUR PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO NATIONAL SELF-
DETERMINATION. 
We, the Liberation Tigers, wish to express our support and solidarity 
to all the revolutionary liberation struggles of the oppressed masses of the 
world. 
Political Committee 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
Source : Towards Liberation (Selected Political Documents of the LTTE), 
Published by Liberation Tigers of Tamil EELAM, September\ 1984, 
pp.3-30, available at Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi. 
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Appendix - XII 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE 
GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND 
NORMALCY IN SRI LANKA, COLOMBO, JULY 29,1987 
The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. 
Rajiv Gandhi and the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka, His Excellency Mr. J.R. Jayewardene having met at Colombo on July 
29, 1987: 
Attaching utmost importance to nurturing, intensifying and 
strengthening the traditional friendship of India and Sri Lanka and 
acknowledging the imperative need of resolving the ethnic problem of Sri 
Lanka, and the consequent violence, and for the safety, well-being and 
prosperity of people belonging to all communities in Sri Lanka. 
Having this day entered into the following Agreement to fulfil this 
objective; 
1.1 desiring to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri 
Lanka; 
1.2 acknowledging that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and a multi-lingual 
plural society consisting inter alia, of Sinhalese. Tamils, Muslims 
(Moors), and Burghers; 
1.3 recognising that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic 
identity which has to be carefully nurtured; 
1.4 also recognising that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces have been 
areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil speaking people, 
together in his territory with other ethnic groups; 
1.5 Conscious of the necessity of strengthening the forces contributing to 
the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, and 
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preserving its character as a multiethnic, multi-lingual and multi-
religious plural society, in which all citizens can live in equality, safety 
and harmony, and prosper and fulfil their aspirations; 
2, Resolve that 
2.1 Since the Government of Sri Lanka proposes to permit adjoining 
Provinces to join to form one administrative unit and also by a 
Referendum to separate as may be permitted to the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces as outlined below: 
2.2 During the period, which shall be considered an interim period (i.e.) 
from the date of the elections to the Provincial Council, as specified in 
para 2.8 to the date of the referendum as specified in para 2.3, the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces as now constituted, will form one Chief 
Minister and one Board of Ministers. 
2.3 There will be a referendum on or before 31 December, 1988 to enable 
the people of the Eastern Province to decide whether: 
(A) The Eastern province should remain linked with the Northern 
province as one administrative unit, and continue to be 
governed together with the Northern Province as specified in 
para 2.2, or 
(B) The Eastern province should constitute a separate 
administrative unit having its own distinct Provincial Council 
with a separate Governor, Chief Minister and Board of 
Ministers. 
The President may, at his discretion decide to postpone such a 
referendum. 
2.4 All persons who have been displaced due to ethnic violence, or other 
reasons, will have right to vote in such a referendum. Necessary 
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conditions to enable them to return to areas from where they were 
displaced will be created. 
2.5 The referendum, when held, will be monitored by a committee headed 
by the Chief Justice, a member appointed by the President, nominated 
by the Government of Sri Lanka, and a member appointed by the 
President, nominated by the representatives of the Tamil speaking 
people of the Eastern Province. 
2.6 A simple majority will be sufficient to determine the result of the 
referendum. 
2.7 Meeting and other forms of propaganda, permissible within the laws of 
the country, will be allowed before the referendum. 
2.8 Elections to Provincial Councils will be held within the next three 
months, in any event before 31 December 1987. Indian observers will be 
invited for elections to the Provincial Council of the North and East. 
2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern provinces by 
15 Augustjl987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over 
the island within 48 hours of the signing of this agreement. All arms 
presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with 
an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government 
of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender 
of arms by militant groups, the army and other security personnel will 
be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of 
surrendering of arms and the confining the security personnel moving 
back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessasion of 
hostilities coming into effect. 
2.10 The Government of Sri Lanka will utilise for the purpose of law 
enforcement and maintenance of security in the Northern and Eastern 
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provinces the same organizations and mechanisms of Government as are 
used in the rest of the country. 
2.11 The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and 
other prisoners now held in custody under the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those 
persons accused, charged and or convicted under these laws. The 
Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate 
militant youth with a view to bringing them back to the mainstream of 
national life. India will cooperate in the process. 
2.12 The Government of Sri Lanka will accept and abide by the above 
provisions and expect all others to do likewise. 
2.13 If the framework for the resolutions is accepted, the Government of Sri 
Lanka will implement the relevant proposals forthwith. 
2.14 The Government of India will under-work and guarantee the resolutions, 
and cooperate in the implementation of these proposals. 
2.15 These proposals are conditional to an acceptance of proposals negotiated 
from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986. Residual matters not finalised during the 
above negotiations shall be resolved between India and Sri Lanka within 
a period of six weeks of signing this agreement. These proposals are 
also conditional to the Government of India cooperating directly with 
the Government of Sri Lanka in their implementation. 
2.16 These proposals are also conditional to the Government of India taking 
the following actions if any militant group operating in Sri Lanka do not 
accept this framework of proposals for a settlement, namely : 
(A) India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory 
is not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and 
security of Sri Lanka. 
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(B) The Indian Navy Coast Guard will cooperate with the Sri Lanka 
Navy in preventing Tamil militant activities from affecting Sri 
Lanka. 
(C) In the event that the Government of Sri Lanka requests the 
Government of India to afford military assistance to implement 
these proposals the Government of India will cooperate by 
giving to the Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance 
as and when requested. 
(D) The Government of India will expedite repatriation from Sri 
Lanka of Indian citizens to India who are resident there 
concurrently with the repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from 
Tamil Nadu. 
(E) The Governments of India and Sri Lanka, will cooperate in 
ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities 
inhabiting the Northern and Eastern provinces. 
2.17 The Government of Sri Lanka shall ensure free, full and fair 
participation of voters from all communities in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces in electoral processes envisaged in this agreement. The 
Government of India will extend full cooperation to the Government of 
Sri Lanka in this regard. 
2.18 The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Tamil and English 
will also be official languages. 
3. This agreement and the annexure there to shall come into force upon 
signature 
In witness whereof we have set our hands and seals hereunto. Done 
in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on this the twenty ninth day of July of the year one 
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thousand nine hundred and eighty seven, in duplicate, both texts being equally 
authentic. 
Rajiv Gandhi 
Prime Minister of the Republic of India 
Junius Richard Jayewardene 
President of the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 
Annexure to the Agreement 
1. His Excellency the Prime Minister of India and His Excellency the 
President of Sri Lanka agree that the referendum mentioned in paragraph 
2 and its sub-paragraphs of the Agreement will be observed by a 
representative of the Election Commission of India to be invited by His 
Excellency the President of Sri Lanka. 
2. Similarly, both Heads of Government agree that the elections to the 
Provincial Council mentioned in paragraph 2.8 of the Agreement will be 
observed by a representative of the Government of India to be invited by 
the President of Sri Lanka. 
3. His Excellency the President of Sri Lanka agrees that the Home Guards 
would be disbanded and all paramilitary personnel will be withdraw 
from the Eastern and Northern Provinces with a view to creating 
conditions conducive to fare elections to the Council. 
The President, in his discretion, shall absorb such paramilitary forces, 
which came into being due to ethnic violence into the regular security forces of 
Sri Lanka. 
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4. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that 
the Tamil militants shall surrender their arms to authorities agreed upon 
to be designated by the President of Sri Lanka. The surrender shall take 
place in the presence of one senior representative each of the Sri Lankan 
Red Cross and the Indian Red Cross. 
5. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka agree that a 
joint Indo-Sri Lankan observers group consisting of qualified 
representatives of the Government of India and the Government of Sri 
Lanka would monitor the cessation of hostilities from 31 July, 1987. 
6. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri Lanka also agree 
that in terms of paragraph 2.14 and paragraph 2.16(c) of the Agreement, 
an Indian Peace Keeping contingent may be invited by the President of 
Sri Lanka to guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so 
required. 
Prime Minister of India 
Excellency, 
Conscious of the friendship between our two countries stretching 
over two millenia and more, and recognising the importance of nurturing this 
traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm 
the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities 
prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial integrity and security. 
In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to 
meet some of India's concerns as follows: 
(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about 
the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence 
personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not 
prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations. 
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(ii) Trincomalee or any other port in Sri Lanka will not be made 
available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to 
India's interests. 
(iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm 
will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka. 
(iv) Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organisations will 
be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka 
are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any 
military or intelligence purposes. 
In the same spirit, India will : 
(i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in 
terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism. 
(ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan 
security forces. 
India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative 
mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of 
the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation 
of other matters contained in this letter. 
Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the 
agreement reached between us. 
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
Yours sincerely, 
(Rajiv Gandhi) 
His Excellency 
Mr. J.R. Jayewardene, 
President of the Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Colombo. 
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President of Sri Lanica 
July 29, 1987 
Excellency, 
Please refer to your letter dated the 29"" of July 1987, which reads as 
follows : 
Excellency, 
Conscious of the friendship between our two 
countries stretching over two millenia and more, 
and recognizing the importance of nurturing this 
traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri 
Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow 
our respective territories to be used for activities 
prejudicial to each other's unity, territorial 
integrity and security. 
In this spirit, you had, during the course of our discussions, agreed to 
meet some of India's concerns as follows : 
(i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about 
the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence 
personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not 
prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations. 
(ii) Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri lanka will not be made 
available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to 
India's interests. 
(iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm 
will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka. 
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(iv) Sri Lanka's agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations will 
be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka 
are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any 
military or intelligence purposes. 
3. In the same spirit, India will : 
(i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in 
terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism. 
(ii) Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan 
security forces. 
4. India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative 
mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the 
light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the 
implementation of other matters contained in this letter. 
5. Kindly confirm, Excellency, that the above correctly sets out the 
agreement reached between us. 
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the understanding 
reached between us. 
Please accept. Excellency, the assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
Sd/-
(J.R. Jayewardene) 
President 
His Excellency 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
Prime Minister of the Republic of India, New Delhi. 
Source : A.S. Bhasin, India-Sri Lanka Relations and Sri Lanka's Ethnic 
Conflict Documents 1947-2000, vol.IV, India Research Press : New 
Delhi, pp.1946-51. 
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Appendix - XIII 
LIST OF 37 TAMIL POLITICAL and MILITANT GROUPS ACTIVE at 
ONE POINT or the OTHER between 1977-78 and 1989 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) 
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 
Tamil Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) 
- Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA) 
- Tamil Eelam Liberation Extremists (TELE) 
Tamil Eelam Revolutionary Organistion (TERO) 
- Tamil Eelam Revolutionary People's Liberation Army (TERPLA) 
- Red Front of Tamil Eelamists (RFTE) 
- Tamil Eelam Liberation Guerillas (TELG) 
National Liberation Front of Tamil Eelam (NLFTE) 
Ilankai Freedom Tamil Army (IFTA) 
Tamil Eelam Defence Front (TEDF) 
Tamil Eelam National Army (TENA) 
Tamil People's Security Organisation (TPSO) 
Tamil People's Security Front (TPSF) 
Tamil Eelam Commando (TEC) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELF) 
Tamil Eelam Eagles Front (TEEF) 
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Revolutionary Warriors (RW) 
Guerilla Army of Tamil Eelam (GATE) 
Red Crescent Guerillas (RCG) 
Eagle Movement (EM) 
Socialist Revolutionary Social Liberation (SRSL) 
Tamil Eelam Blood Movement (TEBM) 
Tamil People's Command Unit (TPCU) 
Eelam Liberation Tigers (ELT) 
- Eelam Liberation Defence Front (ELDF) 
- Revolutionary Eelam Liberation Organisation (RELO) 
Tamil Eelam Security Service (TESS) 
People's Liberation Party (PLP) 
Tamil People's Democratic Front (TPDF) 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Cobras (TELC) 
Three Stars (TS) 
Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) 
Source: J.N. Dixit, Assignment Colombo, Konark : New Delhi, 2001, 
Annexure VI, pp.371-72. 
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Appendix - XIV 
The following is the full text of Mr. Balasingham 's speech at the 
inaugural session of the peace talks in Sattahip Naval Base in Thailand, 
Monday 16 September, 2002. 
Mr. Teg Boonag, Honourable Permanent Secretary to the Foreign 
Ministry of Thailand 
Mr. Vidar Helgeson, Honourable deputy Foreign Minister of Norway 
Your Excellencies the Ambassadors and Honourable Members of The 
Diplomatic Corps 
Honourable Ministers of Sri Lanka, 
Distinguished Delegates, 
Members of the News Media, 
Ladies and Gentlemen. 
Please permit me to express my sincere thanks to the Government of 
Thailand on behalf of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka, for offering your 
beautiful country as the venue for this historic peace-making event. We 
appreciate the gracious hospitality and wonderful conference arrangements 
provided here. We are happy and confident to engage in a constructive peace 
dialogue in this serene environment. 
May I also express my sincere compliments and congratulations to 
the Government of Norway for its success in accomplishing the difficult task 
of bringing the principal protagonists - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
and the Government of Sri Lanka - to the negotiating table. The Tamil people 
are grateful to the Norwegian peace envoys for their dedicated and persistent 
endeavor to bring an end to the armed hostilities and for creating a congenial 
atmosphere of peace and normalcy in the island. The task of building a 
permanent peace and reaching a final settlement to the ethnic conflict may be 
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difficult, challenging and time consuming. Nevertheless, we are confident that 
with the able assistance of the Norwegian facilitators there is a possibility for 
the peace process to succeed. We are optimistic that the peace talks will 
succeed because both Mr. Velupillai Pirapaharan, the leader of the Liberation 
Tigers, and Mr. Ranil Wickramasinghe, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, have 
a genuine will and a firm determination to resolve the conflict through the 
process of dialogue. As far as the Liberation Tigers are concerned, I can assure 
you that we are seriously and sincerely committed to peace and that we will 
strive our utmost to ensure the success of the negotiations. We are well aware 
that there are powerful political forces in southern Sri Lanka who are 
irrationally opposed to peace and ethnic reconciliation. Nevertheless, we are 
confident that the talks will progress successfully because of the fact that the 
principal parties in the conflict as well as the overwhelming majority of the 
people of the island want peace and peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Since we are required, at this inaugural function, to keep our 
statements brief, I do not wish to dwell in detail or in depth on the historical 
evolution of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The Tamil struggle for self-
determination has a lengthy and complex history, the last tow decades of 
which were characterised by a brutal and savage war. All previous attempts to 
seek a peaceful negotiated settlement to this intractable conflict ended in 
fiasco. Though the leadership of the LTTE had, on several occasions, opted for 
cessation of hostilities and peace talks, the previous government rejected our 
conciliatory gestures and intensified the conditions of war that caused heavy 
loss of life and monumental destruction of Tamil property. The intransigence 
of the previous government could only by attributed to its incredible military 
theory that war begets peace and political solutions can only be realised by 
military means. By practicing such an absurd notion the last government of Sri 
Lanka plunged the entire country into the abyss of social and economic 
disaster. 
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The situation has radically changed with the assumption to power of 
the new government with the overwhelming popular mandate for peace and 
negotiated political settlement. The new government reciprocated positively to 
the unilateral cease-fire declared by our liberation organization at the end of 
last year. It was at that stage the Norwegian facilitators were able to intervene 
constructively and work out a comprehensive cease-fire agreement. A mutually 
agreed cease-fire agreement with international monitors from Nordic and 
Scandinavian countries came into effect in February this year. 
The most encouraging aspect of the current situation is that the 
cease-fire has held for the last seven months, without any serious violations. In 
this context I wish to compliment the foreign representatives of the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission for their dedication, commitment and impartiality in 
ensuring the smooth implementation of the truce agreement. 
Peace and stability are being restored in the island for the first time 
after two decades of sustained and relentless war that has torn the country 
apart. This positive atmosphere peace has brought a sense of relief, hope and 
confidence to all major communities living in the island: the TamilSj the 
Sinhalese and the Muslims. A firm foundation has been laid for peace 
negotiations between the principal parties in conflict. 
Normalcy of civilian life is slowly and systematically returning to the 
northeast of Sri Lanka, the homeland of the Tamils and Muslims, the region 
that has faced the brunt of the armed conflict. The north has suffered the most 
horrendous impact of the war, where the entire civilian infrastructure has been 
destroyed, where thousands of civilians have lost their lives, where one million 
people are internally displaced. The economic embargo imposed on the Tamil 
people for the last one decade has had a devastating effect on their social and 
economic life. This economic strangulation subjected our people to extreme 
poverty and severe deprivation. There is an urgent need for relief and 
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assistance to the war affected people. Immediate steps should be undertaken 
without delay, to embark on a comprehensive program of resettlement, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. This monumental task cannot be undertaken 
without the help and assistance of the international community. The concerned 
international governments, who have been supporting a negotiated settlement 
to the Tamil national question, should contribute generously for the 
reconstruction of the war-damaged economy of the northeast. Improving the 
conditions of existence of the war affected people and effecting normalcy, 
congenial for their economic revival, has become a necessary and crucial 
element in advancing and consolidating the peace process. 
Over and above the intricate questions of conflict resolution and 
power sharing, the people expect a peace dividend; they require immediate 
relief to resolve their urgent, existential problems. Therefore, the peace 
process cannot be undertaken in isolation without taking parallel steps towards 
the economic recovery of the suffering population. The leaders of the Sri 
Lanka government have expressed a desire to transform the island into a 
successful Tiger economy. We appreciate their aspiration. Such an aspiration 
can best be realised by embracing the Tamil Tigers as their equal partners in 
the task of economic reconstruction of the country. The LTTE is the legitimate 
and authentic representative of the Tamil people. We have lived, fought and 
suffered with and for our people throughout the turbulent times of the war. We 
have a comprehensive knowledge of the socio-economic needs confronting the 
Tamil people. We have built an effective administrative structure for more 
than ten years which has sustained the social cohesion and law and order. 
Therefore, it is crucial that the LTTE should play a leading and pivotal role in 
administration as well as the economic development of the Northeast. 
The deepest aspiration of our people is peace, a peace with justice 
and freedom; a permanent peace in which our people enjoy their right to self-
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determination and co-exist with others. Peace, stability and ethnic harmony arc 
the foundations upon which the economic prosperity of the island can be built. 
Let us strive, genuinely, with hope and confidence, to consolidate these 
foundations at this forum to bring a peaceful and prosperous life to all peoples 
in the island. 
Source: L.R. Reddy, Sri Lanka-Past and Present, APH: New Delhi, 2003, 
pp.371-75. 
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